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ABSTRACT
Thesis Title:
Confronting Modernity; “Techno-politics” and the Limits of New World Empire
This thesis explores the relationship between modernity and the expansion of Anglo- 
American empire in North America in order to provide a theoretical basis for 
understanding the modem treaty negotiations currently underway in the Province of 
British Columbia, Canada. Canada, largely because it is a successor state of empire, 
has been unable to free itself from colonial attitudes and assumptions which continue 
to inform its negotiating position. In particular, the issue of sovereignty is denied, 
which frustrates any attempt to build a lasting and positive peace in the international 
relations of post-colonial British Columbia. In order to understand and overcome this 
collective failure of the political imagination I have undertaken a theoretical and 
historical analysis of modem sovereignty and the unlimited expansion of 
technological civilisation under the protection of the state, which I refer to as “New 
World Empire. Modem sovereignty and the techno-politics it engenders is the 
product of the scientific revolution and the “culture of improvement” inaugurated by 
Francis Bacon in reformation England. Bacon creatively invented the experimental 
method and its technological applications from his own imaginative reading of the 
“Christian” tradition and in so doing provided the natural philosophy necessary for 
Hobbes’ construction of modem sovereignty. Understanding the state as an 
instrument of power rather than a product of nature inextricably links sovereignty to 
empire as power accumulation and projection are necessarily interdependent 
Drawing on the work of Leo Strauss I have identified three strategies of colonialism 
which are manifested in the combined practices of liberal assimilation, historicist 
development and nihilist segregation. Modem empire simply “asserts” sovereignty 
over territory and unilaterally constructs colonial subjects as allies, wards and 
captives, as passive objects of administration and control, rather than active subjects 
in their own right. These colonial prejudices must be deconstructed and rejected in 
order that the historical institution of treaty, rather than sovereignty, forms the basis 
for ongoing power sharing arrangement which recognizes “Indians” as equal partners 
within the larger context of Canadian confederation and international law.
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Introduction 
Ethics: Indians and the Technological Society; Truth and Reconciliation in the 
Internationa] Relations of British Columbia
Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death: that like Christ was 
raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk 
in newness of life.1
I Romans 6:4
Introduction
Confronting modernity is about confronting the underlying belief system which has 
allowed the drive to ever greater levels of technological prowess to overshadow and 
deny any and all alternative visions of ethical and political life. My own experiences 
with the danger and destructiveness of the excesses of modernity comes from a very 
personal place on the frontline of this violence and disrespect. For many years I 
worked with the Treaty 8 Tribal Association and assisted in the efforts of its members 
to assert their right to exist and to a continue a traditional way of life in the face of 
overwhelming social, economic and political pressure to subordinate themselves to 
the sovereignty of the Canadian state. This does not mean that the Association was 
not also interested in participating within the modem life of the local community of 
which it was also a member, but that the Association continued to invoke a 
relationship to the land and its resources which was prior to and not derivative of 
membership within mainstream Canadian social and political life. The Tribal 
Association insisted on its diplomatic status and hence on its government to 
government relationship to the Crown, in both its provincial and federal 
manifestations. The Tribal Association related to the Canadian government, not as 
one of many plural interest groups within the state, but as a governing body itself, 
entitled to government to government mutual recognition and respect. The Treaty, in 
this case Treaty 8, established the terms and conditions of co-existence between tribal 
members and Canadians as equal partners in a process of ongoing negotiations. The 
relationship between the Tribal Association and the Canadian government was 
conceived and practiced as an international relationship, although the terms and
5
conditions of this relationship were and continue to be contested and unresolved, they 
necessarily generate a point of common origin and reference.
The Thesis itself grew out of my desire to understand the political forces at 
work behind the confrontation taking place between the Treaty 8 Tribal Association 
and the provincial government of British Columbia. The escalating confrontation 
revolved around a dispute over whether or not the Treaty placed limitations upon the 
free exercise of Canadian sovereignty within the traditional territories recognized by 
the Treaty. The Tribal Association and the government were locked in a battle over 
the ownership and control of lands the Association asserted were within the bounds of 
their traditional territories and thereby subject to the terms and conditions of use as 
stipulated by the Treaty. The Government denied the Association’s claims and yet 
was compelled to engage in a process of dialogue and consultation in order to 
determine the facts of the matter within a general framework of law which both sides 
considered a legitimate source of binding authority. The political conflict was 
diffused, if not resolved and the contest at no point degenerated into the violence 
and/or the police action common to other First Nation / Government land clashes 
which had become a frequent and growing occurrence prior to the establishment of 
the British Columbia Treaty Commission in 1991. What made the situation of the 
Tribal Association unique in British Columbia is the fact that the First Nations 
resident in north-eastern British Columbia, by a simply accident of colonial 
geography (they resided on the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountain continental 
divide) had entered into a treaty relationship with the Crown. 2
Aside from the Douglas treaties on Vancouver Island, British Columbia’s 
successive governors and premiers have consistently denied the existence of 
aboriginal title and refused to enter into any form of treaty negotiations and simply 
managed Indian affairs through the unilateral instrument of the Indian Act. 3 As a 
result, there has been a continual conflict between the Provincial government and First 
Nations over the “land question” in British Columbia which remains unresolved to 
this day. The unresolved question is an ethical question over the ownership and 
control of land and resources which in turn raises questions about Canada’s colonial
1 The Holy Bible, in the King James Version, (Nashville.: Thomas Nelson Publishers) 1984, p. 664
2
George Brown and Ron Macguire, Indian Treaties in Historical Perspective, (Ottawa.: Research 
Branch, Canada, Department of Indian Affairs, 1979) pp. 403
Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849 
-1989, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1977)
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legacy. Canada as a successor state of empire claims “sovereignty” over Indian 
territory through nothing other than a self-referential and unilateral assertion of power 
which is devoid of ethical or political content. How such a thing became possible and 
how it manages to maintain itself in the face of sustained and uncompromising 
opposition and resistance must become an immediate source of wonder and 
amazement to any thinking person capable of even the slightest reflection upon the 
basic principles of natural justice. Upon analysis it becomes self-evident that the 
basis of the modem state is not justice, but power. Modem political power is the 
product of a technological world view which has come to regard questions of justice 
as irrelevant to the constitution of political community, which is a monstrous denial 
not only of our human rights, but our very humanity. My own experiences at Treaty 8 
have taught me that such a state of affairs is not some fateful dispensation from the 
Gods which must be passively borne with stoic resignation and acquiescence.
Modem sovereignty is not an empirical fact, but an ideological strategy of domination 
which can be challenged and resisted, both in theory and in practice.
I have titled my thesis “Confronting Modernity; Techno-politics and the 
Limits of New World Empire” because I wanted to explore the connection between 
technology, state sovereignty and empire. 1 believe that modernity is the common 
thread linking all three which can be examined through a systematic analysis of two 
key thinkers of the modem age, Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. Bacon and 
Hobbes inaugurated a revolution in philosophy, both natural and political, upon which 
modem concepts of nature and human nature have been constructed. Modernity has 
been defined in many ways, but for the purposes of this thesis it refers to the 
fundamental belief in the absolute ontological difference between spirit and matter, as 
formulated by modem thought as the subject/object dichotomy. Because this dualist 
world view is a descendent of an original Christian metaphysics separating an 
omniscient and omnipotent creator God from his creation, modernity has often been 
characterised as “secularised Christianity.” The relationship between modernity and 
Christianity is often unexplored because modernity is presented as a turn away from 
religious explanations of the world, as if religion and science, faith and reason were 
absolutely and fundamentally different and irreconcilable ways of understanding the 
world.
The separation of reason and faith has allowed the construction of “modem” 
as the opposite of “traditional” the first being rational and scientific, the second being
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tied to custom, religion and even superstition. Francis Bacon’s project to reform the 
sciences and “advance” learning was specifically designed to “purge” natural 
philosophy from the “idols” of the mind, or the errors of classical philosophy opening 
up “new” horizons for scientific exploration. Thomas Hobbes rejected the “shifting 
sands” of custom and tradition in order to build his state on the firm foundations of 
the “new” sciences. The colonisation of America did not arise out of an empire of 
conquest and crusade, but in the “discovery” of virgin and vacant lands which would 
provide the foundation for a whole new world. What links all three is the 
fundamental belief that the past can be overthrown and jettisoned by a free and 
spontaneous act of self-generation. The power of the “new” that is the calling card of 
new world empire in all its incarnations, technological, political and colonial can be 
found in its faithful replication of the Christian Creator God’s original act of auto- 
poetic genesis ex nihlio. The spontaneous and disembodied self as subject occupying 
an “original” position completely separate and “other” from the object of its power, 
be that nature in the case of Bacon, human nature, in the case of Hobbes or pre­
existing forms of property and ownership in the case of new world empire.
Given the fundamental ontological dualism between subject and object, 
modernity, far from having escaped its origins in Christian metaphysics remains 
rooted in these ideological commitments. It is my hope that by tracing and exposing 
the Christian metaphysics fundamental to modem technological society, its 
ideological power to dismiss and discredit other so called “traditional” ways of 
knowing the world will be overcome. Modernity claims its right to ideological 
dominance in the world based upon its unique discovery of scientific rationalism as a 
universal method productive o f the universal truth. Modernity, therefore empowers a 
universal empire in which nature, human nature and all human relationships are to be 
“purged” of their idols and set upon the firm foundations of scientific principle. New 
world empire in its broadest sense is just such a commitment to total global and 
perpetual world transformation in the name of infinite progress for “all mankind”. 
When the English planted colonies on the vacant and empty “waste” lands of the 
colonised, it was not as if they were unaware that these lands were used by the people 
who occupied them. Waste in the colonial context o f new world empire is not about 
land use, but about efficient and productive land use as a relative measure which can 
always be improved by the introduction of new methods and techniques. In this sense 
“modernization” can never be complete and will always presume the domination of
the technologically advanced over the technologically backwards whose relative 
positions will constantly be replicated and reinforced by the infinite “progress” of 
technological improvement. As such technological “power” and “superiority” are not 
neutral instruments, but fundamental political tools of exploitation and expropriation 
as the successive appropriation of the land and its resources will always be justified 
by a demonstration of productivity and efficiency in the name of the “general benefit 
of all mankind”. Defining “waste” whether it be in the use of land, labour or capital is 
a highly effective ideological strategy which justifies the appropriation of productive 
resources in the pursuit of the “common good” for which the specific and local good 
of any given people or place is necessarily subordinated and silenced. If, in the 
beginning all the world was America4, then the productive power of new world 
empire has transformed us all into Indians.
The Indian Problem and the Legacy of Colonialism
New world empire is constructed as an overarching metaphor to describe a political 
process through which natural men (Indians) become citizens through the civilisation 
process. The term Indian signifies a conceptual category in use since the time of 
Columbus which beautiful illustrates the combination of ignorance and arrogance 
typical of European encounters with their “new world.” Indian, is a colonial term of 
European origins which has nothing to do with actual existing Indian communities 
and everything to do with European prejudice and imperial aspiration. As this is not a 
work of anthropology, nothing about the Indian way of life or Indian experience of 
colonialism is attempted or envisioned as the subject matter under investigation or 
analysis in this thesis. Instead, the focus of my inquiry is new world empire as a 
social and political theory and practice and the strategies of colonialism it engenders. 
Although all of the great powers of early modem Europe, the Spanish, the French, the 
Dutch and the English were all involved in the colonisation of North America, it was 
English social, political and economic institutions that came to dominate the 
continent. The constitutions of both Canada and the United States bear the stamp of 
their English heritage and although important aspects of Spanish, Dutch and French
4
John Locke, (ed.) Charles L Sherman, Treatise o f  Civil Government and A Letter Concerning 
Toleration, “An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End o f Civil Government” (New 
York.: Irvington Publishers) 1979, Chapter V, p. 32
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law remain in effect at the local level, they have nevertheless, been incorporated 
within and subordinated to, an overarching political and legal framework which is 
Anglo-American in origin, form and structure. It is the contention of this thesis that 
Anglo-American empire, because it was a uniquely modem form of empire was 
inherently different from the empire of crusade and conquest undertaken by the 
Spanish, or the vast trading empires created by the French and the Dutch.
Anglo-American empire established great plantations like the Spanish and 
created vast commercial trading networks like the Dutch and the French, but for the 
English, land itself became a commodity, with important consequences for Indian 
relations. Within Anglo-American empire, the “Indian” became an important legal 
fiction legitimating land appropriation through the “consensual” treaty as opposed to 
the purely coercive practice of conquest. Anglo-American social contract theories of 
the state produced a system of land surrender through “purchase” as a straightforward 
and voluntary commercial transaction. The Indian as the original occupant of the land 
was required to surrender the “use” rights of his “hunting grounds” thereby “opening” 
the frontier to settlement. The Indian treaty, once based upon the theory and practice 
of diplomacy became an instrument of colonialism empowering first the Crown and 
then the Congress to exercise prerogative and monopoly rights over Indians and 
Indian lands for the “common good.” The Indians, meanwhile had a very different 
understanding of treaty and have consistently refused to surrender their lands, dissolve 
their governments and generally “disappear” within the mainstream population as 
desired by generations of Anglo-American colonisers up to the present day. The 
resistance of the Indians to the successive strategies of assimilation, development and 
segregation constitutes the essence of the “Indian problem” as it has come down to us 
in Canada and the United States. This thesis does not attempt, yet again, to solve the 
Indian problem, but to undertake a comprehensive genealogical investigation into how 
the Indian became a problem for new world empire.
Techno-politics and New World Empire
New world empire is the product of a modem conception of politics which is 
inherently expansionist and colonialist because its ethical/political purpose and intent 
is to generate infinite and auto-poetic cycles of productivity and power accumulation. 
Technology as applied to nature becomes the metaphor and model for a theory of
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politics applied to human nature. In both natural and social systems, productivity
becomes the standard and measure of truth defined as utility in the unlimited pursuit
of power accumulation. Method organises the production of instruments and
experiments generating unlimited fruits and fertility as a sign and mark of human
progress grounded in divine providence. In techno-politics, sovereignty organises the
production of laws generating civilised subjects whose desires are harnessed for the
collective purposes of self-preservation, commodious living, war and empire.
Techno-politics was originally formulated by Thomas Hobbes in his conception of the
commonwealth as a power accumulation machine whose expansion was only limited
by its technical ability to project power efficiently and effectively. Hannah Arendt
realised that Hobbes’ conception of modem sovereignty would be inherently
imperialistic because he had:
...realised that acquisition of wealth conceived as a never-ending process can be 
guaranteed only by the seizure of political power, for the accumulating process 
must sooner or later force open all existing territorial limits.5
Hobbes’ techno-politics is empowered by a conception of politics which denies all 
human plurality and hence all limits to it ultimate total universal expansion. Hobbes, 
following Bacon’s method “purged” the idols of the mind distinguishing man from his 
fellows and returned him to an “original” condition before the “corruptions” of habit, 
custom and tradition. Thomas Hobbes imagined the state of nature as a “thought 
experiment” in which man was stripped of all his social, historical and cultural 
particulars in order that the base components of civil society could be known in their 
“natural” state as free and equal atomic individuals. Hobbes understanding of nature 
was not the nature of Plato and Aristotle, but of Galileo, Bacon and Rene Descartes. 
Man was not naturally a social and political animal tending towards his own 
perfection or beatitude, but a body in motion, restlessly striving for power after 
power, seeking only his own self-preservation. Once the basis physics of the human 
condition were demonstrated and known, the state could then be rebuilt upon a social 
contract that constructed the political problem as a technical problem; natural men 
could be transformed and remade into civilised subjects.
New world empire is more a process than a place because it aims at the 
creation of a “new” world out of the destruction of the old. Embodied in the concept
5 Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f  Totalitarianism, (New York.: Harcourt Brace, 1976) p. 146
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of infinite progress is a linear temporal dimension that is limitless by definition. 
Bacon’s revolution in science saw a whole new age of man made possible by 
unlimited technological progress in which whole new horizons of power and 
productivity would be channeled and harnessed to the relief of man’s estate. Bacon’s 
new program to advance the arts and sciences was specifically designed to have 
practical application in the world of politics and economics. Bacon as well as his 
student, Thomas Hobbes was deeply involved in colonial projects and both had 
investments in the Virginia Company.6 When new world empire reached the shores 
of the new world, the English simply continued their practices of “planting colonies” 
in Massachusetts and Virginia which they had developed in colonising their own 
Celtic fringe. Central to English colonisation was the redistribution of land ownership 
and control from traditional or tribal forms held communally to individual estates of 
private property guaranteed by the title deed, owned and controlled by the gentry elite.
The very same culture of improvement which saw English peasants lose their 
rights to the commons through enclosure, saw first the Irish and then the Indians lose 
their traditional lands on the basis that they were “vacant” and “empty”. In all three 
cases, traditional land use customs and practices were ignored or denied because they 
did not conform to the new and modem principle of ever increasing technological 
advance or improvement which alone could conform to “modem” English definitions 
of rational and industrious use. As their lands are appropriated, the people of new 
world empire are subjected to a civilising process designed to transform them from 
their wild and savage ways to the passive obedience of productive subjects. Within 
Hobbes’ original formulation of art completing nature, the three main components of 
the civilisation process can be found. First man must be stripped of his particularity 
and returned to a past or original state of nature wherein he can be assimilated as an 
identical body, free and equal to all other bodies. Second, the base components of 
civil society are impressed with their new form, their reason cultivated and developed 
by a process of civil education ordering the differentiated parts to the whole. Lastly, 
those which cannot be assimilated are segregated either inside the state as criminals or 
outside the state as enemies.7
All three strategies of colonialism are present in Hobbes’ original formulation
6 Richard Tuck, The Rights o f  War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from  
Grotius to Kant (Cambridge.: (Cambridge University Press 1999), p. 128
7
All three o f these themes, as developed by Hobbes in Leviathan, will be subject to comprehensive
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of political science waiting to be developed into full blown political theories in their 
own right over the course of two centuries of actual colonial practice. New world 
empire deploys the successive strategies of colonialism identified as assimilation, 
development and segregation in order to civilise the Indian and appropriate his lands 
in the name of a general benefit to all mankind. The Indian, as the primitive “natural” 
man serves as an important point of origin and contrast for European philosophers 
trying to define and differentiate their own “enlightenment” project from all other 
“traditional” forms of civilisation. As the practices of colonialism evolve on the 
ground they are taken up and reflected in modem political theory as it develops during 
the course of liberal revolution and conservative reaction in continental Europe. Leo 
Strauss has identified Hobbes as the beginning of a modem political project which 
transformed the history of western civilisation by rejecting the classics in preference 
for a new technological model of nature produced by the scientific revolution of 16th 
and 17th centuries.8 According to Strauss, the modem political project is inherently 
unstable and basically implodes upon its own foundations as the original liberalism of 
Hobbes and Locke gives way to the historicism of Rousseau, Hegel and Marx only to 
collapse into nihilism under the destructive hammer of Friedrich Nietzsche.9 
Strauss’ analysis of modem political theory is useful because it demonstrates the 
underlying technological dynamic at work in modem political theory which unifies 
the three different waves, so that they may be understood as a continuation of a single 
political project, rather than radically different and incommensurable political 
paradigms.
A unifying and holistic approach is needed to understand the three strategies 
of colonialism as they unfolded in the new world, not as separate and unrelated ad hoc 
practices, but as inter-related policies that naturally followed upon each other given 
their underlying ideological commitment to a technological world view. The 
technological world view insists that all nature and human nature is fundamentally 
identical and that all differences can be erased through the skilful application of force. 
The natural man can be remade into the civilised subject through the rational 
application of force. Force is therefore applied in order to strip the Indians of their 
superficial differences and return them to their natural and original state in order that
analysis in Chapter 2
g
Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves o f Modernity”, in An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Ten 
Essays by Leo Strauss, ed., Hilail Gildin, (Detroit.: Wayne State University Press) 1989 p. 88
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they may then be fully assimilated into the body politic. When polices of liberal 
assimilation fail, the failure is due to an undeveloped reason, a primitive mind, at a 
lower stage of development. When policies of historicist development fail to bring 
Indian wards to graduated maturity, the failure is due to an inherently irrational 
nature. When policies of nihilist segregation fail to capture and contain the 
irredeemably wild savage, removal and/or systematic genocide becomes the final 
solution.
Modem political theory, did not emerge in a vacuum, but was inextricably 
embedded within already existing social and political practices at work in the new 
world. Present, at least in embryo form, since the time of original settlement in the 
early 17th century, the practices and policies of new world empire had become self- 
conscious and systematic by the 18th. By the time of the Revolutionary war in 1776, 
the newly unified colonies of the United States had consolidated enough power to 
break free of the British empire, only to replicated the same strategies of colonialism 
as it expanded created its own empire across the vast interior lands of continental 
North America. The 19th century saw the height of empire both in North America and 
around the world as the European “great powers” colonised the globe in pursuit of 
power, profit and eternal imperial glory. The development of modem political 
philosophy was deeply implicated in the social and political theory and practice of 
empire and cannot be understood without reference to the broader historical context of 
which it was a product. Modem political theory and its obsession with the 
progressive emancipation of “natural” cannot be de-coupled from the colonial context. 
Modem political theory is colonial as it embodies and manifests the very universal 
and relentless expansion of techno-politics and new world empire which has 
“progressively” enveloped the globe and literally created the modem world system of 
sovereign nation-states.
All three waves of modem political theory have their origin in techno-politics 
which is why the strategies of assimilation, development and segregation are present 
in the Anglo-American colonial practices before they are used as empirical fodder for 
later European political philosophers trying to understand the rapid transformation of 
their own “traditional” societies in the 18th and 19th centuries. New world empire is 
not a geographical designation, but a modem political process premised on the
9 Ibid, pp. 81 - 98
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creation of a “new” world out of the destruction of the old. It originates in a 
technological approach to politics pioneered by Thomas Hobbes as a solution to the 
instability engendered by the English civil war. Hobbes constructed techno-politics 
on the firm foundations of Bacon’s empirical method and Bacon constructed 
empirical method on the firm foundations of the Christian faith.10 Bacon believed that 
by dedicating himself to a life of Christian charity, all of nature’s secrets would be 
revealed ushering in a whole new epoch of human history. Scientific method, modem 
sovereignty and new world empire are all three universal machines, producing 
universal processes for a universal subject. Modernity is the technological project to 
“wipe away” the errors and limitations of the past and open up a whole new era of 
infinite progress for the use and benefit of all mankind.
Confronting Modernity with the Limits of Treaty
This thesis is about confronting modernity at the global level of modem metaphysics, 
but for the practical and local purpose of understanding the forces at play in the 
modem treaty process currently underway in British Columbia, Canada. New world 
empire and the enduring polices of assimilation, development and segregation are 
still informing government negotiation and blocking the road to building positive 
peace between Indians and British Columbians. Technology and techno-politics, as 
means and not ends, are of the realm of particularity and as such can admit of no 
boundaries and/or limits. New world empire, as a highly mobile and open-ended 
frontier, swept through the British Atlantic, Continental America and Canada to arrive 
on the outer extreme of the pacific north west coast where it has reached its 
geographical limit in North America, although the same basic strategies can be found 
further a field in white settler societies such as Australia, New Zealand and even parts 
of Africa. Instruments and techniques can only create and recreate themselves within 
the space of infinite temporality until and unless we escape their divine grasp by 
exposing their all too human limit and origin.
The British Columbia treaty talks cannot be understood as simply a local and 
isolated event because the “Indian land problem” which they are attempting to “solve” 
is but the latest incarnation of a colonial process which has been underway for the last
10 The intimate connection between Christianity and Bacon’s project to reform the sciences is the
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400 years. Understanding the modem colonial process is the project and aspiration of 
this thesis and it begins and ends with the local/global politics of the British Columbia 
treaty negotiations on the limits of new world empire. The modem nation-state and 
its foundation myth of the social contract are explicitly rejected by the Indians, 
challenging the universal pretensions of techno-politics and modem sovereignty 
thereby exposing the partiality and limits of new world empire. The refusal of the 
Indians to surrender their lands, dissolve their governments and assimilate themselves 
within the general population has been the defining characteristics of the “Indian 
problem” which has frustrated new world colonisers since their arrival in North 
America. This thesis does not attempt once again to solve the Indian problem, but to 
undertake a genealogical investigation about how and why the Indian problem 
emerged for new world empire. Once the Indian problem is deconstructed it becomes 
possible to see past the Indian, to the Indians with the hope that this may serve as a 
starting point of negotiations not aimed at domination, but reconciliation.
The Indians may or may not be inside or outside the boundaries of Canadian 
constitutional law and practice, incorporated or excluded, by the Department of Indian 
Affairs and its paternalistic policies, but all these issues are subject to negotiation and 
do not exist in the realm of empirical fact. If Indians are ever to be constructed not as 
others, but as partners and friends in the post-colonial project to deconstruct 
sovereignty and reconstruct treaty, they must be subjects rather than merely objects of 
Canadian Indian policy. The BC treaty negotiation process has opened a space, albeit 
miniscule and closely veiled/guarded, from which the origins of sovereignty and new 
world empire may be glimpsed and having been seen, may be understood and 
transformed. The British Columbia government has finally been forced into treaty 
talks by an anxious business community fearful of potential losses in the highly 
profitable resource extraction sector of the provincial economy. Whether or not 
Indians in British Columbia want to enter into a Treaty relationship given the use and 
abuse of treaty as an instrument of colonialism remains an open question. As it stands 
now, the Indians have finally had their inherent right to self-government recognised 
by Section 35 (1) of the Canadian Constitution and the Supreme Court has finally 
declared that “aboriginal title” pre-exists the Crown’s “assertion” of sovereignty in
subject of the first Chapter o f  this thesis where it will be analysed in depth.
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British Columbia.11 Although both the right to inherent self-government and the 
legal definition of aboriginal title remain subjects of intense negotiation and political 
contestation, they nevertheless have proven quite powerful tools to wield against the 
“sovereign” pretensions of the Canadian state.
The courts have unambiguously declared that the reconciliation between 
Crown sovereignty and aboriginal title must take place, not in the legal domain of 
sovereign command and obedience, but in the political realm, Chief Justice Lamer 
calling for “negotiations under taken in good faith by both parties.”12 Negotiating in 
good faith will requires a remembrance and a return to the spirit and intent of treaty 
understood as the co-creation of mutually acceptable forms of power-sharing and 
conflict resolution in light of the past, but grounded in the present with an eye to the 
future. Returning to the spirit and intent of treaty is not a step backwards, but a 
continuation of an alternative path which is and has always been present in the 
encounter between Indian and British forms of diplomacy. Renewing treaty is not so 
much a change and transformation as an active remembrance of origins found not in a 
spontaneous self-generation ex nihilo, but in the traditions of a Christian faith and a 
common law transported and transplanted to an unknown land inhabited by an 
unknown people. As the heirs of new world empire, Canadians have to ask 
themselves how much of this original condition has really changed despite all the 
knowledge and power of our modem progressive technological civilisation? Treaty 
has always been and still remains an alternative method and a model which can be 
freely chosen in place of the failed and failing project of modem sovereignty and its 
oppressive domination / subordination dynamic of force and counter force, power and 
resistance.
My own experience with the Treaty 8 Tribal Association has demonstrated 
that Treaty can be used as an effective instrument of conciliation even in situations of 
extreme volatility and hostility. The living tradition of Treaty provides a common 
ground upon which both Indians and Canadians have built, and will continue to build, 
a political relationship founded on something other than collective organisation of 
violence. While violence, or at least the threat of it, remained an ever-present 
possibility, both sides nevertheless had a shared understanding, brought about by
11 Christopher McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia: Negotiating a Mutually Beneficial Future, 2nd
Edition, (Vancouver.: UBC Press, 2000) pp. 10 - 11
12 Chief Justice C.J. Lamer, cited in Thomas Isaac Aboriginal Law, Cases Materials and Commentary
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many years of experience, that in the end, violence would not resolve the problem. 
Violence was in fact, counter-productive as it served only to exasperate an already 
hostile situation, entrench hard-line positions, put retribution and revenge on the 
agenda and delay any kind of resolution which had to begin, not with violence, but 
with negotiation. As neither side could effectively destroy the other, nor was this a 
political goal desired by either side, it became apparent that some form of political 
framework had to be established as the only practical solution. Before long tribal 
chiefs and government officials were getting down to the political task of constructing 
an ongoing processes of consultation and mediation acceptable to the lawyers on both 
sides and the situation was diffused, if not “resolved.” Despite the conflict, both sides 
held and continue to hold very differing views about their respective rights to the 
land, but were nevertheless able to work out a process grounded in long historical 
precedent established and perpetuated by the Treaty relationship.
The Treaty, as well serving as a basis and framework from within which the 
two sides could negotiate, the treaty itself forms part of a larger body of law 
constituting the relationship between Indians and the Crown established in the 
founding principles of the original imperial relationship. The Treaty relationship as 
inscribed in and defined by federal law governing Indians and lands reserved to 
Indians is part of the legal framework in which political leaders, both Indian and 
Canadian, work toward reconciliation. Ongoing Treaty based consultations and 
negotiations are the real practical alternatives to the exercise of unilateral sovereign 
power which is not only illegitimate, but illegal, under the terms of Canada’s 
constitutional relationship with First Nation peoples. In British Columbia, 
sovereignty, understood as the monopoly of legitimate violence, cannot sanction 
police action against the Mndians because sovereignty, as understood by modem 
political theory does not exist in the Treaty relationship which alone defines the 
political framework in which both partners must act. In the absence of the Treaty 
relationship, the Crown does not hold sovereignty, but is instead, must take into 
account the very real presence of “unextinguished” aboriginal title. The Crown 
remains “burdened” with what Canadian lawyers have come to call pre-existing 
aboriginal rights within each First Nation’s traditional territories. While “aboriginal 
title” has never been fully defined by the courts, it nevertheless invests the Indians
2nd Edition, (Saskatchewan.: Punch Publishing 1999) p. 10
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with certain communal property rights to do with occupancy and use for “traditional 
activities” which cannot be unilaterally extinguished by the Crown, accept under the 
effect of direct legislation and even then only in a specific and established case of
I ' i
overriding “public interest.”
Many aspects of treaty and aboriginal rights remain unresolved in British 
Columbia and have remained “undefined” by the Canadian Courts and as such do not 
provide the “secure foundation” upon which the coercive powers of the state could 
legitimately act. My experience of the Treaty 8 confrontation and its peaceful 
resolution confirmed that concept of modem state sovereignty impedes rather than 
furthers an understanding of the “Indian problem” and the “land question” in British 
Columbia. Put simply, the Crown, in right of Canada, does not hold “sovereignty” 
over much of the land the Treaty 8 Tribal Association claims as their traditional 
territories. It was acknowledged, therefore, that the provincial government did not 
have the unilateral right to use the land and its resources for its own purposes. The oil 
company’s license to carry out its exploration activities was suspended, until such a 
time as an agreement could be reached between the Tribal Association, the province 
and the federal department of Indian Affairs. The topics under discussion included 
the appointment of a joint management structure to monitor economic activities in the 
traditional territories, a negotiated distribution of costs and benefits through resource 
revenue sharing agreements, a shared initiative for capacity building in the fields of 
research and development as well as a commitment to job training and employment 
opportunities for the local community.
Key to the success of the process was also the establishment of a permanent 
consultation process between Indian, federal and provincial levels of government 
empowered by a dispute resolution mechanism of mutual agreement and consent. The 
oil company and other third party interests could participate in the negotiations, but 
decision-making power rested upon a government to government relationship between 
the Tribal Association and federal government officials. Resolution is not a one off 
event, but an ongoing process which is why the treaty relationship is based upon 
reconciliation and accommodation as an ongoing partnership managed sometimes 
better than others. The ongoing treaty process nevertheless holds the ring in times of 
conflict, providing the adversaries with a common text reminding them of a shared
13 Op cit., Isaac, See especially his discussion of the source and nature o f  Aboriginal Title, pp. 1 - 12
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history, which although it admits of differing interpretations nevertheless forms the 
basis of a shared conversation, if not a always a shared understanding, let alone world 
view. The Treaty is a common point of reference in a world full of differences 
allowing the plurality which is human nature a common thread with which to weave 
their different stories of truth, justice and rights in the public discourse of politics.
Treaty is not a temporary and expedient measure to be used and abused at will 
by two sides seeking the ultimate destruction of any enemy, a momentary pause 
between endless and relentless cycles of violence and resistance. Treaty is a sacred 
agreement undertaken by reasonable and mature human beings who have mutually 
decided that peaceful co-existence is in their own best interests. Treaty provides a 
common link to a common world which needs to be valued, nurtured, preserved and 
renewed by the active engagement of everyone it touches and binds to a common 
practice. Treaty is not simply a functional instrument of conflict resolution, but 
contains a spirit and intent of mutual recognition and reconciliation which is passed 
down in the traditional way from elder to younger throughout the generations, from 
time immemorial, time out of mind. Treaty does not reduce or erase differences 
between Indians and Canadians, but creates a history of shared memories and 
practices within which specific conflicts can be, if not resolved at least moderated and 
denuded of their more dangerous aspects and consequences.
By honouring and practicing the tradition of treaty it can even be hoped that 
by building up and sharing a common world, that world will grow and come to extend 
into other areas of co-operation and co-existence over time. Conflict and co-operation 
are permanent features of human plurality, both creative and destructive in turn, to be 
navigated but never fully mapped in the ever-changing realm of human thought and 
practice. Treaty's importance is its lasting stability and endurance though the flux and 
change of human relationships in the world. As such it is a conscious political act 
which is sacred, in itself, because it preserves and nurtures life and prosperity where 
otherwise there be death and destruction. The Treaty, prevents conflict, but is more 
than that because peace is more than the simple absence of war. Peace must be built 
up positively, through the pro-active pursuit of balance, harmony and mutual respect 
whenever possible as a protection against times of trouble when interests, as they are 
bound to come into conflict. Many in the modem world do not think a relationship of 
co-existence, let alone friendship is possible, never mind desirable. Our idolatry of 
power politics has taught us to regard any desire for accommodation as a sign of
weakness and a threat to our sovereign freedom.
The fantasy of total and absolute self-determination however is impossible 
because human plurality is a fact of life and as such makes its appearance in every 
political relationship from the family to the United Nations. Man is neither a beast 
nor a God, but as a being in-between nature and the divine, must learn to manage his 
plurality and the plurality of others in a life affirming rather than death defying way. 
Co-existence and mutual accommodation on the basis of power-sharing remains the 
stated goal of an alternative vision for a pluralist based politics made possible through 
the institution of Treaty. Whether or not treaty can be revived as an institution of 
mediation between Canadians and Indians is of necessity a local problem, but it is a 
local problem with global interest. Actively working to transform modernity’s 
monologue into a dialogue, is the challenge of our times, and engages political 
relationships across any number of old and new partners in the co-construction that is 
world politics. New world empire is alive and well in neo-colonial projects to 
“modernise” every part of the planet in the name of ever increasing levels of 
efficiency and productivity. In a world continually held in thrall by infinite circuits of 
power and productivity technology and techno-politics will make and remake the 
Indian, both backward to a primordial past, the noble savage of man’s mythological 
origins and forward into the future as the ecological and spiritual salvation of a 
disenchanted age.
(Re)newal of the Future through (Recognition of the Past
In order to understand the contemporary failure of the collective political imagination 
it is necessary to under take the long road towards self-understanding which requires 
coming to terms with the legacy of Canadian colonialism. Canadian colonialism, in 
turn can only be understood in the context of new world empire and the techno­
politics which engendered it. It is my contention that modem politics is a techno­
politics because it arises from a metaphysical shift in modernity wherein all 
knowledge is a type of making and all practice, including politics, is a type of 
technology.14 Knowledge, once grounded in the contemplation, or the vision of the
14 Although techno-politics is my own term for the modem political project, the insight into the 
modernity as a philosophical turn in which all knowing becomes a type o f making is grounded in the 
political insights found in Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago.: University o f  Chicago
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good produced by the desiring soul seeking the ordered cosmos, is now grounded in 
technology, or action into nature as a form of production in both theory and practice. 
As such, ethical and political theory and practice are not understood to be the art o f 
wisdom and prudence, respectively, but of the accumulation and expansion of power 
without limit.
The first half of the thesis is an attempt to understand the origin of modem 
techno-politics in the metaphysical shift in natural philosophy undertaken by Francis 
Bacon and applied to politics by Thomas Hobbes. Close examination of both texts 
will uncover the common technological theme defining them as modem projects in 
which power and productivity have become the only stand and measure of human 
thought and action in the world. The first chapter explores Francis Bacon as the father 
of modem technology through his invention of empirical method as machine reducing 
knowledge to power in the relief of man’s estate. Far from being a secular endeavour, 
Bacon explicitly invokes Christian metaphors and imagery to found his revolution in 
ethics and metaphysics which he hoped would transform the sciences and further the 
“advancement of learning.” Method would be the tool which would purge the idols of 
the mind, impose order and discipline on both man and the raw material of nature 
generating a never ending cycle of experiments and productive works. Bacon 
believed that the soul of man was akin to the divine and that this divinity was 
expressed and made manifest through his ability to will and to act. Man’s action into 
nature, transforming it from its original chaos to its fruitful productivity, literally 
informed the natural world with order and purpose by impressing form on matter. 
Bacon knew man to be the instrument of God’s will in the world attained by grace 
manifested through his dedication to Christian charity defined as the active doing of 
good “works”. Science and technology would master and control nature and make 
her a servant of human desires and human purposes, remaking the world in the divine 
image. With his new science and his new method man would reverse the errors of the 
past and bring about a new and heroic age of peace and plenty. Man could reproduce 
in the future what he had lost in the past and through good works and charity return 
himself to a new and improved Garden of Eden, bringing Jerusalem down to earth, as 
God had originally intended.
Press 1953) Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay (Indiana.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2000, 
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London.: Abacus, 1972 and Hannah Arendt, The Human 
Condition, (Chicago.: University o f Chicago Press, 1989.
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Thomas Hobbes, skeptical of Bacon’s ideals, was nevertheless captivated by 
his ideas and especially his method. An analysis of modem sovereignty, as formulated 
by Hobbes in his foundational work, Leviathan, is at the theoretical centre of the 
thesis because it is my contention that it is in and through Hobbes that techno-politics 
finds its origin and therefore its most definitive expression.15 Following Bacon’s 
empirical method, Hobbes would bring order to the chaos of human nature and in so 
doing solve the problem of politics. Hobbes invented modem sovereignty as the 
machine which would produce an eternal order, based, not upon the shifting sands of 
custom and tradition, but upon the firm foundations of scientific principle. The 
Leviathan was not a natural bom King, but an artificial man, a machine produced by 
the social contract in order that men can escape the violence inherent in natural 
liberty. Hobbes’ state of nature was not a real or imagined place or time, but a 
“thought experiment” in which men could be broken down to their base components, 
an imaginary “original condition.” In the state of nature all men were mere bodies in 
motion, free and equal atomic individuals confronting each other with the full force of 
their natural liberty.
Without the coercive sanction of the state to enforce the keeping of covenants, 
men would be propelled by fear to maximise power in order to secure their own self- 
preservation. In Hobbes’ amoral mechanical universe, there could no longer be a 
common good, each man’s preferences being merely the dictate of his multiple 
desires, but only a universal evil, violent death.16 Fear of violent death as well as 
being universal among men is also the strongest passion of all and therefore the one 
single unifying principle upon which to found an enduring political order. The war 
of all against all and the fear of death motivates men to leave the state of nature and 
enter into civil society wherein their natural liberty would be exchanged for safety and 
self-preservation. By submitting to the sovereign, law and order is established and the 
citizen is free to pursue his own passions within the boundaries of the law as set by 
the will of the sovereign. Technology as applied to nature becomes the metaphor and 
model for techno-politics as applied to human nature, productivity itself become an 
end in itself replicated through infinite and auto-poetic cycles of power accumulation
15 Thomas Hobbes, (ed.) Edwin Curley, Leviathan; with selected variants from the Latin Edition o f  
1688 (Indianapolis/Cambridge.: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.)
16 Hobbes use of violent death as the universal evil in the absence o f  a universal good is a much noted 
principle o f Hobbes’ revolution in political theory, See especially Leo Strauss, The Political 
Philosophy o f Hobbes: Its Basis and its Genesis (Chicago.: University o f  Chicago Press, 1952)
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and expansion. Method organises the production of instruments and experiments 
generating unlimited fruits and fertility as a sign and mark of human progress 
grounded in divine providence. In techno-politics, sovereignty organises the 
production of laws generating civilised subjects whose desires are channeled into a 
total social power for the purposes of collective self-preservation, commodious living, 
war and empire.
In its modem form, sovereignty is and can only be based ultimately on terror 
(fear of violent death) but terror as an instrument can only be effective as long as it is 
total and absolute. As nothing temporal can be total and absolute, the power and 
control of even the most totalitarian state can only be finite. Far from being productive 
of a stable political order, modem sovereignty leads only to perpetual war, both inside 
and outside the state, in the endless play of force and counter-force, power and 
resistance. Hobbes invented modem sovereignty as the solution to the practical 
problem of politics, hoping to create the foundation of an eternal order that would 
stand the test of time. It was not long however, before the corrosive element of time 
began to deconstruct what Hobbes had so carefully built and an alternative first 
principle was sought first in history, then in culture. The sequential exploration of 
what can only be described as the implosion of the modem political project into the 
chaos of contemporary nihilism is then discussed in chapter 3. Drawing on the 
valuable insights gained through the study of Strauss’ “three waves of modernity”, I 
have attempted to map out the progress of new world empire.17 The basic thesis of 
Strauss’ work is the three main currents of contemporary thought, liberalism, 
historicism and nihilism are in fact successive manifestations of the same underlying 
technological imperative to reduce politics to a form of making or production.
Hobbes’ critics and successors, for all their innovations seek not to overturn, 
but to correct and therefore preserve his original formulation of politics as techno­
politics, or the application of pleasure and pain in the service of comfortable self- 
preservation. Subsequent attempts to save the modem project, however, require 
shifting the ground of rationality and therefore knowledge from nature to history. 
Reason in Hobbes is not simply given but arises in the state of nature as the product of 
experience and rests therefore on art and not nature. As the arts and sciences are only 
possible in a civil society, a civil society must exist before reason or even self­
17 Op. cit., Leo Strauss in Gildin pp. 81 - 98
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consciousness can developed and man becomes not a universal, but an historical 
being. The internal critique of liberalism reveals that man’s reason is not self­
determining but is in fact embedded in and limited by the social and historical 
structures that have produced it. Liberalism gives way before the historical critique as 
history is shown to produce man and not the other way around. The actualisation of 
reason through time requires that history be in fact rational, which is a proposition 
whose truth can only be known at the end of history. If history remains open-ended 
and uncompleted, evaluation and judgement become suspended, leaving the entire 
metaphysical structure of liberal progress in jeopardy, hanging on the bare threads o f 
hopeful speculation.
To deny that history has reached its telos while maintaining that man’s reason 
is deeply embedded in, and conditioned by, social and historical location is to 
abandon the universal for the particular and therefore the scientific grounds of human 
knowledge. Rather than bemoaning the loss of rationality, nihilism celebrates it as a 
liberation of the will to power. If all perspectives are partial, man and his claims to 
knowledge cannot be measured against an external standard and is therefore free (and 
required) to invent or create his own truth. Human rationality, and the entire history of 
western political thought which has sustained it, has been exposed as a noble (and not 
so noble) lie that can and should be abandoned in favour of the poetic imagination. 
Man still makes his own cultural productions, but these values are constructed self­
consciously and brought into being not by reason, but by conviction as a kind of self- 
willed delusion shored up by the politics of forgetting. Strauss’ analysis of the 
movement from liberalism, to historicism to nihilism serves as a useful starting place 
for an exploration of techno-politics and new world empire. Techno-politics is a 
universal and imperial desire to make and remake the world in its own image erasing 
the idols of custom and tradition in order to subsume a plural humanity within a single 
overarching framework of thought and action.
Techno-politics is and can only be a colonialist project because it reduces men 
to objects of manipulation and control upon which the successive strategies of 
assimilation, development and segregation are deployed in the production of new 
world empire “for the benefit of all mankind”. New world empire is therefore much 
more than the historically specific policies of Anglo-Americans in their efforts to 
solve the “Indian problem” as part and parcel of their assertion of sovereignty over 
North America, although it is this as well. In chapter four an empirical study is
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presented to describe and explain the three strategies of colonialism deployed by first 
the British and then the American empires to make and remake the Indian for the 
purposes of land and resource appropriation. The ““Indian44 therefore is not, nor was 
it ever intended to be an accurate representation of actual and existing Indians but was 
and still is an artificial legal construction designed to serve the purposes of the 
colonial state. As such the “Indian” is a powerful symbol and illuminating metaphor 
for the process by which new world empire seeks to effect the transformation of man 
from his raw and unformed "‘natural” state to the civilised subject of sovereign power.
More important than the metaphor however are the real world consequences 
visited upon the Indians as the forces of new world empire broke upon the shores of 
colonial North American at the dawn of the early modem era. Both the British 
Atlantic and the Continental American empires assert sovereignty over the Indians 
and their land in an attempt to produce the Indian according to the techniques of 
assimilation, development and segregation as predicted by the model of techno­
politics developed in the previous chapter. Policies of assimilation include the 
constmction of Indians as allies who can be subordinated as dependent clients with an 
overarching imperial system, as original possessors of the soil competent to alienate 
those rights through purchase, and finally as free and equal citizens enfranchised 
through the institution of private property as communal or tribal territories are 
dissolved in favour of individual allotments. Policies of development are based upon 
the construction of the Indian as a primitive whose backward society must be 
advanced, even if by force, through the normal stages of social and economic 
progress. Hunting and gathering must give way first to agriculture and then industry 
as the Indian becomes a ward of state under the guardianship of the great white father.
Debt, dependency and education become useful instruments of compulsion 
upon the recalcitrant Indian who is forced to sell his land in order to finance the 
programs of re-education and social engineering designed for his benefit. Finally 
when the Indian irredeemably demonstrates his failure to adapt, due to some deeply 
ingrained and insurmountable cultural (or even biological flaw), segregation remains 
the only answer and the final solution short of genocide. Removal or ethic cleansing is 
only a temporary measure which must eventually be replaced by the institution of a 
reservation system in which the civilised can contain and control the barbarian. 
Simultaneously, the myth of the vanishing Indian comes into being as an apology (in 
both senses of the word) for the excesses of modernity and as a call to protect and
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preserve a lost innocence far removed from the decadence, injustice and corruption of 
contemporary life. The reified identity of the Indigenous serves as a mirror and 
reminder of a very different and distant past in which the modem finds his other self, 
lost, but not quite forgotten in the inevitable and relentless march of progress.
The historical precedents established in both the theory and practice of the 
British Atlantic and Continental American empires establish the foundations upon 
which to understand the three strategies of colonialism that have shaped Canadian 
Indian relations, even before Confederation in 1867. The concluding chapter of the 
thesis ends therefore as it began in ethical contemplation of the Indian problem as it 
has once again manifested itself in the legacy of colonialism that is currently 
frustrating progress in “modem” Treaty negotiations. The conclusion, thus brings the 
Thesis full circle, back to the beginning, but this time the problem can be approached 
in its broader colonial context as a contemporary replication of new world empire. 
Now that new world empire has been exposed, not as an ahistorical and universal 
necessity, but a particular theory and practice grounded in the Christian metaphysics 
of technological modernity, the perspective has changed. However remote and 
unlikely it always remains a possibility that we may be able to lift ourselves out of our 
ingrained cultural prejudice and this time around do things differently and better. 
Although the modem treaty negotiations are of the “political moment” they are the 
end game of a process of colonisation which has its roots both the British Atlantic and 
the American continental empires. The Canadian state is a product of empire and as 
such has to deal with its colonial legacy. The Indian problem has been with Canadians 
before Canada even existed and even before the first British loyalist arrived in what 
had become “British North America” in the wake of the American Revolution.
Canada is a product of the technological society and as such of new world empire and 
will continue to reproduce the three strategies of colonialism unless and until we self­
consciously change the spirit and intent of our politics. Change and transformation 
can and must follow upon ethical confrontation, rational analysis and engaged 
political thought and practice to produce the modem limits of new world empire.
New world empire has its limits, but those limits are not the same as those of 
past empires because new world empire is a modem form, grounded not in rights and 
law, but in power. Classical and Christian ideologies premised upon conceptions of 
natural law give way to the law of nature wherein natural liberty has come to mean 
simply the physical force of bodies in motion. In the modem mechanical universe, it
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is the balance of power, devoid of any ethical, legal or even moral constraint, which 
defines and determines political relations. In its relentless quest for power 
accumulation, new world empire will expand with little or nothing to check its 
appetites and desires, limited only by the relative measure of technological 
capabilities between itself and the societies it encounters. Technological superiority 
renders empire “inevitable” because technology efficiently produces a future defined 
not by any objective measure of right or justice, but by increasing levels of efficiency 
and productivity as ends in themselves. It was not that Indian societies were unknown 
or even ignored, but that these societies were not effective obstacles to colonial 
expansion, once the “balance of power” began to shift in favour of the settlers. New 
world empire would become one of the most fearsome of all historical forms of 
empire as it was driven by the “inevitable and irresistible” force of natural and 
necessary desires (land hunger) in the face of which both reason and compassion 
would prove hopelessly impotent.
The limits of new world empire cannot be sought through a revival of neo­
classical ontology because such a return would mean accepting natural law as an 
objective metaphysical principle linking the “divine spark” of natural reason to an 
ordered cosmos ruled by the divine Nous.18 Nor can a return to “subjective rights” 
grounded in Christian ideas of “right reason” as a correct orientation to divine law 
make any sense to a scientific age which has utterly abandoned any idea of the human 
soul, to say nothing of God himself. Rather than looking to alternative ontological 
premises from which to confront the nihilism of new world empire, it may be more 
strategic to question the universal and scientific rhetoric which empowers the modem 
technological foundation of politics. Techno-politics, far from being universal and 
devoid of moral conviction is grounded in the idea that human beings are “atomic 
individuals”, free and equal in the state of nature. The “original position” of modem 
liberalism is premised on an image of man modeled on a scientific view of nature 
which is composed of elementary particles whizzing about aimlessly in empty space.
By employing a “scientific” image upon which to construct an original 
position of natural liberty, modem liberalism abstracts man from the socially 
constructed narratives of the human condition, except the one grounded in a universal,
18 Cosmopolitan universalism found in Stoic philosophy and the Roman ius gentium was a theoretical 
evolution o f Aristotle’s idea o f Nous, as the intelligible principle ordering the cosmos, including human 
rationality. This theme will be explored in the Chapter on Hobbes’ political revolution in chapter 2
28
because scientific metaphor. The universal metaphor is deployed by Hobbes because 
he wants to erase all difference in an effort to erase all conflict, therein, eliminating 
the faction which he believed was responsible for the dissolution of all previous and 
natural commonwealths. Hobbes’ ‘‘thought experiment” could no more erase the 
divisions of social power, than it could erase the social inequality lurking below the 
legal equality of citizens. In modem liberalism the equality of the state of nature is 
the background upon which the inequality of civil society becomes legitimised 
through the myth of the social contract within which everyone agrees to subordinate 
themselves to the will of the sovereign. The construction and expansion of modem 
liberal empire reveals how white men of substantial property, as the active political 
class within the state, went about using their legally constituted power to appropriate 
and exploit the land, labour and resources of their colonised subjects.
The English constructed a unique form of empire grounded in providence, 
progress and the “natural rights” of freebom Englishmen based upon an understanding 
of liberty which was absolute unless voluntarily alienated through contract. As a 
result, even individuals could engage in a “just war” if their “natural liberty” was 
impeded in any way which they had not actively consented to. Neither the law of 
nations, nor the Spanish Papal Bulls, nor even the presence of powerful Indian 
confederacies was going to stand in the way of English colonialism in the new world. 
The English colonised the new world on their own terms, terms which constructed an 
original state of nature, a wild, empty and primitive place, defined by the absence of 
law, order and civilised society. Natural rights and the social contract theory of the 
state are not universal scientific principles of human social and political organisation, 
but a particular ideology of English liberalism which evolved hand in hand with the 
expansion of new world empire. In the absence of law, techno-politics can be “freely” 
deployed against a colonial subject as an “object” of sovereign power. The colonial 
relationship is therefore one in which all the technologies of power become the most 
visible as the sovereign subject of modernity works to make and remake the Indian in 
its own interest.
Anglo-American scholars have long recognised the difference between 
English forms of colonisation and the Spanish, French or Dutch variants, seeing it as a 
more just and humane form of empire founded upon the enlightenment principles
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whi ch would eventually emerge triumphant in the modem world.19 Franka Wilma
takes the progressive optimism of the modem liberal logic to its ultimate extreme and
imagines, that Indians, like other colonised peoples will gain the full benefits an
unstoppable process of international decolonisation and will one day soon achieve full
recognition of the rights to self-determination and sovereignty.20 Wilmer’s belief in
the capacity of an international law tradition to overcome its inherently colonial
context is further explored by authors such as S. James Anaya whose work on the
“Indigenous” rights movement in the Indigenous rights working group within the 
01United Nations. Both these works, while insightful, are hindered by their 
evolutionary model of law which fails to grasp that the Indian problem is an 
inherently political problem in need of a political solution.
The politics at work which saw the Draft UN Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples become the UN working group on Indigenous populations in 
order to specifically deny the right to self-determination of peoples and the right to 
ownership and sovereignty over territory that such a right invariably invokes. The 
modem movement to pursue “Indigenous rights” at the international level 
unreflectively replicate colonial systems of power which allow Indians to exist only 
on the margins of an already marginal practice.23 Indigenous rights as human rights 
must first be assigned to the bottom of a long list of aspirations listed in order of 
priority from first, (civil and political) second (social and economic) and even third 
(cultural) “generations” of rights discourses operating at a global level.24 
Recognition, in the words of Ted Moses, Grand Chief and Ambassador of the Grand
19 Anthony Pagden, “The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the 
Atlantic to c. 1700, in The Origins o f Empire, The Oxford History o f the British 
Empire, vol. 1, ed. Nicholas Canny, (Oxford.: Oxford University Press) pp. 34 - 54. 
Pagden provides a comprehensive discussion of the themes outlined in the article in 
book form, see Anthony Pagden, Lords o f All the World: Ideologies o f  Empire in 
Spain, Britain and France c.1500-1800 (New Haven.: Yale University Press) 1995
2 See Franka Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics: Since Time 
Immemorial. (Newbury Park, California.: Sage) 1993
21 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd Edition, (New York.: Oxford
University Press) 2000
22 James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson, Post-Colonial Ledger Drawing: Legal Reform, in Reclaiming 
Indigenous Voice and Vision, (ed.) Marrie Battiste, (Vancouver.: UBC Press) 2002 pp. 161-178
23 Ibid pp. 168 - 170
24 It is my contention that the conventional arrangement o f rights discourses in three succeeding 
“generations” or rights discourse follow the conventional divisions o f modem political theory outlined 
as liberalism, historicism and nihilism from which “the Indian” must find his own place at the margins 
because the territorial claim to self-determination and sovereignty cannot be accommodated within the
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Council of the Cree to the United Nations, remains minimal:
The working group was established in a far comer of the United Nations 
system. People would laugh when I described where Indigenous peoples were at 
the United Nations. I would explain that the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, ECOSOC, the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and finally, that the 
sub-commission has a working group and that is where Indigenous people can 
be discussed. I also explained that the words Indigenous Peoples couldn’t be 
used because certain states - Canada among them - are fearful of recognising 
our rights. As a result, the working group is designated as the Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations.25
Pursing Indigenous rights at the international level, while an important part of an 
emerging collaborative project coordinating the political experiences of Indians from 
around the world, points to the persistence of the “Indian problem” as the product of 
a new world empire defined by its total and therefore “global” ambition.
It is not to the Indians, but to the theory and practice of new world empire that 
modem critical thinking must turn, in order to understand the modalities of the 
modem technological project which continues to construct the “Indian,” as the point 
of origin, from which modem sovereignty springs. The “Indian Problem” must be 
seen at its roots, as a consequence of modem colonialism and the political theories of 
expansion and expropriation which it has legitimated. The Indian is the living 
embodiment of the man “in the state of nature” before the “assertion” of sovereignty 
and the production of cultivated humanity, or modem technological civilization. 
Modem liberalism is premised upon the social contract theory of the state in which 
free and equal individuals pre-existing in a mythical “state of nature” agree to 
exchange their natural liberty for the safety and security of life under a sovereign. 
Political life and the exercise of sovereign power is, therefore based upon and 
legitimated by the original “social contract” by and through which the sovereign 
power was “created” by mutual consent and for the common purpose of comfortable 
self-preservation. Treaty and aboriginal rights remain central to the narrative of 
modem liberal sovereignty as it was formulated in the new world because the idea of 
the voluntary “purchase” of Indian lands emerged not in the new world, but the old.
The origins of new world empire are not to be found in the new world, but in 
the old, as a continuation and expansion of a modem “culture of improvement”
modem conceptions o f sovereignty operating at the level o f  international law.
25 Grand Chief, Ted Moses, “Invoking International Law” in Battise (ed.), pp. 172 - 178 op. cit., p.174
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concentrating power at home as well as projecting it abroad. Nicholas Canny has 
shown that Anglo-America colonialism has its beginnings, not on the far from shores 
of North America, but within the “British” Isles themselves. English colonizers 
constructed concepts and images of savagery, paganism and barbarism as part of their 
subjugation of the “Celtic fringes” whose peoples not so different from themselves, 
many of them Christians.26 Modem new world empire works not through creating 
systems of exclusion, but through ever widening and deepening forms of 
appropriation and accumulation within an “open” frontier of perpetual expansion.
New world empire is not a place, but a process, a process in which “natural” men are 
remade into productive subjects of sovereign power through the coercive apparatus of 
the state which both forms and transforms them according to its own self-referential 
will. Sovereignty is the active power which transforms natural savagery into 
civilisation exposing what Stephen Hopgood has shown as the unconscious hegemony 
of the modem liberal self, which deals with people “not as they are, but as they have 
already been remade.” 27
Remaking the savage into a civilised subject of sovereign power has been the 
project of modem new world empire since its beginnings in early modem England 
which find full modem ideological justification in the natural philosophy of Francis 
Bacon which is where we begin in the next chapter. By understanding Bacon and the 
modem technological project, not as a universal, but as a particular practice grounded 
in a specifically Christian metaphysics, we can begin to uncover the limits and 
possibilities of modem techno-politics. Technology and techno-politics have created 
a modem civilisation of great power and freedom, but not without a darker side of 
domination, exploitation and terror. Not only is resistance to technological modernity 
and techno politics, possible but it has been strengthened and renewed by a modem 
international Indian political movement which has challenged new world empire at its 
origin and source. The Indians have not only refused to be disappeared, they have 
survived into the modem world in full possession of their culture and politics and are 
now leading the world in critical and progressive thinking. In order to fully appreciate
26 Nicholas Canny, “England’s New World and Old, 1480 - 1630” , in The Origins o f  
Empire, op. cit., pp. 148 - 169 in The Oxford History of the British Empire ed., 
Nicholas Canny op. cit.
27 Stephen Hopgood, “Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society: The 
Inexorable Hegemony of the Liberal Self’ Millennium, Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 29, No.l, pp. 1-25
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the powerful and inspiring insights of the Indians however, it is important not simply 
to appropriate Indian voice and vision to marshal a critique of the excesses of 
modernity. Again, it is not first to the Indians, but to ourselves that we must look if 
we are ever going to understand ourselves as modem citizens of new world empire. 
The longing for the Indian, is a longing, not for actual existing Indian peoples and 
politics, but for a lost world of innocence and belonging which modem homelessness 
has “wiped away” from the collective unconscious. Modernity romanticizes the Indian 
as some “noble savage” forever locked in a timeless purity, as the “other” of our 
relentless technological civilisation. Rather than mounting yet another project to save 
the Indian, it is time that we began to see the Indian in ourselves and discover not 
escape and nostalgia, but an active ethical and political engagement with the world.
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Chapter 1
Metaphysics: Bacon and the Origins of Modern Techno-logos
The difference between civilized men and savages is almost as great as that 
between gods and men; the difference arises not from the soil, not from climate, 
not from race, but from the arts.
Francis Bacon1
Introduction
The roots of techno politics and new world empire lie not simply in the emergence of 
“the culture of improvement” sweeping across early modem England, but in the 
metaphysical revolution which had so fundamentally altered ideological conceptions 
of God, the cosmos and man’s place and purpose in relation to both. The two great 
intellectual movements of early modem Europe, the Renaissance and the Reformation 
had provided the tools of a radical scepticism which rebellious minds used to break 
away from the old order believed to be impeding both man’s progress and liberty. 
Bacon makes the revolution in politics possible by transforming modem man’s 
understanding of himself and his place and purpose in the cosmos. Bacon inaugurates 
a revolution in knowledge because he views science itself as a productive historical 
force which transforms both man and the world through action into nature in 
accordance with divinely ordained providence. Bacon’s new “empirical method” 
overturns the dominance of Aristotle’s metaphysical system and replaces it with a 
new understanding of knowledge self-consciously grounded in Christian metaphysical 
principles. The radical rejection of the past made possible a new and uniquely 
modem orientation towards the future defined as infinite progression towards greater 
and greater enlightenment and empowerment. Progress only becomes possible once 
the past is something to be overcome and left behind, as opposed to a founding 
moment or point of origin from which all else becomes possible.
For Bacon, the miracle of God’s incarnation into the world had literally 
demarcated time into different epoch wherein the past could only be viewed as 
incomplete and hence a source of error. The classical age could not have had access to 
true science and true knowledge because it fundamentally lacked the most important
1 Francis Bacon cited in Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy o f  Francis Bacon (Chicago.: Chicago 
University Press) 1964, p. 53
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knowledge of all; divine revelation given to man both in the form of divine scripture 
and in the person of Jesus Christ. The intervention of God into the world of historical 
time condemns the past to irrelevance by erecting an incommensurable chasm of 
understanding between those who have heard the word of God and those who remain 
shrouded in darkness and ignorance. Bacon’s scientific revolution begins with his 
rejection of the classical age in general, and Aristotle’s metaphysics in particular, 
holding back the advancement of knowledge. Pagan philosophy is specifically 
identified as the reason and source of the error and corruption which must be purged 
before science can be secured upon solid foundations. Aristotle’s medical training had 
directed him towards nature as the model of perfection to be studied and imitated in 
the production of knowledge and this was the root of the problem.
Bacon finds his inspiration, not in nature or the divine order of the cosmos, but 
in the life and works of Christ as well as biblical stories of genesis in which man plays 
a central role in the divine drama. In Bacon’s experimental method knowledge is the 
product of action, as opposed to contemplation, because it is only through intervening 
in the world that he becomes the producer of causes which can generate predictable 
effects. Bacon’s experimental method is in direct contrast to the method of the 
scholastics of his day who were engaged in contemplation and rationalist 
argumentation in their study of the natural world. Bacon explicitly and forcefully 
rejects the “schoolmen” and their domination of university life in favour of life 
devoted to the practical and mechanical arts and sciences. The study of words and 
rational discourse were mere vanities to be replaced with an active engagement with 
the “things in themselves.” The re-orientation of science to it proper end and function 
would put the sciences on the true path of knowledge, proven in the generation of 
fruitful experiments and inventions for the use and benefit of mankind. Bacon’s 
revolution in the arts and sciences would have profound consequences, not only 
because it paved the way for the invention of new methods and new techniques which 
would transform man’s relationship to the natural world, but because it completely 
transformed the man’s understanding of the natural world itself.
Modem technological society is a product of Bacon’s revolution because it 
established method itself as the ground and foundation of knowledge. Method as a 
kind of productivity machine generating infinite power and progress would become 
the dominating metaphor of the age and would be adopted as the grounding principle 
of all the sciences, even the science of man as it was to be developed soon to be
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developed by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, a student of Bacon, would seek to overcome 
the chaos of his times by effecting a “revolution” of his own, this time in the field of 
political theory. Hobbes would imitate Bacon’s experimental method to discover the 
scientific principles of man and construct his new political order, not on the 
contingencies of custom and tradition, but on the secure foundations of scientific 
principle. In order to understand Hobbes’ transformation of social and political theory 
it is first therefore necessary to understand the metaphysical revolution in the sciences 
which proceeded it and therefore made it possible.
Christian Fundamentalism Let Loose on the World
Bacon’s project to reform the sciences is driven by an underlying Christian 
metaphysics which he believed would unlock nature’s secrets and therefore “advance” 
learning beyond anything that was known or could have been known in past 
philosophies. Bacon’s new approach to the natural world would not be one of passive 
observation but direct physical intervention under the direction of experimental 
method which would act as a kind of “knowledge” productivity machine. Bacon set 
out to correct the errors of the past by purging classical concepts from natural 
philosophy thus placing scientific inquiry back upon its proper Christian path. For 
Bacon, reliance on incomplete and therefore erroneous pagan notions introduced by 
Thomas Aquinas in his attempted “synthesis” of classical and Christian metaphysics 
had been a profound mistake which had to be completely abandoned. Aristotle’s 
pagan pride and his ignorance of revelation had led him to a theory of self-sufficiency 
of reason which excluded any knowledge of the Christian God and his divine 
omnipotence and omniscience. Reason was dependent upon revelation beyond which 
the formal and final cause of creation could simply not be known and any attempt to 
do so was simply an exercise in hubris which would lead to sterility and futility. 
Scholastic arguments about the “nature” of God and his purpose in the world were not 
only futile, but sinful in that they diverted man from his true calling which was to 
found in his active rather than his contemplative capacities.
An exploration of the metaphysical foundations of Bacon’s experimental 
method exposes the many Christian themes fundamental to his “new” science without 
which the technological revolution would not have been possible. Bacon’s 
“revolution” was explicitly premised upon a return to the one true faith and its
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divinely inspired purpose and plan for action into the world. Over and against 
Aristotle’s conception of God as the eternal unmoved mover; we find the Christian 
creator God and the radical dualism between spirit and matter.2 Creation ex nihlio 
reduces the material world to nothing other than the raw material upon which the 
sovereign will of God works to incarnate his divine will into the world according to 
an unknown and unknowable providence. Etienne Gilson describes how the radical 
dualism of St. Augustine’s understanding of the creation from nothing assigns man a 
place as a created creature “from nothing” in which man “finds himself excluded from 
the divine” by a “metaphysical chasm” which nothing can bridge, save a free act of 
the divine will. Man‘s place in the world is given not through rational investigation, 
but through divine revelation in scripture, the free gift of grace and in the passion of 
Christ. Christ as the way, the path and the light provides the model of action into the 
world through the performance of miracles as the basis for acts of charity. 4
As Christ’s love for man is infinite and unlimited so is the productivity of 
charity once it is properly understood and imitated as the base and foundation of 
knowledge. Bacon’s stated purpose is whole scale reconstruction of knowledge to a 
Christian purpose which he plans to effect by return science to its one true path.5 
Experimental method becomes the disciplining and productive machine which he 
believes will keep man to his purpose thereby making him an instrument and vehicle 
of God’s will in the world. In order to understand Bacon’s practical purpose 
however; it is necessary to first understand the metaphysical shift in Bacon’s 
understanding of the ontological structure of the cosmos which has made the 
reformation of knowledge not only a personal vocation, but a divinely inspired 
mission. An omnipotent God cannot be contained within the structured hierarchy of 
the Classical cosmos. As a natural philosopher Bacon was interested in the
2
The dualism of spint and matter is a constant them of St. Paul, who had via Luther and Calvin a 
profound effect on Puritan thinking in England. Typical is the speech in Galatians 6: 17 “For the flesh 
lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other”, 
The Holy Bible, in the King James Version (Nashville.: Thomas Nelson Publishers) 1984, p. 687
3 Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy T d Edition (New Haven.: Yale University Press) 2002 p. 544
The injunction to follow in the life o f Christ as a life called to Christian charity which is a gift o f  
grace “For by grace are ye saved through faith; and not o f yourselves: it is the gift o f  God” Ephesians 
2:8 The greatest gift o f charity is o f course Christ himself “for we are his workmanship, created in 
Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them.”
Ephesians 2: 10
5 Although this is a running theme o f  Bacon’s work which will be explored in the Chapter, it is given 
full and explicit articulation in Bacon‘s “ A Confession o f  Faith” pp. 107 -113,  in Francis Bacon, The 
Oxford Authors (ed. Brian Vickers) (Oxford.: Oxford University Press) 1996
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astronomical anomalies publicised in the work of Galileo and Copernicus, but
considered these cosmological “discoveries” as evidence indicative of a much bigger
problem at the base of the entire structure of scholastic thought. The theological
belief in God’s infinite power had been chipping away at the Ptolemaic system; long
before Galileo famous demonstration of Jupiter’s revolving moons. Historian of
science, Alexander Koyre points to early Renaissance natural philosophers such as
Giordio Bruno and Nicholas du Cusa whose beliefs in the unlimited creative power of
God required them to imagine a universe without limit to contain him.6 The cosmos
could not be a finite ordered whole, but must extend without limit in all directions
rendering both the possibilities of an external boundary or an internal centre logically
impossible. Bruno proclaims:
.. .“the world is infinite and that, therefore there is no body in it to which 
it would pertain simpliciter to be in the centre, or on the centre, or on the 
periphery, or between these two extremes” of the world (which, 
moreover, do not exist) but only to be among other bodies. As for the 
world which has its cause and origin in an infinite cause and an infinite 
principle, it must be infinitely infinite according to its corporeal necessity 
and its mode of being.7
Bacon’s Creator God was one whose infinite power and will could admit of no limit, 
least of all those posited by the metaphysical speculations of pagan philosophers 
The failure of the scholastics lay in their inability to know the “things in 
themselves” as revealed by the errors currently coming to light in the study of nature 
in general and the limitations of medieval cosmology in particular. If the new 
sciences had shown that the earth was not the stable centre of the cosmos, but one 
among many planets revolving around the sun, then all of the assumptions about a 
closed hierarchical world filled with self-moving essences as parts of an articulated 
whole were also no longer credible. Bacon makes reference to the “volumes of the 
schoolmen” amassing “a body of sciences more immense in quantity, and more base 
in substance“ and explicitly called for a creative destruction of the past to clear a path 
for a new beginning.8 If cracks were beginning to develop in the colossus of the 
traditional metaphysics, it was only a natural result of the vanity, pride and error 
which had erected its construction. Now that ancient wisdom had so demonstrably
6 Alexander Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore.: John Hopkins 
University Press) 1994 , pp. 40 - 57
7
Bruno, as cited by Koyre, Ibid p. 40
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beeni shown to have misunderstood the very nature of the cosmos, a radical revolution 
in thee fundamental understanding of knowledge and the production of knowledge 
became not only possible, but necessary.
Bacon’s natural philosophy convinced of the errors produced by the vain 
search for meaning and purpose in natural phenomenon, to the Bible for divine 
inspiration and instruction. Bacon turns away from the speculation about the nature 
and structure of the cosmos to the more humble and useful task of producing useful 
works guided by the moral principle of Christian charity. 9 Christ, not contemplation 
becomes the bridge between man and the world and faith not reason becomes its 
guiding principle. Man is therefore and incomplete, dependent and finite creature in 
the face of an omnipotent and unknowable God. Matter and spirit once conjoined by 
Aristotle’s concepts of form and essence, are now seen as completely other and 
irreconcilable. The result of this fundamental metaphysical rupture is that there is no 
longer a rational intellectual principle (Nous) or world soul animating the cosmos and 
rendering it accessible to the rational mind. St. Thomas’ reconciliation had proven a 
failure and the ancient wisdom was an idol that needed to be smashed before any 
“progress” in the sciences could be effectively undertaken. Christian faith, hope and 
charity are demonstrated not in rational discourse about the fundamental nature of 
reality, but in the ability to produce useful “works.” Knowledge is no longer about 
vision, definition and argumentation but about the technological production of useful 
inventions whose “fertility” is a sign and a mark their divine origin and inspiration. 
Modem progress and scientific/technological advance are all the proof one needs of 
the vanity and sterility of the ancients and classical thought in general. The new 
epoch will “wipe” away the errors of the past and return man to his original condition, 
transformed and renewed, ready and willing take his proper place as instrument and 
vehicle of God’s will in the world.
Nous as the Ground of Aristotle’s Metaphysics
g
Bacon , “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2” in Vickers (ed.) op. cit. pp. 293 - 294.9
“Neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister questions, rather than godly 
edifying which is in faith: so do. Now the end o f the commandment is charity out o f  a pure heart, and 
of a good conscience, and o f faith unfeigned ” and “From which some having swerved have turned 
aside unto vain jangling; Desiring to be teachers o f the law; understanding neither what they say, nor 
whereof they affirm.” St. Paul, Timothy I 1:4 - 7, The Holy Bible., op. cit., p. 698
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For Aristotle, the unmoved mover was not the personal, historically active God of 
Judeo-Christian belief, but the remote and disinterested ‘‘final cause” that anchored 
his entire metaphysical system. God as the embodiment of pure reason or (nous) 
reason or intellect conceived as thinking, thinking itself, a perfect and eternal motion, 
that by its very perfection inspired the rationally changing universe as it imitates 
God.10 In this way, nous or intellect animated the world as a moving and generating 
cause, but each thing had its own essence or form which determined the (telos) or end 
to which it was moved. Substance is the unity of form and matter in which each being 
in fulfilling its specific function performs its essential nature and hence makes visible 
the “essence” of “what” it is. While each empirical occurrence of an actual individual 
thing possessed an infinite variety of accidental or contingent properties, it 
nevertheless possessed a specific group of characteristics that identified it as a 
member of its class or kind. The demarcation of genus and species were identified as 
specific and defined parts within an articulated and integrated whole which as 
differentiated totality expressed the ordered rationality of an unchanging divine 
intelligence. In this way the world was knowable because the rational principles of 
things were accessible to the rational part of the human soul because both participated 
in the essential rationality of the cosmos.
In Aristotle’s metaphysics each creature, in its own way, strove towards the
completion and perfection of its own nature determined by the telos that described and
delimited its essence. As political theorist Janet Coleman describes, the divine Nous
serves to connect the different orders of being, including man:
Aristotle speaks of nous or rational intuition. Nous or intuition is that faculty or 
rational part of the soul whose activity is to apprehend correctly (by the process 
of induction based on perception) indemonstrable and fundamental first 
principles that strike all humans as such. In effect, Aristotle merely asserts that 
Nous is that part of the rational soul which is engaged both at the beginning and 
at the end of cognition.. .Intuition (Nous) starts as perception, it grasps and 
identifies the ultimate particulars, the “facts” or infimae species, the immanent 
essence of a something, and it ends with the primary definitions or first 
principles that are not reached by reasoning but by induction from perception.11
Man as the rational animal perfected his own nature by engaging in those activities 
that were distinctly human, thereby actualising his potential though thinking, acting
10 Vasilis Politis, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics, (London.: 
Routledge) 2004, p. 294
11 Janet Coleman, A History o f  Political Thought; From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity,
(Oxford.: Blackwell Publishing) 2000 p. 182
40
and speaking. Through thought and language, man as the rational animal, is able to 
recognise (re-cognise) the intelligible form that underlies and defines things, as they 
are, without which the mind would continue to divide and separate individual 
instances into the infinite regress of particularity rendering all speech and thought 
arbitrary and unintelligible.
For Aristotle it was self-evident that the very possibility of knowledge 
required the existence of primary definitions through which the fixed identity of a 
thing became knowable. Primary definitions had no cause other than themselves and
I ^
were sometimes expressed as self-caused or self-explanatory. The definition,
defined or (de)limited one “thing” from another by separating and dividing out
through logos (language, dialectic) Behind all the arbitrary and contingent
characteristics of an individual thing in order to isolate and grasp through a theoretical
concept. The concept articulated the necessary qualities that unified the thing as a
whole and identified it with its defining “genus” and “species”. Aristotle’s system is
ontological because it defined through logos, or rational intellect, the essence of a
thing, the “what it is” as it presented itself to the human cognitive faculty through the
act of thinking. Rational intuition recognises or grasps the concept, which while being
a product of the human mind nevertheless discloses the “real” structure of being
because it participates in the same rational principle by and through which all of
nature, including man is ordered. Theoria, or the art of dialectic is the inquiry into
these “essential” or “formal” qualities underlying the structure of natural phenomenon
which enables the human intellect to build up a scientific system of knowledge from
first principles. Definitions, or non-demonstrable axioms are fundamental to the entire
Aristotlian system of knowledge:
Definitions are not in the natural world and cannot be empirically observed as 
already constituted elements of nature. According to Aristotle, they arise in us 
as a consequence of a human way of coming to think about, know and express, 
in language, what humans have perceived...Once we have the definition, the 
functional expression that reveals the purpose of the named something, it 
remains fixed as a kind of ideal. The logos or set of words which indicates the 
essence of a subject, here man, does not change over time or culture because the 
elements of the definition are prior, more universal and intelligible absolutely 
than any particular subject whose essence is thereby expressed.13
12 Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle, A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford.: Oxford University Press) 2000, p.
55
13 Op. cit., Coleman, p. 131
Science for Aristotle was the systematic investigation of natural phenomenon as they 
formed part of the seamless web of natural relationships whereby the evidence of the 
senses was used as a starting point for dialectical analysis which revealed the essence 
of things and their relation to other things in the overarching order of nature.
Essence understood as the rational, intelligible, organising principle that 
makes a thing what it is, is eternal and unchanging, while its realisation in actual 
existing things is a matter of chance and contingency. Aristotle’s physics is the study 
of the movement from one form to another as individual things move through their 
life cycles from potentiality to actuality, as their nature unfolds, each seeking its own 
highest good in the completion or perfection of its specific nature as defined by its 
essence or essential being. Change and alteration in the world are explained by each 
“thing’s” inherent, self-propelled motion towards the realisation of its own perfected 
nature as it strives to actualise the fullness or completion of its own inherent 
potentiality. Final and formal causes or essences are therefore prior to existence as 
they define the identify of particular things as they strive to embody the universal 
qualities that define their species and genus.
Identity and essence are inherent in individual things whose differences are 
merely the product of the accidental qualities which differentiate each unique 
individual across a range of infinite variability. It is not surprising therefore, that the 
science of dialectic, while it begins with sense impressions from actual things, moves 
from this initial encounter to a level of conceptual analysis relying on words as 
categories of intuitive understanding which is definitive of cognitive thought. This 
entire ontological operation is made possible by the conjunction of thought and the 
world, the unity of reason that allows the mind to “see” or to “grasp” the concept as 
“essence” as the thing in itself made visible through critical argumentation leading to 
definition as the first principle of theory, or scientific thought. It is this reliance on 
rational and systematic thinking made possible by the inherent conjunction of mind 
and cosmos which the early modems called into question.
Purging the Idols of the Mind; Nominalism and the Vanity of Words
Contemplation is important to medieval Christian humanism because it was 
through rational and systemic thought and discourse that words revealed their 
connection to essence and hence to God’s design. The Christian humanism,
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dominant in the universities in the high middle ages, taught that the human 
faculties of reason and speech were definitive of man and disclosed his “highest” 
nature as intended by God. Discourse and disputation were not an empty and idle 
indulgence, but a profound religious and moral duty through which man discharged 
his responsibility to actualise his potential as a thinking and speaking being. 
Contemplation and the practice of dialectic were important not only because they 
disclosed divine truths, essential for the realisation of the good life, but were 
equally if not more important as ends in themselves. Contemplation was not “mere 
speculation” and disputation was not an “idle” activity precisely because the 
human intellect possessed the capacity to perceive and grasp the truth and beauty 
of being through logos, reasoned speech.14
Bacon rejected scholastic thought because he rejected reason’s ability to 
disclose the truth of being,. Contemplation could have no place in Bacon’s 
philosophy because there was simply nothing to “see.” The ideas of the mind 
expressed in words and concepts were human inventions and nothing more. Bacon 
accuses the ancients of “idol” worship because they falsely and sinful attribute 
divine and eternal qualities to things that are of human not divine origin. 
Knowledge could not advance, unless it turned from “words” to the things 
themselves. Bacon was self-consciously reinventing natural philosophy, by 
placing it upon another tract, moving from passive contemplation to active 
intervention:
Let Plato be summoned to the bar, that mocking wit, that swelling poet, that 
deluded theologian...When, however, you gave out the falsehood that truth is, 
as it were, the native inhabitant of the human mind and need not come in from 
outside to take its abode there;.. .when you taught us to turn our mind’s eye 
inward and grovel before our blind and confused idols under the name of 
contemplative philosophy; then truly you dealt us a mortal blow.15
Contemplation was meaningless because it mistook human abstractions as actual 
existing things which had no substantive reality. In reality the “names” of things do 
not exist proven by the fact that “just as there are things without names because they 
have never been seen, so there are names without corresponding things; the result of
14 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f  the Human Condition (Chicago.: University of Chicago) pp. 289 
- 294 for a discussion o f  the centrality o f contemplation and logos to Classical thought in general and to 
Thomism in particular.
15 Bacon, “The Masculine Birth o f  Time” in Farrington, op. cit. p. 64
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fanciful suppositions.16
Words far from revealing the true nature of things are in fact nothing other
than conventions; “idols” of the market place and as such are as variable and
accidental as the human condition itself. Linguistic conventions because they are
embedded in social and historical practices reflect nothing other than their use. As
such words need to be investigated and evaluated for their utility and systematically
order to a single purpose before they can be held to have any value or meaning.
Language has to be purged of its common place usages and standardised to produce
useful definitions suitable for natural philosophy;
The Idols of the Market-Place are the most troublesome of all; these are the 
idols that have crept into the understanding through the alliance of words and 
names. For while men believe their reason governs words, in fact, words turn 
back and reflect their power upon the understanding and so render philosophy 
and science sophistically and inactive...Yet even definitions cannot cure this 
evil, so far as they contain natural and material things. For definitions 
themselves consist of words and words beget words, so that we have to go back 
to particular instances and to their due order, as I shall say in a moment when I
17come to the method and plan for the construction of notions and axioms.
Bacon’s rejection of contemplation was not original, but had been build upon the 
ideas of the nominalists; Franciscan scholars who had challenged the doctrine of 
‘essence” which had become by the late middle ages a type of metaphysical realism 
used to support many of the church’s more dogmatic teachings.
While the debate between nominalists and metaphysical realists was exactly 
:he kind of internal Catholic scholastic debate which Bacon disapproved of he 
levertheless was the beneficiary of nominalist arguments which had made their way 
nto the teachings of protestant scholars. Although the Franciscan movement predates 
Luther’s break with the Church; it was a reform movement which sought to turn the 
Lhurch back to a focus on the passion of Christ as its central teaching and as such 
prefigured many of the later arguments which would result in the eventual schism and 
he emergence of Protestantism. The medieval St. Francis had had a powerful 
personal vision of the suffering Christ on the Cross and had set about a reform 
novement to bring the believe closer to God through direct identification with
6 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1 Aphorism 60, Translated and Edited by Peter Urbach and 
ohn Gibson, (Illinois.: Open Court Publishing) p. 64
7 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 59, Ibid, p. 64
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Christ’s personal human suffering.18 As such the Christian incarnation of God in 
human form was the key event and Christ’s unique and singular experience was above 
and beyond any and all “intellectual” teachings of the Church. As a Franciscan, 
Ockham insisted upon the individuality of Christ and his personal and unique 
sufferings on the cross as the core Christian teaching. The priority had to be on 
Christ as an individual, real man whose humanity and passion could not be 
subordinated to the formal, distant and austere law-giver often depicted in the early 
medieval church.
The early Church under the influence of Greek classical thought had portrayed 
Christ as king and judge, the divine logos, and the embodied word of the God. Words 
and speech had therefore been gradually turned into the doctrine of metaphysical 
realism which the Franciscans had so objected to. As an active reforming Franciscan, 
William of Ockham had developed his own interpretation of Aristotle arguing that 
metaphysical realism was an error based upon a misunderstanding of “substance” and 
“essence” as they are used in the original text. The “essence” of things could only be 
approached through their individual existences and as such existence was the primary 
category of being and “essence” only a derivative concept, a product of the mind. An 
appreciation for things in their unique singularity flowed from this emphasis on Christ 
the man; and became a religious philosophy in which the creation was understood not 
through “concepts” which were but ideas of the mind, but in a love and appreciation 
for things themselves.
In Ockham’s scholastic philosophy words did not reveal a higher, more true
plane of reality, “substance” had to be accessed through the immediate experience of
individual things. “Essence” as an ontological category of being was an error based
upon a misreading of Aristotle which failed to appreciate “substance“ as an actual
existing thing and not a “concept44 of the mind. Ockham explicitly challenges the
doctrine of metaphysical realism by claiming:
There is no universal outside the mind really existing in individual substances or 
in the essences of things.. .The reason is that everything that is not many things 
is necessarily one thing in number and consequently a single thing.19
18 hSt. Francis and his identification with the individual suffering o f Christ had a profound effect on 13* 
century depictions o f Christ’s humanity and passion on the Cross. Prior to St. Francis, Christ was 
usually pictured either as an infant or as a transcendent judge. Artists like the Italian painter Giotto 
began the study o f the individual human body which would mark a return to classics definitive o f the 
humanism of the later Renaissance. See Andrew Graham-Dixon, Renaissance, (London.; BBC 
Worldwide Ltd.) 1999 pp. 16 - 24
19 Sharon M. Kaye and Robert M. Martin, On Ockham, (California.: Wadsworth) 2001 p. 10
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This did not mean that words were of no consequence, indeed they were intimately
involved with human power and utility, but tools to be put to use in this world, rather
than signposts or symbols to another. As Bacon learned from Ockham:
Properly speaking, no universal belongs to the essence of any substance, for 
every universal is an intention of the mind or a conventional sign and nothing of 
either sort can belong to the essence of a substance. Consequently, no genus, 
nor species, nor any other universal belongs to the essence of any substance.20
The rejection of “divinity” of essence and substance is a rejection of the Classical idea 
of the “divine nous” and the metaphysical connection between man and the world, 
reason and nature. Nominalist critiques of Aristotle are taken up by the protestant 
Bacon; because his aim is one in the same; to purge classical “errors” from the faith to 
return science to a study of the “things in themselves.” Bacon’s was a puritan and as 
such he wanted a return to Christian fundamentals: the separation between Creature 
and Creator is definitive and absolute, God simply did not reveal himself in the world 
through things, but through scripture and the teachings of Christ, nor did the world or
* 71any of the creatures in it “reflect” or “embody” the divine perfection of the absolute.
The schoolmen were not only in error, they were guilty of the sin of pride 
which had led them, in their arrogance and ignorance, to confuse the imaginations of 
their own minds with the inner workings of nature. Bacon believed such attempts 
were the result of an unholy and impious attempt to reduce the glory of God’s creation 
to the needs of human understanding. Aristotle, says Bacon is guilty of distorting 
and corrupting his thinking with preconceived fancies which “utterly enslaved his 
natural philosophy to his logic, rendering it more or less useless and contentious. ”22 
Vain philosophy oversteps its bounds and leads to idle speculation because it ventures 
into the realm of the divine and inscribes its own limits upon the nature of things. 
Human understanding is simply not meant to grasp the divine and the corruptions and 
distortions that arise with the attempt, only serve to demonstrates the natural limits of 
reason. Bacon explicitly makes the link between man’s demand for order, logic and 
perfection and the resulting “Idols of the mind” rampant in ancient philosophy, 
beginning in Aphorism 46:
20 Ibid p. 28
21 One cannot come to God through the senses, but only through the soul because God is not in the 
universe. “I asked the whole mass o f the universe about my God and it replied, I am not God. God is
he who made me” St. Augustine, Confessions, Book X section 6, op. cit., p. 213
22 Bacon, Novum Organun Book 1, Aphorism 54, op. cit., p. 61
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The human understanding on account of its own nature readily supposes a 
greater order and uniformity in things than it finds. And though there are many 
things in Nature which are unique and quite unlike anything else, it devises 
parallels and correspondences and relations which are not there.23
He relates this tendency to the search for causes at Aphorism 48
The human understanding is restless; it cannot stop or rest, but presses on 
though in vain. Thus it is unthinkable that there should be any end or limit to the 
world, but always as if of necessity, the thought arises that there is something 
beyond.. .But this immoderation of our mind is much more harmful in the 
discovery of causes... Thus it is that in reaching out for things further away, it 
falls back upon nearer ones, namely final causes, which have relation entirely to 
human nature rather than to the universe, and have corrupted philosophy to an 
extraordinary degree?*
Because the scholastics had moved from the observation of things to the disputation 
over final causes which could be no more than “fancies” and “speculations” of the 
mind, they were forever doomed to spin endless cobwebs within the infinite 
possibilities of the human mind.
For Bacon, scientific method had to be redefined, shorn of its confusions with 
words and essences to mean an investigation into the underlying processes of nature, 
understood as natural history. Not “what“ things are, but how things come to be and 
change in the world follows from a strict separation of nature and faith in which 
natural objects and natural philosophy has been “purged” of all theological questions
25and concerns which can only be served by religion. The mixture of science and 
philosophy, was an error of the classics and a consequence of the prideful over-
9ftreaching of the mind into matters beyond its capacity to know. Aristotle’s 
ontological investigation of being gives way to Bacon’s search for productive tools 
and instruments to further the work of Christian charity. The whole point about the 
advancement of learning is that it has practical application for human knowledge, 
theory itself becomes a kind of practice and is measured by its productive output, not 
by claims to have revealed eternal truths. As modems we are so familiar with this 
image of science that we do not always recognise the intellectual shift that defined 
early modem science as a rejection of contemplation in favour of technological
23 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1 Aphorism, 46, op. cit. p. 57
24 Bacon, Novum Orgartum, Book 1 Aphorism, 48, op. cit., p. 59
25 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 1”, in Vickers, op. cit., pp. 194 - 196. Bacon specifically 
and explicitly redefines metaphysics to suit his own purpose and to purge it o f its theological/ethical 
dimension.
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production in the service of God and man.
The Rule of Passion over Reason; the Image and Example of Christ
The separation of reason and faith in Bacon’s metaphysics of the natural world did not 
mean that his scientific revolution was a secular affair. It was, in fact, exactly the 
opposite, in that the pursuit of science as a vocation would not only be a spiritual life, 
life lived in imitation di Christ; but that the very work itself would transform both 
man and the world to a Christian purpose. Rather than being a “secular” endeavour, 
Bacon saw his scientific revolution as a sacred duty, an inspired “return” to the life 
dedicated to the fundamental values and daily practices of “true religion”. Science 
was itself a mediation as it was modelled on and an imitation of the divine example 
given to man through the life of Jesus Christ. The reformation had introduced the 
bible in the vernacular and encouraged the faithful to cultivate an intensely personal, 
relationship with God and to practice devotional meditation in order to awaken the 
call of conscience. Men were save not by works, but by grace and grace came to only 
those whom God “awakened.” The ancient confidence self-sufficient reason was an 
error due to the immaturity of their age and the narrowness of their experience of the 
world.27 Fundamentally the error of the ancients rested in their historical 
inaccessibility to God’s grace which only came down to man with the sacrifice of 
Jesus as the saviour of mankind. Salvation and the embrace of a life lived in Christ 
was the experience which would change men and not scholastic debate about the truth 
or error of an ancient and misconceived science. Before true knowledge was possible, 
the will to knowledge had to be present and this was a matter of ethics and not 
ontology. Ethics became possible once man’s reason was turned towards the good 
and this was accomplished not by man, but by God’s who made himself known to 
man through his gifts, the greatest of which was the sacrifice of his only son.
Natural human reason was a flawed instrument incapable of discerning the 
Good or God without God’s direct intervention. Man’s reason was finite, partial, 
incomplete and most damning of all corrupted by original sin and remained plunged 
in darkness and ignorance until the coming of Jesus whose sacrifice alone made it 
once again possible for man to be saved from his error and redeemed in the face of
26 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 1”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 123
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God. Salvation came in the study of the bible, earnest prayer and redemptive grace 
found not in his own efforts but through the person of Jesus as the one true path, the 
mediating bridge between the sacred and the profane, man and God. Jesus Christ was 
the truth, the light and the way because he and he alone brought redemption from sin 
and only in Christ could man find God. It was through Christ and the imitation of 
Christ’s life and works that would place man on the right path to salvation and the 
sciences on the right path to true knowledge. Grace not only turned the mind towards 
the good, Christ and his charitable work in the world, but allowed the focus, discipline
7Qand unity of purpose which came from a heart transformed by salvation. The 
Christian path was not the prideful search for knowledge of God, but the embrace of 
God in one’s heart and it was in this submission, humiliation and sacrifice that truth 
would be found and useful works would be produced.
Reason, once turned towards the good and placed upon its proper path, would 
no longer be ensnared by the idle speculations of the mind, but would be rewarded 
with the profitable and productive “fruits" of a man‘s daily labour. Through the 
active production of the image of Christ held before the mind, man could reproduce in 
himself the very image of the God he needed to discipline his desires and effect his 
Christian purpose. The impotence of self-sufficient reason and the vanity of the pagan 
philosophers was a favourite theme of St. Augustine. In the City of God, he warns 
that man is flawed creature immersed in sin truth can come to man only after the 
intercession of God’s grace turning man away from “human sensation and reason” 
which lead only to “self-aggrandizement” and towards the source of truth in divine 
authority found in scripture.30 Bacon’s science aimed not a “vision” of the truth, but
27 Bacon, “Refutation o f  Philosophies”, m Farrington op. cit., p. 131
28 “I am come a light into the world, that whosever believeth on me should not abide in darkness.”,
Gospel o f John, 12: 46, The Holy Bible, op. cit., p. 632
29 Grace as the free gift o f God allowing the discipline to turn away from the desires o f the body 
towards the good is a strong protestant theme and can be seen in St. Augustine’s dramatic retelling of 
his own conversion experience in Book X o f the Confessions “There can be no hope for me except in 
your great mercy. Give me the grace to do as you command and command me to do what you w ill!
You command us to control our bodily desires.. .1 know that no man can be master o f himself, except 
o f God’s bounty” St. Augustine Confessions, Translated by R.S. Pine-Coffin (London.: Penguin) 1984, 
Book 10, section 29 p. 233
30 Augustine, The City o f  God, Chapter 45 Book XVIII, in Augustine: Political Writings, Translated by 
Michael W. Tkacz and Douglas Kries, (ed., Ernest L. Fortin and Douglas Kries) (Indiana.: Hackett) 
1994 pp. 135 - 136 The vanity o f worldly wisdom was also a great theme o f St. Paul, “For it is written 
I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and will bring to nothing the understanding o f the prudent.” First 
Epistle o f Paul to the Corinthians 1:19. Wisdom is not to be found in Greek “scribes” but in Christ,
“But of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who o f God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and 
sanctification and redemption: That according as it is written, He that glorieth, let him glory the Lord.”
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in the active production of works made possible by a correct moral orientation made 
possible by faith and the close adherence to scripture. Science, by engaging men in 
the active production of Christian charity would, in imitation di Christi, allow man to 
reorient his desires away from the prideful and sinful pursuit of knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake which had only produced error and vain philosophy. Christ had 
redeemed man and returned him to his original position as co-creator of the world 
with God. Bacon believed that coming of Christ had “accomplished the whole work 
o f the redemption and restitution of man to a state superior to the angels.” 31
Rather than being driven to work on the world through a restless insecurity, 
Bacon believed that Christ, as God on earth had been set as an example to be followed 
joyously and productively. Men who had heard the call, who had been transformed by 
grace were “those that are regenerate by the Holy Ghost; who breatheth where he will 
of free grace, which grace, as a seed incorruptible, quickenenth the spirit of man and 
conceiveth him anew, the son of God and the member of Christ.” 32 A Christian 
expressed is devotion to God through the active emulate of God and just as Christ had 
worked miracles to relieve the needs and wants of the poor, so would the sciences 
bring about “wonders” to relieve suffering and end poverty. Those whom God in his 
free gift of grace had chosen to redeem and restore had been reborn and remade, 
transformed by the intervention of God to once again take their place as agents and 
instruments of the divine will in its work upon the world.
Men were transformed because they had accepted God into their hearts and 
received the light of God changing them from ordinary men who pursued only their 
own selfish desires to those who worked in the service of God. Reason could not of 
its own accord access truth, but was dependent upon divine intervention to redeem it 
and release it from its obsessions with worldly desires and ambitions. Man in his 
unreformed state was a weak and pathetic creature, his will divided and confused, 
amongst a cacophony of multiple and competing desires, each as empty and 
unsatisfying as the next.33 In Augustine’s conception of human nature the
Corinthians 1: 30, The Holy Bible, op. cit. p. 671
31 Bacon, “A Confession o f  Faith” in Vickers, op. cit., p. 110
32 Bacon, “A Confession o f  Faith” in Vickers, op. cit. p. 111
33 St. Augustine discusses the multitude o f bodily desires in food, drink and sex in the “gratification o f  
corrupt nature, gratification o f the eye, the empty pomp o f living.” Through salvation and God’s 
“abundant grace” to “quench the fire o f  sensuality” Confessions, Book X section 30, op. cit. pp 233 - 
234. St Paul o f course was always at war with his body and its desires. St. Paul, Romans 7:22 “For I 
delight in God after the inward man; 23 But I see another law in my members warring against the law
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fundamental Christian dualism between spirit and matter necessitated an 
understanding of soul which as a created thing was not divine itself, but made in the 
image of the creator. The soul was not spirit, but made in the image of spirit whose 
fundamental purpose was to reflect the glory of God’s divine nature by turning from 
the ways of the world towards the infinite perfection of God’s glory. 34 Augustine had 
then been able to place free will at the centre of his doctrine in which man and not 
God was responsible for the evil in the world brought about by man’s disobedience 
which had resulted in the fall and original sin. For Bacon, as with Augustine, faith 
made reason possible, because it removed from man the stain of original sin which 
had so corrupted his judgement and perverted his knowledge.
Reason was impotent without faith because it was faith that made God’s 
redemptive grace possible and faith was a matter of will and will was moved not by 
the persuasive force of reason, but by the divine intervention of God. The enlightened 
mind, was the location of understanding which intuitively apprehended the truth of 
the Christian revelation as well as God’s divine laws and decrees, but putting this 
knowledge into action required the motive or active force of the will, appetite and 
affection as the (e)motive force of execution. Unlike in Aristotle, where knowledge 
of the good naturally propels men (and all natural beings) to the realisation of their 
own good, Bacon takes on the Augustinian principle of free will as the free choice 
between good and evil. Moral choice or orientation is therefore constituted as a free, 
undetermined and autonomous choice of the individual, as opposed to a natural 
disposition towards ethics, determinate of man as a particular species-kind of animal. 
For Bacon, reason does not possess any active, compulsive power of its own, but 
merely presents or represents) the good, through the faculty of imagination in order 
to move the will towards good and away from evil. Reason, does not deliberate on 
the best means to realise its own good, known or recognised intuitively through the 
understanding, because understanding does not come through the senses, but in being
o f my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.”, The Holy Bible, 
0|>. cit., p. 665
3 “For wherever the soul o f man may turn, unless it turns to you, it clasps sorrow to itself’ because 
worldly things have no permanence and the soul “is tom by desires that can destroy it. In these things 
there can be no rest, because they do not last.” St. Augustine, Confessions, Book IV, section 10, op.
cit. p. 80
35 “It is not, therefore an inferior thing that makes the will evil, but it is the created will itself which has 
become evil by wrongly and inordinately seeking an inferior thing.” St. Augustine, The City o f  God, 
Book X I 1, chapter 6 , in Augustine's Political Writings, eds. Fortin and Kries, op. cit. pp 86 - 87,
36 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2” in Vickers op. cit., p. 217
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one of God’s chosen.37 Once reoriented to the good, reason is free to actively 
construct through its faculty of imagination ,the images which in turn produce and 
maintain an alliance between appetite and affections. An active imagination produces 
the right kind of passions to restrain the appetites or direct them to the good, 
understood as discipline through method and obedience to law (both divine and 
positive).
Images work as a device to make and re-make impressions on the memory and 
allow it to hold to a correct (and corrected) path, free of the distortions and impurities 
accumulated from an immature (and undisceming) natural reason. Men’s minds 
could not be trusted in their natural state having been clouded and distorted by the 
“idols” endemic to the human condition. From birth, man’s mind already a flawed 
and finite instrument is further compromised by the needs and demands of the body 
and its necessary interaction with the world and all its sin. Salvation itself is a kind of 
purification which comes with a mature understanding cleansed through the reading 
of the gospels and the moral choice of having opened one’s heart to the call of God. It 
is the conversion process which “wipes away the sin of the world” creating a blank 
slate realising the mind from the accumulated corruption a lifetime of irrational and 
contingent customs habits and beliefs.
Freed from the cloud of prejudice, tradition and arbitrary social convention,
the mind was no longer a tarnished glass, but a polished mirror ready and able to hold
and reflect the true image of God through Christ. Knowledge once obscured becomes
possible only because the love of god turned or (re-turned) man’s will to its correct
“end”, redeeming and transforming him through the active intervention of grace. A
purified reason is one that has a “corrected” understanding because it is directed to the
right end, love of God from which flows a moral life manifested in the obedience to
his laws and the practice of Christian charity. Passion and not reason moves men, and
all the moral philosophies of the ancients, based as they are on rules and arguments
simply do not hold a candle to the transformative power of divine love :
But these heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state 
of mind which religion and the holy faith doth conduct unto men, imprinting 
upon their souls Charity, which is excellently called the bond of Perfection, 
because it comprehended and fasteneth all virtues together...that love teaches a 
man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor., .because with all his
37 Understanding is not a matter of sense perception , but o f  reason apprehending the good made 
possible by hearing the word o f God. Christ speaks in parables “.. .that the seeing they may not see and 
hearing they might not understand.” Luke 8: 10, The Holy Bible op. cit., p. 605
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rules and preceptions he cannot form a man so dexterously nor with that facility 
to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do; so certainly if a man’s mind 
be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection 
than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of 
the other. 38
Without the conviction of passion to direct the mind, reason alone would be impotent
to command the will because the will follows the desires of the heart which are
determined, not by knowledge, but by the imagination. It is the active production of
“images” constantly held before the mind’s eye that fixes the will upon the correct
path, without which the memory can become distant and faded and the will less
resolved and more likely to fall back into bad habits or give into the demands and
temptations of its natural state:.
Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were 
there should be no great use of persuasions or insinuations to the will, more than 
naked prepositional proofs, but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditions 
of the affections... reason would become captive and servile if Eloquence of 
Persuasion did not practice and win confederacy between reason and 
imagination against affections - For the affections themselves carry ever an 
appetite for the good as doth reason, the difference is that the affections behold 
merely the present, reason beholdth the future and some of time and therefore 
the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but 
after the force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future remote 
appear present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.39
Man is by nature a beast ruled by his passions and desires and it is only by keeping
the Good present before the mind or there is every likelihood that his appetites will
drive him to revert to his former irrational and chaotic nature:
...but every beast returned to his own nature; wherein is aptly described the 
nature and condition of men; who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires, of 
profit, of lust, of revenge, which as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to 
religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, 
of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained. But if these instruments 
be silent, or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve 
into anarchy and confusion.40
Persuasion, through rhetoric moves the heart and turns the will to reason and truth 
and away from the compulsions of desire and appetite that constantly threaten to undo 
the alliance of reason and imagination that keeps man under the sway of good and not
38 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning” Book 2, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 263
39 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 239
40 Bacon, “Advancement o f  Learning, Book 1”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 154
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evil.
Bacon self-consciously employs metaphor, poetry and rhetoric in order to 
move the passions and stimulate the imagination because it is in the free choice of the 
will, inspired by religion, that holds the truth of reason before the mind of man and 
persuades him to the Good. Virtue does not come naturally, but is a “culture of the 
mind”, a matter of strategy, a medicine applied to the soul through the ministrations of 
poets and writers of history and most importantly by the “observances or exercises” as 
“they keep the mind in continual obedience”.41 Moral philosophy can only be the 
handmaid to religion, because it is through divine inspiration and love of God and the 
desire to imitate him in good works that “sets before man “honest and good ends and 
insures that he will be resolute, constant and true onto them.” 42 Chastising Aristotle 
for his “negligence” in matters of ethics he remarks that “those things which consist 
by nature nothing can be changed by custom” and that by “allowing his conclusion 
that vice and virtue consist in habit, he ought so much more to have taught the manner 
of super-inducing inducing that habit:43” Super-inducing meaning to change and 
transform through the application of force, something that the mere “disputations on 
pleasure and pain” were wholly incapable of producing. What was required was not 
persuasion based upon a rational apprehension of the good, but rhetoric understood as 
“force and operation upon the mind to affect the will and appetite to alter manners44” 
Bacon proposes to counter the power of passion with passion thereby balancing their 
power, as one would set factions in the state against each other to neutralise and check 
each other’s force. Reason has no persuasive power over the passions with the result 
that one must “set affection against affection and to master one by another,” thereby 
“employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and 
bridling of the rest.”45
Fear and hope are of course the paradigmatic Christian passions and it is 
Christian love which transforms the soul and inspires it to the imitation of the 
example of Christ whose passion for man knew no bounds up to and including his 
ultimate sacrifice of life itself through his death on the cross. Christ and his actions in 
the world were Bacon‘s inspiration and through this inspiration he hoped to re-orient
41 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers., op. cit., p. 262
42 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers., op. cit., p. 262
43 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 260
44 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers., op. cit., p 260
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the sciences and place them on the firm foundation of true knowledge. While 
Augustine and Paul had felt themselves remade and bom again through grace, Bacon 
harnessed this conversion and salvation experience to be the basis of his new method 
and new science. Christian science, based on the works of Christ and not men, would 
transform not only himself and his disciples through charitable acts, but would 
transform the world itself as God had originally intended.
While Augustine and Paul had remained pessimistic about man’s capacity for 
good works while his mortal body remained mired in sin, Bacon believed that Christ 
had pointed the way towards salvation and through science man could not only 
perform Gods work on earth but do so through Christian acts of charity in the relief of 
man’s estate. Christ4 s passion for man had been shown in his acts, and it was he who 
“made the body of man the object of his miracles as the soul was the object of his 
doctrine.4446 Christ life was one of self sacrifice and service, dedicated to the glory of 
God and the relief of man’s estate through Christian charity. Once knowledge was 
placed upon a correct foundation and inspired by the its imitation of Christ’s life and 
works man’s progress would be as limitless as God’s goodness. Bacon’s Novum 
Organum or New Method was self-consciously designed to overturn and overcome 
the errors of the past in order that there would be a regeneration and instauration of 
the sciences. Meditation on Christ’s life and works was both a model and a metaphor 
for a renewed and reborn science that would transform the world as grace itself had 
transformed the soul of man. Science and technology based in the truth of experience 
and not in the vanity of words would bring into being the very “fruits” of knowledge, 
in the service of Christian Charity inaugurating a whole new epoch of human history. 
A scientific revolution had been launched and scholasticism would be left utterly 
behind, the past far from grounding the present, had become nothing other than an 
irrelevant and archaic curiosity. Bacon’s new experimental method would literally 
wipe the slate clean “opening” the way to a whole new world; empiricism would 
found an empire, a new world empire; one that would infinitely expand into the 
infinite expanse. The past would be left further and further behind as infinite cycles of 
technological advance which would make and remake the world anew in the endless 
production of a future which could know neither limit nor end.
45 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers., op. cit., p. 261
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Method as the Disciplining and Producing Machine
Purging the mind of vain philosophy required not only that the vain errors of past 
custom, tradition and prejudice be rooted out and eradicated, but a new method by 
instituted to discipline the mind to keep it from error. Not only are the methods and 
metaphysics of “the schoolmen“ discredited and dismantled, but a program of re­
education is initiated in order that “clouds” and “distortions” be wiped from the 
mirror of the mind in order that it reflect nature purely and accurately. The new 
system of science will not only capture and describe nature as it really is, but more 
importantly, prepare and equip the mind to receive and reproduce the secrets of nature 
through the mediation of correct method. Man’s mind as well as the “objects” of his 
inquiry must first be ordered and disciplined, prepared and digested into recognisable 
form through which the a correct interpretation of nature then becomes possible. 
Method, and not man’s natural capacities, therefore holds the key to success because 
it, and it alone, returns man universal because original position. Bacon’s new and 
improved method would generate the very fruits and fertility that would verify its 
truth. Progress, understood as the “advance” and “improvement” of productive 
techniques would in turn serve as the universal standard and measure that would 
discipline science itself and keep it to its proper course; the invention and production 
of yet more new methods of production and invention. As the future was infinite; so 
was the technological invention and improvement; as long as it stayed to its proper 
course of action work on the world “for the use and benefit of all mankind.” 
Technology would not only be guided by Christian charity it would become Christian 
charity; and as such it would embody and manifest the divine in all of its infinite, 
eternal and universal infinite aspects and possibilities.
The mistake of the past had not been to assume aspects of the divine, but to 
misuse those aspects of divinity that God had given man in the creation. The error lay 
not in man’s capacities, so much as the “end” to which these capacities had been 
directed. Divine things such as “essence” or “purpose” were unknowable because 
divine and any such attempt would only spin the infinite webs of vain philosophy as 
would be expected in the contemplation of divine things. Because man possessed a 
soul and the soul was an infinite thing, akin to the divine it was attracted by its nature
46 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers., op. cit., p. 210
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to divine things; but this is where its prideful over-reaching lead it into error. Man’s 
reason, unlike God’s was not infinite and as such when it turned towards the 
contemplation of divine things it would be subsumed within an infinite web of its own 
errors and imaginations. The “idols“ of the mind were “idols“ in the literal sense that 
the mind in its pride mistook its own images and productions for the actual divine 
things themselves. Man, because he was not God, could not know divine things, but 
man, because he was made in the image of God could recognise and reflect the divine 
on the “mirror of the mind” and thus harness divinity to a human purpose.
There was however the danger of not keeping to the correct path; and that
danger could only be avoided and overcome through the institution of method. Man’s
greatest gift was also his greatest curse, and the mind, left to its own devises, would
under the motive force of pride, always steer man into error. Through Christ, and
Christ alone, could the human mind be remade and restored to its original condition in
the divine “image” in “a reasonable soul, in innocence, in free will and in
sovereignty.”47 Method was the machine to keep man to his proper path and in so
doing direct his divine gift to the divine purpose; not the contemplation of divine
things, but the production of useful effects. Bacon understood himself to be creating a
whole new practice that would liberate man from his natural condition and elevate
him to his god given place in the cosmos as the divinely inspired co-creator of the
world. Bacon’s reformation changed the purpose of scientific inquiry from the world
of discourse and contemplation to the world of action and transformation. As Christ
performed miracles, works and acts, the new scientist would perform action into
nature and nature rather than being the model of the good would be the raw material
upon which experimental method would work:
.. .For what I am establishing in the human understanding is a true model of the 
world, as it is found to be, not what anyone’s own reasoning shall have dictated 
to him. And this cannot come unless the world is most carefully dissected and 
anatomised.48
The inadequacies of man’s natural reason would be overcome through the discipline 
of method which like a meditation would in itself turn man‘s mind to the good.
Method literally keeps the mind “on track” by restricting its operation to its proper 
“objects” it orders the mind, turning it away from the waste, futility and frustrations of
47 Bacon, “Confession o f  Faith”, in Vickers, op. cit., p.109
48 Bacon, Novum Orgcmum, Book 1, Aphorism 124, op. cit., pp. 125-126
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its own natural inclinations, to the productivity, fertility and fulfilment of its use in 
furthering the divine purpose. By guiding and controlling the mind, method acts as a 
universal leveller and engine through which any mind (and all minds) can be 
harnessed and co-ordinated concentrating and channelling their collective productive 
energy to the universal purpose of technological progress.
Method is more than a means (and embraces any number of means), it 
embodies an end in itself, as it is techno logos, or the logic of technique, more than 
the products of technique, that secures and guarantees the advancement of the 
sciences.
The human soul because it was divinely inspired was prone, given its natural 
inclination towards prideful over-reaching, to entangle itself in the webs and mazes of 
infinite speculations without end or purpose.49 In Bacon, as with all Christian 
philosophy, there is the strict separation of soul and world; inspiration and 
knowledge; faith and reason. Bacon while following the conventional path of denying 
reason access to matters of faith, nevertheless uses this limit to a channel and direct 
man’s divinely inspired reason to its proper purpose and end. By narrowing the track; 
Bacon in effect concentrates, focuses and channels the force of man’s power by using 
the mind as “mirror” of the divine to master nature and reason far from being shorn of 
its power is in fact re-engineered and emerges renewed and remade, ready, willing 
and able to fulfil its divinely ordained destiny.50 Although man is not privileged to 
God’s intention and purpose in the creation, he nevertheless has a unique access point 
into the workings of nature, precisely because his mind has been created in the 
“image” of the creator. Bacon ceases upon the identity or affinity between soul and 
divine substance to open a new path for human knowledge as he turns the mind away 
from the divine and towards the natural world.
The mind because it has a unique vocation to knowledge of the good can be 
reoriented and redeployed by method to receive and reflect the laws underlying the 
divine creation. The corruption of the fall can be undone by undoing the
49 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 215
50 The Christian assimilation o f man to the divine comes from the “liberty” o f  salvation. St. Paul, 
Romans 8: 15 “the Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit that we are the children o f God.” And (21) 
“Because the creature itself shall be delivered from the bondage o f corruption into the glorious liberty 
of the children o f God.” The Holy Bible., op. cit., p. 665 The idea o f mind as a “mirror” is also a 
Pauline idea, “But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory o f  the Lord, are changed into 
the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit o f the Lord.” Corinthians 11 3:18, The Holy 
Bible op. cit., p. 680
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undisciplined abuse of free will through the institution of method. Once man regains
his own self-mastery he will, once again, possess within himself, the means to
establish and maintain his God given position as co-creator and master of creation:
Also, he hath placed the world in man’s heart, yet cannot man find out the work 
which God worketh from the beginning to the end: declaring not obscurely that 
God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass capable of the image of 
the universal world, and joyful to receive the impression thereof, as the eye 
joyeth to receive light; and not only to be raised also to find out and discern the 
ordinances and decrees which throughout all those changes are infallibly 
observed.51
While the “ordinances” and “decrees” had traditionally referred to the law of God 
inscribed within the hearts of men understood as the call of conscience, Bacon 
broadens this understanding of “law” to include the “natural laws” which the mind 
can “know” as an “an image of the universal world”. God’s law was a universal law 
that penetrated the whole of creation and could be made visible to the mind of man as 
an “image” reflected on a glass wiped clean of distortions, by the saving power grace 
and the proper application of method.
Method is serves in its dual productive capacity; inwardly transforming the 
mind capacity; so that it may be redirected outward to transform the world. Method is 
both the foundation upon which all subsequently knowledge is produced, but more 
importantly is the productive instrument itself which not only makes knowledge 
possible by brings it into being. Method bridges the gap between knower and known 
because it takes the raw material of both mind and matter and unifies them in the very 
act of production itself, like the divine creation which it imitates, method instantiates 
a whole new order of things. Bacon speaks of method, not only as a necessary aid to 
reason, or as an instrument or support, but more fundamentally as the source of man‘s 
knowledge and productive power. Bacon employs the metaphor of a compass which 
enables the drawing of a perfect circle, something which cannot be done by hand 
alone, adding that :
Methods of procedure are potentially things themselves. I mean that the value 
of any thing or effect will be determined by the value of the method of 
production. Now if the methods followed in the constitution of your philosophy 
are not the right ones, if they cannot pass the test, obviously the hopes you 
cherish of a good result will be in vain.52
51 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning Book 1”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 123
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Things and effects do not possess a value (or telos) of themselves, but are the products 
of the methods or procedures used to produce them, so that the things of the natural 
world are understood not as essential objects, but as underlying processes. Bacon 
redefines science from the knowledge of things as an account of their eternal natures 
(the what-ness of things) to the knowledge of things in an account of their natural 
history (the how-ness of things).
Christian Charity and the Transformation of the World
Science had been redefined by redefining its end; technological production was not 
only a means, but more importantly and end in itself. The direct intervention of God 
in history had shown man the way the truth and the light, man must now follow this 
example and redeem himself and his world through the work that would perfect both. 
A devotion to Christian charity was to be a new end for a new age made possible by a 
regeneration of faith. Bacon would harness Christian truth to transform man’s natural 
reason to the productivity and fertility that had been its promise from the very 
beginning. In order to perform this work Bacon had invented method as the machine 
which would produce the experiments which would transform the world by acting 
upon the underlying processes of nature. The scientist would directly intervene in 
these processes to “super induce” a material change in natural objects thereby 
transforming them from one thing to another. “Form” in Bacon’s philosophy has 
been “purged of its theological content in that it is now “absolutely abstracted from 
matter and not confined and determined by matter.”53 Form is not a final or “formal” 
cause; a telos or purpose inhering in matter directing change, but “only” an efficient 
and material causes which produces change as objects change from one “form” to 
another. Change being the constant state of things, it does not indicate a self­
defining purpose, it is merely motion as such; the product and result of a fixed (and 
limited) set of underlying processes which together, and in their various 
combinations, explained the production of all things in their infinite diversity.
Bacon uses the analogy of letters in an alphabet, to convey the idea of basic 
parts whose rules or laws of recombination and rearrangement provide the structure
52 Bacon, “Refutation of Philosophies”, in Farrington, op. cit., p. 128
53 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 196
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through which all surface phenomenon can be explained.54 By looking for the finite 
processes which produce things, rather than the individual things themselves, the 
scientist will avoid the classical problem of the proliferation of forms. Classes and 
kinds of things because they inhabit the world of definition can be infinitely disputed 
and admit of no final resolution. Systematic inquiry requires method as a tool to 
correct the unaided “failing of the human understanding which left to its own nature is 
given to abstractions and assumes to be constant those things that are in flux.”55 
Definitions find no resolution because they move in the world of ideas and ideas can 
be constructed and deconstructed at will because they are merely the conventions of 
the mind. There is no defining “essence” or “ontological” substance which could ever 
end the disputation, the mind does not come to rest upon a final conception of eternal 
form, but spins endlessly in webs of infinite speculations. Understanding Bacon’s 
reinterpretation of metaphysics requires a detailed analysis of the text itself. Bacon 
writes:
Forms of Substances 1 say (as they are now by compounding and transplanting 
multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be enquired; no more than it 
were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds 
which make words, which by composition and transportation of letters are 
infinite. But on the other side, to enquire the form of those sounds or voices 
which make simple letters is easily comprehensible and being known induceth 
and manifesteh the forms of all words, which consist and are compounded of 
them. In the same manner to enquire the Form of a lion, of an oak of gold, nay 
of water, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to enquire the Forms of sense, of voluntary 
motion, of vegetation, of colours... of heat, of cold and all other natures and 
qualities, which like an alphabet are not many, and of which the essences 
(upheld by matter) of all creatures do consist; to enquire I say the true forms of 
these, is that part of Metaphysic which we now define of.
Things only exist in their individual, unique, particularity and as such do not possess 
or participate in an idea or form which somehow transcends, perfects or completes 
them. The objects of science therefore are not things, but the processes of change 
and transformation which produce them. Things exist only in their individuality and 
are therefore ultimately unknowable; what is knowable are the fixed number of 
underlying natural processes by and through which individual things “change” from 
one thing to another, or in other words change their “form.”
Science is about “transforming” nature because it is about “super-inducing”
54 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 196
55 Bacon, Novum Orgcmum, Book 1, Aphorism 5 1, op. cit., p. 60
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change from one form to another in order to understand the underlying processes of 
change by and through which natural things come and go out of existence. Bacon’s 
empirical method is not one of passive observation, but direct intervention because it 
is only by intervening in these natural processes that one establishes a point of origin 
from which the resulting change can be observed. Man intervenes through the 
experiment to produce an effect; the scientist because he knows he has produced the 
effect knows the cause of the effect (his intervention) and therefore knows the process 
by and through which that particular change has been effected. Science is not the 
passive observation of natural processes, but the production of change through the 
manipulation of natural processes wherein the “moving principles” of how things 
come to be or transform from one state to another are revealed and literally “made” 
known.56
Natural things may appear to be in a state of flux and change, but there are 
underlying laws of motion or change, which if brought within the frame of science 
will reveal their secrets. The concept of form, therefore, if it is to have any meaning 
at all, must reflect this new interest. In Aphorism 51, Bacon instructs that the 
scientist:
.. .rather than turn Nature into abstractions, it is better to dissect her, as did the 
school of Democritus, which delved further into Nature than others. Matter 
rather should be our study and its schematisms and changes of schematism, and 
pure action and the law of action or motion; for forms are fictions of the mind, 
unless we choose to call those laws of action forms.57
As such scientific investigation will never progress if it merely observes nature in its
surface manifestations, but must delve into nature and “vex” her in order to wrest
from her the secrets which are hidden within her inner workings. Knowledge and
power therefore become intimately intertwined because metaphysics is not about the
passive contemplation of eternal form; but about the active manipulation of nature for
a human purpose. Knowledge of the underlying processes of change:
.. .doth enfranchaise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of 
works and effects . For Physics carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, 
subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous 
courses of nature.. .For physical causes give light to new inventions “in simili 
materia”, but whosoever knoweth any form knoweth the utmost possibility of 
super inducing that nature upon any variety of matter and is so less restrained in
Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 66, op. cit. p. 73
57 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 51, op. cit., p. 61
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operation...58
Man is empowered by method to be unrestrained in operation and knowledge is 
power in that knowledge is knowledge only in so far as it produces a change; causes 
and effect moves natural objects from one form to another. Method therefore not only 
arranges the materials and produces the experiments; it is productive of the very 
change which is the source of knowledge and explanation itself.
The scientist can no longer be content to merely observe and learn from nature
because nature does not open herself to the human mind. There is no longer a direct
correspondence between the knowing mind and the thing known because there is no
underlying intellectual principle, no divine nous, common to the soul of man and the
natural world. Creature and creator are absolutely separate and the mind of man being
a product of the creator must leam to know the material world as an object completely
other than itself a mere object for his manipulation. Knowledge isn’t knowledge if it
is not productive of useful effects; there is no point to the endless collection of
abstractions which serve only to clutter the mind without order or purpose. Order and
purpose do not exist in nature; nature is a dumb material upon which order and
purpose are imposed by the scientist. Likening empiricists to ants who only “gather
and consume” and rationalist who like spiders who “only spin webs out of
themselves” he recommends the bee who adopts the middle course in:
.. .drawing her material from the flowers of the garden or the field, but 
transforming it by a faculty peculiar to herself. Such should be the activity of a 
genuine philosophy. It should draw its material from natural history and 
mechanical experience, but not take it unaltered into the memory, but digest and 
assimilate it for storing in the understanding.59
Man has a unique place in creation and although is a creature himself he is 
nevertheless is in possession of a soul which was created in the divine image. Man, 
resembled God in his possession of a free will which when properly harnessed and 
channelled to the good would imitate and therefore continue the divine work of 
creation. Bacon’s empiricism, is not that of passive observation, but of active 
intervention, in which the experiment allows human action to produce and reproduce 
changes in natural things, thereby identifying “causes” which produce “works and 
“effects”. Man, like God is a world creator through the productive power which like
58 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., pp. 197-198
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the divine force itself stamped its impressions upon a lifeless, inert and unformed 
matter. Man could imitate God as the author of created things, but only by first 
establishing and then harnessing the laws of nature through which his power was 
made manifest in the world. The experiment substitutes, man for God as the author 
and origin of an action which forces or produces a change in “appearance” from one 
state to another. Man’s actions into the world as disciplined by scientific method are 
thereby equated to God’s actions as they are a direct extension of the creation through 
th e hands of man.
Fruits and Fertility; The Production of Useful Effects
Although Aristotle had begun from sense experience of things he nevertheless 
subordinated his science to “demonstrations” based upon first principles intuitively 
known by the mind. Aristotle’s error had been to aspire to the “essence” of things 
when no such “essence” existed. Proof was not in rational argumentation that made 
visible the definition of things, but in acts and works that produced useful effects. As 
Christ brought knowledge through productive works that bore fruit, so the truth of 
charitable works would be found in their fertility. St. Paul in the First Epistle to the 
Colossians, sets the example and the standard of “truth” that Bacon will follow: 
Colossians 1:6
Which is come unto you, as it is in all the world; and bringeth forth fruit as it 
doth also in you, since the day ye heard of it and knew the grace of God in 
truth...(9) and to desire that ye might be filled with the knowledge of his will in 
all wisdom and spiritual understanding (10) That ye might walk worthy of the 
Lord unto all pleasing, being fruitful in every good work, and increasing in 
knowledge of God.60
The generation of productive works would be the “fruits” that would guarantee the 
“truth” of the experiment. Fertility is the proof of power; genesis and generation 
being the sign and proof of the creative power unique to God and man.61 Bacon 
warns that without the proof of experience and useful effects science will not 
progress:
59 Bacon, “Refutation o f  Philosophies” in Farrington, op. cit., p. 131
60 The Epistle o f Paul to the Colossians, 1:6,9 - 10, The Holy Bible, op. cit., p. 693
61 “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you and ordained you, that ye should go and bring forth 
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give it to you.” John 15: 16 The Holy Bible p. 634
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.. .the best demonstration by far is experience, so long as it holds fast to the 
experiment itself. For if it is to be transferred to other cases which are thought 
to be similar, unless this transfer is made correct and regular procedure, the 
result is false. But the method of learning from experience in current use is blind 
and silly, so that while men roam and wander along without any definite course, 
merely taking counsel of such things as happen to come before them, they range 
widely, yet move little further forward...62
Demonstration was not of the realm of argument and words, but in the realm of action 
and production. Things were not “known” so much as produced or brought into being 
through the control of the underlying processes which determined their existence. In 
Bacon’s new method experiment featured as an intervention into nature in order to 
produce effects thereby harnessing and directing the natural productive capacity of 
nature itself, but through the channel of human intention. The point of intervention 
would thereby determine the beginning of the process and as such turn nature to a 
human and therein a divine purpose.
Human purpose however was not to be found in the arbitrary and contingent 
whims of individual psuedo scientists such as alchemists and magicians who dabbled 
in the sciences to suit their own fancies and to advance their own egoistic interests.63 
Serious scientific investigation was not any individual’s personal plaything, but was 
and could only be a collective effort in which each and every man gave up his own 
selfish will and desires in order to align his mind and his actions with the divine 
purpose. Only the proper application of method to science would ensure both the 
internal and external discipline that a collective and cumulative human endeavour 
required. Progress however cannot be guaranteed by the fruits alone, but must press 
on to the search for the causes “productive” and “generative” of the fruit itself.
Bacon again deploys the Biblical metaphor to convey his distinction between the 
production of useful and practical works and the axioms, which as underlying 
principles, are the real source of nature‘s power and the proper object of scientific 
inquiry:
Whereas in the true course of experience, one that will bring new works, divine 
wisdom and order should be the pattern before us. For God on the first day of 
creation created light only, devoting to that task an entire day, in which He 
created no material substance. In the same way and from experience of every
62 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 70, op. cit., pp. 78 - 79
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kind, we should first of all discover causes and elicit true axioms; and seek 
experiments that bring light, not fruit. Indeed axioms that are correctly devised 
and established assist in practical application to no small degree and bring hosts 
and troops of works in their train.
It is in the creative power of God that he demonstrates his ability to generate works 
and it is to that creative power as knowledge of axioms and causes that science must 
turn if it is to restore to man and regenerate the world.
These laws of nature however, do not readily appear before man, as both 
nature and his natural understanding have become corrupted by the fall. Because of 
original sin man was condemned to struggle for his existence against a resistant nature 
and it would only be by the “sweat of his brow and the labour of his hands” that man 
would win his earthly existence. “It is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but the 
glory of a king to discover a thing”; it is nature’s way to “play hide and seek”, but in 
his compassion and indulgence God “chose the human soul to be his companion in 
play in this game”.65 Man approaches nature as a hunter hoping to trap his prey in an 
experiment, nature is put through her paces exposing the underlying processes hidden 
in her depths. Man acts into nature, thereby intervening into the natural process of 
change and transformation, substituting any number of as yet undetermined causes, 
for a single cause, originating in man. Nature does not simply display her “mysteries” 
but must be tricked and coaxed and finally mastered. The experiment is the art, or 
artefact “freely” made by man to impose order upon nature and make her subject to 
his will;
I arrange it as a history, not only of Nature free and untrammelled (that is where 
she flows along of her own accord and on her own business) but much more of 
Nature constrained and vexed by which I mean when by art and intervention of 
man, she is forced out of her natural state and is pressed and moulded.66
Domination, replaces imitation, and the cause of change is identified by and through 
man’s direct intervention in the form of the controlled experiment.
Bacon recommends that tables be established to order and arrange experiments 
in a collaborative effort to flesh out the “light” bearing axioms necessary to the 
accumulation process. Bacon knows his task to be a mighty one, but he has hope for 
the future and a plan to put it into practice. The great number of particulars, which
64 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 70, op. cit., p. 79
65 Bacon, Novum Organum, Preface, op. cit., p. 15
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seems “like an army, an army scattered and confused” can be “disposed and arranged 
in appropriate tables of discovery” which will if “well prepared and digested” afford 
the necessary assistance to the inquiring mind. 67 Knowledge, says Bacon, is 
“worthiest when charged with least multiplicity - simple forms or differences of 
things which are few in number” as it is not the proliferation o f forms but their 
combination or “the degrees and co-ordinates which make all this variety.” The 
experiment will examine and eliminate definitions and ideas, until an affirmative one 
is discovered.69 The elementary processes are declared to be finite in number “for the 
particular phenomena of the arts of Nature are only a handful compared to the fanciful 
speculations of the intellect” leading him to boldly proclaim that if there were 
“someone among us who could answer our questions concerning the operation of
70Nature, the discovery of all causes and sciences would be a matter of a few years.” 
Science is the business of accumulating knowledge with the result that the 
only “legitimate” practice is one aimed at locating and securing the source of power 
and productivity identified in mastering and controlling the underlying processes of 
nature. In an authoritative address to the new generations of scientist, entitled the 
“Masculine Birth of Time” Bacon promises his followers that they will no longer 
have to sit at Nature’s feet learning her lessons but will instead assert power and 
control, directing nature to a human purpose. Bacon mixes the metaphor of the 
master/servant with the sexual one of masculine generative power in bringing “Nature 
with all her children” within the scientists power allowing him “to bind her to your 
service and make her your slave” which will in turn “stretch the deplorable narrow 
limits of man‘s domination over the universe to their promised bounds.”71 No longer 
would man be bound by a passive imitation of nature, but would forceful assert his 
sovereignty through the use of his arts and inventions so that “the mind can exercise
77 *its rightful authority over the nature of things.” Bacon is very conscious that he is 
changing the standards upon which science is to be pursued and makes the direct link 
between knowledge and the human interest, directing and determining the collective
66 Bacon, Novum Organum, Plan o f  Work, op. cit., p. 25
67 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 102, op. cit., pp. 109-110
68 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning, Book 1”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 197
69 Bacon, Novum, Organum , Book 1, Aphorism 105, op. cit., p. 111
70 Bacon, Novum, Organum, Book 1, Aphorism, 112 , op. cit., p. 116
71 Bacon, “Masculine Birth o f Time”, in Farrington, op. cit., p. 62
72 Bacon, Novum Organum Preface, op. cit., p.7
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research project:
The other part of Invention, which I term Suggestion, doth assign and direct us 
to certain marks or Places which may excite our mind to return and produce 
such knowledge as it hath formerly collected to the end we may make use 
thereof.. .For as Plato saith “Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh 
for in a general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it”? And 
therefore the larger your Anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is 
your search.73
Not only is a Bacon clear that the researcher must design his inquiries with his
ultimate end in mind, but equally, that it is only by those ends themselves that the
outcome of the research can be judged. Bacon is aware that it is not by appeal to “the
evidence” alone that determines the success or failure of theories because each theory
carries within it it’s own criteria of judgement. Bacon cites the example of the
controversy in astronomy raging in his own time:
Both those who accept the rotation of the earth and those who hold to the old 
scheme show an equal desire to “save the appearances.” Nay, the astronomical 
tables suit either system. So in natural philosophy, but even more easily, can 
men think up theories, all differing from one another and all logically self- 
consistent. They all appeal to the same stock of experience, the same vulgar 
instances, which in the present state of philosophy exercise men’s wits, but each 
uses them to support a different system.74
The rival claims dividing the old from the new cosmology cannot be determined by a 
simple appeal to the “facts” because it is not the facts alone, but their interpretation 
within a system of demonstration and logic determined by different “ends” directing 
different standards of evaluations. Bacon1 s new method is cannot be assessed within 
the old system because its purposes are different and as such must be held to a 
different standard:
.. .the end I propose for my science is the discovery not of arguments but of 
Arts, not of things that are consistent with first principles, but of the principles 
themselves, not of probable reasons, but of indicators and directions of works.
As my intention is different so is the result. The result of the one is to overcome 
an opponent by disputations of the other to overcome Nature by Action.75
The intention and end to which Bacon directs his new science is nothing less than to 
“lay down firmer foundations for the power and grandeur of man, and extend their
73 Bacon, “Advancement of Learning Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 224
74 Bacon, “The Refutation o f Philosophies” in Farrington, op. cit., p. 117
75 Bacon, Novum Organum, Plan o f  Work, op. cit., p. 19
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limits more widely.” 76 As such knowledge and power become synonymous in
Bacon’s scientific utopia as truth is demonstrated not by reference to some “imaginary
higher principle” but by their success and generative power.
Bacon consciously resets the standards upon which natural philosophy is to be
judged and then employs his considerable rhetorical skills to condemn ancient
philosophy because it fails to meet not its own standards, but Bacon’s new purpose.
Bacon’s argument with the ancients is one of purpose and as such it is one of values
allowing Bacon to dismiss ancient philosophy precisely because it doesn’t further the
dreams of unlimited power and control over nature animating Bacon’s reformation
theology. In another essay entitled the “Refutation of Philosophies” Bacon advises
his new scientist to attend not to arguments but to “signs”.
Let us then retrace our steps and examine the “signs”. There is no “sign” more 
certain and more noble than that from fruits. In religion we are warned that faith 
be shown by works. It is although right to apply the same test to philosophy.77
Complaints are levelled against ancient philosophy because it is “barren of works”
and “impotent”, capable of generating nothing but “chatter”, proving its “immaturity”
by its lack of “fertility”. Man has so disabused his reason and neglected his proper
vocation, that he in fact has lowered himself, even below the animals:
As the next “sign” take the question of an abundant harvest of works. I say that 
your philosophy - and it is a field which has been tilled and cultivated for ages - 
has not yielded one achievement tending to enrich and relieve man’s estate, 
which can truthfully be set down to the credit of its speculations. So, true is this 
that it might be claimed that the instinct of dumb beasts has produced more 
results than the discourses of learned m en.78
In the Novum Organum, Bacon makes it clear that it is his intention to institute this 
new criteria of truth in order to place science on a the “correct road” by establishing
70appropriate “ends” and “goals.” True science will be known by signs, “..none of 
which is more certain or worthy than that which has come from fruits; for fruits and 
practical discoveries are, as it were guarantors and sureties for the truth of 
philosophies.”80
As usual for Bacon, it is the intention of God, that Man should be by his “true”
76 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 116, op. cit., p. 118
77 Bacon, “The Refutation o f Philosophies”, in Farrington, op. cit., p. 124
78 Bacon, “The Refutation of Philosophies”, in Farrington, op. cit., p. 125
79 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 82, op. cit., p.90
80 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 73, op. cit., p. 82
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vocation above and in command of the natural world, a mortal God empowered with a 
new method establishing not an imagined but a “true“ model of the world for his use 
and exploitation. Bacon cannot help but be jubilant at this coming regeneration of the 
sciences as truth and utility cannot help but progress together as God had originally 
intended:
But I say that those foolish and aping imitations of worlds which men’s fancies 
have created in their philosophies must be utterly put to flight. Men must 
realise, therefore, as I said earlier [in Aphorism 1,23] how great a difference 
there is between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the divine mind.
The former are no more than arbitrary abstractions; the latter are the Creator’s 
true stamp upon created things, printed and defined on matter by true and 
precise lines. In this respect, (ipsissimae res) so works themselves are of greater 
value as pledges of truth than as comforts of life.81
Man knows he has hit upon a truth, when the possession of that truth allows him 
power and control. Truth has become an instrument of technological domination 
proven in action; power is the proof and sign of a divine purpose working its will 
upon the world; Man, the mortal god, brings nature to its completion and its 
perfection.
The Completion of Nature by History
Bacon inaugurated a revolution in science because changed the “ends” of science by 
changing its purpose. Rather than being directed to the contemplation of the “divine” 
or “eternal” form or essence of things; science was about harnessing the underlying 
processes of nature to “progressively” expand the scope of human power. Science was 
would no longer to be the idle occupation o f a privileged and cloistered elite, but 
would be brought out into the world to become the one and only organising principle 
of modem life the generation and accumulation of knowledge in the pursuit of power 
and productivity without end. The application of a systematic methodology to the 
investigation of the natural world served as the cornerstone of a productive 
epistemology that initiated and defined a radically new technological world view.
81 Bacon, Novum Organum Book 1, Aphorism, 124, op. cit., p. 126. As the editors point out in 
footnote #108, this passage has been the subject o f much debate as the relation between truth and utility 
is central to Bacon’s interpretation o f  nature. See Paolo Rossi, “Bacon’s idea o f science” pp. 25 - 46 
and Antonio Perez-Ramos, “Bacon’s forms and the maker’s knowledge tradition” pp. 99 - 120 in 
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As with all great revolutionary movements this change was not justified by its 
radical modernity, but by its “return” to an “original” position and as a “restoration” 
of a lost promise. Bacon committed himself to the future with the fundamental and 
animating belief that in a “return” to the garden of Eden where before the fall man and 
nature had enjoyed a direct and untarnished communication and correspondence.
Man had once had command of nature and now “every effort should be made, by 
whatever means to restore to its original condition or at least to improve, that 
commerce between Mind and Things” Man had been created in the image of God 
to assist in the naming of things in the world and having lost that privileged position 
by his own error and sin, and must now work to regain his God-given place in the 
order of thing; The Great Instauration, and proclaimed that “a path must be opened
J91to man’s understanding entirely different from that known to men before us ’ Hope,
was possible for man if he lived a life in imitation de Christi and set his mind upon the
“true ends of knowledge.” Man’s work on the world would bring change and
transformation; its purpose being to:
.. .direct and bring it to perfection in charity, for the benefit and use of life. For 
the angels fell through hunger for power; men through hunger for knowledge.
But of love and charity there can be no excess, neither did angle nor man ever 
run into danger thereby.84
Science in the service of charity, marked a new age and a new beginning, one that 
would overturn the errors of the past and open the way for unlimited human progress 
as God had originally intended.
The past, rather than being the living tradition through which man defined 
himself and his place in the world, was viewed instead as the dead weight of a sterile, 
failed and distant civilisation whose time had past and could be justly buried and 
forgotten. Bacon believed man was destined to pass through certain stages, with the 
past being defined as a time of death and vanity; the image of God in man having
o c
been defaced and heaven and earth corrupted by the fall. According to Bacon 
history is the unfolding of time through demarcated epochs identified as the creation, 
the fall, the Christian era and finally into the “end of times” when the world will be
82 Bacon, Novum Organum, Preface, op. cit., p. 3
83 Bacon, Novum, Organum, Preface, op. cit., p. 7
84 Bacon, Novum, Organum, Preface, op. cit., p. 15
85 Bacon, “A Confession o f Faith”, in Vickers, op. cit. p. 109
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restored to its original glory.86 The Christian era was a time of overcoming which
would be marked by unlimited progress, fertility and productivity. The masculine
birth of time, would consummate a whole new relationship with nature in which will
usher in the end of history as a time of abundance, happiness and blessedness. The
“masculine” era inaugurates a whole new age of “men” rediscover their origins, not in
the feminine element of nature which has held them in bondage, but in their
“adoption” as sons of God the Father. St. Paul to the Galatians 4 :1-7
Now 1 say, That the heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a 
servant, though he be lord of all; But it is under tutors and governors until the 
time appointed by the father. Even we, when we were children, were in bondage 
under elements of the world: But when the fullness of the time was come, God 
sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, To redeem them that 
were under the law, that we might receive adoption of sons. And because ye are 
sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying Abba,
Father. Wherefore thou art no more a servant, but a son; and if a son, then an 
heir of God through Christ.87
Man is no longer in “bondage” to nature, he can reclaim his rightful place as
“master”, as a son and heir of God through Christ. Nature is seen as the raw material
of production and generation, the fertile body upon which man can procreate and
bring forth a boundless abundance from which a whole new future for the human race
can emerge. Grasping nature in its naked state, opens her to the unlimited potentiality
of change and transformation that can be wrought in the service of man. Bacon’s
rallies his disciplines with the biblical injunction to be fruitful and multiply,
proclaiming nature to be both bride and servant;
My dear, dear boy, what 1 propose is to unite you with things themselves in a 
chaste, holy, wedlock; and from this association you will secure an increase 
beyond all hopes and prayers of ordinary marriages, to wit, a blessed race of 
Heroes and Supermen who will overcome the immeasurable helplessness of 
poverty of the human race, which cause it more destruction than all giants,
monsters, or tyrants and will make you peaceful happy, prosperous, and
88secure.
The new age would be a technological age when new inventions would prove the 
fertile fruit from with each new generation building upon the advances of its 
predecessor. The power of technology would be harnessed as a means propelling 
geometrical growth as each new discovery prepared the ground for the next and so on
86 Bacon, “A Confessions o f Faith”, in Vickers., op. cit., p. 110
87 The Epistle o f Paul to the Galatians, 4: 1 - 7, in the Holy Bible., op. cit., pp. 686-7
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into the future. Useful inventions, were of course desired, but of secondary, not
primary importance because it was the system, not its products which was the source
and origin of productivity and progress. The “fruits” or products of the productive
process were themselves merely by-products and to be regarded as a dead end if they
were not themselves capable of producing a whole new generation change and
transformation. Ends became means and means became ends as each thing was not of
value in itself, but only in so far as it could be feed-back into the productivity system
itself thus engendering unlimited cycles of technological advance marching forever
into the future. Bacon distinguishes between withdrawing the “fruits” of experiments
for immediate use and reinvesting them within the productive process in order to
generate and accumulate more knowledge. He even uses the metaphor of “capital”
and “interest” to refer to science as a productive base that is better served through
reinvestment where “products” are ploughed back into the productive cycle, rather
than being extracted for immediate use:
.. .as I have often clearly stated and would like to state again, it is not to extract 
works from works, nor experiments from experiments as empiricists do, but 
from works and experiments to extract axioms and causes, and again from those 
causes and axioms to extract new works and experiments, as a legitimate 
interpreter of Nature.. .Anyone therefore who is more apt and better prepared 
for mechanical matters and is clever at hunting down works merely by a 
frequent use of experiments, is free to employ that diligence to pluck out from 
my history and tables any number of things that he can find on his way, and 
apply them to works and so receive some interest, as it were, before he lays his 
hand on the capital. But for my part, having higher aims in mind, I condemn all 
hasty and premature delay on things of that kind being, as 1 often say, like 
Atlanta’s apples. I have no childish longing for golden apples, but stake all on 
the victory of art over Nature in the race.89
Bacon’s vision of a disciplined system of scientific accumulation was different in 
conception from proceeding experiments in natural philosophy because it served a 
universal and infinite theoretical purpose and not a particular and limited practical 
end. Bacon’s method brought the realm of the transcendent into the plane of human 
progress by locating the infinite in an undisclosed future potentiality that was always, 
just beyond the horizon. Bacon’s unbounded hope for unlimited and infinite “social 
progress” found expression in the creation of method as a machine dedicated to the 
command and control of nature’s (and human nature’s) productive forces which when
88 Bacon, “Masculine Birth o f Time”, in Farrington, op. cit., p. 72
89 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism, 117, op. cit., pp. 119-120
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feed back into themselves would produce a self-generating process of unending
expansion and growth. Bacon speaks of growth and development generating perpetual
progress in the advancements of the sciences:
Signs can also be drawn from the increase and growth of philosophies and the 
sciences. For things that are based on Nature grow and develop...So long as 
they find favour, they are always thriving and growing, as if endowed with a 
certain spirit; at first primitive, then useful, finally highly developed, and always 
improving.90
Nature having been stripped of eternal “form” is broken down to base component 
parts and elementary processes which can be combined and recombined, not for any 
specific and therefore de(limiting) purpose, but for the purpose of productivity itself, 
in all its unbounded infinity. As such, the self-reproduction of technology 
productivity subsumes all other partial “ends” to its universal process which can never 
be realised, because to be actualised is to be embodied, and to be embodied is to be 
limited and defined. Limitation and definition are however impossible because all 
ontological “essence” has been deconstructed and shown to be nothing other than the 
arbitrary assertions of mere human convention. Existence is all there is and existence 
itself is not a thing, but a process, a process with neither beginning nor end, just 
unlimited expansion with the cumulative result that all of “being” has been 
annihilated on the infinite plane of becoming.
Man, in imitation of God, inserts his action into nature, to mark an origin, the 
beginning of a process, an artificial cause that produces and artificial effect without 
truth or purpose other than whatever he temporarily and contingently assigns it. 
Manipulation and control of the processes of cause and effect allow man to transform 
things and thereby produce “new” things which have never been known or seen 
before. The world is made up not of nature’s bounty and gifts, but of her poverty and 
hostility wherein man must fight a rearguard action of defence against corruption and 
marshal all his powers of command and control to produce and maintain a world of 
“artefacts” that exist, not by nature but by art or techne. In the end however, man’s 
artificial productions have no more stability, endurance or reality than the natural 
things they replace and betray nothing other than the will to change and 
transformation as an end in itself as nothing other than the human all to human desire 
for the demonstration and display of power.
90 Bacon, Novum, Orgcmum, Book 1, Aphorism, 74, op. cit., p. 84.
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It is the task and purpose of human power to generate and super induce a new 
nature or new natures on a given body. It is the task and purpose of human 
knowledge to discover the form of a given nature, or its true specific difference, 
or nature engendering nature, or source of emanation.. .and subordinate to these 
primary tasks there are two others.. .the transformation of one material 
substance into another, within the bounds of possibility; subordinate to the 
latter, the discovery, in every instance of generation and motion, of the latent 
process operating continuously from the manifest efficient and the manifest 
material [causes] to the resulting form;...91
Artificial products have the advantage over natural ones, in that man is their source
and origin and through them alone he can know himself as the sovereign power
ordering all the world to his fantasies of domination and control;
Among prerogatives of instances, I will put in tenth place Instances of Power, or 
the Fasces (to borrow a word from the insignia of empire) which I also call 
Instances of the Ingenuity or Hand of Man. These are the most outstanding and 
perfect works, the very ultimate in any particular art. For since it is my chief 
concern that Nature should serve the affairs and convenience of man, it is 
entirely fitting that the works already in his power (like provinces already 
occupied and subdued) should be noted and enumerated, especially those that 
are most complete and perfect, since if we start from them, we shall have an 
easier and nearer journey, to new and hitherto undiscovered works.92
Bacon’s scientist “knows” his creations because he has made them, there is nothing
in the product of his making that is outside his will and control because he is their
common origin and creator. Man, not only rules the created world, in the sense of a
relation of command and obedience, but is in total control and domination of it, as it is
made only from himself and in-(formed) only by the continuous action and
intervention of his knowledge and will:
For although nothing truly exists in Nature except separate bodies performing 
separate pure actions, in conformity with a law; in philosophy, on the other 
hand, that very law and the search for, discovery and explanation of it, are the 
foundation of knowledge as well as of operation.
Created nature, does not have a life of its own, but is animated by the will and spirit of 
man, and as such acts as an external and extended apparatus through which man’s will 
is immediately channelled, amplified and expanded. The raw material of nature does 
not offer resistance because, it has no will, form, telos, or purpose of its own, but is 
merely so much matter in motion, mere potentiality, to be dissected, dissolved and
91 Bacon, Novum Organum, Book 2, Aphorism 1, op. cit., p. 133
92 Bacon, Novum, Organum, Book 2, Aphonsm 31, op. cit., p. 198
93 Bacon, Novum, Organum, Book 2, Aphorism, 2, op. cit., p. 135
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destroyed, the malleable raw material subject to the will and command of the human 
interest.
Truth is demonstrated not only in utility, nor in the production of useful works
and instruments, but more fundamentally, in the self-generating development and
multiplication of the sciences themselves. Science becomes an auto-poetic process,
undertaken by generations of men, guided by the divine hand of providence, in which
the will, interest and intention of any one man can only be partial and limited. Just as
an abstracted, unlimited and undefined “future” subsumes all human effort, vocation
and hope, an equally abstracted, unlimited and undefined power guides and
disciplines the general interest towards a unified because universal interest.
Technology is imagined as neutral because it serves a generalised social utility, which
because of its abstracted nature, in neither limited, nor corrupted by partiality as long
as it remains in the purity of transcendence as pure potentiality. Just as corporeal
nature and selfish desires, fragments power and descends into irrationality and the
chaos of unreformed nature, so does disciplined products of artifice embody the
transcendent future of pure will and divine intention. Not men, but Man incarnates
the universal interest of the total human project understood as the collective human
good both now and in the future:
... we have spoken first of the Good of Society, the intention whereof embraceth 
the form of Human Nature, whereof we are members and portions, and not our 
own proper and individual form. We have spoken of Active Good and supposed 
it as a part of Private and Particular Good; rightly; for there is impressed upon 
all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves, one of 
preserving and continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their 
form and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things; 
whereof the multiplying or signature of it upon other things is that which we 
handled by the name of Active Good.
Bacon’s interest in experimental science is a universal, technical interest, wherein 
“charity” as the universal purpose guides and guarantees a harmony of interests that 
unite all private or partial goods within a single path on the road to the perfection of 
“human nature”. By looking to the “light”, rather than the “fruits” of science, man 
ensures his heart is pure and he is not temped by his own base desires. Knowledge 
and power are perfected through their multiplication and man perfects nature by 
completing her, by diverting her from her natural course and remaking her in his own, 
divine image. The real promise of science as the key to the human understanding, is 
its ability to harness and unite to a common purpose; “as new discoveries are in fact
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like new creations, imitations of the divine handiwork.”94
The only thing marking beginnings, epochs and endings on this linear
temporal trajectory is the will of God, who in his infinite purpose authored a
beginning, inscribed a series of distinct periods of time and planned an ultimate
conclusion at the “end of days”. Bacon was intervening and directing history by
establishing a new foundation of science through which man would collectively learn
to intervene and direct nature. Man would not only “return” to his original and
intended path, but would do so this time not as an innocent child benevolently
incorporated into the paternal protection of the divine father, but would join the father
in the productive and creative process of world creation. As Christ had been brought
into the world to serve as the example to man, experimental science had been brought
into the world to continue God’s work in imitation di Christi. Science, like
Christianity before it marked a separation in time, a beginning of a whole new epoch
of man which would transform man himself and in so doing transform the world.95
A whole gulf of understanding had opened up between the modems and the
ancients as there would be a whole gulf of understanding between those inaugurated
into the new sciences and those who were still idling in ignorance. Enlightenment
would literally light the way of the new world as Christ had brought the good news of
the one, true path to knowledge and salvation. The modems would have triumphed
over the past in a way that opened a chasm a deep and as wide as that which existed
between pagans and Christians because man himself had been transformed into a new
creature. Science transformed the mind of man as Christianity transformed his heart,
by re-orienting him from a human to a divine purpose. Those unreformed would be
literally ex communicato and as such could only be dealt with by force lacking in their
very nature the ability to understand:
We see Moses when he saw the Isrealite and the Egyptian fight, he did not say 
“why strive you?” but drew his sword and slew the Egyptian; but when he saw 
two Isrealites fight he said “you are brethren why strive you?” If the point of 
doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be slain by the sword of the spirit and not 
reconciled. We see of the fundamental points our Saviour penneth the league 
thus “ He that is no with us is against us, but on points not fundamental thus, He
94 Bacon, Novum, Organum, Book 1, Aphorism 129, op. cit., p. 130
95 ‘Tor every one that useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness; for he is a babe. But strong 
meat belong-eth to them that are o f full age, even those who by reason o f use save their senses 
exercised to discern both good and evil.” Paul’s Epistle to the Hebrews 5: 13-14, The Holy Bible, op. 
cit., p. 704
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that is not against us is with us.”96
Science is a universal system that embraces all that is not against its fundamental 
principles and as such has world wide application as the one and only means to 
knowledge. When it comes to the differences between modems within the system and 
primitives without it, there can be no basis of reconciliation or even understanding 
conversion becoming the literal pre-requisite to conversation. Differences between 
rival systems cannot be resolved by reason because reason is dependent upon 
definitions and first principles which can only be established by authority and 
authority rests not on reason, but on force.97
Bacon’s authority comes from the force of his vision and the power of his 
rhetoric. Modem science and technology was a new instauration, a new foundation 
moment bom of prophecy and promise. Benjamin Farrington believes that Bacon 
symbolised his project on the cover of his New Organon; it is the image of a British 
ship passing through the Pillars of Hercules and “foretells the escape from the 
Mediterranean Sea (and ancient civilisation) to the oceans of the world and a new 
epoch of human history.”98 Urging men to shake of the chains of their own 
oppression and become masters of themselves and encouraging them to act 
courageously:
The thunderbolt is inimitable, said the ancients. In defiance to them we have 
proclaimed it imitable, and that not wildly but like sober men, on the evidence 
of our new engines. Nay, we have succeeded in imitating the heaven, whose 
property it is to encircle the earth; for this we have done by our voyages. It 
would disgrace us, now that the wide spaces of the material globe should be set 
by the narrow discoveries of the ancients. Nor are these two enterprises, the 
opening up of the earth and the opening up of the sciences, linked and yoked 
together in any trivial way. Distant voyages and travels have brought to light 
many things in nature, which may throw fresh light on human philosophy and 
science and correct by experience the opinions and conjectures of the ancients. 
What else can the prophet mean who, in speaking about the last times, says:
Many will pass through and knowledge will be multiplied? Does he not imply 
that the passing through or preambulation of the round earth and the increase 
and multiplication of science were destined to the same age and century.99
The metaphor is a powerful one and is still with us in the science fiction of popular 
technological culture, man as the action adventurer striking out under his own steam,
96 Bacon, “Advancement o f Learning Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 292
97 Bacon, “Advancement o f learning, Book 2”, in Vickers, op. cit., p. 293
98 Farrington, op. cit., p. 132, footnote #1
99 Bacon, ‘The Refutation o f Philosophies” in Farrington, op. cit., pp. 131- 2
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relying on his own wit and technological prowess to conquer and explore untold new 
found worlds lying just beyond the horizon.
Bacon’s technological revolution unleashed an age of unprecedented imperial 
expansion and material progress. Bacon’s new experimental method was universal in 
application and would wipe away the past errors not only of English society and 
civilisation, but of all other civilisations around the world. Nor was scientific 
improvement to be restricted to the merely “natural” world as the demarcating line 
between nature and human nature would prove as arbitrary and contingent as all other 
“essential” differences before it. Building on the ideas of the scientific revolution and 
the theories of motion developed by Galileo, Hobbes would seek to understand man 
from within the perspective of a purely mechanical universe. Rejecting notions of 
spirit or soul “human” nature was to be described by the same natural laws that 
animated the rest of the natural world. Following Bacon’s method of resolving 
complexity into its base components and underlying process in order to erect a solid 
structure which would endure the test of time. Thomas Hobbes would harness the 
revolution in knowledge to produce a “new” and “modem” physics of man in order to 
establish the first principles of political association.
Abandoning the shifting sands of custom and tradition, Hobbes sought to 
remake the state as a freely constructed artifice that would serve the collective needs 
of a civil society remade in the service of power and progress. Hobbes however, 
would take the revolution one step further and insist that science as the instrument and 
method of the human interest need not concern itself with God or the mysteries of 
divine creation and purpose. To Hobbes it would matter not whether the sovereign 
power created by a collective act of the human will was turned towards the purposes 
of good or evil, these things being mere empty speech and devoid of meaning.
Without an orientation to the good the accumulation of power after power produced 
not Bacon’s charitable Christian utopia, but only the reproduction of the technological 
society itself as a uniquely modem way of life, which would, with force and violence, 
subsume the entire globe within its grasp.
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Chapter 2
Political Physics: Thomas Hobbes and the Foundation of an Eternal Order
To conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact 
definitions first snuffed and purged of ambiguity; reason is the pace; increase of 
science, the way; and the benefit of mankind the end. And on the contrary 
metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui [a fool’s 
fire], and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; 
and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.1
Thomas Hobbes
Introduction
Thomas Hobbes’ originality lay in his revolutionary attempt to found politics on the 
firm foundation of scientific principles rather than the shifting sands of history, 
tradition and custom. As a modem he looked to the future rather than the past and 
saw before him the infinite progress of human power through the cultivation and 
application of the arts and sciences. Modem man could leave behind his primitive 
and ignorant ways and establish the commonwealth on the secure scientific principles. 
Hobbes dissolved civil society into its base components, individual men, identified 
the fear of death as the most powerful passion, and founded his political order on this 
primary scientific fact about human nature.2 Self-preservation was to be the common 
end of the commonwealth achieved through the artificial construction of an 
overarching sovereign power to which all citizens would be equally subject. State 
sovereignty was to be the modem machine enabling and empowering its subjects to 
pursue their individual self-interest within the liberty of established law and order. 
Hobbes’ civil society was not natural, but artificial and rested on the force of the 
sovereign to command obedience through the exercise of power. To Hobbes, as with 
Bacon, Aristotle’s natural philosophy had been discredited and any talk of a natural or 
essential “end” of man was mere “absurd” speech and idle speculation. Man was no 
longer to be regarded as a social and political man “by nature” nor was it to be 
assumed that he had a “natural” inclination to the pursuit of “happiness” or “the good
1 Thomas Hobbes, cited in Hobbes Leviathan, (ed.) Edwin Curley, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc.) 1994, hereafter, Leviathan, Chap. v, p. 26
2
Richard Tuck, The Rights o f  War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from  Grotius 
to Kant (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1999, p. 130. See also, Leo Strauss, Translated by 
Elsa M. Sinclair, The Political Philosophy o f  Thomas Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, (Chicago.: 
University o f Chicago Press) 1952, pp. 15 - 22
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life” however defined.
Men in their ‘‘natural” state were not differentiated into classes or kinds and 
differences of character were the product of arbitrary and contingent personal, social 
and historical factors which could not form the basis of a stable and enduring political 
order. In the state of nature a basic equality and liberty would produce nothing but a 
natural anarchy Hobbes described as the war of all against all. Man was not “by 
nature” an isolated individual moved by powerful passions and self-interest. Man’s 
reason, his ability to calculate and reckon could be used to demonstrate the need to 
establish a civil commonwealth in order to avoid violent death. Men would then be 
persuaded to exchange their “natural liberty” for civil liberty and the state would be 
secured by the social contract. Once the artificial man had been created through the 
transfer of each individual’s natural to a single power, the Leviathan would then 
maintain civil order through the production of universal law back up by 
overwhelming force. The coercive power of the state flows from its monopoly on the 
use of violence produced and legitimated by the social contract. Once civil society is 
established, individual subjects are then “free” to pursue their “liberty” within the 
framework of law as sanctioned by the state.
Hobbes’ breaks with past traditions of political theory because he rejects the 
juridical foundations of ethical and political action grounded in the natural law 
tradition of the scholastics. The Leviathan is not a Prince, but an artificial man 
constructed for a technological purpose; the production of law and order. By 
destroying the irrational constraints of the past, Hobbes frees man to pursue his 
desires within the freedom of the state and as such improves nature through artificial 
means. Hobbes is the first modem to secure a path for human development not 
ordained by nature, but freely constructed through improvements in the arts and 
sciences. Hobbes began the project of European enlightenment later to be heralded by 
Kant as the emancipation of man from his own self-incurred immaturity, defined as 
one’s inability to use’s one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. 
Hobbes founds modernity on the rock of human freedom, a freedom that requires man 
himself be transformed in order to become a civilised subject. Modem techno-politics 
is the production of the citizen from the raw material man and as such defines a civil 
society based not on ethics but on natural necessity. The machine of modem state
3 Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment.” in Kant, Political Writings, T d Edition (ed.) Hans Reiss
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sovereignty is the technological solution to the modem political problem of managing 
and controlling human nature for a human purpose; comfortable self preservation. 
Hobbes’ political theory is a political science because it identifies the underlying force 
animating man and constructs a social and political order which facilitates rather than 
frustrates natural necessity. Once the absurd speech of the schoolmen had been 
purged and the errors of the past had been wiped away, a new scientific understanding 
o f man and society would form the foundation for a whole new world order.
Scientific method would be harnessed as an instrument or tool to guide and discipline 
the mind and nature would reveal her secrets. If the pursuit of power after power 
defines the natural condition of man; then the Leviathan must be nothing other than a 
power accumulation machine.
The Collapse of Aristotle’s Ontology as a Foundation for Ethical Life
In a technological culture, science is something taken for granted, it is the background 
and standard upon which all “softer” knowledge is measured and ranked. This is why 
“science” marks the birth of “enlightenment” as a story of liberation and awakening, a 
dramatic rupture between a past defined by mankind’s enslavement to irrational and 
arbitrary idols of custom, tradition and superstition. The scientific revolution had 
lead to dramatic increases in agricultural and manufacturing productivity, establishing 
itself as the universal engine of human progress. The civil war in England had seen 
the successful challenge of divine right monarchy and the institution of parliamentary 
government at the hands of a revolutionary army.4 The restoration of the Stuart 
Monarchy in 1660 could not restore the tarnished mystic of kingship or the various 
layers of aristocratic status and privilege which defined the medieval state. The civil 
war had struck a fatal blow to traditional conceptions of political order and 
legitimacy, but had not effectively resolved the relationship between Crown and 
parliament. It is in this climate of uncertainty, doubt and confusion that Thomas 
Hobbes began dissect society looking not for the superficial appearances of things, 
but the causes and processes which lie at their root. Hobbes new political order was 
self-consciously designed to reorder society, not on the shifting sands of custom and 
tradition, but on the firm foundation of unchanging scientific principle.
(Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1991, p. 54
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The scientific revolution had transformed early modem conceptions of nature 
and with it human nature with all the social and political “consequences” that this 
entails. Hobbes was able to draw up new ideas emerging from Bacon’s project to 
advance learning beyond the narrow confines of scholastic thought that dominated the 
universities. The new physical forces describing the universe could be used to 
understand the motions and passions of man as a natural creature. Man was moved by 
appetites and aversions as matter was moved by attractions and repulsions and these 
underlying physical forces could be harnessed and channelled to construct a stable 
and enduring political order. The lose of the pre-modem metaphysical structure of the 
cosmos necessarily entailed a simultaneously loss of pre-modem conceptions of social 
and political life. The medieval view of the state as an ordered political community 
functioning as a part of an ordered cosmic hierarchy, described in short hand as the 
Great Chain of Being was being dramatically eroded by the new discoveries of natural 
philosophy.5 Man and the state could no longer be understood as the microcosm 
mirroring the macrocosm undermining a strictly defined social order in which the 
different estates of the body politic reflected the natural order of the cosmos.6
Aristotle’s metaphysical principles and his teleological view of man and the 
state were no longer credible leaving the natural law tradition without its ontological 
support cosmological support. For centuries Aristotle’s principles had underwritten 
the legal basis for the state and without his supporting metaphysics whole new 
conceptions of man and the nature of political association would have to be reformed. 
Without a natural philosophy grounded in classical conceptions of “form” or 
“essence” ethical and political life could no longer be guaranteed by the inherent 
movement of man to his natural “perfection” whether defined by classical “happiness” 
or Christian “beatitude.” The unifying principle in Aristotle’s metaphysics is the 
divine Nous which animates the rational order and permeates all of being including 
the human intellect.7 While animals and even some plants demonstrate the ability to 
move themselves, only man has the capacity for reflective awareness and possesses
o
the capacity for reason and speech . Through reason and speech man is able to
4
.Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History o f  Ethics, (London.: Routledge) 2005 pp. 144-146
5 Arthur O Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f  Being, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press) 1964
6 Otto Gierke, Political Theories o f  the Middle Age, (Bristol.: Thoemmes Press) 1996, pp. 7 - 8
7
See the discussion on nous as the ground of Aristotle’s metaphysics in Chapter 1
g
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Translated by J.A.K. Thomson (ed.) Betty Radice, (London.: 
Penguin Books), Book 1, subsection vii ,pp. 15 - 16
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organise himself through reflection and deliberation, seeking the good by nature in 
their engagement in moral and rational activity.9 Man’s rationality endows him with 
the capacity for virtue as well as vice and it is in the cultivation of his nature in 
community with others that his essential humanity finds perfection in the good life.10 
The soul is divided between the rational and irrational components and virtue is 
divided into classes in accordance with the differentiation of the soul. Some virtues 
are intellectual, wisdom, understanding and prudence, liberality and temperance are 
moral and what is referred to by a man’s character.11 Although man as a species is 
defined by the same essential capacities, differences of circumstance and birth 
produce differences of character which organises them as parts with a whole, his 
equality as a citizen comes in his participation in the deliberating and judging 
functions of the state.12 The differences between citizens is not one of species, but of 
character and are indicative of the inherent plurality of the human condition defining 
politics as a field of praxis within which differences are reconciled and/or co­
ordinated for the common good.13 The polis is the public space in which the diverse 
forms of human excellence are harmonised and men as citizens create an equality 
based on the rule of law and not men, made possible by their equal subordination to 
the constitution. Virtue, although it may take many forms, is composed of a prudent 
or moderate negotiation between extremes made possible by subordinating the 
irrational part of the soul, through persuasion and argument made, possible by the rule 
of the intellect. The state, like a well ordered soul will moderate the passions of its 
baser elements and educate them to virtue for the common good or the good of the 
whole. The best regime, will naturally be one of a mixed constitution, embodying 
principles of both consent and coercion, in which the best men rule (aristocracy), but 
in which all citizen’s have access to public office (democracy).14
The polis represents the common or public space in which each man can meet
9
Janet Coleman , A History o f  Political Thought, From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity, (Oxford.: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd.) 2000, p. 125
10 My interpretation o f  Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics owes much to Janet Coleman, graduate seminar I 
attended at the London School o f  Economics, in 2002 and whose books have provided essential 
guidance to the original texts.
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, subsection xiii op. cit., pp. 27 - 30
12 Aristotle, The Politics,, Translated by T.A. Sinclair, Revised and Reprinted by Trevor J. Saunders,
(London.: Penguin Books) 1992 Book IV, subsection i v , pp. 246 - 251
13 For the “public realm” as a construction o f a “common ground” from a plurality o f perspectives and 
locations, See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago.: University o f Chicago Press) 1958 
p. 57
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hi s fellow citizens as friends and equals for the activity of participating in political 
justice, the administration of the laws, through which the good is mutually constituted 
and actualised.15 The polis, as an arena for practical politics, in which the plurality, 
partiality and relativism of the human condition are ordered and contained providing 
the stability and compromise necessary for a common life. Political contention, for 
example, between the rich and the poor is therefore contained and moderated by a 
“mixed” constitution which subordinates the good of the parts to the good of the 
whole. Order and stability are both possible because men, as rational creatures, can 
and do reflect and deliberate upon their actions and restrain their passions.16 The love 
of the good and the love of one’s own, while never perfectly harmonised are 
nevertheless reconciled across a variety of political activities all of which allow 
different citizens at least a share in the “goods” of collective life. The cultivation of 
public justice and political virtue defuses the conflict between private and public 
interest and allows men as citizens to escape their own personal partiality. For 
Aristotle, the whole or the end, is always prior to the part and each part is structurally 
related to the whole because the totality defines the possibility within which 
individuals and their different activities become possible.
Aristotle’s system ties metaphysics, ethics and politics to natural physics, in a 
way that places ontology at the centre of his system. Man fulfils his essence and his 
nature, by living a life ordered to the good whether defined by practical political 
action or intellectual theoretical contemplation. Reason and speech are man’s 
defining qualities and it is only through a life lived in common that his higher and 
nobler activities and functions can be actualised. Although the polis is a product of 
human art and invention through the institution of laws and a constitution, common 
life itself is essential and definitive of man being and therefore natural. Although 
political regimes vary and aim at different ends, the best regime will be the one which 
aims at the most “complete” form which actualises man’s highest rational capacities 
by educating men to a life of moral and intellectual excellence. When the modems 
rejected Aristotle’s metaphysics as an impious restriction on the infinite power of the 
Creator God the link between human knowledge and rational end or (telos) was 
irretrievably severed. Classical ideals of human virtue, moral, political and intellectual
14 Aristotle, The Politics, Book IV, subsection xi, op. cit., pp. 264 - 269
15 Coleman., op. cit., p. 179
16 MacIntyre, Chapter 7 “Aristotle’s Ethics” op. cit., especially pp. 57-6 1
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are subordinated to Judeo-Christian ideas of an omnipotent divine will above and
17beyond all human understanding. The fundamental problem of man’s fall from the 
garden and the centrality of divine grace in the soul’s “free choice” between good and 
evil meant the end of classical virtue and its concept of self-sufficient reason. Man’s 
capacity for right reason determined his desire for the “higher” human values of moral 
and/or intellectual perfection and right reason was dependent upon revelation and 
salvation.
Aquinas managed to make Aristotle acceptable to the Church, but only by
18subordinating ethical and political virtue to spiritual revelation and reason to faith.
The “good life” meant a life in pursuit of the natural ends of virtue and “good works”, 
but within the confines of obedience and submission to worldly authority instituted by 
God. The divine right of kings and the nature and extent of sovereign authority were 
part of and embedded within a larger framework of law, divine, natural and positive 
which ordered each political community and united them within the broader 
community of European Christendom and the cosmos as a whole. The exact order 
and description of the various rights and duties of the different parts of these 
overlapping communities formed the contested ground upon which medieval 
scholastics and the lawyers employed by both church and state staged their struggles 
over power, authority and jurisdiction. The infinite webs of idle speculation were not 
simply spun in the ivory towers of academic philosophy but had made their way into 
the court politics and had fuelled the religious wars of Europe. The subtle complexity 
of the rational/legal tradition had not only failed to provide stability for the political 
order it had actually produced its opposite; endemic civil war. Hobbes believed, as 
Bacon before him, that the entire foundation of scholastic thought was deeply flawed 
and needed to be completely destroyed before a new foundation for politics could be 
built in its place. Hobbes had to “clear” a new path and make a new way; politics 
could not be built on the shifting sands of custom and tradition, these were mere idols 
and accidents which must be “wiped away.” Man would be reduced to his original 
condition in the state of nature and from there the principles of motive force would 
become visible. The manipulation and control of mechanical, physical forces, “the 
laws of nature” and not the teleological doctrine of the “natural law” tradition informs
17 St. Thomas Aquinas, On Ethics and Politics, Translated and Edited by Paul E. Sigmund, (New
York.: W.W. Norton and Company) 198818See Frederick Copleston, S.J., “St. Thomas and Augustinian Christianity” in Sigmund, Ibid., pp.
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Hobbes’ new theory of the state. The Leviathan would be erected upon the firm 
foundation of man’s most powerful motive force; fear of violent death. The social 
contract is a method and a means; it is a technological instrument which brings the 
Leviathan as artefact; into being. Knowledge is power and power is productive, the 
Leviathan transforms natural man into a citizen; art perfects nature and brings it to 
completion.
Purging Absurd Speech in the Search for Scientific Principle
Both the classical republic of antiquity and the Christian commonwealth of the high
middle ages rely on conceptions of an corporate holism in which man’s “right reason”
links him to a rational cosmos established either by nature or God. The denial of
these traditions and their replacement by an uncompromising mechanical/materialist
metaphysics is the self-proclaimed goal of Hobbes revolutionary political philosophy.
Hobbes’ philosophy is that of the technical expert and not that of a moral/ethical
practitioner and as such he uses the language of math and physics to describe his new
understanding of law as rule or method:
For though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their 
houses on the sand, it could not be thence inferred , that so it ought to be. The 
skill of making and maintaining commonwealths consisteth in certain rules. As 
doth arithmetic and geometry, not (as tennis play) on practice only; which rules, 
neither poor men have the leisure have hitherto had the curiosity or the method 
to find out.19
Hobbes has little time for the “senseless speech” of schoolmen whose “abuse of 
words” would be quickly dismissed if it was not so dangerous. Classical pride and 
Christian fear-mongering have both so inflamed the passions that rational discourse is 
hardly possible. The first step is to deflate man’s vanity by pricking it with the cold 
logic of rational scepticism. Aristotle’s system is ridiculed by being equated with all 
the other “fabulous” traditions dealing with ghosts, spirits and other such super­
natural follies.20 Scholastic thought is erroneously founded on the human capacity for 
“right reason” which is nothing more than an illusion; all men being prone to 
partiality, prejudice, and vanity rendering them incapable of judging the merits of
131 -135  
19 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xx, p. 135
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their own case. 21
Human nature is radically flawed and must be radically improved by natural
philosophy and advancement in the arts and sciences if any moral philosophy is to
have any success or endurance. Hobbes put the failure to construct an adequate
natural philosophy in the past down to the “lack of method” and “lack of leisure”
among uncivilised peoples.22 Hobbes urges that the past be overturned as it is
founded on nothing more than the “dreams” of the unprofitable Grecians whose
“moral philosophy is but the description of their own passions.” 23 Hobbes announced
his new era of techno-politics with the equation of the modem age; if the problem is
superstition, the solution must be knowledge :
Ignorance of the causes and original constitution of right, equity, law and justice 
disposeth a man to make custom and example the rule of his actions.. .which is 
the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by 
the pen and the sword, whereas the doctrines of lines and figures is not so, 
because men care not, in that subject, what be truth as a thing that crosses no 
man’s ambition, profit or lust.24
Hobbes begins in typically modem fashion by giving free reign to destructive 
criticism in order to erase the errors of the past, in order that he can begin anew on 
freshly cleared ground. The vices and virtues of man are social and historical 
prejudices; surface phenomenon and not the underlying principles sought by scientific 
method. Man is a pliable material, capable of taking on whatever form and 
pattern fashioned by the skill of the architect who alone is responsible for the quality 
of the edifice erected.25 Man, says Hobbes as the matter of the commonwealth is not 
the source of disorder, but it is with man the maker with whom the problem lies. 26 
Hobbes’ method is to overcome the flux of history by establishing the “eternal” 
principles of natural necessity. Once the universal principles of the state have been 
determined the threat of faction and dissention will be diffused and the breakdown of 
civil order will no longer occur. Politics will no longer be about the unpredictable 
practice of prudence, moderation and compromise, but about the rational calculability 
of technical administration. The fallibility and partiality of the human prince has
21 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 1, Chap. xi, p. 61
22 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 111, Chap., xlvi, p. 454
23 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 111, Chap. xlvi, p. 456
24 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 1, Chap. xi., p. 61
25 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxix, p. 210
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxix, p. 210
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been replaced by the pure poetics of power. In the introduction Hobbes describes the 
Leviathan not as an earthly King; but as a technical machine; it is “but an artificial
77man in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul”.
Hobbes intends to set out the technical formula describing the universal 
principles of civil organisation by first considering the means “or the matter” from 
which the state is constructed (man) and then the “ends” for which the state is 
constructed (self-preservation). Once the theorist has a “true” grasp of these base 
principles, s/he will be able to complete or perfect nature, securing the state from the 
danger of internal corruption and/or disorder. It is simply a matter of the 
commonwealth being well made and this cannot be accomplished by flattering man‘s 
vanity. Man is not made in the image of God, nor does he hold a “higher” place in the 
cosmos than other animals. Reason and speech are mere survival mechanisms and do 
not disclose any intrinsic “order” either in man or the cosmos; nor does man have any 
special vocation towards the “good” or any particular love of justice. Behind all these 
religious myths, vain prejudices and noble lies, lies nothing other than the seamless 
unity of nature;
For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some 
principle part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move 
themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For 
what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the 
joins, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as intended 
by the artificer?2
For Hobbes, civil society itself is no longer natural to man, developing according to
its own teleological principles, but an artificial state that must be fashioned through
the direct human intervention of man. Natural society is the product not of rational
intent, but the accidents of history compounded by the irrationalities of custom and
tradition. As a result natural societies are highly unstable and prone to disorder and
dissolution. Natural societies will be replaced by civil societies built upon scientific
principles he identifies as knowledge of cause and effect::
Science is the knowledge of consequences and dependence of one fact upon 
another, by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do 
something else when we will or the like, another time because when we see how 
anything comes about, upon what causes and by what manner, when the like 
causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects.29
27 Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction, p. 3
28 Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction, p. 3
29 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. v, p. 25
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Natural societies are prone to dissolution because they come into being through the 
accidents of history and not on the knowledge of cause and effect. Cause and effect 
will be the eternal principles upon which Hobbes will erect his eternal order. The 
thought experiment must be conducted in order to force nature to reveal her secrets. 
Once those secrets are made known; a technological solution to the problem of 
politics will finally be available and he can deploy his knowledge to perfect his 
nature. Hobbes proposes an entirely novel approach, a scientific examination of man 
in his original condition which will reveal the base components and underlying 
processes which determine him as a natural being. Nature however; is no longer the 
structured hierarchy of Aristotle’s ordered cosmos; but the infinite expanse of the 
modem mechanical universe.
The State of Nature; Material Bodies and Physical Forces
The state of nature describes more than the mere absence of political authority or man 
in his pre-social condition. Hobbes uses “the state of nature” as a rhetorical devise to 
destroy traditional concepts of man’s basic humanity as described by natural law in 
either its classical or Christian manifestations. Man is fundamentally without soul or 
“essence” and as such can not be distinguished in any qualitative way from the rest of 
the brute matter moving around in the empty void of space. As modems we take such 
the mechanical/material universe for granted and forget how this radical world view 
does not accord with ordinary human experience of the life world. Hobbes follows 
Descartes’ road of extreme scepticism in order to do away with scepticism, but in so 
doing he erases all of man’s qualities, all the customs, traditions and histories by and 
through which men live their lives in the world.
To Hobbes, the world of socially constructed meaning is an “idol” a fiction 
and a vanity that prevents man from knowing himself as he “really is” before all the 
arbitrary accidents of history and custom mould him in all their manifold particularity. 
In the state of nature all men are equal because all men are the same; difference is a 
surface phenomenon which must be wiped away before man in his original condition 
comes into view. Nature does not reveal herself by passive observation; direct 
intervention is necessary before she reveals her secrets to the probing mind of the 
scientist. Man may appear to himself as a divine creature made in the image of God;
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but such an illusion should not stand in the way of logical thinking and scientific 
thought. Even Descartes investigations into man’s functions as a corporeal being 
moved mechanically by the passions were premised upon the first principles of a 
human soul aligned to a rational universe created by God and ordered to his divine 
w ill.30 Hobbes image of man as a desiring machine greatly resembles Descartes’ 
descriptions of the bodily machine where the motion of brain, muscles and nerves is 
“.. .just as the movements of a watch are preformed simply by the strength of the 
springs and the form of the wheels.”31 Hobbes, however, went further than Descartes, 
insisting on a consistently materialist basis for his natural philosophy, an objection 
which put him increasing at odds with Descartes during the course of what had 
become a heated debate.32 Hobbes refuses to compromise his mechanical 
metaphysics in order to preserve man’s vanity; vanity being the primary political 
problem in need of a radical solution. The solution is to be found in disabusing man 
of his high minded self-regard. Man enjoys no privileged place in the creation and the 
creation itself is best understood in its material rather than spiritual manifestations. 
Man’s reason has no access to the divine will and public administration is not about 
cultivating virtue or instilling character. Man must be understood not in his 
complexity as a thinking and feeling human being, but as a simple body in motion, an 
automaton, as blind and as purposeless as the brute forces acting upon him.
Man is no longer described as the rational animal because the qualitative order 
of being distinguishing “rational” and “animal” as categories no longer exist. There is 
no fundamental difference between animate and inanimate nature and life itself has no 
qualitative value whatsoever. Higher and lower “forms of life” signifies nothing other 
than more or less compound or complex levels of structural organisation and as such 
is merely a distinction of quantity, not quality. Man is and can only be a machine 
because life itself is a mechanical force, moved by its own attractions and repulsions, 
appetites and aversions. Physical forces “act” upon the senses stimulating responses 
which are accumulated over time. The “mind” of man is not ordered by a rational
30 Descartes, “Discourse on Method,” Meditation Six, in Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and 
Correspondence, (ed.) Roger Ariew, (Indianapolis.: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.) 2000, p. 135 
Descartes does however admit that the most violent passions may be out o f the soul’s control due to the 
levels o f force involved, an idea that was no doubt lost on Hobbes who sought the foundation for the 
state not in reason, but in the physical force o f the most violent passion o f  all; fear o f  violent death.
See Descartes, “The Passions o f the Soul” in Ariew (ed.) above pt., 46, p. 312
31 Descartes, Ibid., “The Passions o f the Soul” pt. 16, p. 303
32 Roger Anew, Introduction, Ibid, p. xiii, See also “Aubey’s Life o f  Hobbes” in Hobbes’ Leviathan,
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soul, but is simply the sum total of a lifetime of “experience” wherein the impressions 
of pleasure and pain are recorded and stored as “images” or “memories.” The 
accumulation of memories builds up a store house of “experiences” by and through 
which man’s action in the world is determined. Man’s existence is reduced to the 
simple principles of motion as the passions or the desires propel him through a 
lifetime of experience governed by the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure.
In the state of nature man is at liberty in the sense that he is a body in motion 
which will continue in motion until and unless his motion is checked or held in place 
by another thing of equal or greater force. Liberty is therefore not merely the pre­
social condition of man before the establishment of civil government and law, but in 
the purely mechanical sense of bodies in constant motion as a condition of their 
physical existence. Hobbes conception of natural liberty is grounded in natural law, 
but in the laws of nature as described by Galileo. Hobbes not only denies the 
species differentiate between human beings and other animals, but rejects the law of 
motion described by classical physics. Aristotle’s laws of motion described objects 
finding their “natural place” within an ordered whole. The closed world of the 
structured cosmos has been exploded into the infinite universe of extended space in 
which matter is simply in perpetual motion.34 Hobbes directly addresses the 
misconception of the “schools” that “things seek repose of their own accord.” 35 In the 
new physics “when a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder 
it) eternally”.36 Natural liberty has nothing to do with the dignity of man and his 
unique capacity for deliberative self-directed action towards a moral or intellectual 
goal and everything to do with the physical laws of the universe:
.. .everyone is moved by an appetite for what is good for himself, and by an 
aversion for what is evil for himself, but most of all by the greatest of natural 
evils, which is death. This happens by a certain necessity of nature, no less than 
that by which a stone is carried downward.37
Motion and not rest describes this new physical reality and natural liberty is simply
0|). cit., p. lxvii
During the course o f his career, Hobbes toured Europe meeting leading scientists and philosophers 
o f his age, including Galileo whom he met in 1636. See Roger Ariew, Introduction, Ibid., p. xii,
footnote 28
34 Alexander Koyre, Introduction, From the Closed world to the Infinite Universe, (Baltimore.: John’s
Hopkins University Press) 1957 p. 2
35 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. ii, p. 8
36Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. ii, p. 8
37 Hobbes, De Cive, cited in the Introduction to Leviathan by Edwin Curley, pp. xvii
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that state of arbitrary and contingent “restlessness" that animates life until some
■70
artificial obstruction or intervention is introduced for “nothing can change itself’.
As such:
Liberty or Freedom signifiieth (properly) the absence of opposition (by 
opposition 1 mean external impediments of motion and may be applied no less 
to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied 
or environed as it cannot move, but within a certain space is determined by the 
opposition of some external body we say it hath not liberty to go further. And so 
of all living creatures whilst they are imprisoned or restrained with walls or 
chains and of the water, whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels that otherwise 
would spread itself into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at liberty to 
move in such and such manner as without those external impediments they 
would.39
The natural “state” of man or the “state of nature” is therefore envisioned by Hobbes 
as one of perpetual motion and infinite expansion. Anything which obstructs this 
motion automatically then becomes a barrier or a boundary artificially imposed. Man 
is a body in constant motion with the result that all constraints become “external” and 
“unnatural” limiting and restraining an original condition of absolute “liberty.” The 
liberty at the heart of modem liberalism is the radical freedom of atomistic bodies in 
constant motion through a void space. As constant motion describes man’s 
fundamental existential condition there is a “natural right”" of “every man to every 
thing.” All limits to this freedom of movement or desire are therefore artificial and 
unnatural; artificial constructs contrary to man’s natural motion. Liberal negative 
freedom is premised upon a background conception of “natural liberty” upon which 
each and every negation, or restriction of right, must be artificially constructed and 
maintained by a force of equal or greater power.
Hobbes’ new found scientific principles allow him to overturn the classical 
and Christian doctrines of an objective natural or divine law ordering human relations 
and substitutes the purely subjective need for individual self-preservation. The “right 
of nature” knows no “moral or intellectual limits” because morality and reason are 
relative terms, subject to the needs of each individual man at a particular time and 
place. Moral relativism is not even limited to individual preferences as the individual 
himself is nothing but a collection of fragmented experiences which change moment 
to moment. Neither are there any rank or order among ends because they are merely
38 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. ii, p.7
39 Hobbes, Leviathan Chap. xxi, p. 136
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the product of the random, arbitrary and contingent compulsions of taste and/or
preference. There can be no “rational will” because there is no intellectual principle
in the cosmos directing individual men to a collective or common good embedded in
their “substantial essence44 as human beings. Each man's good is relative to his own
“experience44 and individual sensations of pain and pleasure, good and evil being mere
words to describe relative evaluations of each man’s own judgment:
For these words of good and evil and contemptible are ever with relation to the 
person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any 
common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects 
themselves, but from the person or the man (where there is no 
commonwealth).40
Reason is therefore disassociated with classical and Christian conceptions of the
“intellect” and its “rational appetite” towards the good and reformulated as a mere
instrument in service of the passions. There is no substantial unity to the soul to
organise a totality of interest or an identity; a whole that is more than the sum of its
parts. Man is immersed in the constant flux of experience; his partiality permeating
even his own private appetites and aversions making them constantly subject to
change.41 The only constant desire underlying all the rest is the fundamental
principle of self-preservation. In the state of nature man knows nothing but the
realities and necessities of his own immediate needs and desires and will do anything
to preserve his own life; :
The Right of Nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale is the liberty 
each man hath to use his own powers as he will himself, for the preservation of 
his own nature, that is to say of his own life and consequently of doing anything 
which, in his own judgement and reason shall concieve to be the aptest means 4
Natural liberty is a therefore a condition of war, not because men are evil, but because 
they are in a constant condition of fear and insecurity. In the state of nature there are 
no limits “each and every one” is entitled by the right of nature” to 44 make use of 
anything to preserve his own life” up to and including “another man’s body44.43
In Hobbes’ mechanical universe it makes no sense to talk of community or 
sociality because he has eradicated the ontological ground for holistic unity in the 
individual, never mind society. Any and all connection between men is the product of
40 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. iv, pp. 28 - 29
41 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xv p. 100
42 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiv p. 79
43 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiv, p. 80
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calculated self-interest and can be understood only in terms of reciprocity and 
voluntary contract. Self-preservation remains the only unifying principle of the human 
existential condition and it alone provides the possibility of a common interest 
founded not in a positive good, but in a universal negative; fear of violent death. 
Natural liberty in Hobbes describes an original condition of atomistic and egoistic 
individuals in perpetual motion driven by the flux of appetite and aversion. There is 
no overarching or universal conception of the good above and beyond the immediacy 
of personal desire. Good and evil are relative terms with each man’s good determined 
by his personal and empirical experience of pleasure and pain. Instead of the rest 
found in happiness or beatitude, Hobbes describes a restless striving inherent in the 
life process itself.
Desire does not come to an end accept in death. Life is constant motion an 
happiness is not freedom from desire, nor even the temporary satisfaction of a desire, 
as one desire leads necessarily onto the next and so on as long as there is life in the 
body. It is not even enjoyment itself that has value, but the “felicity” that comes with 
the “continual progress of the desire, from one object to another, the attaining of the 
former being still but the way to the latter”.44 Securing the satisfaction of the desires 
becomes the purpose for which man’s reason as instrument is continually employed. 
Reason does not disclose the order of being, but serves as an instrument to the 
passions. Reason does not direct or moderate the passions, but becomes a slave to 
them precisely because there is no order to the soul differentiating noble from base 
desires. Reason no longer has its independence because it no longer has it place in a 
rationally ordered cosmos. Reason does not define itself through the “recognition” of 
the good, or in the self-directed motion towards the completion or perfection of its 
own higher nature. Reason is and can be nothing other than calculation or reckoning; 
the means to ever changing ends which admit of neither stability nor endurance in the 
random flux of human existence in the state of nature.
The Rule of Passion Over Reason as the Natural Condition of Man
Man as a natural being is governed by the mechanical necessities of motion and it is 
in the motion from one passion over the other which defines the human condition.
44 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xi, p. 57
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Man is in pursuit not only of present desires, but future ones as well. Man, unlike the 
animals possesses the capacity for “imagination” and or re-collection” and so has an 
awareness of past and future. By positing a future, man must look not simply to the 
possession of things, but to the means of possession in order to secure his future 
desires. Time describes man as a being with unlimited future desires because “the 
object of a man’s desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to 
assure forever the way of his future desire.” 45 As Hobbes readily acknowledges, not 
all men are possessed of immoderate desires and human desire itself is not a product 
of a sinful original nature. Instead, unlimited desire is the unavoidable result of the 
capacity to “imagine” which produces an “unlimited” and open-ended future 
projected as a “fiction of the mind“ 46 Enough can never be enough because 
everything possessed in the present is by definition de(limited) by actual existence 
whereas the future, is a realm of pure, unlimited, potentiality. Human desire 
therefore, based as it is on unlimited rational calculation, can only be an unending 
spur to “restless” striving. Desire “increases as it proceeds, or like the motion of 
heavy bodies which the further they go, make still more haste.” 47
As an isolated automata in perpetual motion all men are identical in their basic 
component structure and mechanical determination. The infinite variety of ends gives 
way to the single desire for power as a universal means. Power becomes the abstract 
concept through which all human desire can be understood and analysed by scientific 
method. Hobbes’ thought experiment has produced the underlying principle of all 
human motion; “all of mankind is in a perpetual and restless desire for “power after 
power that ceasesth only in death”48 Reason no longer limits desire in shaping action 
into the future towards a definitive because defined end or telos. Instead, reason in 
the service of the imagination opens up a future of unlimited fear and insecurity. A 
present end or goal is and can only be a partial good in comparison with the totality of 
all possible goods making it merely a way station on the road to endless 
accumulation.
As an instrument in its natural state, reason is more of an impediment to man’s 
self-preservation than an aid because his fear of the future leads him into contention
45 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xi, p. 57
46 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. iii, p. 14
47 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. x p. 50
48 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap xi, p. 58
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with others. Man although a solitary and isolated automata, separated from his
fellows by nature is also condemned by the presence of others to an even higher state
of natural insecurity. Not only will he imagine a future of unsatisfied desires due to
his own weakness and nakedness in a hostile nature, but he must face the struggle of
survival against his fellow man. The competitive struggle fuels a desire for
domination and condemns all men to a life of perpetual fear and insecurity:
.. .competition of riches, honour, command or other power inclineth contention, 
emnity and war because the way of one competitor to the attaining of his desire 
is to kill, subdue, supplant or repel the other.49
Not only must man struggle to meet the unlimited desires of an unlimited future, but 
he must do so in a competitive environment in which his fellow man is not friend, but 
an enemy.
There is no natural sociality because there is no possibility of reasoned
restraint on desire in the absence of a common power to construct and enforce limits.
Natural men do not seek their fellows out for the “higher” pursuits of political and
philosophical activities, but can only view them as impediments and obstacles
threatening not only present, but future possession. Natural man “imagines” the future
and projects fear as a rational response to his existential condition. His finite
capacities lead to the “reasonable” desire to “master all men” which is nothing more
than is required for his own conservation.50 Fear of the future produces the uniquely
human capacity for “spirited” competition, comparison and vain-glory; the natural
result of human equality and liberty:
From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. 
And therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they 
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is 
principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, 
endeavour to destroy or subdue one another.51
An already bad situation is made worse as man’s natural desires, unlimited even in his 
own mind can only be enhanced and inflamed by the presence of others which forces 
men , whatever their natural disposition, into the war of all against all” as a matter of 
mere self-preservation. Men says Hobbes give each other “no pleasure, but on the
49 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xi, p. 58
50 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiii, p. 75
51 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiii, p. 75
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e*y
contrary a great deal of grief. ”
Man is not simply an “animal” propelled by endless cycles of production and
reproduction, need and satisfaction, but has human passions which lead to contention
and from contention the search for self-preservation. Reason is an instrument of
survival brought into being by the passions which stimulate the search for ways and
means of advancing interests. Reason, furthers a passion for knowledge which far
from being the noble pursuit of philosophers is the result of “curiosity” which moves
men from his immediate present to consider the future. Curiosity” for Hobbes is the
“passion” which distinguishes man from the other animals:
Desire to know why and how so that man is distinguished not only by his 
reason, but also by this singular passion from other animals. The care for 
knowing causes, which is a lust of the mind that by perseverance and delight in 
the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge exceeded the short 
vehemence of carnal passions53
Reason and the desire for knowledge doesn’t elevate man in the order of things, they
are merely passions like any other and important only in so far as they service the
competitive struggle for self-preservation.
Hobbes indicates his intellectual break with the classics by refusing the
species defining capacity of man as man anchored in reason and speech. Hobbes
observes that man is just another animal and that “memory, deliberation, speech and
even “understanding” are common in beasts.54 Reason as well as being a mere
instrument of the passions, is also an unfinished process of nature. Ideas are not innate
and reason is not a substantial property of the embodied soul. Reason, is the product
of experience an outgrowth of memory and imagination. Man is mere raw material
upon which life stamps its mark. There is nothing essential about man and like all
natural beings he is infinitely malleable;
There is no other act o f man‘s mind that I can remember, naturally planted in 
him so as to need no other thing to exercise of it but to be bom a man and live 
with the use of his five senses. Those other faculties of which 1 shall speak by 
an by and which seem proper to man only, are acquired and increased by study 
and industry and of most men learned by instruction and discipline, and proceed 
all from the invention of words and speech.55
Man through art can “cultivated” his mind and extend the power;
52 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiii, p. 75
53 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. vi, p. 31
54 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. ii, p. 11
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From desire ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of 
that which we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of the means to 
that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own 
power...The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds: one when of an effect 
imagined, we seek the causes and means to produce it, this common to man and 
beast. The other is when, imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the 
possible effects that can be produced by it be produced. That is to say we 
imagine what we can do with it, when we have it.56
Reason, as ratiocinatio, the faculty of “reckoning”57 when linked to the human 
passion of “curiosity” results in the production of useful knowledge. Science arises 
from the desire to know the causes of effects in order to further the pursuit of power. 
Science, like reason itself, is not natural to man, but a product of natural processes 
which drive man to fear for his future and act accordingly. Because reason is an 
impotent tool of the passions, it is to the passions that Hobbes turns in order to tame, 
subdue and redirect man’s “natural liberty”. Passion must be deployed against 
passion as natural force must be used against natural force to counter and redirect 
natural motion in Hobbes’ mechanical universe. Hobbes rationally calculates that he 
must ground the construction of his commonwealth on the most powerful passion of 
all; fear of violent death.
Art Perfects Nature Through the Productive Power of Force
In Hobbes’ political theory the passions themselves have value, not because they 
propel man towards some “good” greater or external to himself, but because they 
provide a means to his end; founding a stable commonwealth. The productive power 
of the passions will be harnessed to create the Leviathan. It is not that the passions 
provide a necessary benefit or utility from which one could base a hedonistic moral 
philosophy, as with the ancient sceptics, but that they provide the “control” 
mechanism for technological innovation. Natural men will be remade into artificial 
citizens through the application of human science and technique. Hobbes follows 
Bacon’s lead; knowledge is power and power is productive. Human intervention in 
nature reveals her secrets; the manipulation and control of these secrets allows for the 
transformation of natural things from one form to another, but also brings new beings
55 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. iii, p. 14
56 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. iii, p. 13
57 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. iv, p. 20
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into being. Once nature has been dissolved into its base components and underlying
processes new combinations become possible and new things emerge which would
have remained “unknown” if nature was passively left to follow her own natural
course. The passions of man will be harnessed and directed in order to serve Hobbes
utilitarian purpose; the construction of a stable political order. He performs a
“thought” experiment in order to produce a human passion; fear of violent death. In
the state of nature as rhetorically described there is a perpetual war of all against all
and man is confronted with the fragility of his natural condition. Man’s vanity, far
from being an obstacle to the production of peace turns out to be a powerful and even
necessary precondition to the establishment of civil society. Without the direct
confrontation with danger; man would never be persuaded to seek peace:
Vain-glorious men “without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of 
themselves are inclined to rash engaging and in the approach of danger or 
difficulty to retire if they can, because not seeing the way of safety, they will 
hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse, than their lives for 
which no salve is sufficient.58
Because men are prone to irrational self-love and over-estimation of their own worth, 
their competitive striving will lead them into adventurous dangers, the immediate 
consequence of which is fear. The immediate encounter with death concentrates the 
mind on what is most important; self preservation. Men imagine all sorts of things 
and project infinite desires into an infinite future and leads them into the contention 
the experience of which will produce a passion with the greatest force.
Fear of violent death is the “experience” Hobbes produces through rhetorical 
devise of the state of nature. The production of this passion moves men from their 
vain-glorious love of what they imagine to be natural liberty to the rational calculation 
that civil society is both necessary and desirable. Man must be in “terror of some 
power” to awaken him to the fragility of his own life and move him away from his 
own natural liberty to the artificial liberty of civil society.59 Hobbes lists twelve 
reasons why man in the state of nature cannot live sociably as do bees and ants all of 
which are derivative of vanity. Men says Hobbes are “continually in competition for 
honour and dignity”, and he is a creature “whose joy consisteth in comparing himself 
with other men”, as a result he “can relish nothing but what is eminent.” 60 Only man
58 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xi, p. 60
59 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xvii, p. 106
60 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xvii, p. 108 -109
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has the capacity to “imagine” and with this imagination comes infinite desire which 
because it is relative and comparative can find no limit or end. It is the very 
destructiveness of passion and violent desire without end which mobilises men’s fear 
of violent death and turns him to the relative peace, stability and comfort of civil 
society:
The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as 
are necessary to commodious living and a hope by their industry to obtain them. 
And reason suggested convenient articles of peace, upon which men may drawn 
to agreement.61
Reason allows men to calculate that the “liberty” of the state of nature is no real
liberty at all because each becomes a force checking the force of the other leading not
to freedom, but subjugation. Men “hinder one another and reduce their strength by
mutual opposition, to nothing; whereby they are easily subdued”, either by each other
or a “few who agree together.” 62
Man, however; unlike the animals can escape the state of nature and their
natural opposition through the institution of the social contract. Science can be
deployed to perfect a flawed natural condition. Men in order to master their own
nature must exit the state of nature:
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men is by covenant 
only, which is artificial; and therefore, it is no wonder if there be somewhat else 
required (besides covenant) to make their agreement constant and lasting, which 
is a common power to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the 
common benefit.63
Fortunately for man, the source of his unique problem, radical freedom and the 
perception of past and future, is also the source of its unique solution: the artifice of 
the social contract. Man is lead to science as a technical solution to his natural 
condition. It is this “anxiety over the future” that disposes man to “inquire into the 
causes of things” because the knowledge of them maketh men better able to order the 
present to their best advantage.”64 Man’s reason, or the ability to “reckon from 
consequences” allows him to construct an artificial state from his knowledge of cause 
and effect. Man, or at least the man of science can use his knowledge of cause and 
effect to impose order on chaos and transform nature through art.
61 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiii, p. 78
62 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xvii, p. 107
63 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xvii, p. 109
64 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xi, p. 62
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The problem of politics is not some intractable problem rooted in the diversity 
and plurality of human nature, but is simply a technical problem of calculating the 
correct means to effect the desired end. Man is a malleable raw material who can be 
transformed into a compliant citizen through the proper application of force. The 
construction of the commonwealth is premised upon the basic scientific principle that 
force counters force and the chaotic consequences of man’s natural desires will be 
compel him to the civil state. The citizen is work of art in which the forces of blind 
and contingent nature receive the imposed form of human purpose. Without purpose 
or direction natural “liberty” is a nothingness; a blind mechanical force which far 
from being the source of human freedom and dignity is dangerous, destructive and 
capricious force of nature. In order to escape the poverty, fear and isolation of his 
natural liberty man must “exchange” it for the relative security and comfort of the 
civil state.
In order to persuade men to give up their “natural liberty” Hobbes has spent
considerable effort disabusing men of their erroneous ideas of natural liberty. Natural
liberty as described by ancient philosophy is a false idol that must be smashed before
men are willing to see it in its true light of scientific analysis. The error, as with so
many things can be found in men’s unexamined prejudices which come from customs
and traditions handed down from the past. The flaws of present commonwealths,
their instability and disorders comes not from a flawed human nature, but a flawed
scientific method. Neither the absurd speech of the philosophers, nor the lessons of
history can reveal the true principles of government, only the science of man. The
fault lies not with the common people, but the false philosophy which informed past
authors of political and moral theory. Man as the raw material of the state will take
on whatever form is pressed upon them, so the problem lies not with men, but with
the learned men of past ages:
Potent men digest hardly anything that setteth up a power to bridle their 
affections; and learned men, anything that discovered their errors, and thereby 
lessened their authority; whereas the common people’s minds, unless they be 
tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of 
their doctors, are like clean paper fit to receive whatsoever by public authority 
shall be imprinted in them.65
The problem lie in the instability of interpretation and the unreliability of “words”
65 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxx, p. 221
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whose meaning can change with context, highlighting the weakness of scholastic
method. A misunderstanding of words has led to a misunderstanding of the basic
scientific principles of civil society. Ancient philosophy makes numerous errors by
mistaking the idols of the mind for empirical fact. Liberty as it has come down to us
in custom and tradition is not liberty as it exists in nature, but is a product of civil
society and cannot therefore serve as a basis upon which to found the state. Liberty in
the writings of “ancient Greeks and Roman refers not “to the liberty of particular men,
but the liberty of the commonwealth”66 which if not corrected will only perpetuate a
fatal error regarding a fundamental political principle:
It is an easy thing for men to be deceived by the species name of liberty and (for 
want of judgement to distinguish) mistakes that for their private inheritance and 
birth right which is the right of the public only. ..Aristotle, Cicero and other 
men, Greek and Romans living under popular states derived those rights, not 
from principles of nature but transcribed them into their books out of the 
practice of their own commonwealths which were popular, as grammarians 
described rules of language out of practice of the time or the rules of poetry out 
of poems of Homer and Virgil.67
“Liberty” as understood by the ancients is not the product of nature, but of society.. 
By falsely confusing a social product with a natural condition, past philosophers have 
built upon false foundations.
In the state of nature man is not a social, but a natural creature moved by 
natural forces which compel him to act out of necessity for his own preservation and 
nothing more. Hobbes strip man of the aristocratic virtues he finds so troublesome and 
vain-glorious by stripping him of all social and historical conditions. Man as an 
atomic individual is free and equal in his very nakedness, exposed not only to the 
predations of his fellow man; but the hostility of nature herself. Hobbes reverses the 
traditional glorification of the past as an heroic or innocent age before the corruption 
or “fall” of man. Neither does Hobbes does seek to found his state upon a moral 
theory of man’s evil nature which justifies government, inequality and other forms of 
necessary subjugation. The state of nature is not immoral, but amoral; morality and 
moral theory has nothing to do with what is at base a technical problem. Morality by 
its very nature is an imprecise science and as such provides a flawed foundation for 
the construction of civil order. Hobbes bypasses the problem of morality and ethics 
altogether by looking for the foundation of his state elsewhere. If “natural liberty”
66 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxi p. 139
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simply results in the chaos and incoherence of mutual antagonism, there can be no
such thing as natural justice. Justice, like the classical conception of liberty, is not the
product of nature but of sovereign authority and the rule of law:
To this war of everyman against everyman, this also is consequence that nothing 
can be unjust, the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no 
place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no 
injustice. Force and Fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and 
injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor the mind.. .They are 
qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude.
Liberty and justice are not found in nature because where there is no common power 
the relativity of good and evil will produce relative notions of right and wrong and 
with no common power to judge, contention and war is the inevitable result.
The poverty of man’s natural condition; however does not condemn him to a 
life that is nasty, brutish and short because he has the ability, through his knowledge 
of science to act into nature and transform it. Man may not be social by nature, but he 
is driven into society by the diversity of his needs and desires. Natural states arise, 
but they are based in the family or are mere extensions of the family. These states 
because they are natural are not the product of human reason, but the accidents of 
history. History is in turn composed of the sad story of failed states. States come and 
go out of existence, great empires rise and fall, but this is not the inevitable pattern of 
human civilisation. The new sciences offer a new method from which to produce new 
knowledge and from that knowledge will arise a new path and an alternative future. 
Man will no longer have to seduce the bitch Fortuna, but will be able to freely 
determine his own destiny. The state like any other constructed thing can be made 
well or poorly depending upon the skill of the mechanic.
Man no longer has to accept his fate as a natural being but can improve upon 
his nature through technique. He is neither irredeemably evil nor cursed by God, but 
is in fact a creature above all others, not by nature, but by artifice. Dismissing the 
sceptics of his time, Hobbes argues that despairing of every finding a stable basis for 
the commonwealth, is as “ill argued as the savages of America denying there were 
any grounds, or principles so to build a house as to last as long as the materials, 
because they never yet say any so well built.”69 Hobbes proudly proclaims that with
67 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxi p. 140
68 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiii, p. 78
69 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxx, p. 220
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the proper knowledge anything is possible because man is infinitely malleable and can
be made fit for purpose. It is not the fragility of the human condition, nor the
irresistible power of time which forever frustrates human ambition and power, but the
mere defect of ignorance. Ignorance is something that can be overcome with
knowledge and knowledge is within man’s grasp now that the universal principles of
human nature have been revealed through science. Hobbes proposes to escape fate
with its endless cycles of generation and corruption, growth and decay, rise and
decline by escaping the natural condition itself. Hobbes may not be able to produce
immortality for individual men, but he can produce it for mankind in general through
the stable and enduring commonwealth. Industrious men will harness his principles
and put them to go use in the production of the perfection itself:
Time and industry produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well 
building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious men that 
had long studied the nature of materials and the diverse effects of figure and 
proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build, so, long time 
after men have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect and apt to relapse 
into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out by industrious 
meditation, to make their constitution (excepting by external violence) 
everlasting.70
Man does not have to suffer from his natural condition, but can apply scientific 
method to perfect his art; and with perfect art comes the perfect product; Hobbes 
commonwealth will be as stable and enduring as the laws of nature themselves.
Sovereignty for a Human Purpose; Self Preservation
Politics is about the efficient management of force because men is definitive of the 
human condition. Man is but matter in motion and liberty is nothing other than the 
absence of external impediments.71 Through the thought experiment of the state of 
nature it has been demonstrated to man that his natural liberty only leads to mutual 
antagonism and contention. Science reveals man in his original condition and from 
this knowledge he is able to reckon or calculate that self-preservation requires peace. 
Peace, as the absence of war, is unnatural and therefore cannot be achieved in the state 
of nature. Man must exit the state of nature to produce peace and therefore secure his
70 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxx, pg. 220-221
7 ] Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiv, p. 79
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own self-preservation. Man’s reason shows him that he “ought” to desire peace in 
accordance to the law of nature that compels him to preserve himself, but he cannot 
achieve this end in the state of nature. Man can only achieve peace and hence self- 
preservation in civil society. Civil society is an artificial construct made possible by 
concentrating each and every man’s natural force in a single site of overwhelming
72 ipower. Through the construction of the artificial man, the Leviathan man transform 
his flawed human nature into a perfected citizen and achieves his end; self- 
preservation. The Leviathan, does not wield arbitrary power over the citizens because 
it is the citizens. The Leviathan is a power accumulation machine in which the power 
of each and every one is transformed into a single universal power. The diverse and 
arbitrary will of particular men becomes a single overarching and transcendent power 
when the power of the multitude is transformed into a single, unified power, serving a 
single unified purpose; self-preservation..
This transformation comes about through the mechanism of the social
contract. Each and every one “transfers” his natural liberty to the sovereign and
through this voluntary act the Leviathan is made. Man’s original natural liberty is
both preserved and enhanced in this transformation. Civil liberty improves upon
natural liberty by perfecting it. If in nature, each and every man is both the source and
the origin of the his own “natural liberty”, then each is equally bound in civil society
to submission to the sovereign which they have constituted. Each is an equal owner
and author of the sovereign power which is nothing other than the product of their
combined natural force. True to the technological theme, art perfects nature and
natural liberty is literally reformed to serve a human purpose:
The only way to erect such a common power.. .is to confer all their power and 
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their 
wills, by plurality o f voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to 
appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person, and every one to own 
and acknowledge himself to be author of whatever he that so beareth their 
person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern their 
common peace and safety and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will 
and their judgements, to his judgement. This is more than consent or concord; it 
is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of 
every man with every man.. .This done, the multitude so united in one person is 
called a COMMOMWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that 
great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God to 
which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and defence. 73
72 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxvi, p. 174
73 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xvii, p. 109
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The central fact of this construction is the act wherein each and every man “lays 
down” or “divests himself’ of his natural liberty (his natural force) and his “right to 
anything” in order to constitute the sovereign. The sovereign creates an artificial civil 
society which makes it possible for natural liberty to be enjoyed.74 In the state of 
nature men in motion check each other and become obstacles and impediments to 
each other.
In civil society each is free to move and enjoy his natural liberty because each 
one’s natural force will be organised under the rule of law. The rule of law provides 
the framework for peace and the enjoyment of liberty by removing the mutual 
antagonism of the state of nature. Sovereign power is not prohibitive, but productive 
because laws are designed not restrict or limit natural desires, but on the contrary to 
expand and enhance them. The Leviathan allows for an efficient functioning of 
natural forces not possible under natural conditions. Art perfects nature by obeying 
her:
For the use of laws (which are but rules authorized) is not to bind the people 
from all voluntary action, but to direct and keep them in such motion as not to 
hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness or indiscretion, as
c
hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the way.
Nature, (even, and especially human nature) left to her own devises does not perform 
for human purposes and it is only through direct intervention that she can be moulded 
or channelled to a human end. By probing her secrets and exposing her inner 
workings that she can be tamed, domesticated and ultimately “transformed” into a 
new and “higher” state of being. Nature as dumb, brute materiality is devoid of 
spirit, purpose, form or any other kind of “rational” order and must await the 
organising breath of god, or hand of man, to whip her into shape. Hobbes makes it 
clear that men, as natural beings are as dumb and devoid of purpose as any other 
element of nature. In the state of nature, life is nasty, brutish and short. Man only 
overcomes his flawed nature, through artificial construction. Man has no value in and 
of himself; he is a mere raw resource and as such only has a value relative to his other 
men. His value lies in his utility and his utility is a function of the value other men 
place upon him:
74 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiv, p. 81
75 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxx, p. 229
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The value or worth of a man is, as of all things, his price, that is to say, so much 
as would be given for the use of his power, and therefore is not absolute, but a
7 (\thing dependent on the need and judgement of another.
Man is just another commodity, a means to an end and his end is determined not by
himself, but by others. Man value is a function of the use to which he is put. Man
must be put to use securing his own self preservation. Man serves this purpose by
existing in the state of nature and constituting the Leviathan through the mechanism
of the social contract. The social contract is the instrument which perfects what is
given by nature. The social contract makes law and order possible thereby
transforming mere potentiality into actuality. Only in civil society is man’s natural
liberty finally realised. Liberty and necessity are identical because man himself is but
an extension of nature. Man’s liberty only comes into being through his submission to
natural necessity; “liberty and necessity are consistent; as in the water, that hath not
only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel.“77
The Leviathan as an organising machine both channels and concentrates
human motion and power as the raw material from which civil society is made. The
sovereign embodies and therefore subsumes the power of each and everyone;
sovereignty itself being nothing other than the combined force of all. The sovereign
is and cannot be in opposition to the subject because he is the subject and his power is
the subject’s own power reformed and remade. The sovereign and the subject are not
two contending “forces” holding each other in balance, but are instead the mutually
constituted products of a reciprocal relation. Sovereign authority is therefore based
not on the power of one, but on the power of all:
For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, 
he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him by terror 
thereof he is enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace and mutual aid 
against their enemies abroad. And in him consiseth the essence of the 
commonwealth, (which to define it) is one person, of whose acts a great 
multitude, by mutual covenants one with the other, have made themselves every 
one the author, to end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall 
think expedient, for their peace and common defence. And he that carrieth this 
person is called Sovereign and said to have the Sovereign Power and every one
7ftbeside, his Subject.
Hobbes’ natural physics sidesteps questions of traditional definitions and disputes
76 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. x, p. 51
77 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxi, p. 136
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regarding the rights and duties of sovereigns and subjects because he erases the
distinction between them as moral/ethical agents. Hobbes political science is not
about moral and ethical praxis, but about the manipulation and control of physical
force. There is no limit to sovereign power because sovereign power is not founded
upon moral principle, but upon the on the pure poetics of power
The Leviathan is not a person, but a machine and as a machine it serves a
function. The successful functioning of the machine is the only criterion upon which
the Leviathan can be measured. Politics is not an ethical/moral practice, but a
technical problem in need of a technical solution. The Leviathan provides the
solution to the problem of politics; it organises natural physical forces to a common
purpose; self-preservation. If  the Leviathan preserves the peace and enforces law and
order its purpose has been fulfilled an nothing else is of any consequence because
nothing else has any “meaning.” Hobbes explicitly denies that there is any difference
between despotic power and the constituted sovereign because both perform the same
function; they both preserve the peace. 79 A commonwealth by acquisition is the same
as a commonwealth constituted by consent because both are based upon force and
fear, whether originating in another man or the state of nature.80 As such the rule of
the leviathan is justified not by any “objective” standard of natural law or natural
justice, but on the brute fact of power which is the most efficient when it is the most
absolute. Sovereign power is and must be absolute and therefore unlimited because
any limit will only impede the efficient functioning of the machine and divert it from
the purpose for which it was created. Absolute power is requires the absolute
obedience that comes from absolute dependence. The sovereign preserves life by
wielding absolute power over life and death;
For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved, because preservation of life 
being the end for which man becomes subject to another, everyman is supposed 
to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him.
By usurping the power of nature, the sovereign becomes the ultimate source and 
origin of the subjects life and can therefore command it. Man acts into nature and 
establishes himself as the sole source and origin of all he creates; the subjects life is 
the sovereign’s to command at will.
78 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xvii, p. 109
79 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xvii, p. 109
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The preservation of the commonwealth requires absolute submission and 
obedience because it is only through the exercise of absolute and unlimited power that 
liberty can be both produced and maintained. Each and every subject is the author of 
his own subjugation and it is in this equality of submission that his true freedom is 
realised:
To come now to the particulars of true liberty of a subject., .we are to consider 
what rights we pass away when we make a commonwealth or what liberty we 
deny ourselves by owning all the actions (without exception) of the man or 
assembly we make our sovereign. For in the act of our submission consisteth 
both our obligation and our liberty which must therefore be inferred by 
arguments taken from thence, there being no obligations on any man which 
ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men equally are by nature free.82
In the state of nature liberty can have no meaning because there is no power to put it 
into effect. The social contract produces the common power making liberty possible 
and hence both preserves and enhances natural liberty by bringing it into being. The 
basis of all law and order is power, simply because power alone is what makes civil 
society possible by compelling men to uphold their mutual covenants. Covenants are 
not possible in the state of nature because there is no power to enforce them; “Bonds 
that have their strength, not from their own nature, but from fear of some evil
O')
consequence upon the rupture”.
In the absence of such a power, all covenants are void because men cannot be 
relied upon to act against their own interest. The leviathan makes covenants possible 
because he makes their enforcement reliable and predictable through the use of 
overwhelming force. The Leviathan simply makes non-compliance more painful than 
compliance. Men are rational; without a coercive force they will act in their own 
interest and not keep their covenants. A coercive force must be present to ensure that 
individual interest is identical with common interest. The Leviathan ensures that men 
calculate correctly:
Therefore, before the names just and unjust can have place, there must be some 
coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants by 
the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach 
of their covenant and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men 
acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon, and such power84there is none before the erection of a commonwealth.
81 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xx, p. 130
82 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxi, p. 140
83 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xiv, p. 81
84 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xv, p. 89
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Liberty depends upon each man, “forbearing” his natural right to everything in
exchange for a mutually constructed “right” of each to his own or “mine” and “thine”.
As each man’s liberty is mutually dependent on each man’s equal constraint it must
be imposed from above by an “artificial” means. The Leviathan is the machine
created to enforce covenants and therein preserve the peace. Law is the means by
which the Leviathan produces the civil order through which peace is preserved. The
Leviathan as the source of the law cannot be limited by the law. Sovereign power is
and can only be self-referential because it does not possess a will separate from the
public power that constitutes it:
To the care of the Sovereign belonged the making of good laws. But what is a 
good law? By a good law I mean not a just law, for no law can be unjust... It is 
in the laws of a commonwealth, as it is in the laws of gaming; whatsoever the 
gamesters all agree on is injustice to none of them. A good law is that which is
or
needful for the benefit of the people and withal perspicuous.
In Hobbes, the traditional role of the Prince in enacting or enforcing an already 
existing law, whether located in nature, divine will, custom or tradition is displaced by 
the modem conception of positive law in which the sovereign is and can only be the 
source and origin of its own power.
Law and order flow from the sovereign because law and order are only
possible if men are compelled to obey and can therefore rationally calculate that law
will be obeyed. Law is a product of human action; it is created by obedience and
obedience is a product of sovereignty. Once sovereignty is established it is the source
and origin of all law because it alone controls the force of the body politic. Law is the
power to compel and through compulsion produces the existential condition through
which liberty comes into being. Again, liberty and necessity are one; because
obedience is necessary; liberty and civil society becomes possible. The Leviathan as
the executive power of civil society fulfils its function by making a civil life possible;
civil life is the precondition for all other liberties which flow from it:
Again, if we take liberty for an exemption from laws, it is no less absurd for 
men to demand as they do that liberty by which all other men may be masters of 
their lives. And yet, as absurd as it is, this is it they demand, not knowing that 
the laws are of no power to protect them without a sword in the hands of a man, 
or men, to cause those laws to be put into execution. The liberty of a subject 
lieth, therefore, only in those things which, in regulating their actions, the 
sovereign hath praetermitted (such as is the liberty to buy and sell, and
85 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxx, p. 229
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otherwise contract with one another, to choose their own abode, their own diet, 
their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves see fit; and 
the like)86
Sovereign power has no “limit” because it embodies the collective will of the body 
politic and is the source and origin of law itself. The leviathan is a total power 
because it is the totality of all powers; subjects realise their natural freedom and 
liberty only through their mutual and absolute obedience to the machine they have 
created for that purpose and that purpose above all others.
Leviathan; Power Accumulation Machine
The sovereign gives life and liberty to his subjects and in so doing becomes their 
creator. The Leviathan is a mortal God because it creates and through this act of 
creation controls the power of life and death. A man’s life is the sum total of his 
existence and the Leviathan in creating and maintaining that life wields total and 
absolute power. There is no limit to the Leviathan because there is no limit to life; 
individual men may die, but their collective life as a body politic is forever. It is in 
this unified and collective existence that human civilisation becomes possible. Peace 
is the universal background within which private interest may be productively 
pursued. Without peace there would be no “rightful” possession because there would 
be no overarching power to enforce contracts and ensure that property rights would be 
respected. In the state of nature possession, even of one’s own body, is not secure 
making the investment and improvement in land or any other goods through an 
irrational calculation. Without the stability of ownership, improvement and the 
advancement of the sciences would be impossible and men would remain in a 
primitive state, struggling day to day for their own survival, living like animals rather 
than men.
Property however; introduces inequality and with inequality comes the 
partiality of faction and a potentially powerful source of civil discontent and disorder. 
The only “property” that men have in common is the property in their own bodies, 
which is why self-preservation becomes the universal end of civil society in Hobbes’ 
theory. Self-preservation, like property, however; is a good, and as such is a relative
86Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxi, p. 138
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value and cannot serve as the universal and eternal principle of political power. 
Hobbes formulates self-preservation first and foremost, not in its positive aspect as an 
appetite towards a particular good, but in its negative aspect as an aversion against the 
universal evil; violent death. The fact that Hobbes emphases violence demonstrates 
that he is trying to present, not a moral choice, but an overwhelming and even 
instinctual passion above and beyond rational decision. Hobbes wants a scientific 
principle of motion which is follows a law of natural necessity and not the ambiguity 
and unpredictability of moral praxis, which by definition admits of many goods. 
Goods, especially with regard to property are relative, some men value honour more 
than property, some people believe property should be held in common, some believe 
it is the private product of labour., etc., etc., without end. Property leads to a division 
in the commonwealth that if not checked will lead to sedition and faction; especially 
with regard to taxation and the needs to support the public goods, which are by 
definition contentious because non-universal. Hobbes is clear that the sovereign must 
be supreme in all decisions regarding property because property is only possible 
within the protection of civil society. Property does not and cannot limit sovereign 
power because the sovereign must be free to dispose of property for the common 
interest as determined by solely by the sovereign.
Fear of violent death is absolute and definitive, because even if one were to 
heroically chose death over dishonour, in the pursuit of tragic love, in defence of the 
state etc. etc., fear of violent death compels obedience because it is not a rational, 
reflective act, but an overwhelming immediate and existential reaction. Hobbes 
purposefully and rhetorically founds his political science on extreme violence and 
terror precisely because the subject must be completely, absolutely and totally over­
awed in order to ensure obedience. If men are by nature self-interested egoists 
incapable of co-operative action then they must be compelled to obey by force and 
fear because reason will calculate that it is in their interest to cheat and free ride. 
Hobbes was attempting to escape irresolvable moral disputes by abandoning the 
moral ground altogether because of their inability to provide a stable and enduring 
foundation for the commonwealth. The commonwealth by definition cannot be a 
partial power acting on behalf of a faction; but must be the embodiment of a universal 
will of each and everyone. The radical freedom and equality o f the state of nature 
must be preserved, even as it is transformed into a higher transcendent “public” power 
which is more than the sum of its parts.
Individual men in their finite particularity are limited; collectively they 
produce a social power which is infinite and universal. The whole is a totality; a 
sovereign person in its own right, authorised by all to act and to legislate in the public 
interest. The public power brings into being a new creature; the Leviathan which 
being the power of all is, an must be unopposed, because individual subjects have 
divested themselves of their natural powers and transferred them to the sovereign 
leaving them in a position of absolute and total dependence. A division of sovereignty 
is a contradiction in terms, because a power divided is a power opposed and 
opposition betrays a lack of universality, leading to the infinite fragmentation of 
faction. A faction as a part of the body politic cannot hold the public power and will 
inevitably implode in on itself until it is resolved back into the original partiality and 
relativity of each and everyone. The dissolution of the commonwealth immediately 
returns man to the state of nature because it is only the unified power of everyone that 
there is the rule of law and not men. The rule of law comes into being only when it is 
not the particular rule of a faction of society, passing laws in its own interest, but 
when the law itself determines and defines the role of individuals and groups within 
society as subordinate to it. The Leviathan is not restricted or confined by the law 
because the law is not something already existing and merely confirmed by the 
sovereign, but must come from the sovereign as a creative and hence spontaneous act 
of will.
The Leviathan is not a man, but a machine and as such it is an instrument of 
the public will expressed and executed through the framework of law which its power 
alone has constituted. Law flows from sovereign power as universal power because it 
is the universal power; it is literally all or nothing with sovereignty. Within this 
universal framework of law and order; everything else becomes possible. Sovereignty 
works not to constrain the power of citizens, but to provide the efficient system 
through which their power can be realised and enhanced. The commonwealth is a 
common wealth; it is the public power under which private liberty and prosperity is 
secured. Culture, civilisation and progress are all products of society and industry and 
as such can only be achieved by men in a civil state. Reason itself, is not innate, but 
the result of a social process in which knowledge has been advanced as a result of the 
peace and security created by civil order:
By this it appears that reason is not, as sense and memory, bom with us, nor
gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but attained by industry, first in apt
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imposing of names and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in 
proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by 
connections of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the 
consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it men 
call science.87
Reason and science are advanced by the knowledge that is produced in the 
commonwealth enriching the lives of citizens which in turn produce more science and 
knowledge in an endless circuit of power. It is not the citizen, but the citizen’s 
productivity which advances society, just as it is not the fruit; but the fruit’s fertility 
which advances the sciences.
The destructive forces of fear, competition and greed are no longer in their 
“naturally” mutually antagonistic state but have been transformed by the leviathan 
into the source of social power to for the advancement of industry and culture. Law is 
not designed to limit desire and power, but is instead an instrument for its 
magnification and multiplication. The civil law as a code of positive law artificially 
furnishes the paths upon which the orderly flow of desire and motion can flow 
“freely” and unimpeded. The rational construction of channels, or law defined as 
rules regulates individual action thereby “open-up” an entire horizon by “creating” the 
peace necessary for the products and benefits of civil society to come into being.
Civil society and the artificial freedom which it creates is therefore above and beyond 
anything granted to man in his “naturally” deprived and impoverished original 
condition. Man improves the world and improving the world he improves himself.
A universal peace is the primary condition upon which all subsequent benefits are 
dependent and without which they could not even be “imagined”. Without the 
leviathan there would be no security and without security there would be only the 
brute facts of nature, negating not only culture and civilisation, but the human 
condition itself:
In such a condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the 
commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no 
instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no 
knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no 
society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death,
oo
and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.
87 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. v., p. 25
88 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xii, p. 76
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Man’s “rational” calculation will demonstrate that life in the state of nature is not 
worth living and that any human life worth its name is a civilised life. Civil society 
and his participation as a subject of civil society allows him the liberty to unleash the 
passions which are the engine of his intellect.
The more cultivated and sophisticated his appetites, the more advanced his 
reason will become in order to satisfy these new desires. Hobbes Leviathan promises 
not only security but “commodious living” as a benefit of civil society made possible 
by the socially constructed liberty of his subjects. Security of possession in private 
property right is made possible by the original social contract in which men agree to 
give up their natural liberty for an artificial liberty in which the possession of property 
becomes guaranteed by the public power. The protection of property, the 
enforcement of contracts, the facilitation of commodity exchange; the encouragement 
and protection of international trade; the improvements of agriculture and 
manufacturing, the advancements of the arts and sciences, the protection and 
provision of the poor in the name of general welfare and industriousness, are all 
recognised as important, if secondary and derivate, functions of sovereign power.89 
Within the framework of public law established by the sovereign; the liberty of 
private subjects lies in the “silence of the law” wherein a man may dispense of is 
natural powers at his own discretion.90
A subjects liberty however, must always be regulated with an eye to the
common good which requires direct intervention in nature because man is not by
nature a social creature. Social habits must be impressed upon subjects through
education designed to habituate subjects to the comforts a civilised life. Through the
judicious use of the pleasant, the raw material man can be reformed and cultivated to
a common purpose:
For cultus signifieth properly and constantly that labour which a man bestows 
on anything with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things whereof we 
make benefit are either subject to us and the profit they yield follow-eth the 
labour we bestow upon them as a natural effect, or they are not subject to us, but 
answer our labouring according to their own wills. In the first sense the labour 
bestowed upon the earth is called culture, and the education of children, a 
culture of their minds. In the second sense, where men’s wills are to be wrought 
to our purposes, not by force, but by complaisance, it signifieth as much a 
courting, that is a winning of favour by good offices (as by praises, by 
acknowledging their power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom
89 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxiv, p. 160 and Chap. xxx, p. 228
90 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxi, p. 143
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we look for any benefit). 91
As man is both the product and the producer of the civilisation that creates his 
humanity, his existence has become by necessity social existence in which his mutual 
dependence is definitive of his being. As a social creature dependent upon the created 
nature of every aspect of his existence, the commonwealth, becomes not only the 
means, but the end of his individual life. Individual life and private interest are made 
to conform to the common good through education; but also in the administration of 
justice
Justice provides the common good in the protection of property that binds
individuals to civil society above and beyond what can be established through fear
alone. Justice, however retains its utilitarian function and operates by necessity
within the framework of law established by the sovereign’s will. What is just and
unjust does not reflect some higher value or objective standard outside o f the
framework of law operative for the common good of the commonwealth. Hobbes
strategically uses the “schools” definition of justice as “the constant will of giving to
every man his own,92” but limited to the reciprocal and contractual relations between
subjects. It is the imposition of sovereign power and the sovereign power alone
which produces all forms of social life, down to and including the person and property
of each and every social subject. The absolute necessity of sovereign power grounds
all other socially constructed goods:
Take away the civil law and no man knows what is his own and what is another 
man’s. Seeing therefore the introduction of property is an effect of the 
commonwealth, which can do nothing by the person that represents it, it is the 
act only of the sovereign and consisteth in the laws which none can make that 
have not the sovereign power 93
On the basis of the sovereign’s claim to create the social conditions in which contracts 
and hence property and rightful ownership become possible, the sovereign reserves 
the right to legislate and regulate and determine the nature and extent of property 
rights within the commonwealth.
Hobbes removes justice from the wider context of moral, religious or 
philosophical concern to a strict interpretation concerning property rights which are 
purely subjective having validity only within a commonwealth:
91 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxxi, p. 239
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.. .where there is no own, that is no propriety, there is no injustice; and where 
there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, 
there is no propriety, all men having right to all things; therefore where there is 
no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice in 
keeping valid covenants; but the validity of covenants begins not but with the 
constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them; and then it 
is also that propriety begins.94
Property right is defined by Hobbes as the exclusive use of a thing made possible by 
the power of the sovereign to restrict and constrain the liberty of others through the 
use of force. As such property is a civil and not a natural right and as such it is 
absolutely derived and dependent upon sovereign power without which it simply 
would not exist. The power of Hobbes’ Leviathan is and can only be absolute because 
it power that defines justice and not justice which defines power. In Hobbes 
mechanical universe it takes force to counter force and as the sovereign embodies a 
monopoly of power there simply is no other power capable of restraining the exercise 
of power by the sovereign.
The sovereign is not “above” the law for moral or religious reasons deriving 
from some “objective” natural or divine order but simply because there is no force to 
oppose it. As the sole author and origin of social power the law is and can only be the 
product of the sovereign’s will and that will operates freely because there is nothing to 
oppose it with the result that there is nothing the sovereign can do which is “unjust.” 
The sovereign only “breaks” the social contract through a functional failure to secure 
the peace and not through some moral breach of legitimate rule. The right of 
resistance is not completely denied in Hobbes theory, but this right only arises when 
the sovereign power has become so ineffective that each subject must preserve his 
own life returning everyone to the state of nature. Short of the dissolution of the 
commonwealth, however, no opposition to the will of the sovereign can be tolerated 
because the sovereign’s power is by definition absolute. Any attempt to reclaim 
power from the sovereign is an act of sedition which threatens the peace and security 
of all and is treated as the worst of crimes, punishable by death.
The sovereign as the public power can and will use any and all means to 
preserve itself as it is the ground upon which all subordinate benefits of civil life 
depend. Sovereign power is an absolute power which represents a universal interest
93 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxiv, p. 160
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which by definition cannot be divided without falling into infinite partiality and
faction destructive of the commonwealth itself Sovereign power is limited only by
its capacity to enforce its will, which as a technological power will only increase with
the advances in the arts and sciences. Technological advance, however is itself the
product of a well ordered commonwealth which accumulates power with the
prosperity and productivity of its subjects. Subjects have a direct interest in nurturing
the commonwealth and ensuring its health and prosperity because it is on the strength
and power of the sovereign that all the “comforts” of civilised life depend. Increased
power and productivity of subjects feeds back into the power of the sovereign because
the subjects are the means through which common power is realised and enhanced.
Wealth and property although a private right protected by the sovereign is also the
source of the sovereign’s power and as such must be made subject to its needs. The
preservation of the whole takes precedence over preservation of the part, with the
result that property right is subordinate to the needs of the sovereign to further the
public good, as defined by the sovereign’s will. The needs of the sovereign must be
met through the appropriation of taxes or any other such means that the sovereign
may require.95 The sovereign acts for the “public” and as such it can have no
legitimate opposition because it embodies the will of the whole in its very existence:
It is true that a sovereign monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, 
may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their passions, contrary to 
their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and the law of nature, but this 
is not enough to authorise any subject, either to make war upon, or so much as 
to accuse of injustice or any way to speak evil of, their sovereign; because they 
have authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the sovereign power, made 
them their own. 96
As long as laws flow from the will of the constituted authority embody the will of all 
something which cannot be opposed by any part, however constituted, because it is by 
a partial interest and a negation of the whole.
A good law is therefore whatever is so called by the sovereign because it is his 
will alone which established law. Sovereignty by necessity is self-referential because 
it must be completely free and self-determining. Any reference to an “objective” or 
“external” standard would take away or limit the power of the sovereign and hence 
subordinate the collective will to something with no authority. Justice is found in
95 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxiv, p. 161
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equal subordination to the law as determined by the will of the sovereign in that each
find an equality in their absolute submission to law publicly proclaimed. What
constitutes good laws therefore is a common system or rules that are universally
enforced as a formal or functional whole and not any particular “end” or “good”
which individual laws may aim to produce. Individual laws are just or unjust solely
within the frame of reference established by the totality of the system:
By a good law I mean not just a law, for no law can be unjust. The law is made 
by the sovereign power, and all that is done by such a law is warranted and 
owned by everyone of the people; and that which everyman will have so, no 
man can say is unjust. It is in the laws of the commonwealth as in the laws of 
gaming; whatsoever the gamesters all agree on is injustice to none of them. A 
good law is that which is needful for the good of the people, and withal 
perspicuous.97
Only the sovereign decides in practical terms what is and is not needful for the good
of the people because he is the common judge of the common interest. Individual
men or groups of men must accommodate themselves to the public interest as
declared by the sovereign through the rule of law. While men have an equality before
the law in absolute submission, their qualitative differences while not being politically
significant can still be put to good use. Man as the raw material of a collective
common interest and can be deployed as necessary for the common good. Employing
an architectural metaphor Hobbes maintains that subjects must observe the natural law
of “complaisance” whereby each must strive to accommodate himself to the rest:
For the understanding whereof we may consider that there is, in men’s aptness 
to society, a diversity of nature rising from their diversity of affections, not 
unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. For 
as that stone which (by asperity and irregularity of figure) takes more room 
from others than itself fills and (for hardness) cannot be easily made plain, and 
thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable and 
troublesome, so also a man that (by asperity of nature) will strive to retain those 
thing which to himself are superfluous and to others necessary and (for the 
stubbornness of his passions) cannot be corrected, is to be left or cast out of 
society as cumbersome thereunto.98
As such subjects must be prepared to mould themselves to the needs of the whole 
because it is only in the smooth functioning of the entire social order that their safety 
and security can be produced.
The continued functioning of the sovereign power is assured by the obedience
97 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xxx, p. 229
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of its subjects even if this obedience is contrary to their individual self-interest
because obedience not simply a matter of rational calculation, but of over-awing
power. The sovereign must exercise not only a monopoly of power, but must possess
such a power as to move the passions as well as the reason of men:
So it appeared plainly, to my understanding, both from reason and scripture, that 
the sovereign power (which placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one 
assembly of men, as in popular and aristocrat-ical commonwealths) is as great 
as possibly men can imagine to make it...And whosoever, thinking sovereign 
power too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself to the power that 
can limit it, that is to say to a greater."
Because force and force alone is the final arbitrator of any dispute, limits to power can
only be imposed by a greater power. If the commonwealth is subject to a power
greater than itself it is not a sovereign, but a subordinate power subject to the will of
another. In order to avoid the contest for power which always arises between rivals of
equal or comparable power Hobbes sovereignty is absolute and indivisible as a
condition of the multitude^ incorporation into a unity. This unity is a product of an
unlimited transferring of natural right to the person of the sovereign;
And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many, they cannot be 
understood for one, but many authors of everything their representative saith or 
doth in their name, every man giving their common represented authority from 
himself in particular and owning all the actions the represented doth, in case 
they give him authority without stint; otherwise, when limit him in what, and 
how far, he shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they gave him 
commission to act. 00
The common good is assured by the exercise the superior force, necessary to 
command obedience, the greater its power the less resistance, the more efficient its 
rule. Because self-preservation is an absolute end, it justifies absolute power to secure 
that primary end, without which all subsequent and secondary benefits of civil life 
would not be possible. Pacification is not compromise and sovereignty remains 
indivisible because it must be able to hold all subjects in immediate and constant 
terror to secure obedience and through obedience self preservation. Without the 
pervasive and over-awing power the subjects would pursue their own self-interested 
and partial interests when in conflict with the public good. Reason, although able to 
calculate enlightened self-interest is powerless to execute it without the certainty that 
comes with law and its universal enforcement. The police power of the state is the
99 Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xx, p. 135
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only thing which ensures that men fulfil their covenants with each other and it is only 
terror that makes them amenable to fulfilling their duties and subordinating their own 
interests to the common good. It is for this reason that Hobbes calls his sovereign the 
LEVIATHAN, a MORTAL GOD who has so much power and strength conferred 
upon him that he is enabled by terror to conform the wills of them all to peace at 
home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.101
Collective Self Preservation and the Infinite Expansion of Power
The common end of self-preservation therefore justifies the use of absolute power to
unify particular interests into one, through the use of terror. Terror is the primary
instrument of social co-ordination as it is only the immediate threat to a man’s self-
preservation that conforms his will to the common good. Without a common power
to keep them all in awe the commonwealth would dissolve into the natural disorder of
its component parts:
For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation 
of justice and other laws of nature without a common power to keep them in 
awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there 
neither would be, nor need be, any civil government or commonwealth at all, 
because there would be peace without subjection.102
It is only in the mutual fear of the Leviathan that the common good is realised in the 
peace which is not a positive, deliberate choice of rational men, but a negative by­
product of the fear constantly instilled in them by the threat of punishment. The 
sovereign alone can make this calculation because he must not only secure the life and 
liberty of his subjects within the commonwealth, but must have the power to 
command their obedience in the face of an external enemy. This obedience cannot be 
partial and limited to a partial purpose, because such a unity of purpose would 
constitute, not a body politic, but merely an alliance of interest. Men must not only be 
made into a unity, but held in a unity which is artificial in its very definition. The 
commonwealth is forged only by direct human intervention into nature and is in 
constant threat of dissolution because men may easily revert to their natural state. The 
commonwealth being artificial can be maintained only through the use of force as it is
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through force alone that citizens keep their covenants and perform their duties.
Although the commonwealth has come into being as a matter of rational calculation
for common self-preservation it is only in the immediate threat of war that the
common purpose remains “present” before the mind. Without a common threat or a
common enemy, the commonwealth once again becomes prone to faction as the
different parts forget their common purpose and turn against each other:
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of 
their life, that they be governed and directed by one judgement for a limited 
time, as in one battle or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their 
unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy, yet afterwards, when either they 
have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by 
another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests 
dissolve and fall again into a war amongst themselves.103
A changing and unreliable alliance of interest is simply not a commonwealth because 
the partiality of interest remains until each and every man gives up those interests in 
their entirety and submits his individual will and transfers all this power to an 
overarching sovereign.
Although war and collective self-defence is the unifying principle of the 
commonwealth, it is also a source of danger because actual war requires loss of 
individual life for the survival of the whole. The primary motive force of man in 
times of actual war sets the individual against the whole because the survival of the 
whole threatens the individual’s self-preservation. It is to be expected that self- 
preservation will override any sense of duty or obligation on the part of individuals 
who may be expected in times of danger to “cast down their weapons to save their 
own life.” 104 The concentration and endurance of a single will is what marks the 
difference between an alliance of particular interests and a commonwealth which has 
become a unified body politic. What makes the difference is the habituation to 
obedience which comes through a regular submission of the individual will to the 
collective good. Social discipline must be at all times maintained not only because 
external threats are unpredictable and may arise at any time, but primarily because it 
is what establishes and maintains the citizen as an artificial construct. Individual men 
quickly revert to the self-regard and vain-glorious behaviour of the state of nature if 
they are not constantly reminded of their immanent peril from foreign enemies or are
10^
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kept in perpetual awe of sovereign power itself
Sovereign power serves a purpose and that purpose is self-preservation which
must be always on the mind of reluctant citizens who would otherwise simply pursue
their own interests to the detriment of the common interest. The fear of foreign
invasion is used as an instrument of internal pacification to remind citizens that
concord and unity is and must be the primary goal of their collective life. Collective
self-defence is an ongoing and open-ended goal because external threats are a matter
of unpredictable contingency which requires a state of perpetual preparation and
readiness. The sovereign as the executive power must always be in possession of the
means to act for the whole in matters of war and peace thereby constructing the zone
of internal peace and security which allows men to go about their daily business
without fear of their lives. The sovereign is the machine which generates both
internal and external security for the common benefit of all:
The only way to erect such a power as may be able to defend them from 
invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another and thereby to secure them 
in such as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may 
nourish themselves and live continentally, is to confer all their power and 
strength upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality 
of voices, unto one will, which is as much to say, to appoint one man or 
assembly of men to bear their person, and everyone to own and acknowledge 
himself to be an author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or 
cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety, 
and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements, to 
his judgement. This is more than consent, or concord; it is the real unity of them 
all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every 
man... 105
In order to meet not only present, but unknowable future challenges the sovereign
power must at all times have absolute freedom, not only to judge and act upon
external threats, but to ensure that he possesses the wherewithal to secure the public
safety.106 Freedom of action is dependent upon access to the means of that action,
with the result that limits on the needs of the sovereign cannot be set;
Commonwealths can endure no diet; for seeing their expense is not limited by 
their own appetite, but by external accidents and the appetites of their 
neighbours, the public riches cannot be limited than those which the emergent 
occasions require.107
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The sovereign power must not only secure the liberty of subjects with respect to each 
other, but must also secure the their collective self-defence in an anarchic world.
The perpetual state of war in a world composed of mutually opposing 
sovereign power is used to consolidate power at home and project it abroad. 
Individual men may escape the state of nature through the establishment of 
commonwealths, but kings and persons of sovereign authority remain in a constant 
state of alert or “posture of war” and in “continual jealousy” with weapons pointed
1 HRand their eyes “fixed on one another”. Because there exists no overarching power 
to regulate the relations between commonwealths, each retains the absolute liberty of 
the state of nature with the result that war or potential war remains an ever-present 
reality:
For amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war of every man against his 
neighbour...so in states and commonwealths not dependent on one another 
every commonwealth (not every man) has an absolute liberty to do what it shall 
judge (that is to say, what that man or assembly that represent-eth it shall judge) 
most conducing to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a 
perpetual war and upon the confines of battle, with their frontiers armed and 
cannons planted against their neighbours round about.109
It is true that Hobbes qualifies the comparison of men in the state of nature with the 
relations between sovereigns by noting that the misery which accompanies the liberty 
of particular men is not visited upon the condition of commonwealths because each is 
“able to uphold the industry of their subjects.” 110 The progress of arts and industry 
made possible by the internal peace of the commonwealth generated the very wealth 
which inflamed the desires of men and created the demand for international goods 
which produced mutual interdependence.111
Whether this interdependence produces friendship or hostility is a matter of 
contingency, as each judges and executes its own self-interest with all the instability 
and unpredictability that this inevitably entails. Complete autarchy; while it may be 
an ideal in theory, remains impossible in practice with the result that international 
trade is an unavoidable part of the political and economic life. Trade and mutual 
dependency are however as likely to exacerbate hostilities as moderate them simply 
because they serve only to add another dimension of mutual insecurity to an already
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perilous and unpredictable relationship. Treaties, while they may serve a temporary 
and expedient conjunction of interest may be broken at any time without consequence 
serve whatever can be mustered by self-help. Without an overarching common power 
to judge disputes there is no security of covenants between commonwealths and war 
is the natural result as each retains its right to make war in pursuit of its own interests. 
Commonwealths, unlike individual men, have not transferred their power to a 
common power and therefore possess their natural liberties which they can be 
expected to pursue without limit until checked by an equal or greater force as a law of 
nature. War therefore remains an absolute right of each and every sovereign power as 
a condition of its independent existence.
In a situation of anarchy the most powerful always have the advantage setting 
off a potentially unlimited contest for power as each strives to attain an unachievable 
position of dominance. Hobbes was well aware that the security dilemma would 
constantly prevail in international relations and war would be so endemic to the 
system that peace would be nothing more than a temporary cessation of hostilities. 
War or at least the potential for war, therefore remains a constant state of being 
between sovereigns who must at all times remain vigilant in the face of an ever­
present threat of external aggression which can break into open war at any time.
Hobbes uses the perpetual state of war as a central part of his argument for the total 
and complete submission of subjects to the executive power of government.
Collective self-preservation is the over-riding end of social organisation but it is an 
end which can never be obtained within any finality or security. As a result the 
sovereign must be empowered at all times to demand the ultimate sacrifice which 
requires a society habituated to the efficient function of command and obedience.
As the interests of subjects and the interests of the commonwealth are in direct 
conflict when it comes to individual death as a means to collective life, subjects 
cannot be trusted to judge the rights and wrongs of war. Because, no man can be 
expected to willingly lay down his life, the sovereign must be at all times capable of 
terrorising his subjects into immediate submission and obedience, even and especially 
in the face of immanent personal death. Sovereign power can only fulfil its primary 
function when it commands absolute obedience because it is only in absolute 
obedience that the self-preservation of the commonwealth can be secured. No rational 
argument because there is none nor even an inculcated sense of moral duty or honour 
can overcome the natural force of man’s most powerful passion for self-preservation.
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Force can only be countered with counter force; the sovereign must ensure that 
disobedience presents a more certain violent death than taking one’s chances on the 
field of battle. In so far as the prudent sovereign will anticipate the reluctance of his 
subject’s to sacrifice their own life it is efficacious habituate subjects to obedience, 
but this alone cannot secure the commonwealth; which ultimately rests on fear and 
fear alone.
Hobbes constructs his sovereign as an absolute power, not because he 
approves of tyranny, tyranny is when the sovereign rules in his own self-interest 
against the good of the whole. Hobbes’ sovereign does not have an interest separate 
from the whole because he is the whole. Hobbes has simply calculated from his initial 
premise of natural liberty defined as physical force that force and force alone is the 
underlying principle of civil society. If force alone defines the relations of men then 
collective self-preservation depends upon that force being contained within a single 
site of power. A divided sovereignty is a divided force which will only check and 
counter itself producing a divided society resulting in either civil war or foreign 
conquest or both. The sovereign for Hobbes, is not a natural person, moved by the 
irrational passions of natural desires, but an artificial man, constructed as an 
instrument of collective self-preservation. Collective self-preservation can only be 
secured by the combined force of the commonwealth both to prevent faction 
internally and to face the perpetual security dilemma externally.
Sovereign power is total and absolute because the whole must override the 
parts in each and every instance as a condition of their continued collective existence. 
While actual war both civil and foreign may remain an extreme case, both are an ever 
present danger against which the sovereign must be continually vigilant and 
adequately prepared. The smooth operation of sovereign power therefore is a sign and 
a mark of a well functioning commonwealth in which each individual enjoys the 
benefits of civil society, but knows that the condition of this enjoyment is his absolute 
and total submission to the sovereign whenever necessary. While the subject’s 
freedom is a positive freedom in that anything not strictly prohibited by law is 
permitted, the extension of the law into every aspect of social life is not only possible, 
but likely. The traditional distinction between “public” and “private” spheres is 
eroded by the need to take any measure necessary to preserve public order and 
collective self-preservation. The police power of the state can only increase as the 
needs of collective self defence demand more and more sacrifice of private interests to
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the security needs of the commonwealth. Private interest must be kept continually 
subdued and kept within strict subordinate bounds in order to ensure they do not 
become obstacles to the smooth functioning of the commonwealth. Private interest as 
such does not even exist except in so far as they are permitted by the sovereign who 
can withdraw them at his pleasure.
Without a limit on public power, privacy ceases to have any substantial 
meaning as it is always subject to a police power which demands absolute and total 
transparency in the name of public security. Subjects have their rights within the law, 
but the law is ordered and reordered by the sovereign at will and even as a 
demonstration of his power. Subjects must be kept in continual awe of the sovereign 
power if compliance and obedience are to be readily at hand if and when they are 
required. As each man’s power is a necessary part of the total social power, the most 
efficient use of each and every man is to be encouraged and even engineered. Hobbes 
state cannot remain a minimal state because social interdependence demands that 
social productive power is not squandered or wasted. Each man does not own his 
own productive property, even in his own body, because he has transferred that power 
to the sovereign who can deploy it at will. In order to extract full productive potential 
of each individual social provision is made for the “encouragement of all manners of 
industry.” 1,2 Public charity is to be provided for the poor, but idleness is not to be 
tolerated. “Master-less” men not only fail to contribute to the collective good, but
113they are a danger to public order and so if able bodied, must be forced to work.
For Hobbes social utility measures individual worth and if a man cannot 
secure his price at home he is to be transplanted abroad where he can serve the 
commonwealth through the foundation of colonies. Commonwealths grow and 
multiply through the production of colonies thus providing an outlet for the 
“multitude of poor” who would otherwise be a drain on the public purse and a threat 
to social order.114 With the foundation of civil society and the advancement of the 
arts and sciences men’s natural passions and desires are channelled into social 
productivity which brings not only the benefits of civilisation but the expansion of 
power. The expansion of power inevitably feeds into an ever increasing desire for 
foreign goods and the growth of international trade and empire. With an international
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system composed of rival sovereigns the defence of foreign interests, trade routes and
colonies feeds into a system defined by war and the search for strategic advantage no
matter how temporary. State power will expand until checked by an equal and
opposite force producing a system of international geo-political competition limited
only by the strategic “balance” of power between rival sovereigns. Peace at home
inevitably produces war abroad because the social advances made possible by civil
society and the progress of civilisation necessarily “spill-over” into less advanced
areas of the globe until the balance of forces finds its natural equilibrium. The
expansion of social power brought about within the state finds its expression in the
expansion of power abroad in the form of empire limited only by the “balance” of
international power. It follows from Hobbes’s analysis, that as the technical means
present themselves, expansion and conquest are not only natural, they are inevitable:
The multitude of poor (and yet strong) people still increasing, they are to be 
transplanted to countries not sufficiently inhabited, where nevertheless, they are 
not to exterminate those they find there, but to constrain them to inhabit closer 
together, and not range a great deal of ground to snatch what they find, but to 
court each little plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due 
season. And when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then the last 
remedy of all is war, which provideth for every man, by victory or death.115
Nature abhors a vacuum with the result that men will fan out across the world far and 
wide until the entire surface of the globe has been colonised with war proving to be 
the final arbitrator of the human condition.
Hobbes does warn of the hazards of over-stretching the empire, pointing out 
that a lust for conquest is one of the surest ways to self ruination.116 Hobbes 
conservative and prudent politics is consistent with his appraisal of vain-glorious men 
and their delusions of grandeur, checked not by reason, but the hard knock of 
experience. War may check and limit imperial ambition, but only temporarily, as each 
technological advance, strategic alliance or geo-political opportunity changes the 
“balance” and may lead to a complete realignment of the international system. As the 
expansion of power will continue until checked by a force of equal or greater power 
domination of the weak by the strong is a normal state of affairs which finds its limit 
only in technological feasibility. While extermination, may not be one’s first choice 
(a bloody useless waste of human resources, whatf), containment only remains a
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viable option as long as there are alternative avenues of expansion. Once all the globe 
has been filled and all pressure valves have been exhausted a contest for power will 
ensure the peace one way or another. It is doubtful however that an end of war could 
be found even in the total global domination which is the logical outcome of Hobbes’s 
war system as the consolidation of power would inevitably produce the resistance 
unless each and every sovereign “voluntarily” submitted to an international Leviathan. 
Such a vision of logical necessity would inspire Kant’s theory of the natural progress 
towards perpetual peace, but even Kant recognised that this was nothing other than an 
“idea” of pure reason with little chance of actualisation short of the providential end
117of history. In the meantime, the infinite progress of technological civilisation
would provide the engine of competitive geo-political imperial expansion which 
would span the globe. The English, while entering the contest for empire late in the 
game would prove its most efficient player as first the Spanish and then the French 
were subordinated to British naval power. Britain’s “advanced” economy was both 
the product and the cause of an exceptional national unity which propelled the newly 
emergent nation-state to naval supremacy by the 18th century, although battles with 
France would continue until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. Britain’s internal 
consolidation proceeded apace within its imperial expansion and lead the way from 
agricultural, to commercial to industrial revolution which was to leave it unchallenged 
on the global stage until the first world war. The culture of improvement literally 
“opened” the horizons of the possible, inflaming the passions and desires of all 
industrious men until unlimited technological advance became as definitive of English 
civilisation as the rule of law and the institution of private property.
When new world empire reached the shores of the “new world” it found only 
the puny opposition of “natural man” in his “primitive” condition and hardly in a 
position to oppose the Leviathan on his inevitable path of progress and civilisation. 
Although the initial period of colonisation had been a private rather than a public 
affair, both the Virginia and Massachusetts companies relied on charters guaranteed 
by the Crown. The colonies may have entered into peace treaties with the Indians, but 
their property rights in land were derivative not of Indian law and government but of 
English territorial claims. The settlers expanded their enterprise in English fashion 
and the inevitable conflict over land and resources lead to war. Indians were required
117 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, Eighth Proposition, in Kant
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to submit to English sovereignty, remove themselves from the vicinity of English 
settlement or pay the price with their lives. Indian resistance proved their savagery as 
well as their irrationality as an uncivilised race living without the benefits of arts and 
sciences to advance their minds. Reason neither being innate, nor the common 
inheritance of mankind, but the “product” of experience it was only natural that a vast 
historical chasm should open up between the technologically advanced and the 
technologically backward.
In the new world it became abundantly clear that reason was the product of 
history and not nature and as such was dependent upon the stage of cultural 
development achieved by the productive forces at work in civilised societies. When 
reason is the product of history it is defined and determined by social and historical 
factors of which it is but a small and finite part. Liberal progress requires a 
teleological view of history, which is undone by the very rejection of teleology which 
marks the birth of the modem age. Reason, first the product of history, soon becomes 
the product of culture with all the nihilism this necessarily implies. As such, modem 
political theory following upon Bacon’s revolution in metaphysics, the ground of 
Hobbes political physics, quickly devolves or implodes from its original liberal 
formulation, to an explicit historicism and then nihilism as unmediated power politics 
becomes definitive of the human condition at all levels of social interaction. While 
Hobbes had maintained force and the balance of force as the fundamental political 
fact, he nevertheless believed that politics could be effectively managed in efficient 
technological manner for the common good. Self-preservation and the fear of violent 
death however, were never enough to subdue the vain-glorious imaginations of men 
whose imperial ambitions could not be contained with the secure borders of the state 
given the logic of unlimited power expansion. Modem techno politics would finds its 
purest expression in new world empire where its encounter with the raw material man 
would be the least opposed by an equal and opposite force. The pure malleability of 
the Indian would be explored through the operational dynamics of the three 
successive waves of modem political theory and their individual colonial strategies. 
Liberalism would produce policies of assimilation based on “universal” laws of 
nature, historicism would produces polices of development based on “the stages” 
theory of civilisation and both would inevitably collapse under the weight of modem
Political Writings, Reiss, op. cit., p. 50
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nihilism which only knows how to produce and reproduce a segregated other as the 
object of its own will to power.
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Chapter 3
Political Theory: Techno -politics and the Three Strategies of Colonialism
Whereas medieval and ancient man aimed at the pure contemplation of nature
and of being, the modem one wants domination and mastery.1
Alexander Koyre
Introduction
The paradigm of modem “political science” developed by Thomas Hobbes in the mid 
17th century was intended as an “eternal order” that would, because of its scientific 
basis, provide the final answer to the problem of politics. Hobbes was writing at a 
time of great social change and he was looking to find some stability which would 
secure the state while providing the basis for an infinite expansion of power brought 
into being by the revolution in the arts and sciences. Bacon’s advancement of 
learning had unleashed the “culture of improvement” within the English state at the 
same time as the commercial revolution would fuel a drive for international trade and 
empire building. The civil war ushered in a national state of common purpose leading 
to Hobbes’ theory of modem sovereignty grounded not in the rule of the Prince, but in 
the Leviathan as a power accumulation machine. Social power and productivity had 
inaugurated a whole new age of English expansion which quickly found its outlet in 
new world colonisation.
The British Atlantic was in fully integrated into the triangle trade between 
Britain, Africa and the West Indies by the mid 18th century and the demand for new 
land had already marginalized and then displaced the original habitants from the 
Eastern seaboard. The strategies of colonialism as they developed under English 
systems of politics and government were later replicated by the Americans when the 
new republic gained its independence in 1791 and again when Canada became an 
independent Dominion in 1867 and set out to create a “nation” from sea to shining 
sea. New world empire in all three cases of Anglo-American colonisation of North 
America was of a different order of empire than traditional forms which had followed
1 Alexander Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, (Baltimore.: John Hopkins 
University Press) 1994, p. 1
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upon the Christian and Roman model of crusade and conquest still being practiced by 
the Spanish throughout their vast territorial empire to the south. In England, the law 
of nature had replaced natural law as the primary political principle of social 
organisation as the old feudal society crumbled before the advance of new ideas based 
on the new sciences. Bacon’s revolution had been part and parcel of the reformation 
project to purge natural philosophy of its ancient corruption and establish knowledge 
on the firm foundations of a Christian science returned to its true path. True religion 
would guide society back to its God given task to remake the world in the divine 
image through the proper application of method proven in the fertility and 
productivity of its works. The sciences would provide an unlimited source of useful 
instruments and inventions which would be harnessed to transform the world in the 
name of Christian charity and the relief of man’s estate. New world empire in all its 
geographical incarnations is “wiping away” of the past and the foundation of the 
future on “new” and empty lands awaiting the arrival of the rational and industrious to 
harness the productive power of nature for the general benefit o f mankind. Although 
the roots of new world empire can be found in early modem England, its 
internationalisation has been the practical work of over 400 years of North American 
colonisation. Beginning on the north-eastern shores of the Atlantic seaboard in the 
early 17th century and moving relentlessly westward and northward crossing the 
Appalachian mountains in the 18th century, to reach its peak in the 19th century wars 
of the “western plains” in the 1860s and 70s, and included the extension of Canadian 
sovereignty through the numbered treaties of 1871 - 1877 to the Continental divide 
where it was halted by a recalcitrant British Columbia government.
As new world empire moved westward through space and through the 18th and 
19th centuries in time, it maintained a remarkably coherent program of assimilation, 
development and segregation as its main strategies of colonialism modifying and 
being modified in turn through the evolutions and rationalisations of European 
political theory and its justifications of colonialism in the “new world” and beyond. 
Modem colonialism is a product of the metaphysical revolution inaugurated by 
Francis Bacon and harnessed to a political project of world transformation by Thomas 
Hobbes. For Bacon, knowledge was power because it made man the master of 
nature, whose secrets when revealed, disclosed whole new horizon’s for man’s 
creative imagination. Man’s control of productive technology would build him an 
empire, a new world empire through which his progress would be as unlimited as his
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goal. Christian charity knows no bounds because improvement is a relative, not an 
absolute ideal and produces change over time which stretches infinitely into the 
future. Method, was modelled on Christ as the one true, path that would light man’s 
way through the world and provide him with not only the knowledge, but the comfort 
of a transformed nature. Progress was an end in itself because it was a sign and a mark 
of man’s true vocation; action into the world in accordance with divine will. 
Technology was an end in itself because it freed man from the accidents of history 
and the arbitrary idols of custom and tradition. Method not only transformed the 
world, but more importantly “wiped” clean the mirror of the mind, thus enabling it to 
accurately reflect the divine image, as originally intended. Man was co-creator of the 
world with God and his mastery over both nature and human nature, proof of his 
infinite perfectibility. Bacon’s mission embodies the modem will to power to remake 
the world in its own image and for its own purpose.
The early modem project was underlined by an explicit and fundamental 
Christian faith which was to come under more and more challenge as man usurped 
God’s place as origin and anchor of technological progress. Thomas Hobbes knew 
that mortal man could have no access to divine providence and castigated the 
metaphysician’s of “right reason” for being responsible for the wars of religion which 
had brought so much human misery and suffering to the world. Man was not a 
rational, but a vain creature moved by his imagination and his passions to his own 
self-destruction. Human nature was but an extension of nature herself and as such 
flawed to its very core and in need of direct intervention if it was ever to be put on its 
proper course. Hobbes invented the Leviathan as an artificial man; a machine to run 
the apparatus of state for the universal purpose of self-preservation. Men could not be 
trusted with their own political affairs because each would frustrate the other in the 
pursuit of a multiplicity of ends and desires which could lead only to conflict and 
chaos. Natural men and vain-glorious men had to be transformed into obedient and 
compliant subjects through the instrument of the social contract.
The social contract established a common judge who as a common power 
would produce the peace of an ordered civil society in which men could give free 
reign to their desires within the framework of the law. Total and absolute submission 
to the sovereign was the price paid for the individual security that was productive of 
the benefits of civilisation and commodious living. Hobbes conception of absolute 
and unlimited sovereignty was the machine which would be productive of civil order
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whether it was located in the Monarch, parliament or people. Successive political 
theorists would reject Hobbes absolutism, but would struggle to find the limits of 
political power when sovereignty and self-preservation remained the foundations of 
the civil order. Hobbes’s moral relativism had pronounced modem reason incapable 
of acknowledging a common human good with the result that the legitimacy of the 
state was anchored in a common human evil; fear of violent death. Locke would 
attempt to limit absolute sovereignty through the positive institution of property; but 
property would remain the disputed terrain of the modem social contract throughout 
the early modem era and would admit of no easy solution. Property introduced 
inequality and inequality introduced the spectre of faction which Hobbes had sought 
to eradicate by reducing man to his “original” equality in the state of nature. Property, 
unlike possession was not an individual product; but a social institution made possible 
through law backed up by the collective force of the state. Property was not of 
natural, but historical origins located not in individual action, but in the social division 
of labour which made it possible. The state institutionalised not a natural equality, but 
a social inequality by reifying the property relations of an already advanced and 
civilised society based not in nature, but in the vested interest of the landed 
aristocracy and the gentry classes of England.2 The divine right of kings was replaced 
by the concept of Crown-in-Parliament in which the sovereign was a symbolic head 
of an unwritten British constitution based upon the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy under the common law as established by the revolutionary settlement of 
1688.3 The English civil war, closely followed by the Glorious Revolution had 
established the protection of property as the only legitimate end of government.
Locke followed Hobbes in his utilitarian principles of government, but limited the 
power of sovereignty at the inviolable rights of private property. Man exited the state 
of nature not to become a slave, but to become a productive member of an advancing 
civil society in which the preservation of life, liberty and estate was declared the true 
principle of civil government.4
2
For the social context o f the social contract theory o f the state grounded in the emerging market 
economy of England, See Neal Wood, John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism, (Berkeley.: University of 
California Press) 1994
3
For the social history o f English concepts o f sovereignty grounded in the Crown-in-Parliament 
configuration o f  political theory, See Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Pristine Culture o f  Capitalism: A 
Historical Essay on O ld Regimes and Modem States, (Verso.: New York) 1991
4 John Locke, “An Essay Concerning The True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government” in (ed.) 
Charles L. Sherman) Treaties o f  Civil Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, (New York.:
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The English carried their revolutionary ideas to the world as the modem 
enlightenment project spread to the new world and the continent under the prowess of 
English empire and worldly success. English empire was first and foremost a 
commercial empire dedicated to the production of export goods for the home market 
as well as re-export to the world. The first colonies in Virginia and Massachusetts 
had been undertaken as investment projects designed to wrest a profit from the land 
through the production of “tropical” goods, but found their real wealth lay in the sale 
of the land itself. Land could be sold “freehold” in America where before it could 
only be leased, thereby transforming the tenant farmers of England into independent 
owner occupiers of their own productive property. The colonies had originally been 
little more than joint-stock companies and had used their corporate form of 
organisation to establish political institutions reflective of these property rights.
These rights were themselves vested in the company Charter through which the 
Crown unilaterally asserted its sovereignty over the land and people of the new world. 
The principle of Crown prerogative government established the colonies on lands held 
within the King’s “sovereign domains” and subjected them to the rule of a governing 
council and an imperial bureaucracy. Colonial officials held their position by virtue of 
Crown appointment although members of the advisory councils were selected from 
amongst the colonial elite.
All men of landed property had political rights within the colonies in the form 
of elected assemblies through which they could air their grievances and restrict the 
power of the executive through their control of the Governor’s ability to raise revenue 
through taxation. The executive however, controlled the sale of land by controlling 
the issue of title deeds which transformed mere “possession” into legal property right. 
Only the Crown and its representatives were empowered to enter into treaties with the 
Indians which either through purchase or through war established legal land hold 
tenure in the new world. Settlers did not simply venture out into the wild, they were 
brought in by proprietors and land speculation companies and worked the land as 
indentured labourers unless able to purchase their lots outright. As profitable 
agriculture flourished after the introduction of Tobacco in Virginia and as the New 
England colonies found a viable market for their farm produce in the West Indian 
plantations, land became an ever more valuable commodity. Seeking to establish
Irvington Publishers) 1995. Chap. IX, p. 82
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peaceful relations, treaties were entered into and occasionally “land purchase” 
agreements were undertaken, especially in the early years of colonial vulnerability 
and economic isolation.
The colonies expanded and competition between settlers and Indians for the 
land and its resources escalated with violent consequences. Once the colonies were on 
a firm foundation however and commercial export crops had been introduced, the 
spirit of accommodation was quickly undone by the rapid influx of settlers. Indian 
trading and raiding alliances remained an important part of colonial politics up to and 
including the Revolutionary war. Because the Indians were valued as allies and 
suppliers of a variety of trade goods collectively referred to as the fruits of the forest”, 
colonial authorities attempted to assimilate the Indians as subordinates within the 
overarching structure of English law and imperial government. Indians were pushed 
to the margins of colonial settlement as more and more of their villages and traditional 
hunting territories were appropriated for commercial farming geared to an infinitely 
expanding export market. Indian occupation and land use patterns while evident, 
were dismissed as “primitive” and “inefficient” because they did not conform to the 
English pattern of individual private property ownership based on the title deed. 
Indians did not own property in their own lands as could thus be dispossessed at will 
and punished by violence if they resisted. Land surrender was the price of peace and 
Indians who remained within the settled boundaries of established colonies were 
herded onto reserves set up for their “protection” as wards of the Crown. If they were 
to survive in the “new world” that was taking shape all around them they would have 
to adapt and learn the ways of Christian civilisation. Indians, being in the state of 
nature, with neither private property or civil government, could be empirically shown 
to be in a savage condition which was by definition in need of “improvement.” To 
the English, the Indians lived a wild existence in the state of nature deprived of even 
the basic elements of civilised life.
Indians could be assimilated within the colonial regime only so far as they 
contributed to the colonial economy through trade or as military allies but they would 
eventually be forced from the lands that were “in excess” of their needs. Common 
lands were unproductive lands and fencing was the first step in establishing private 
property anything else was simply “lying waste” and could be appropriated by the 
incoming settlers. The colonists established “praying towns” for the Indians, small 
islands of reserved lands held not by the Indians, but by the missionary societies who
138
came to convert the Indians to Christianity. Indians became wards of the state 
“protected” from the worse abuses of the “sharp” traders who attempted to evade the 
government monopoly on the Indian trade. When missionary and educational 
activities failed to convert sufficient numbers of savages into civilised men, removal 
to the margins of colonial settlement followed. The reserves once set aside for the 
benefit of Indian instruction in agriculture became areas of enforced confinement 
creating a permanently segregated and captive population. New world empire 
invented its own myths of progress over and against a resisting “other” defined as the 
primitive savage from which its identity could be cemented as a triumph of science 
over nature. Science harnessed to the arts and inventions of a technological culture 
marked off the difference between modem man having escaped his original condition 
and “mastered” his own savage nature. The Indian became a sign and symbol of 
human development and progress, even when the explicitly Christian teleology of 
providence was no longer available to the sceptical mind of secular modernity.
Cultural and even racial superiority became an ingrained justification for imperial 
domination both in the new world and beyond as the industrial revolution carried the 
“great powers” of Europe to the backward lands of uncivilised barbarians across the 
globe.
Techno-politics produces the three strategies of colonialism which can be 
seen at work in the British Atlantic as early as the 17th century. European political 
theory built upon and reflected the embedded practices of empire already at work in 
the new world and soon to be exported across both the continent and then the globe. 
All three of these strategies aimed at the dismantling and denial of Indian political 
structures and territorial jurisdiction because the Indian presence on the land presented 
an inconvenient obstacle to colonial expansion. While the inevitable advance of new 
world empire proceeded apace with technological developments further distancing the 
civilised man from the primitive savage. The march of progress and civilisation 
simply ordained that the Indians would be made refugees and fugitives in their own 
lands. The Indians fought back but were invariably branded as savages standing in 
the way of progress towards a higher civilisation. In revolutionary Europe the Indian 
became the living embodiment of the “natural man” of Hobbes’ thought experiment. 
Knowing little of anything of actual existing Indian societies did not stop political 
theorists from Hobbes to Hegel from speculating on the Indian as a starting point for 
human evolution and development. Deprived of civilisation, man existed in a state of
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“natural liberty” which while containing its own innocence or nobility was 
nevertheless a rude and barbarous state of being.
The progress of mankind was dependent upon men exiting this natural state 
and converting their natural liberty to the security of property and possession under 
the rule of law as envisioned by the original social contract. The social contract 
became the foundation for the modem state because it preserved the equality and 
freedom of the state of nature while elevating man to his higher nature through the 
institution of law backed up by the coercive force of the state. Liberal revolution and 
conservative reaction warred for supremacy in Europe, but the Indian remained a 
powerful symbol for political theory seeking to mark an original starting point from 
which civilisation could be shown to have progressed. Indians as natural men would 
have to be civilised and the civilisation process would be premised upon the 
transformation of brute material into productive citizens.
Hobbes had laid the foundations with his scientific basis of the state in which 
nature, in order to master her must be obeyed. Rather than suppressing the passions 
and thereby creating resistance to political power, political power must instead be 
founded upon the premise of the passions themselves; the most powerful of which 
was fear of violent death. The Indians, like natural men everywhere, were to be 
assimilated as individual parts within an ordered whole and remade into a unified 
body politic serving a common purpose; comfortable self-preservation. As an eternal 
and universal project, modem techno-politics transcended culture by stripping man to 
his very nature revealing the inner secrets of society in order to remake it to a positive 
human purpose. With Hobbes a metaphysical shift had been inaugurated in political 
thinking as understandings of nature, man and knowledge had fundamentally changed 
with the rejection of Aristotle’s final causes as the necessary ontological basis of 
ethical life. Man no longer possesses an essential nature receptive to knowledge but is 
instead the creator of that knowledge through his active intervention in nature. 
Knowing has become a kind of making in that the human understanding proscribes 
laws to nature and in so doing infinitely increases his power as truth and meaning 
originate in man and are not inherent in a cosmic order independent of man’s 
activity.” 5
For all those who followed Hobbes politics has become a technological
5 Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves o f Modernity” in Hilail Gilden, (ed.)An Introduction to Political
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problem to be solved through ever greater intervention into human nature as man’s 
malleability and perfectibility are put to the test by successive waves of political 
theory and practice. The progressive answers given to the Indian problem in new 
world empire and the strategies deployed in order to solve it demonstrate the 
successive formulations of natural man and the means to “improve” him for the 
common good. The fact that there is not a single answer to the Indian problem, 
speaks to the failure of Hobbes’ project to solve the political problem once and for all. 
While Hobbes firmly proclaimed that the irreducible diversity inherent in 
international relations would inevitably lead to assimilation or annihilation and end in 
victory or in death, techno-politics has yet to impose its totalitarian aspirations on the 
world. The fact that it has not even been successful in the arena where it has enjoyed 
the greatest freedom to remake the world in its own image, the virgin soil of the “new 
world” attests to the inherent limits of new world empire. The abiding resistance and 
survival of “Indians” despite centuries of colonial domination is instructive of how 
modem techno-politics has been forced to adjust its own self-understanding and 
intensify its strategies of power up to and even beyond the point of its own credulity.
In his famous essay, “The Three Waves of Modernity”, Leo Strauss shows 
how the inherent instability of Hobbes’ modem project inevitable implosion over time 
from its initial liberal foundations with Hobbes and Locke, to the historicism initiated 
by Rousseau and systematised by Kant, Hegel and Marx until it unravelled in the 
radical historicism or nihilism of Nietzsche. While Strauss’ model provides a 
valuable insight into what he describes as the progressive degeneration of the modem 
technological project of politics, it is constructed in such a way as to present three 
different moments or waves in the “progress” of modem reason as it decays into 
unreason ending in the pure will to power. The liberalism of Hobbes, Locke and Kant 
engender a politics of assimilation through the machine of the social contract, the 
historicism of Rousseau, Marx and Hegel produce a politics of development spun 
through the mechanism of dialectic, while Nietzsche’s critique of modernity turns on 
his revaluation of values as the poetic machine producing a politics of segregation and 
will to power. It is not an accident that the different characteristics and attributes 
assigned to “natural man” by Locke, Rousseau, Kant Hegel, Marx serve to legitimate 
different types of political order and the necessary relations between the rulers and the
Philosophy, Ten Essays by Leo Strauss (Detroit.: Wayne State University Press) 1989, pp. 88
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ruled. With Nietzsche, rationalisations or the positing of values becomes the key 
question to be addressed, not because he rejects the modem paradigm of materialist 
politics defined by Hobbes, but because he takes it as a necessary beginning. With 
Nietzsche, modernity has become fully self-conscious and as such it makes a 
transition to the “post-modem” as the desperate search for values in a valueless age in 
which all human relations are merely the product of force and counter-force, and the 
“balance of power”. Art completes nature, but with Nietzsche art itself is nothing 
more than a contingent configuration of forces, each following the other as will to 
power flowing through the eternal return of the same. Modernity never escapes from 
Hobbes materialist political physics, because physics is the foundation and metaphor 
of all human thought and practice. As modem theorists, Hobbes and his heirs share 
the basic premise that politics is techno-politics; not a natural state but an artificial 
construction in which man is completed through the application of the arts and 
sciences. It is the unifying theme of technological application to the raw material, 
man, that identifies the unique departure point of modem political theory which views 
nature as a chaotic and meaningless starting point and not an ideal held up as a 
universal and eternal standard and measure.
Nature does not tend to its own good, but must be perfected by the active 
intervention of man using method as a machine in the production of unlimited 
improvement into the future. With the power and productivity harnessed by the 
technological society both nature and human nature come under the increasing control 
of instrumental domination in the name of expansion without limit. Techno-politics is 
inherently colonialist because it ceases upon the productive life force of both man and 
nature to create a self-reinforcing circuit of power accumulation which can only turn 
back in on itself with ever faster cycles of creative destruction. The original liberal 
premise of the modem project to emancipate man from nature is subverted by the 
increasing intensification of force necessary to make and remake society in the wake 
of wave after wave of technological change. Modem sovereignty is the machine 
which harnesses the productive power of force to produce compliance and obedience 
to a formalised system of law which subordinates the man as part to the common 
good of the whole defined by reference to a completely abstracted “national interest.” 
The state as a legal/bureaucratic apparatus projects power internally from a 
concentrated executive through the instrument of the police and externally through the 
instrument of the armed forces. A political system based upon violence and terror
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which can find no limit either in property or the universal rights of man because the 
only standard and measure it recognises is quantitative increases in levels of 
productivity and efficiency in pursuit of a common good it can no longer define. As 
ends become means and means become ends, technological progress subsumes all 
other goals regardless of the consequences to actually existing human beings and the 
world in which they live. When everything has been reduced to mere raw resource, 
grist to the mill of an undefined and indefinable process of technological “advance” 
politics ceases to have any meaning above and beyond the smooth functioning of 
sovereign power in the service of this insatiable God. Technology as the secular 
replacement for a dead or dying God was the well established principle of Thomas 
Hobbes’ original 17 century “thought experiment” forged in the founding fires of 
Bacon’s new world empire.
Liberalism and Assimilation
Although Hobbes’ political theory contains Christian concepts such as natural right 
and state of nature, the meaning of these terms had undergone a radical 
transformation. Hobbes explicitly denies the existence of “right reason” and 
formulates his idea of natural right as a strictly “scientific” concept. For Hobbes, the 
state of nature is, as it was for Christians, an absence of government, but for Hobbes 
the state of nature is not ruled by “natural law” so much as “the law of nature”. Man 
as a mechanical, desiring animal is not moved towards the good, but is moved only by 
his own passions, the most powerful of which is the fear of death. The state of nature 
therefore becomes a place of danger where each man’s preferences and competitive 
jealousies result in the “war of all against all”. Nature is irrational and incomplete and 
man, in order to survive, must exit the state of nature and establish a coercive power 
strong enough to inspire “awe and obedience”. Hobbes invents modem sovereignty 
as an “artificial” construction, a technology, to transform the raw material man into a 
law abiding subject, whose compliance in society becomes the basis of civil order, 
social progress and commodious living. Sovereignty with Hobbes knows no “limits” 
because it is power alone that determines “right” and all “rights” are derivative of the 
sovereigns will as manifest in the establishment and enforcement of the civil law.
Outside the boundaries of the commonwealth, there is no law, as all law is a 
product of the sovereigns will, it is an artificial construction designed by man for a
143
human purpose. Art completes nature and civil society completes man. Reason is a 
product, not of innate ideas, but of experience and as such all science, art and 
civilisation is a product not of some innate capacity of man, bom of a rational soul 
and a rational will, but of technology. Man in his natural state is wild, unfinished, 
brutish and it is only through a self-conscious process of “making” of imposing order 
on chaos, that man transforms himself to a higher, civilised state. It is for this reason, 
that the technological society represents a “higher” more complete or perfected state 
of being as man has “liberated” himself from the “irrational” customs into which he 
was bom, a passive object of history or tradition. Modem technological society is 
based upon the idea that man can objectify himself, step out of his own past and 
recreate himself anew an active subject in full possession of both himself and his 
world. The “first” wave of modernity is the realisation of the modem liberal 
revolution in social and political thought in which man frees himself from past error 
and establishes a “whole new” foundation for civil life in the new natural philosophy 
of the modem scientific revolution.
Hobbes, following Bacon, demonstrates that in order to “master nature one 
must obey her” by constructing a self-conscious techno-politics, in which man the 
maker, imposes order and form upon the raw material “natural man”. The man of 
science is an architect and engineer who builds the “artificial state”, not on the sands 
of irrational and arbitrary custom and tradition, but on the purely “rational” basis of 
man’s most basic and powerful motive “force” the passions. Passion, not reason 
directs man in his natural state, because reason is simply the ability to calculate, it is 
an instrument which is of use to man in attaining “what he desires”. The object of 
desire however, is a pure matter of arbitrary and contingent choice, reflecting not 
man’s capacity for “right reason” defined as an “intellectual or moral appetite for the 
good”, but the exercise of relative and personal preference conditioned by experience 
to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. As the perception and knowledge of good and evil 
is conditioned by sensual experience, rather than rational insight or intuition, there is 
no stability or order of desire as man, as a mechanical and corporeal being is 
immersed in the flux and change of his own material nature. Desire, is a multiple, 
overlapping, changing and chaotic drive or instinct “experienced” as irrational 
impulses without hierarchy or order. Man therefore, in his natural state is condemned 
to a meaningless and futile existence unconsciously and aimlessly propelled in an 
endless, infinite, chaotic and disordered “restless striving” summarized by Hobbes in
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his famous formulation as the universal struggle for power after power which ceases 
only onto death.
The state of nature, man in his original condition, is nothing more than mere 
matter in motion a desiring machine, whose reason is a mere instrument, a means to 
an end, a slave to the passions which alone fix the “objects” of desire as a function of 
wilful self-assertion. Because there is and can be no greatest good, all goods being 
relative to the irrational pull of a multitude of desires, the foundation of a stable civil 
order must be founded, not in a positive goods which are many and varied, but in the 
single common denominator of life, the universal and eternal fear of violent death.6 
Self-preservation premised upon the fear of violent death, therefore becomes the 
unifying glue of the civil state because it is the one principle, or law of nature, which 
must be obeyed, not as a matter of moral right, but as a matter of pure natural 
necessity. As method imposes order and discipline on scientific inquiry, the 
application of power through the instrument of the Leviathan imposes order and 
discipline upon the natural condition. Man, the civilised subject of a commonwealth 
is then the “product” of art over and above a primitive natural condition which has 
been transformed and reformed by the “civilising” process in which he comes to know 
himself through the “cultivation” of nature and human nature, defined as progress in 
the arts and sciences made possible by the establishment of the civil order.
A cultivated nature, means an improved nature as art completes nature and 
raises man above his original brutish condition and sets him upon the path civilisation 
and enlightenment. As life in civil society has solved the problem of order, man can 
enjoy the luxury of indulging his passion for “commodious living” as his needs and 
desires are “cultivated”, “refined” and “expanded” beyond anything that would have 
ever been possible in the state of nature. Positive law is a form of artificial regulation, 
which allows men to rationally order and channel the force of their natural desires 
within a system of administration and management in order to realise and actualise a 
“higher” because self-willed purpose. Man because he is free, experiences his 
freedom in self-determination or the ability to impose his will on nature, including 
human nature in satisfaction of his desires, as he himself, rationally establishes for 
himself. The purpose of civil society, is emancipation from the chaos and disorder of
6 See discussion in Chapter 2 on the centrality o f violent death to Hobbes’ political philosophy. See 
also, Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy o f  Thomas Hobbes, Translated by Elsa M. Sinclair, 
(Chicago.: The University o f Chicago Press) pp. 15 - 23
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natural liberty, in which each man’s “force” of will is checked and frustrated by the 
contest and competition of every other man. Stripped of all social demarcations of 
difference and reduced to his pure material physicality, even women enjoy equality in 
the state of nature because the basic common denominator is nothing other than the 
ability to inflict violent death upon each other. As no man, or group of men is ever 
able to effectively establish his or her domination of others with any degree of 
stability and certainty, the only alternative is a civil order based upon consent and the 
willing (and equal) submission of one and all to an overarching sovereign or “artificial 
man”.
The Leviathan, is not a private person, but a machine through which the 
separate and particular wills of the many are transformed into a single unified body 
politic, the commonwealth. The sovereign power therefore is not simply the person 
of the Prince, but is a representative and embodiment of the “universal will” and can 
be vested in a variety of forms as long as it effectively performs the tasks for which it 
has been “constituted”. The purpose of the commonwealth, is nothing more than the 
foundation and security of the public order from which all the other “private” goods 
of civil life can then flow. The establishment and coercive enforcement of a system 
of law and order, premised on the sovereign power to judiciously apply the 
instruments of pain and pleasure, punishment and reward then become the effective 
instruments of a civil society. The civilised life secured by the overarching frame of 
positive law is productive of a highly advanced social organisation in which progress 
and improvement become possible. The division of labour indicative of civil society 
allows for the infinite expansion, not only of commodious living, but in the means of 
commodious living through the advancement of the arts and sciences. Reason, not 
being innate, but the product of experience, advances with the advanced productivity 
of the sciences in the service of infinitely expanding needs and desires. Science and 
technology therefore are both a product of and a foundation for an infinite system of 
self-generating expansion made manifest through world transformation. Man, the 
desiring machine, experiences and therefore knows his freedom because it is the 
product of his own making. Civilised man is emancipated from an original natural 
state of primitive ignorance which had enslaved him within the “artificial” and 
“arbitrary” boundaries of superstition and “irrational idols.
Liberal freedom and enlightenment, however are premised upon a particular 
formulation of technological assimilation in which all civil and political “rights“ are
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derivative of an original social contract in which all natural rights are transferred and 
transformed through the instrument of sovereign power. Assimilation into the 
modem liberal state requires that all ‘‘idols” be purged from the mind and all custom 
and tradition be “wiped” away in preparation for a new and clean beginning. Man 
acts into nature to establish his own point of origin free of the irrational sources of 
prejudice and error which had differentiated him from his fellow man. Natural 
society is a paternal society based upon habits and manners indicative of a traditional 
system of rights and duties destructive to the universal pretensions of a politics 
grounded in scientific principle. Liberalism as an ideology was formulated within the 
context of the bourgeois revolution and as a result embodies a political strategy of 
resistance against the “special status and privileges” of the various corporate estates 
that comprised the feudal political power structures of medieval Europe. Central to 
this struggle was the centralisation of power and control within a national-state that 
had a purely linear relationship between individual citizen units and the single 
overarching sovereign power “constituted44 by universal voluntary consent either
n
actively or passively expressed through the institutions of government. As such 
admission into civil society was premised upon the consent of “each and every man, 
one with another” reflecting the radical liberty and equality, but also the essential 
homogeneity of all potential citizens in the state of nature. Because the modem 
citizen or subject is reborn or remade upon his entry into civil society all the customs 
and traditions of the proceeding “natural” form of government must be abandoned. In 
order to be “incorporated” into the “body politic” former corporate or privileged 
groups must dissolve and give way to atomic individuals in possession of “property” 
even if that property is nothing other than the simple possession of “life and liberty”. 
Man in his natural and corrupted state “voluntarily” enters into civil society, by 
alienating himself, from himself and his traditional society in order to be assimilated 
along with others in the new and “true” form of government constituted for the sole 
purpose of the preservation of property.
Wiping clean the slate, in order to “found” a new order of government and 
authority is a necessary preliminary to the establishment of modem sovereignty, as
7
It is not custom or tradition that assigns the “true proportion” o f representation which follows a 
rational rule the “number o f members in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented” which 
is not a new legislature, but to have “restored the old and true one and to have rectified the disorders 
which succession o f time had insensibly as well as inevitably introduced”. John Locke, op. cit. Chap. 
XIII, p. 107
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any rival or independent source of power simply cannot be tolerated within a system 
of positive law, which is by definition, constituted as inherently self-referential. It is 
for this reason, that Indian rights, including the traditional rights flowing from an 
original use and occupation of the land are assimilated within and ultimately 
subordinate to the system of colonial law which is said to have produced them in the 
first place. Sovereign authority, and not the natural rights of Indians, is the “sole 
source” of the positive law which establishes all rights within its self-referential 
system. Indian rights, when they are defined at all, are held by the pleasure of the 
Crown and flow from original assertion of sovereignty wherein the lands and peoples 
of the new world were unilaterally incorporated within the British empire by legal 
fiat. As such the Crown retains its “prerogative14 with respect to these “rights44 and its 
unilateral power to define, limit and judge all subsequent application and exercise of 
these “rights44 within and subject to the fundamental sovereignty of the “public” 
interest represented by and embodied within the common law state. Indian land rights 
based upon a traditional “use” must therefore be “extinguished” through the 
instrument of treaty before a relationship of peaceful co-existence can be established 
between the contracting parties.
Sovereign power, because it is self-determining can recognise no limit on its 
power, other than those voluntarily entered into and then only as a temporary and 
expedient measures based upon a strict reciprocity of interest. The balance of power 
and not principles of natural justice determine the nature and duration of treaty 
relationships which can be revoked or invalidated by a strategic realignment of forces 
within or between competing imperial systems. Even Locke, who asserts the 
possession of property in the state of nature, does not recognise the validity of Indian 
land rights because for him property does not exist in communal form, but only as a 
result of private individual labour. Natural societies certainly exist, but these societies 
are governed by primitive customs and not the rule of law. Civil society is only 
possible with a certain level of social advance based upon the division of labour in 
which the true principles of civil government become visible because the level of 
social complexity produces a requirement for a government based, not upon nature, 
but on an instituted social contract. As such modem liberalism is intrinsically 
individualist, unable to recognise “collective” rights accept in the form of subordinate, 
pluralistic “associations” of individuals either constituted by the state itself to fulfil 
some “public” function or to represent the “sectional interest” of a “private” self-
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defining group within civil society itself.
Liberal society assumes a radical equality and universality of interest in self- 
preservation and the pursuit of “commodious living” narrowly construed by C.B.
o
MacPherson as the politics of “possessive individualism44. Assimilation within a 
liberal polity means understanding the self as a “rights” bearing individual insofar as 
one is the “owner” of one’s own labour, whether vested in the private property of the 
body, or the “commodities” one has produced as an extension and objectification of 
the body by “mixing one’s labour with the soil”. Locke’s reformulation of “property” 
as the product of “labour” and “improvement” allowed for its definition as an 
exclusive “private possession” over and against the traditional understanding of 
property as a social institution, founded upon dominion and/or the “right of 
conquest.”9 Property, therefore was a legal and civil relation, instituted, sanctioned 
and enforced by the state even if it was “produced” originally from private effort and 
individual productivity and accumulation. By placing property right prior to civil 
society, Locke hoped to circumvent the communal or collective interest in the earth 
which God had been given to man in common. Common right is therefore construed 
not as property and ownership but as a simple 44use right” which is superseded by 
individual cultivation and improvement which transforms the raw stuff of nature into 
the “useful” goods of human consumption. The poverty and scarcity of nature is 
assumed by a labour theory of value in which what simply lies “waste” is transformed 
by human knowledge and power to productive property. 10 Locke postulated that 
“private property” could be appropriated without the consent of the community 
because ownership and use were established, not by social convention, but by 
individual will through the command of the body, one’s own as well as one’s 
servants.11 Only when the fruits of the earth were gathered and appropriated for 
individual use did they become “property” and only by “improving” the productivity
g
C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory o f  Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford.: 
Oxford University Press) 1980
9
For a discussion o f how Locke reformulates the traditional natural law theory o f property and 
government see James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge.: 
Cambridge University Press) 1993. For its specific relevance to the Indians o f the new world see 
Chapter 5 “Rediscovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights” pp. 137-176
10 John Locke, op. cit., Chap. V., pp. 18 - 33. “Nature and the earth furnished only the almost 
worthless materials as in themselves.” p. 29
11 Ellen Meiksins Wood and Neal Wood, A Trumpet o f  Sedition: Political Theory and the Rise o f  
Capitalism 1509 - 1688, (London.: Pluto Press) 1997. Here the author’s point out the importance o f  
ownership of labour extending beyond one’s own personal labour to include the purchase o f  labour as a 
commodity, a social relation particular to a market society, pp. 131 - 134
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of land could one claim rightful ownership.
Rightful ownership, is therefore, not first the product of natural law and “right 
relation” but of the technological advances of an improving mankind whose 
increasing productivity requires the invention of law and civil government in order to 
regulate the growing disputes of men brought on by emerging social inequalities. In 
the beginning, men possessed property in common as a function of the limits of 
primitive societies. With the invention of money however, this original limit is 
transcended, freeing man to unlimited accumulation and the benefit of all through the 
possibilities of expanded productivity and technological advance. The invention of 
money overcomes the traditional limitations of natural law stipulating that each man 
is entitled only to that which he needs and therefore does not waste. Money allows 
men not only to exchange surplus property in the market, it also allows them too 
convert perishables into durable goods or hard currency, thereby removing any and all 
limitations on private accumulation.12 The invention of money not only overcomes 
the natural wastage of good, but it introduces new and improved methods of efficient 
resource allocation which serve to increase the common good of all mankind. Nature 
provides not sustenance and abundance, but poverty and deprivation, until it is 
transformed by human labour. In the beginning “all was America”, unclaimed and 
under utilised commons lying waste until settlers came to put it into active production, 
as “tis labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it 
would scarcely be worth anything” .,3
Locke, following Bacon, is interested not only in private consumption and 
production, but in the improvement of the general welfare of mankind in the tradition 
of Christian charity which raises technological advance, invention, improvement and 
progress to a positive moral duty. Following on the Christian model of incarnation 
and conversion, the divine will and the human soul as an extension of that will, 
“informs44 matter with purpose thereby bringing it to completion and perfection. 
Because “art” transforms and completes nature, man and his technology literally 
brings new beings into being in the form of an improved nature and human nature as 
well. Civil society brings the division of labour making possible all sorts of arts and 
inventions never seen in the world before as unleashed passions and desires drive men 
to the want of all number of useful and valuable commodities. Increased wealth bring
12 Locke, op. cit., Chap. V, p. 28
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increased inequality which produces not only a social division in economics, but in 
politics as well as new and more sophisticated machines of government are required 
to regulate social intercourse and administer justice. Primitive forms of government 
are no longer adequate to manage growing levels of social complexity and the state 
comes into being in order to escape the “incontinences” of the state of nature. The 
institution of laws in turn provides the stability of contracts, which in turn fuels social 
power and progress. Locke follows Hobbes in the absolute sovereignty of 
government power, he simply locates it in the people, represented by parliament but 
does not change either its character or its function.14 Political and economic advance 
create social advance and the citizen as part of an advancing society can know himself 
to be the product of a rational and industrious society, the social superior of those who 
have not benefited from the education afforded the life of a leisured gentlemen.
Progress in the arts and sciences, the invention of money and the division of 
labour and “advanced” market economy comes into being whose integrative effect is 
to produce a social interdependence capable of generating ever increasing levels of 
prosperity for its rational and industrious members. Nature only provides the raw 
resource from which man in pursuit of his own desires creates out of virtually nothing 
the products of labour capable of satisfying not only his needs, but his wants. Civil 
society raises man out of the paucity of his natural condition by providing the 
abundance of “commodious living” from which man leams to value the law and order 
necessary for the protection of his property. Communal property ownership and its 
customary regulation of use right may have been sufficient in the early stages of 
social organisation, but technological necessitates social change. With advancing 
productivity and the increasing division of labour comes more extreme forms of social 
inequality as the “rational” and “industrious” gain the competitive edge in the struggle 
to accumulate wealth and possessions. An inequality of possession creates the need to 
protect their advantage from the “fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and 
contentious” through which man discovers the true end of government in the need to
13 Ibid, p. 28
14 Even property isn’t inviolable as once men have entered into political society the distribution of  
property is in the hands o f  civil government for the common good, although compensation is o f  course 
given least the state be accused o f theft. One thinks o f the enforced property redistribution that took 
place under the Enclosure acts o f  the middle 18th century. Here the concept o f consent was stretched as 
far as in any Indian land surrender. See J.L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer, 
1760 -1832: A Study o f  the Government o f  England Before the Reform Bill (London.: Longmans,
Green & Co.) 1987
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protect his property.15 Far from being a restraint upon men’s desire, law and 
government provide the means for its emancipation and multiplication by providing 
framework of social regulation necessary to overcome conflict and strife inherent in 
man‘s natural condition.
The only solution to the inherent conflict of the state of nature is for men to 
exit that state by forming a civil society through the mutual act of covenant, one with 
another, leaving the realm of necessity (law of nature) in exchange for a life governed 
by “freedom44 (positive law). The civil state, founded on positive law, is an artificial 
construction but because it is made on the basis of scientific principles, it not only 
incorporates the “eternal” laws of nature, but also transcends and perfects them.
Nature is mastered by obeying her, the strategy is one of harnessing and channelling 
productive forces for human purposes, not restraining, but emancipating natural 
desires. Left to their own devises, natural desires and forces fly about in a chaotic, 
irrational and unorganised fashion which not only weakens and diffuses their potential 
power. The desires must be properly ordered, focused and disciplined to prevent them 
from their natural course of chaos and confusion. As with Hobbes, nature is 
inherently flawed and must be perfected by art and in order for true liberty to come 
into being. Civil society and the rule of law must direct and channel the passions of 
man and therefore empower his natural productivity which otherwise would lead to 
nothing other than mutual antagonism and “inconvenience.” The law, says Locke, is 
“not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper 
interest” and that its end “is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge 
freedom” for “liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others; which 
cannot be where there is no law”.16
The law of nature may govern social relations in the state of nature, but it is 
essentially a moral rule in the absence of sovereign power necessary to enforce it. 
According to Locke men must keep their contracts but the reason such contracts are 
kept is because of the power to punish wielded either by God who has the power of 
eternal life and death or because the public requires it and the Leviathan will punish
15 For the intimate link between man’s “liberation” from natural restraint and the true end of 
government founded in the protection o f private property see “John Locke”, by Robert A. Goldwin, in 
Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), History o f  Political Philosophy, Third Edition, (Chicago.: 
University o f  Chicago Press) 1987, pp. 493 - 495
16 Locke, op. cit., Chap. VI, pp. 36 - 37
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you if you do not.17 While Locke, unlike Hobbes, preserves the traditional scholastic 
postulate of “right reason” and/or the principle of Christian “conscience” which 
teaches the “law of nature” as a moral duty, but it is explicitly distinguished from
I o  t
“civil law” which is the rule set by a commonwealth. Right reason however, is not 
immediately present to man nor is reason alone enough to produce a rational and 
lawful society. In the reasonableness of Christianity Locke, echoing Bacon, speaks of 
the reign of darkness and ignorance where vice and superstition held the world“ and 
where no “help be had or hoped for from reason”, reason being a product of correct 
moral orientation and not visa versa.19 Ethics is not a matter of rational intuition or 
deliberation but of moral persuasion dependent not upon judgement, but authority as 
it is force which moves the passions. Reason without the motive force of interest and 
desire is especially impotent in the face of entrenched and corrupt interests usually in 
the persons of (non Christian) priests. Knowledge” or “true” understanding is the 
preserve of men of “experience” who have the leisure to study and the means to 
cultivate their reason.21 While Locke holds that the state of nature may have the law 
of nature to govern it and teach men the utility of making and keeping promises, there 
is no escape in the state of nature from the “violence and partiality of men” which 
inevitably leads to transgression and war. 22 The protestant cleric Richard Hooker is 
cited in support of the view that law is “ordained” for external order given the 
presumption that the will of man is “inwardly obstinate, rebellious and averse to the 
sacred laws of his nature” and that “man to be in regard of his depraved mind little 
better than a wild beast” from which the laws are framed so that his “outward” actions
'y ' l
be of no hindrance to the common good.
Even the “mind” of man when left to its own devises strays from the path of
17 Ibid., p. 17. Nature says Locke “has put into man a desire for happiness” and be observed in all 
persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not 
impressions o f truth on the understanding.” p. 16
18 Ibid., Chap. XXVII, p. 152
19 John Locke, “The Reasonableness o f Christianity” in , (ed.) David Wootton, Divine Right and  
Democracy: An Anthology o f  Political Writings in Stuart England, (Indiana.: Hackett) 2003 p. 479
20 Ibid, p. 480
21 Because “most men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labour o f their callings”
are “wanting skill and leisure, and others inclination and some being taught, that they ought not, to
examine; there are few to be found, who are not exposed by their ignorance, laziness education or
precipitancy, to take them upon trust.” John Locke, (Abridged and edited Kenneth Winkler) An Essay
on the Human Understanding, (Indiana.: Hackett) 1996, Chap. iii, p. 22
22 Locke, Treatise, op. cit., Chap. 11, p. 11
23 Ibid., Chap. XI, p. 90
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natural law and following instinct and desire unavoidably “errors” and falls into 
corruption and degeneration. Not only is nature a poverty stricken wasteland, but man 
in his natural state moves not forward, but backward as whatever “natural” reason 
man possesses is used in the pursuit of evil in the absence of a legislator with the 
power to enforce law and order. Locke in effect adds to Hobbes’ amoral or pre-moral 
state of nature the Christian contention that inherently evil and “varying from the right 
rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate and declares himself to quit 
the principles of human nature.”24 Such a man becomes no better than a wild beast 
who may be killed as a wolf or a lion who “have no other mle but that of force and 
violence, and so may be treated as a beast of prey, those dangerous and noxious 
creatures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.” In 
Locke’s theory of human nature it becomes possible for men to divest themselves of 
their very humanity through their evil actions allowing them to become the perpetual 
property of another as a life long punishment.
Slavery once justified on the grounds that it was a rational relations, which if 
based upon force, nevertheless was reciprocal and productive of a common good. 
Slavery could be judged to by unjust if it did not stay within the bounds of natural as 
well as positive law. In modernity, where all political relations are based not upon 
justice, but upon force slavery is nothing but the most extreme of a normal political 
situation of domination and subordination. The slave has forfeited his life and thus 
becomes subject to the tyrannous mle of his master with total and absolute obedience 
being the price of his self-preservation. In his definition of slavery as “nothing else 
but the state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive” Locke 
faithfully reproduces the Hobbes’ fundamental political principles with the added 
value of moral hypocrisy. When individuals willingly place themselves in a state of 
war, by violating the natural liberties of their fellow men, they forfeit their own rights 
and may be justly enslaved and/or deprived of their possessions. Slavery is enforced 
in as a punishment or compensation not only for the evil they have committed, but 
also for their demonstrated lack of moral “capacity” and self-control. Through his 
moral philosophy justifying slavery, Locke reintegrates a just war doctrine into the 
modem political discourse, albeit in a much transmuted form. Although the law of
24 Locke, Treatise, Chap. Ill, p. 13
25 Ibid., Chap. Ill, p. 13
26 Ibid., Chap. IV, p. 17
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nature is supposed to be about “self-evident” principles of natural reason and 
morality, it is clear in Locke’s discussion of war and slavery that some are 
nevertheless more rational and moral than others.
The natural state in addition to being inefficient and irrational is inherently 
regarded as tending towards corruption and dissolution because it is under the rule of 
the passions and not reason. The passions must be moderated and cultivated by 
education and experience otherwise man remains in his animal existence, a brute beast 
driven by impulse towards force and violence. The cultivated citizen is a work of art 
and as such it has a master and creator, the political architect who has directly 
intervened in nature to transform man from his natural wild state. Rationality, 
because it is not innate, but a product of experience, can only develop under the 
careful guidance of educators who have the time to study and discover the rational 
principles of society which they can then impart to their wards. The irrational 
multitude which constitute the majority of mankind both inside and outside the state 
are destined to passively submit to the rule of the rational and industrious for their 
own good.
Locke extends his thought from the foundation of his own civil society to 
encompass the universal subject of “all mankind” as he envisions the unlimited 
expansion of civil society to all parts of the world and specifically the new world. 
Locke uses the “wastes” of America and the poverty and underdevelopment of 
American “primitive” societies as empirical evidence to back up his colonial claims to 
land and resources which could be put to more effective and efficient use for the 
benefit of not only the English settlers, but the Indians themselves.27 Liberty to 
Locke is not restricted by national boundaries, but is extended as a natural right 
throughout the world because all the world was given to man in common. The 
common right to all lands lying waste remains the cornerstone of a colonialist theory 
of unlimited accumulation through private property appropriation. Arbitrarily 
restricting access to this God given common resource therefore becomes a “just” 
cause for war because it arbitrarily impedes man’s natural liberty. Men have a right to 
the common unless they have voluntarily entered into agreements restricting their 
liberty. Moreover, the common lands are wasted and do not serve the common good 
if they are not put into the most rational and efficient form of cultivation productive of
27 Ibid., Chap. V, p. 30
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the “general benefit” of all mankind. Locke’s is a relative measure, where hunting 
and gathering or subsistence agriculture on the common because it is not an efficient 
use of the land through the most advanced methods and techniques is the same as 
leaving it lying waste. Not developing or improving the land to its full potential 
according to the possibilities of the most advanced techniques of the most advanced 
societies is equivalent to wastage and hording which has the effect of “subtracting” 
from the common good. 28 Occupancy and even use of the land is no longer sufficient 
to convey ownership and jurisdiction, as the “empty land” or terra nullis is no longer 
about the empirical fact of the Indian presence or even their effective occupation of 
traditional territories or cultivation of the cultivation of village farms and gardens. 
Ownership is instead about the relative value of traditional versus improving methods 
of agriculture and production in which the greater productivity of the latter is decisive 
by the purely utilitarian argument of the greatest benefit to a generalised “universal” 
mankind. Ownership and rightful political jurisdiction over land and resources is 
therefore the product of technological advance rather than the scholastically derived 
legalisms of the “right to rule” and the “just war” theories and their traditional subtle 
distinctions between “rightful” possession, usufruct, dominion and conquest.
It was precisely these kinds of “irresolvable” conflicts of interest which 
convinced Hobbes that traditional moral and legal doctrines were either hopelessly 
corrupted or practically ineffective and obsolete. While it was “self-evident” that 
property as the means to self-preservation was necessary to man’s survival and well­
being and that, justice, in theory, entailed ensuring that “each man should be given 
what was rightfully his own“, there was very little, if any agreement in practical 
application. Hobbes was explicit in his rejection of both the natural and divine law 
traditions as sources of interminable conflict, as each man would always favour his 
own interest, making all talk of natural justice, nothing more than “absurd speech” of 
lawyers and scholastics. Locke follows Hobbes in reducing the natural law tradition 
to the minimalist law of nature in which self-preservation alone becomes grounded 
not in the natural order of a cosmos governed by the rule of reason, but by the 
physical imperatives of force and motion which compel men as desiring machines to
28 See John Tully, op. cit., On Locke’s theory o f  property and the common good as a just war 
rationalisation for the dispossession o f the Indians, especially subsection entitled “Dispossession: the 
role of the State o f Nature” in Chapter 5, p. 140 - 155. For the appropriation o f resources as well as 
land see Barbara Ameil, John Locke and America: The Defence o f  English Colonialism (Oxford.: 
Clarendon Press) 1996
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pursue their self-interest, restrained only by the voluntary alienation of these “natural 
rights” to an effective sovereign power. While a God governed universe may still 
command the “moral duties” of sociable life and fellowship, these duties can only 
come into force to oppose the natural inclination towards evil of the majority of 
mankind with the effective sanction of civil government. In the absence of sovereign 
power, moral degeneration can and must be countered by rational individuals who 
must meet force with force in the general interest of the liberty and prosperity of all 
mankind.
If the realm of liberty is found not in nature, but in technique, which 
completes and perfects nature, than anything not re-ordered and remade to serve the 
“general benefit of mankind” can only exist in a state contrary and at odds with a 
higher, because self-conscious human purpose. Science and civilisation raises man 
out of “natural society” and subjects him to the disciplined production of ever 
increasing rational and efficient techniques to master and subdue nature and human 
nature alike. Knowledge, for modems is power because it is only through the 
intervention into nature that man makes manifest his own independent, sovereign will 
which is above and beyond his profane, corporeal and material condition. Technical 
ability and desire are open-ended serving to “expand” rather than “restrain” each other 
producing a civilization ordered to unlimited appropriation in the name of the 
satisfaction not of natural, but of artificial needs and desires. The inevitable march of 
progress and improvement is inherently expansionist because each technological 
innovation justifies the subjugation of the backward and the primitive to the rule of 
the advanced and the “modem”. The liberal movement to the progressive 
incorporation and assimilation of all mankind within a single cosmopolitan 
community is forever frustrated by differences among societies ordered to a relative 
measure. Societies are ordered “lower” to “higher” in respect of their technological 
and organisational complexity (hunter gather, pastoral, agricultural, manufacturing) 
which because it is a function of a never ending cycle of technological invention at the 
centre diffusing out to the periphery can never be overcome. Liberalism assumes the 
potential rationality of universal mankind, but its actualisation in the world is a matter 
of practice, experience and technological advance in which the “backward” are 
always subject to the rational and industrious whose right to rule is grounded in 
success as a product of power.
Rousseau saw that modem prejudice against the past was based upon an
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unproven belief in progress and made it his aim to develop a science of man as nature
2Q
made him in his “original” constitution and “primitive” state. It was Rousseau’s 
contention that entry into civil society caused a “corruption” of man’s natural 
innocence brought about by the competitive and self-interested struggle that resulted 
from the division of labour and the mutual dependence of men in the modem world. 
Moreover, the virtues of comfortable self-preservation and “commodious” living were 
at best mixed bringing with them the increased vanity and venality of the rich while 
leading to the oppression and misery of the poor. Civil society produces an inequality 
o f property, which as an artificial condition creates an arbitrary and distinction 
between citizens which is unjust and ultimately destructive of the commonwealth and 
the purpose for which it was established; to preserve man’s freedom. As such it was 
an unjustifiable and illegitimate barrier to the realisation of man’s natural freedom and 
equality which was a function not of the relative value of utility, but on the absolute 
value of liberty. Rousseau’s principle of the “general will” replaces the utilitarian 
pursuit of happiness whether defined by security or commodious living to the 
realisation of absolute freedom through the construction of a commonwealth on the 
principle of universal law. The social contract must be so structured that the freedom 
which man possessed in nature must be realised in the state by making everyone 
wholly and equally subject to the laws which each has fully and equally contributed in 
making.31 Man realises himself as man not in the utilitarian pursuit of self-interest but 
in the actualisation of his nature as a “free” being. The truly free will is the general 
will precisely because it has been universalised being the particular wills of isolated 
individuals and remade into the collective will of the nation through the institution of 
the social contract. 32
The separation of man’s moral being found in the freedom of his will from the 
selfish striving towards power and the calculation of advantage grounds Rousseau’s 
republic in the universal rights of man regardless of the actual circumstances of 
individual men. Rousseau resurrects a moral basis for the state, but it is a morality
29 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Translated by Maurice Cranston, A Discourse On Inequality, (London.:
Penguin Books) 1984 , “Preface” p. 67
30 “...nothing is less stable among men than these exterior relationships which are produced more 
often by chance than by thought and since weakness or strength go by the names o f  poverty and riches, 
human institutions seem at first sight to be founded on piles o f shifting sands.” , Rousseau, Ibid., 
Preface., p. 71
31 Strauss, “The Three Waves o f Modernity” in Gildin, op. cit., p. 90
32 Allan Bloom, “Jean Jacques Rousseau” in Strauss and Cropsey, op. cit., p. 567
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produced from within man himself as his own universally free self-determination.
Like Hobbes however, liberty is found not in nature, but in convention as through the 
creation of positive laws that the general will is realised and actualised. Rousseau 
maintained that man’s freedom lies not in the rational calculation of self-interest, but
' i ' l
in his capacity as a moral agent, to refuse mechanical determinism as a “free agent”. 
Morality is not found in reason, but sentiment and feeling which transcends and 
ultimately orders reason by legislating freely determining its own ends, to which 
reason as an instrument serves to achieve or attain. Once again, reason as a means, 
cannot posit its own ends, but must look to a decision of the will, which is prior to and 
therefore determining of the rational calculative capacity which serves it as a means to 
that end.
Rousseau’s concept of the general will as the source of man’s freedom in self­
determining action highly influenced Kant’s concept of moral autonomy as the base 
and foundation of “right” to be realised in law through the instrument of the state. 34 
Kant as dissatisfied with the moral ambiguity of utilitarian ethics sought to effected a 
“revolution” in metaphysics in order to provide a theoretical space for human dignity 
and self respect in the face of mechanical determinism.35 Kant established man’s 
autonomy on the basis of a subjectivity which transcended space and time by locating 
both of them, not in the external and independent realm of “natural” phenomenon, but 
within the “internal” structures of the mind. The problem with empiricism which 
takes its foundation for the production of ideas from the sense impressions received 
from objects is that it bypasses the entire question about the mind’s ability to “grasp” 
or “know” these objects in their synthetic unity. The things in nature are quite simply 
unknowable because the mind takes an active role in “forming” sense impressions 
into “concepts” which are the objects of understanding, not the “things in 
themselves”. Known objects are represented to consciousness through the “faculty”
33 Rousseau, op. cit., p. 87
34 Hans Reiss, “Introduction” in Kant: Political Writings, Second Enlarged Edition, (ed.) Hans R eiss, 
(Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1991, p. 28 The idea o f transcending or transforming each 
individual and particular will through their participation and immersion in a general or universal will is 
a way o f  moving from a mere association o f atomic individuals into a collective or communal identity 
in which the whole is greater than the sum o f its parts. While this concept originates with Rousseau, it 
is given subjective priority in Kant and literally a life o f its own in Hegel. See Charles Taylor, Hegel
and Modem Society, (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1998, p. 77.
35 The practical will is nothing else than “personality, understood as the freedom and independence 
from the mechanism o f nature regarded as a capacity o f being a subject to special laws (pure practical 
laws given by its own reason.” Immanuel Kant, Translated and Edited by Lewis White Beck, Critique 
o f  Practical Reason, Third Edition, ( New Jersey.: Prentice Hall) p. 90
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of reason:
It is only when we have produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition 
that we are in a position to say that we know the object.. .reason has insight only 
into that which it produces after a plan of its own.3
Kant takes the familiar frame of modem freedom that you only know what you make 
and gives it a metaphysical foundation in transcendental idealism. As such a truly 
“enlightened” subjectivity emerges wherein modem technological man is able to free 
himself from the “yoke of his guardians” and is no longer captive to his “self-incurred
*X7immaturity.” Human freedom is grounded in the fact that the rational faculty which 
measures and quantifies the objects of nature, which he calls “pure reason”, is limited 
to the empirical realm and can add nothing to an understanding of ourselves as moral 
agents.
The critique of “pure reason” in in large part designed by Kant to not only to 
give outline to, and an explanation for, man’s ability to know the empirical world as it 
its given through sense impressions, but to make way and even give primacy to man‘s
- j o
ability to determine his own moral freedom through the faculty of practical reason. 
Practical activity, is the manifestation of man’s freedom from the determinations of 
his material existence under the rule of pure practical reason. Freedom as an “idea” 
produces an unconditioned and hence “spontaneous” practical will. Pure practical 
reason sets goals or ends for itself through the application of a moral law conceived 
by reason not as an empirical law of nature or even human nature (personal
IQ
psychology) but as a categorical imperative which is both universal and absolute.
As such these “acts” are manifested in the freedom of the will to determine its own
ends under the rule of duty and morality. The freedom of the will to act practically
over and above purely natural determinations based on corporeal need, blind,
mechanical necessity or animal instinct, defines man as a purely autonomous agent; or
personality. Pure practical reason or personality has a causality all its own
experienced in rule governed actions:
Now, that this reason has causality, or that we at least conceive such a causality 
in it, is evident from the imperatives which, in all that is practical, we impose 
rules on the per-formative powers. The ought expresses a kind of necessity and
36 Sebastian Gardener, Routledge Philosophical Guidebook to Kant and the Critique o f  Pure Reason,
(London.: Routledge) 2003 p. 192
37 Kant, “What is Enlightenment” in Reiss op. cit., p. 54
-5 0
Gardener, op. cit., p. 320
39 Lewis White Beck, op. cit., ‘Translators Introduction”, p. xi
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connection which basis does not otherwise occur in nature.. .reason does not 
yield to the empirically given basis and does not follow the order of things as 
they exhibit themselves in appearances, but with complete spontaneity makes 
for itself an order of its own according to ideas. 40
Man may be “conditioned” by natural necessity, but he is not determined by it, as 
demonstrated in his capacity to “refuse” natural compulsion and “determine” his own 
ends. Man, unlike any animal, can deny and negate the “impulses” of instinct, up to 
and even including the risk of his own life. Freedom, therefore is about the rational 
capacity for “reflection41 understood as “negation” of natural necessity, wherein man 
“experiences” his freedom in morality with respect to others, duty in respect of law 
and “conscience” in respect to religion. It is our capacity to act in accordance with a 
universal and eternal “moral law” which transcends whatever “conditioned” context, 
individual, social and/or historical to express our universal humanity. The realisation 
of one‘s “true personality” is a trans-formative as well as transcendent experience 
raising out of our embodied limitations to become “like the independent deity, which 
might come into possession of holiness of will through irrefragable agreement of the 
will with the pure moral law becoming, as it were, our nature.”41
Kant’s philosophy secures human freedom by effectively removing it from 
the mechanical and material determinism reducing him to no more than the “desiring 
machine” described by Hobbes. Man’s new found moral responsibility however does 
not diminish his mastery and domination of nature which is instead directly tied to his 
own uniqueness as a “rational” being. Having once again discovered his “spiritual” 
being, the raw stuff of nature is once again under his control: “everything in creation 
which he wishes and over which he has power can be used merely as a means, only 
man, and with him, every rational creature, is an end in himself42 While Kant’s 
philosophy is the modem ground for the universal rights of man, it is important to 
remember that Kant’s humanism is ultimately directed not at the “conditioned” man 
of individual particularity, but at man as a species-being, in his “universal totality” 43 
Kant’s political philosophy is “critical” precisely because it begins with the given and 
negates its necessity, positing the "‘idea” of pure freedom as an “intuition” of the
40 Immanuel Kant, Translated by S. Werner Pluhar, Critique o f  Pure Reason, Abridged, (Indiana.:
Hackett) 1999, pp. 187-188
41 Kant, in Beck, op. cit., p. 85
42 Ibid., p. 91
43 Kant, “Idea For a Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose” in Reiss., op. cit., Sixth 
Proposition, p. 46
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infinite from the perspective of the finite. The “is” because it “exists” is by definition, 
limited and as such determined by its concrete materiality and can only be a negation 
from divine perfection, partial and imperfect. Man may not have to accept what is 
“given” in the realm of right, because law is a pure product of the will, but he is by his 
very existence embodied in nature and plagued by desire as long as he remains alive.44
From Kant’s philosophy we get a politics of irreducible dualism, nature
forever divided against freedom wherein man is denied by his own materiality the full
“realisation14 of his own perfection. Man‘s inability to fully escape his corporeal
nature means that man’s individual reason will always be compromised by his own
self-interest and partiality which can only be contained within coercive institutions.
Man will always be an animal that requires a “master”; each one will “misuse his
freedom if he does not have anyone above him to apply force to him as the laws
should require” 45 Ultimately, however, the coercive authority itself, can only be a
human invention and artifice with all the flaws that this implies:
.. .the highest authority has to be just in itself and yet also man. This is therefore 
the most difficult of all tasks, and a perfect solution is impossible. Nothing 
straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made 
of. Nature only requires of us that we should approximate to this idea. 46
Human perfection cannot be realised in any particular individual, or even any 
particular state, past or present, although Kant does leave open its possibility for the 
future which he postulates as the “end of history” 47 As such man can only know its 
ultimate rationality in the totality of experience as he works his way ever slowly and 
painfully to the establishment of institutions which will secure a cosmopolitan and 
perpetual peace.
Kant’s conception of a universal and cosmopolitan peace is an “idea” of pure 
reason is the logical determination of human freedom within Kantian political 
philosophy which produces the ultimate assimilation dynamic within modem
44 Life and desire do not however do not enslave man to nature, but rather the other way around. “Life 
is the faculty o f a being by which it acts according to the laws o f the faculty o f desire. The faculty of 
desire is the faculty such a being has o f causing, through its ideas, the reality o f the objects o f these 
ideas.” Kant, in Beck, op. cit., “Preface”, p. 9. This idea will be developed with great effect by Hegel
in his attempted reconciliation o f spirit and matter.
45 Kant, “Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose” in Reiss, op. cit., Sixth 
Proposition, p. 46
46 Ibid, p. 46
47 Kant, “Conjectures on the Beginning o f Human History” in Reiss, op. cit., p. 229 “Man was meant 
to rise, by his own efforts, above the barbarism o f his natural abilities.. .He can expect to attain this 
skill only at a late stage and after many unsuccessful attempts; an in the meantime, the human race
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liberalism. Because Kant grounds the metaphysics of morals in the capacities of the
human mind, it is universal by definition; morality and human freedom can only be
realised, if at all, within institutions of law and government established according to
the “true” principles of the universal moral law. As these principles are the product of
the “enlightenment” they are a product of self-conscious action and construction
which carry with them a “moral duty” through which man “may see himself as
analogous to the divinity.”49 While individual men may be resistant, this resistance is
down to their immaturity or partiality which cannot stand in the way of “progress”
and necessary reform of social and political institutions. Such persons are to be
regarded not as active citizens but passive recipients of action provide a condition
which thus requires that the person “never be used as a means except when he is at the
same time treated as an end”. 50 The “end” being to realise a universal humanity
through the transformation of original “primitive” and “savage” “ways of life” into
the civilised subject of the modem personality:
We look with profound contempt the way in which savages cling to their 
lawless freedom. They would rather engage in incessant strife than submit to a 
legal constraint which they might impose upon themselves, for they prefer the 
freedom of folly to the freedom of reason. We regard this as barbarism, 
coarseness, and brutish debasement of humanity. 1
Kantian inspired enlightenment rationalism is there for directed to a universal project 
of modernisation and “civilisation” necessary to secure a “cosmopolitan” peace. 
Republican government based upon the social relations of private property and the 
coercive administration of law and order is therefore necessary to “produce” the 
“ultimate” “end” of man as a species-being which by its nature “approximates” the 
divine. Man’s ultimate “moral” being, however comes in one form only as 
homogeneity replaces plurality as all “primitive” customs, traditions or alternative 
“ways of life” are postulated as immature errors or self-interested deviations from a 
“norm” that stands as a universal and eternal standard against which any and all 
“forms” are evaluated and condemned to the dust-bin of history. Competition and war 
in the state of nature drives man into society, but a truly civilised society will not be
|roans under the evils which it inflicts on itself as a result o f its own inexperience.”
8 Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, in Reiss, op. cit., p. 98 “Thus the postulate on 
which all these articles are based is that all men who can at all influence each other must adhere to
some kind o f civil constitution.”
49 Kant, “Theory and Practice” in Reiss, op. cit., p. 65
50 Kant, in Beck, op. cit., p. 91
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based upon natural necessity and the arbitrary authority found in “natural 
government” based upon paternal authority or traditional custom. Only the full and 
complete realisation of government according to the universal and rational principles 
of a voluntary social contract and a constituted civil authority will allow man to 
realise his fully “rational” and “moral” nature.
Although Kant recognised that a universal mankind was distributed within
particular nations, the differences between nations, like the differences between
people, were to be regulated and controlled by an overarching system of law,
international right, premised upon the universality of the republican constitutions,
shared by all, as parts within a greater whole. Kant, as much as Hobbes, understood
that the underlying logic of modem natural liberty meant that war was a necessary and
legitimate instrument of civilisation and that a universal history with a cosmopolitan
purpose would entail the wholesale re-making of man in order to “free” him from the
inevitable consequences of his own inherent (because natural) barbarism. Because the
only secure state is one of a “lawful” relation and all laws are only as good as the
power which enforces them, the more advanced have a “pre-emptive” right to impose
civilisation upon the savage or force his “removal”:
It is usually assumed that one cannot take hostile action against anyone unless 
one has already been actively injured by them. This is perfectly correct if both 
parties are living in a legal civil state...But man (or an individual people) in a 
mere state of nature robs me of any such security and injures me by virtue of 
this very state in which he coexists with me. He may not have injured me 
actively (facto) but he does injure me by the very lawlessness of his state (statu 
iniusto) for he is a permanent threat to me, and I can require him either to enter 
into a common lawful state along with me or to move away from my vicinity.53
The inability of “civilised” peoples to tolerate relations with people in a state of nature 
directly justified the modem equivalent of the just war to bring civilisation to the 
savages or to have them “removed” from areas of settlement, remarking that “of all 
ways of life, that of the hunter is undoubtedly most at odds with a civilised 
constitution.” 54 Kant, like Hobbes before him, recommends that civilisation be 
brought to the “savages” by Treaty, but does not shrink from the use of force and gave 
the following justifications for state violence: that it is “plausible enough arguments
51 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, in Reiss, op. cit., Second Definitive Article, p. 102 - 103
52 Kant, “Perpetual Peace” in Reiss, op. cit., p. 99 Kant insists all civil constitutions must be 
republican
53 Ibid., p. 98
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for the use of violence on the grounds that it is in the best interests of the world as a 
whole,” that it “may bring culture to uncivilised peoples,” “it may purge our country 
of depraved characters” and that “the whole world would perhaps still be in a lawless 
condition if men had had any such compunction about using violence when they first 
created a law-governed state”.55 In other words, if you want to make an omelette, 
you have to break a few eggs, especially when dealing with human beings who 
require the concealed coercion embodied in the civil laws to develop their moral 
capacities towards a state where morality is recognised for its own sake.56
What is more, the violence engendered by the progress to perpetual peace is 
not merely an unfortunate side effect, the collateral damage of civilisation, but is 
instead inherently necessary within the process itself. Man is compelled not by 
reason, but by selfish passions whose only limit is found in the use of force with the 
result that it is only through the violent encounter of the counter force of others that 
peace becomes possible. War therefore is a necessary instrument in the domestication 
of the passions and plays a central role in the civilisation process through which man
en
learns to voluntarily submit his arbitrary and lawless will to the rational rule of law.
In this way, Kant, no less than Hobbes is able to tolerate the most extreme forms of 
human brutality and injustice as an “engine” of progress, which although condemned, 
is also rationalised on the basis of an unpleasant necessity. Man’s reason may 
calculate his enlightened self-interest, but his passions rule his nature until he his 
driven into law governed civil society. In turn, these societies will be forced into ever 
greater cycles of violence until they themselves submit to a law governed 
international order in the form of a universal federation of republican nation-states. 
That this “idea” will only come about as a result of war and imperialism practiced by 
the strong against the weak betrays the colonialism at the heart of Kant’s political 
philosophy. The progress of “civilisation” therefore becomes an end, not just for one 
part of humanity, but for the whole which because it serves a divinely sanctioned
54 Ibid., p. 110
55 Kant, “The Metaphysics o f Morals” in Reiss, op. cit., p. 172
56 Kant, “Perpetual Peace” in Reiss, op. cit., p. 120
57 War however; does not require any particular kind o f motivation, for it seems ingrained in human 
nature, and even to be regarded as something noble to which man is inspired by his love o f honour, 
without selfish motives. Thus warlike courage, with American savages as with their European counter­
parts in medieval times, is held to be o f great and immediate value - and not just in times o f war (as 
might be expected), but also in order that there may be war. See Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, in Reiss, op. 
cit., p. 111
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“goal” is above and beyond mere person or society.58 Man is not human as he is 
empirically given, but as he is re-made into a self-conscious moral actor, a product not 
of his natural condition, but of a civilising process whose ultimate realisation can only 
come at the end of history. Existing political institutions were flawed and would only 
conform to the proscriptions of a universal rational will through a process of gradual 
evolution whose progress towards perfection man could only “imagine” as an idea of 
pure reason. The infinite progress towards perpetual peace was best left to providence 
because it was something so beyond human experience man could only project it as 
an absolute negation of his own limited and incomplete human nature.59 A life lived 
in faith and hope, however did not translate into a life of inaction as it is through 
man’s work on the world that the transformation moves from potentiality to actuality 
with man’s serving as God sanctioned instrument.60
The technological drive towards civilisation, in which man’s innate capacities 
are “realised” through the establishment of particular social and political institutions 
evolves into a discourse of development in which history begins to take on an active 
productive role, above and beyond the conscious efforts of individual human beings. 
History becomes secularised providence as “the cunning of reason”, which works 
behind the backs of individual men and even states to achieve the “rational” destiny of 
man through the transformation of both man and the world. As with Bacon’s original 
technological utopia, man and nature are infinitely malleable, base materials and 
underlying processes can be manipulated and controlled for the benefit of all 
mankind. Nature and human nature are not simply given, but can be made and remade 
by human action to wipe the slate clean and inform a passive an inert matter with 
meaning and purpose. The workings of Providence may be a mystery, but it is not 
necessary for individual men to “know” the end of the whole, or even to obey the call 
of conscience and the rale of reason. All that is required is that man’s natural needs 
and desires provide the unsocial sociability that drive men to rationally calculate that 
their selfish ends can only be realised through the rale of law. Man gives up his
58 Man as a species being means not individuals, but the totality o f a series which runs into infinity or 
“In other words, no single member of all the generations o f the human race, but only the species, 
attains its destiny completely.” Kant, “Reviews o f Herder’s Ideas on the Philosophy o f  History o f
Mankind” in Reiss, op. cit., p. 220
59 Kant directly cites Augustine with regard to providence guiding “the design o f a universal creator 
who has determined everything in advance” Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, in Reiss, op. cit., p. 108.
60 The perfectibility o f  man and the world through the incarnation o f the divine through the 
development and expansion of human technology and knowledge is strikingly similar to Bacon’s
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natural liberty through mutual submission to the social contract in order to create the 
civil institutions with sufficient coercive force necessary to domesticate a reluctant 
and disobedient nature. 61 Man by servicing his needs and giving full reign to his 
desires drives forward the path of progress as he humanises the world through culture 
and cultivation. The historicity of reason is highly problematic for Kant because 
although he insists that the first human beings can speak and therefore think, he also 
assumes that these “skills” are not innate, but are “acquired.” Reason is present, but
latent in man who is not “conscious” of it until it makes its presence known, and with
62the imagination, extends itself beyond the limits of mere instinct and natural desire.
By insisting that man’s rationality is universally and necessarily present and 
hence an a priori fixed structure of human subjectivity, Kant overcomes the problem 
of empiricism, but in so doing must formulate “reason” in its “totality” and as such it 
becomes a “transcendental ideal.” 63 Reason, in effect, is located above and beyond 
individual men and in so doing is well on its way to developing a personality of its 
own, a theoretical development flushed out to its logical conclusions in the 
philosophy of Hegel. If reason is not innate, but is the product of experience, then 
man is a tabla rasa, a blank slate upon which to write, an empty cupboard waiting to 
be stocked, then history and experience begin to intrude more and more into maiTs 
self-making.64 Because man’s nature is not fixed by substantial essence, he becomes 
infinitely malleable, capable of change and transformation and is shaped, one way or 
another, either by the irrational flux of chance or through deliberative and calculative 
action. History, both personal and social, takes on an ever increasing importance as 
man and his self-understanding become more and more conditioned and even 
“determined” by experience. Before proceeding down the developmental path of 
reason however, it is first necessary to retrace our steps back to Rousseau whose
original vision.
61 “ ...man, even if  he is not morally good in himself, is nevertheless compelled to be a good citizen. As 
hard as it may sound, the problem o f setting up a state can be solved even by a nation o f devils (so long 
as they possess understanding).” Kant, “Perpetual Peace” in Reiss, op. cit., p. 112
62 Kant, “Conjectures on the Beginnings o f Human History”, in Reiss, op. cit., pp. 222 - 223
63 Peter Sedgwick, Descartes to Derrida, An Introduction to European Philosophy, (Oxford.:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd.), p. 50
64 Locke uses the empty cupboard metaphor in, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and the 
tabla rasa image is a direct copy o f Hobbes’ “blank page” metaphor in the Leviathan which in turn 
mimics Bacon’s original injunction to “purge” the mind by “wiping clean the slate” or the act o f  
“erasing” idols through the self-conscious act o f writing over the past in order to “remove” the false 
“impression” left by error or false philosophy. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, (ed.) Winkler, op. cit., p. 11
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“science of man” first “discovered” the problem of reason in history, which Kant felt 
so compelled to resolve.65
Historicism and Development
Historicism is bom when history, as an independent and transcendent force, begins to 
take precedence over man as the “agent” of human self-consciousness, a theoretical 
development which begins in Rousseau’s critique of Hobbes and his formulation of 
man in the state of nature. 66 Rousseau, because he wanted to preserve the modem 
concept of liberty and equality, could not simply restore classical virtue and as such 
was forced to reinterpret virtue within the modem understanding of the state of nature 
as man finds himself at the beginning. 67 Rousseau rejects Hobbes’ “war of all against 
all” as “the law of nature” arguing that in the state of nature man would have lacked 
the maturity of reason described by Hobbes and that reason far from being productive 
of civil society is actually the product of it. 68 For Rousseau reason “develops” 
through time with important implications for social and political theory as both early 
childhood for the individual and the distant past of early social development set the 
stage for future historical progression. There is a search backwards into the past for a 
primordial or “primitive” origin or innocence which like the Christian myth of the 
garden before the fall, was a state of innocence based largely on the ignorance of the 
knowledge of good and evil. Man is only “awakened” to his sinful nature after he 
misuses his uniquely divine capacity for “free will” to transgress God’s moral 
commands. With the fall and sin, however, comes a moral maturity and responsibility 
not present in the garden. Man is now forced to “labour” for his survival against a 
resistant nature, but it is in this “struggle” that he advances the arts and sciences and 
with it his rational capacity and his reason. Increased rationality creates inequality 
and interdependence which in turn drives men into society and their mutual voluntary
65 Rousseau ,like Hobbes before him, sets before himself the task o f investigating the “science o f man” 
which he believes to be the “most useful” and yet the “least developed” o f all the sciences. Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau, “Preface” in A Discourse on Inequality, op. cit., p. 67
66 Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves o f  Modernity” in Gildin, op. cit., p. 89
67 Ibid, p. 89
68 “.. .it is impossible to understand natural law and hence obey it, without being a very great reasoned 
and a profound metaphysician. This put precisely, means that men must have employed in establishing 
society an enlightened intelligence which is developed only with the greatest difficulty and among the 
very few people within the bosom o f  society itself. “ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on 
Inequality, op. cit., p. 69
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submission to the social contract as the foundation for government. In all of these 
formulations, Rousseau follows the conventional liberal account of progress from the 
state of nature to civil society, but by making the “development of reason” a question 
rather than a pre-ordained process, man’s movement through time and the emergence 
of his “rationality” becomes the object and not the subject of scientific inquiry.
Man’s substantive “self’ can no longer stand as either “self-evident” or simply 
God-given, nor is it directly accessible to the mind, because it is lost in a distant 
and/or distorted past. 69 Moreover, because reason, is inescapably embedded and 
conditioned by the body, sense organs are corporeal and hence subject to personal 
idiosyncrasies and environmental conditions including the social and historical as well 
as the physical context of climate and geography. Rousseau was obsessed with the 
importance of early education and was adamant that moral character was more a 
matter of learned habit and custom as well as personal sensibility.70 Bourgeois 
society was for him a fundamental corruption in which artificial needs inflamed the 
passions producing the mutual hostility which Hobbes erroneously projected 
backward into the state of nature.71 Rousseau is famous for being the first to idealise 
“the noble savage” and hold him up as a critical mirror from which to judge and 
condemn the petty viciousness of modem man. Rousseau in contradiction to Hobbes, 
imagined the state of nature to be one of peace and harmony in which man was “at 
home“ in his natural surroundings and reacted out of simple “instinct” to his fellow 
creatures whenever he encountered them.
Rousseau’s natural man was a solitary, not a social creature and was motivated 
to sociality only when stirred to by natural need (reproduction) or when moved by 
compassion when he witnessed the visible signs of pain or distress on his fellow 
man.72 Because reason was a “product” of language and intelligence the product of 
the arts and sciences, these tools would only be developed in the service of need and a 
natural state would perpetuate a state of simplicity in both needs and the means to
69 “How can man come to know himself as nature made him once he has undergone all the changes 
which the succession o f time and things must have produced in his original constitution...“ Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, “Preface” A Discourse On Inequality, op. cit., p. 67
70 Confessions is an attempt to re-member the “events” o f his own past in order to clarify his own 
origins and come to “self-consciousness” regarding the developments which lead to the formation of 
his own “character” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Translated by J.M. Cohen, The Confessions (London.:
Penguin Books) 1954
71 Rousseau, A Discourse On Inequality, op. cit., p. 98
72 Rousseau notes two passions antecedent to reason our own preservation and the “natural aversion to 
seeing any other sentient being perish or suffer. “ Preface”, A Discourse on Inequality, op. cit., p. 70
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their satisfaction.73 All of the competitive striving that drove man into the war of all 
against all was not his “natural” state at all, but was the result of increased and 
artificial needs and desires which only produced a fear of the future where there was 
none before.74 The “experience” of insecurity raises man’s self-awareness from the 
present as it is only when he “imagines” death that he begins to worry about his future
7Sself-preservation. Becoming self-conscious or taking himself as an object for his 
own rational reflection and concern therefore represents a developmental leap, not 
natural but produced through historical circumstance. In his natural state, man’s needs 
were few and easily satisfied and it was only with the “fortuitous circumstances of 
several alien causes which might never have arisen” that propelled man out of his 
“primitive condition.”76
Like Locke and Hobbes before him, the invention of property and the need for 
its protection was central to the foundation of the state and it remained for Rousseau a 
“progressive” if ambivalent development because with self-reflection also comes
77vanity and pride. In order to secure possession man exits the state of nature through 
the technical devise of the social contract in which men preserve their natural freedom 
in their equal participation as citizens within the republic. Property, therefore, as a 
legally constructed and sanctioned “right” does not exist except in civil society and as 
such becomes the basis of a “higher” moral existence in which “consent” replaces 
force as the basis of social life.78 As security of the person and property forms the 
basis of a universal interest, each citizen experiences himself as an equal and free 
subject, produced through the act of self-legislation, “transforming” his particular 
interest by harmonising it with the “the general will.”79 Citizens are mutually 
constituted through the actualisation of reciprocal rights and duties and come to
73 Rousseau, A Discourse On Inequality, op. cit., p. 104
74 ...it is by activity that our reason improves itself, we seek to know only because we desire to 
enjoy;.. .the passions in turn, owe their origins to our needs and their development to our knowledge, 
for one can desire or fear a thing only if  one has an idea o f it in the mind. Rousseau, A Discourse on
Inequality, op. cit., p. 89
75 Natural man fears only pain and not death “.. .because an animal will never know what death is, 
knowledge o f death and its terrors being one o f the first acquisitions which man gains on leaving the 
animal condition. Rousseau, A Discourse On Inequality, op. cit., p. 89
76 Rousseau, A Discourse On Inequality, op. cit., p. 106. It is perhaps this assertion that man’s rational 
progress was due to chance and not providence which so exercised the mind o f  Kant and Hegel that 
much o f  their philosophical systems can be an attempt to secure the necessity o f  reason and it
actualisation in human self-consciousness.
77 Rousseau, A Discourse On Inequality, op. cit., p. 109
78 Rousseau, A Discourse On Inequality op. cit., p. 112 - 113
79 Rousseau, A Discourse On Inequality, op. cit., p. 121
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understand themselves as free and self-determining beings through the practice of 
civic virtue within the national community. The active practice and cultivation of 
republican virtue elevated man above his previous natural state of childish innocence 
and is transformed into a “civilised” human being with a moral sense and a rational 
self-consciousness.
If Rousseau was the first to move history to the centre of his personal and 
political philosophy and it was Kant who sought to overcome it with his “revolution 
in metaphysics”, it was Hegel who took the further step of making Reason as it 
unfolded in history as the subject of his entire philosophical system. Hegel introduces 
the dialectic as a complete historical system culminating in the liberal constitutional 
order fully actualised in the post-revolutionary German Reich-state. For Hegel, 
history is fully realised rendering it an “object” for reflective thought and therefore of 
rational understanding comprehended and subsumed within Hegel’s system which
OA
stands at its “absolute” moment and end. With Hegel’s historicism, reason is not 
only the product of time, individual reason becomes subordinated to and subsumed 
within an overarching historical process which fully determines human consciousness 
at each particular “stage” of social and historical “development14. 81 If reason is 
inescapably embedded within and conditioned by social and historical context then 
any “objective” knowledge will only be possible at the end when “what is rational is 
actual; and what is actual is rational.”82 Hegel attempted to rescue “reason” by 
constructing a sacred science in which God and man both come to self-consciousness 
via the mediation of history as the “product” of collective social and political 
experience, the totality of which constitutes the whole of human history. Kant 
remained content with the duality of the human condition with man immersed in the 
mechanism of nature as a sensory being whose “final form” is only intelligible to us if  
“we attribute it to the design of a universal creator who has determined it in advance.” 
83 Hegel understood however that in order to move from the realm of faith to the 
realm of knowledge and therefore reconcile man to nature he would not only have to
80 Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves o f  Modernity” in Gildin, op. cit., p. 95
81 “As far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any case a child o f  his time; thus 
philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to imagine that any 
philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as that an individual can overleap his own time or 
leap over Rhodes.” G.W.F. Hegel, “Preface” Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, (ed. Allen Wood)
Translated by H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1991, pp. 21 - 22
82 Hegel, “Preface” in Elements o f the Philosophy o f  Right, op. cit., p. 20
83 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, in Reiss, op. cit., p . 108
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make the metaphysical claim that both consciousness and the world share the same 
logical structure. 84 Moreover since reason and self-consciousness are not simply 
given, but must be acquired over time, human subjectivity can no longer be a “fixed” 
form always already present in the human mind, but must itself be a product of human
oc
history and culture.
Hegel‘s system is dialectical because it posits successive stages or epochs in
the progress of man, wherein the contradictions of previous societies are transcended
and surpassed until the end from which point the parts can be rationally ordered to the
whole. Playing upon the Christian metaphor of God’s incarnation in the world
through the vehicle of man in the form of Christ, Hegel designs a system in which
Spirit objectifies itself in the world in order to come to self-consciousness through the
agency of human thought and practice. Spirit’s joumey to the realisation of its own
objective freedom is the driving force of change that moves the historical dialectic
towards its own self-determined “end.” The aim of world history is that:
.. .Spirit should attain knowledge of its own true nature, that it should 
objectivise this knowledge and transform it into a real world and give it 
objective existence...the spirit is such that it produces itself out of itself and 
makes itself what it is...this process, in which it mediates itself with itself by its 
own unaided efforts, has various distinct moments; it is full of movement and 
change, and is determined in different ways and at different times. It consists 
essentially of a series of separate stages, and world history is the expression of 
the divine process which is a gradual progression in which spirit comes to know07
and realise itself and its own truth.
Hegel takes the modem injunction that you can only know what you make and creates 
a philosophical system through which God and man constitute each other through 
time as nature and human nature are transformed by human desire and its engagement 
with the world.
Man is driven by biological necessity into intercourse with the world and it is
upon the basis of human need that man “humanises” the world and universal spirit
88gradually realises itself in the development of human consciousness. In the
84 Peter Sedgwick, op. cit., p. 61
85 Ibid, p. 51
86 Hegel, “The Realisation of Spirit in History”, in G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f  World 
History, Introduction: Reason in History, Translated by H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge.: Cambridge
University Press) 1975, pp. 4 4 -1 2 4
87 Hegel, ‘The Realisation o f Spirit in History”, op. cit., p. 64
88 “The universal Spirit is essentially present as human consciousness. Knowledge attains existence 
and being for itself in man. The spirit knows itself and exists for itself as a subject, and its nature is to
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satisfaction of his needs man appropriates the raw stuff of nature and through the 
imposition of his will abstracts from the infinite raw material of nature a “thing” de­
fined and de-limited by the purpose to which it is to be transformed into a “use” 
object. 89 While Kant strives to transcend the limits of his natural being and deny the 
validity and value of his own needs and desires, except in their negation, Hegel sees 
need and desire as providing the necessary motion which will eventually propel 
natural man to full self-consciousness. For Kant man forever remains alienated from 
nature and stands over and against it as a master and possessor who has learned that 
“reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own” and must 
not be allowed itself to be “kept on nature’s leader strings.” 90 Hegel effects the 
reconciliation of man with nature because he “de-centres” the subject and sets him on 
an intellectual quest to overcome the duality of his own spiritual/animal existence. 
Hegel effects a reconciliation precisely because he begins with man as a natural being 
embodied in the life process from which human consciousness emerges over time.
Man finds his consciousness in nature because, it, like his mind, is rationally 
structured and available to meet his needs and in the processes reflects back to him the 
limits and determinations of his own being. Through the act of producing and 
consuming the object man comes to realise his own individuality in the freedom and 
power he exercises over the object he has created. During the natural process of 
satisfying his own desires, man works on nature and thus transforms it to an object of 
his own need through work which externalises or humanises the object as his product 
of his own will. The product, through the act of consumption is then totally 
annihilated and assimilated in an act of absolute freedom over the object, thus 
constituting man as a self-determining subject over and against the object.91 The 
immediate loss of the object sets consciousness out upon its quest to determine its 
individuality, but as long as it remains conditioned both by its desires and the objects 
of its gratification, it will remain trapped within the cycle of life and never reach a
posit itself as immediate existence; as such, it is equivalent to human consciousness. Hegel, ‘The
Realisation o f Spirit in History” op. cit., p. 95
89 Hegel, Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, Part 1, Abstract Right, subsection 44, op. cit., p. 75
90 Merold Westphal, History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology Third Edition, (Bloomington.:
Indiana University Press) 1998, p. 94
91 Thus, with desire the subject attempts to preserve its individuality by negating the world around it. 
The difficulty with desire however, is that is that it involves the destruction o f the object, but once the 
object is destroyed, the subject has nothing over which to exert its control and so demonstrate its 
individuality. Robert Stem, Routledge Philosophical Guidebook to Hegel and the Phenomenology o f  
Spirit, (London.: Routledge) 2004, p.73
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higher state.92 Man projects himself onto the world and comes to self-recognition by 
coming to know what is inside through objectifying his own needs and imposing form 
on the raw material of nature, but this satisfaction is and can only remain self- 
contained and one-sided, it is therefore self-consciousness in-itself, but not for-itself. 
Nature, being inanimate, simply receives the form that is impressed upon it and 
although man comes to know himself through his work on the world, this knowledge 
is only partial and incomplete, man satisfying his immediate, bodily needs.
It is only when self-consciousness encounters another like itself, that it is able 
to “recognise” itself and through the master/slave dialectic demand the “recognition” 
of the other, thereby raising itself to full self-consciousness. When man confronts 
another man in the state of nature, he encounters, not the passive stuff of nature, but 
another will, which like itself demands the other “recognise” it as a free and self- 
determining being. As each refuses to be an “object” for the other, the result is the 
life and death struggle with the master emerging as the one who risks death thereby 
raising himself, if only temporarily from his immediate, animal existence. It is 
however, ironically, the slave, the one who submits to the rule of the master, who 
continues the journey towards human self-consciousness, because he is forced by the 
master to satisfy not his own needs, but those of another. As a result, the slave leams 
to delay his own satisfaction, master his own desires and through the work he does in 
service of the master’s needs, furthers the development of his own self-consciousness 
through the labouring process. The master, because he does not work, does not 
“develop” beyond his crude warrior existence and is in the end, dependent upon the 
labour of the slave for his own material existence. The slave, because he acquires the 
knowledge and skills of work, leams to build his own world and eventually raises 
himself to full self-consciousness, understands himself as a free and self-determining 
being, overthrows the master and establishes a society of universal freedom in the rule 
of law. 93
The lord and serf relation of political domination is replaced by the modem 
liberal constitutional state in which mutual interdependence of the division of labour 
forms the foundation for both a private and public realm based not upon dominance 
and subordination, but upon freedom and equality manifested in property right and
92 Recall with Rousseau, natural man could continue indefinitely in the immediacy o f his natural 
simplicity, never thinking o f the future and never therefore raising himself to above his mere animal 
existence. Rousseau, A Discourse On Inequality, Part 1, op. cit.
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exchange made possible by the rule of law.94 As with Hobbes, Kant and Rousseau 
however, mere possession in the state of nature is based upon force and not right and 
can only be converted into “property” through the mutual recognition of right in the 
social contract, established through civil society and enforced through the legal 
sanction of the state.95 Hegel however, taking a lesson from Rousseau, believes that 
the external laws of bourgeois society need to be internalised as moral duties willingly 
embraced and not simply coercively imposed. Hegel therefore introduces the idea 
that man progresses morally from the original bond of familiar love, to the purely 
“objective” rules of property right in which the men who are divided against each 
other by a civil society are nevertheless reconciled in their individual and particular 
interests within the universal interest of the state and its survival.
For Hegel, ethical life is only found in a properly constituted “public” realm 
which comprises a whole complex web of social relationships in which individual, 
fragmented men find a higher moral purpose. Social relationships proscribe duties 
specific to themselves which together constitute the realm of ethical life definitive of 
human existence. Men, in performing their duties to one another and especially by 
contributing to the public life of the state actualises a higher spiritual capacity because 
it requires the use and satisfaction of his reason as a civilised being within the rational 
legal order of objectified spirit. Unlike liberals, the state is not a mere instrument of 
individuals, but as the totality of individuals embodies and manifests a communal 
unity in which the individual finds and serves a larger goal which is the very ground 
of his own identity and source of his own individuality.96 The state represents a 
“public” universal interest in which man’s “spirit” as a social and historical being 
finds expression, collectively as art, culture, religion and science.
Civilisation, in short, teaches man to willingly “limit“ his own desires as part 
of a freely chosen ethical community. Individual men “recognises” each other, as the 
way and means to a “higher” life, self-consciously experienced and expressed as 
participation within and even subordination to, a well ordered and rational “life- 
world”. Ethical life is realised as the active life of virtue, understood as duty in which 
individual freedoms are “reconciled” to the greater good. Through voluntary action
93 Robert Stem, op. cit., pp. 74 - 84
Q4
William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford.: Basil Blackwell Ltd.) 1988 , pp.
117-118
95 Hegel, Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, Part 1, Abstract Right, subsection 78, op. cit., p. 108
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and the self-sacrifice of individuals, mutual recognition of rights becomes actualised
through the participatory citizenship within a national community. As such the state is
much more than the mere “night watchman” of liberal theory and takes an active role
in ordering the parts to the good of the whole including all sorts of active
interventions in family, social and economic life as required for the well-being of
citizens and the cultivation of virtue. As such education, is something that the state
must take seriously:
Education [Padagogik] is the art of making human beings ethical: it considers 
them as natural beings and shows them how they can be reborn and how their 
original nature can be transformed into a second, spiritual nature so that this 
spirituality becomes habitual to them. In habit, the opposition between the 
natural and the subjective will disappears and the resistance of the subject is 
broken; to the extent, habit is part of ethics that the mind [der Geist] should be 
trained to resist arbitrary fancies and that these should be destroyed and 
overcome to clear the way for rational thought.97
The art of making human beings ethical is a process in which social norms and values 
are internalised by the subject in order that he may transcend the limits of his own 
natural love of himself in order to realise a higher self in the recognition, honour and 
esteem to be found in the service of others. Social life is more than the sum of its parts 
and cannot be reduced to the mere rational calculation of enlightened self-interest 
which is so destructive of utilitarian ethics. Public spiritedness and even patriotism 
are natural and necessary components of any stable society and provide the counter­
balance to the self-seeking and alienating tendencies of arbitrary freedom which is 
given full reign within the limited sphere of civil society. Civil society, however, 
exists for the state and not visa versa, a situation which comes clearly to the for in the 
event of war when all the parts of the whole must pull together to ensure their mutual
QO
survival and self-preservation.
It is the realm of international relations above all others where the “truth” of 
the state is fully realised as a bearer of the “world-historical” spirit in the Spirit of the 
nation which bears it. World history, therefore is a grand narrative of the species- 
being man, advancing from a primitive to a civilised existence, driven at first by 
immediate needs which in turn develop into more and more sophisticated and refined
96 Charles Taylor, op. cit., p. 86
97 Hegel, Elements o f the Philosophy o f  Right, Part 3: Ethical Life, subsection 151, op. cit., p. 195
98 Hegel, Elements o f the Philosophy o f  Right, Part 3: Ethical Life, subsections 323 - 324, op. cit., pp. 
360 - 363
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“desires” which his increasing technological prowess make possible. Civilisation and
the “invention” of new methods and techniques, pushes man forward as he is forced to
invent new and more complex systems of social intercourse, economic development
and formalised legal structures to met the needs of a more integrated and advanced
technological culture. Spirit,while it may dwell in the transcendent and rarefied
realms of justice, art, religion and philosophy, is nevertheless made possible and even
determined by the levels of technological sophistication which forms its material
base." In Hegel‘s system spirit is driving history and not the reverse (a la Marx) but
it is still committed to the modem claim that reason is only developed through
experience and as such advances with industry, arts and sciences as means to human
freedom as an emancipation from nature. The dialectic passes through various and
different stages each of which are partial and incomplete waiting only to be
superseded by and advanced form. This does not mean that redundant societies cease
to exist, although in many cases they do, but that the world historical spirit has
finished with them and moved on to find expression in a “higher” national culture.
During the course of world history, only one nation is dominant at a time and in that
time it holds an “epoch-making role.” When a state embodies the spirit of its time it
has an “absolute right” against which the “spirits of other nations are without rights
100and they, like those whose epoch has passed, no longer count in world history.”
Furthermore and with specific reference to conquest and colonisation Hegel
pronounces, that the absolute right of the Idea:
.. .entitles civilised nations to regard and treat as barbarians other nations which 
are less advanced than they are in the substantial moments of the state (as with 
pastoralists in relation to hunters, and agriculturalists in relation to both, in the 
consciousness that the rights of these other nations are not equal to theirs and 
that there independence is merely formal.101
99 What is properly called industry takes up raw material in order to process it and derives its 
subsistence from what it can produce by dint o f intelligence, reflection and application. All this belongs 
to the particular sphere to which there are no inherent limits because the accumulation o f wealth and 
the refinement o f techniques can continue indefinitely. Hegel, “The Realisation o f Spirit in history”, in 
Lectures on the Philosophy o f  World History, op. cit., p. 114100
Hegel, Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, Part 3: Ethical Life, subsection 347, op. cit., p. 374
101 Hegel, Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, Part 3: Ethical Life, subsection 351, op. cit., p. 376.
For an interesting discussion o f  the impact o f differentiation between civilised and barbarian nations as 
an evolutionary development in International law in the early 19th century and its impact on indigenous 
peoples the world over see Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Groitus, Colonialism and  
Order in World Politics, (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 2002, especially Chapter 4, pp. 97- 
119. Crucially this “new strategy” o f only including Europeans within the “law of nations” effectively 
“wiped the slate clean, liberating European rulers from treaties they had made that had often been 
signed under conditions o f parity or even inferiority with non-European rulers”. Keene, p. 111
177
Of all the “stages” of development, the “savages” of north America embody the most 
primitive form, because pursuing the life of the hunter/gatherer can only produce a 
“natural” man who has not reached the level of time, history and consciousness 
because he exits in such a primitive form. Hegel’s observations of new world empire 
and colonisation are refreshingly blunt and to the point and convey the degree of 
cultural superiority felt by colonising Europeans in the their encounter with the weak 
and degenerate indigenous people whose culture being purely “natural” was destined 
to “perish as soon as Spirit approached it.”102 The intellectual commitment to the 
superiority of their own “civilisation” was not the exclusive property of German 
philosophers such as Kant, Hegel and Herder whose idolatry of Kulture can be 
explained away as a romantic reaction to the violence of the French Revolution, the 
Terror or even the Napoleonic invasion of Prussia. Although a revulsion of the 
excesses of the enlightenment no doubt had a profound importance to the conservative 
tenor of much post-revolutionary political theory, all of the most important German 
philosophers, including Nietzsche thought of themselves as Europeans first and 
explicitly rejected nationalism as narrow and vulgar ideology. The “superior” 
civilisation is not the exclusive property of any single European nation, but is the 
collective cultural product of west whose classical and Christian traditions have given 
birth to he modem miracle of the scientific enlightenment whose technological 
prowess makes resistance futile and assimilation the key to survival.
The British, no less than the American’s, believed in their destiny to rule 
foreign peoples and nations, “developing” their societies in order to “encourage 
economic progress and stamp out the barbarism, corruption, despotism and 
incompetence” to which they were prone whatever the beauty and sophistication of 
their cultural achievements.103 Thomas Jefferson was a great exponent of the 
traditional American belief in “progress” which defined societies according to the 
stages of development they had successfully undergone; moving from the “lowest” to 
the “higher.” Moreover he believed that the man of science could see the
102Hegel, “The Geographical Basis o f World History” in Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History, 
op. cit., p. 162. God evidently had as little use for Indians as did the Americans who in their 
“energetic activity” have “destroyed and suppressed”. The North American tribes whose 
“degeneration” and “impotence” having proven so profound that they have been wholly unable to 
either “amalgamate” with their superiors or organise themselves into independent states capable o f  
joining the Union. The original inhabitants having “disappeared”, or “ withdrawn themselves from 
contact with Europeans” have in effect “vanished” as nations having contributed nothing to the world 
spirit. Hegel, pp. 162 -165
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evolutionary path of society unfolding across the geography of his own country
moving from west to east beginning with the “savages” of the Rocky Mountains:
These he would observe in the earliest stage of association living under no law 
but that of nature, subscribing and covering themselves with the flesh and skins 
of wild beasts. He would next find those on our frontiers in the pastoral state, 
raising animals to supply the defects of hunting. Then succeed our own semi- 
barbarous citizens, the pioneers of the advance of civilisation, and so in his 
progress he would meet the gradual shades of improving man until he would 
reach his, as yet, most improved state in our seaport towns.104
Jefferson includes the “civilisation” of his own “semi-barbarous” pioneers in the story 
of progress because the stages of development are a product of culture and cultivation 
and not (yet) the absolute separateness of biologically determined difference between 
races of men. It is not a matter of racial difference, but of levels of civilisation 
“cultivated” in the human being which is why semi-barbarous peoples whether Indian 
or otherwise still have the capacity to become civilised; it is only a matter of 
education and habituation to a civilised way of life. This is why development and 
modernisation strategies attempting to bring Indians “into civilisation” involve the 
most interventionist forms of social engineering aimed at all levels of Indian society. 
Dramatic transformations of Indian societies from the ground up are undertaken to 
break down and reconstitute all levels of social, economic and political organisation 
from marriage customs to inter-tribal alliance systems. Inferior Indian culture is 
subverted and undermined through a truly a totalitarian level of control prohibiting 
language, dress and traditional kin-ship networks down to the most intimate details of 
family life designed to separate the individual from the bad influence of the tribe and 
especially tribal elders and spiritual leaders. Indian “education” is key with the “art 
of making man ethical” aiming at “breaking the will” in order that the barbarian may 
be “reborn” as a higher “civilised” being “capable of rational thought”. It is only 
after social and political relations have been forcibly reformed, that Indians may one 
day hope to achieve the “capacity” and “maturity” to run their own affairs. Until such 
time he is to be regarded as a hopeless incompetent, a child in need of a fathers 
benevolent guidance and is to be “protected” as a powerless ward of the state with 
little if any control over his own future.
Keene, op. cit., p. 98
104
Thomas Jefferson, cited in D.W. Meinig, The Shaping o f  America, Vol., 1 Atlantic America, 1492 - 
1800, (New Haven.: Yale University Press) p. 258
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Hegel tamed the corrosive effects of time by reworking the familiar story of 
Christian providence as the foundation for ethical life within the properly ordered 
liberal constitutional state, but the modem scientific sensibility has little tolerance for 
the lingering irrationalism of religious sentiment. No sooner had Hegel completed the 
dialectic, then Marx famously turned it on its head and announced that the 
philosophy of the past had been merely to “know” history, while he intended to 
change it. 105 Marx literally “gives up the ghost” substituting the practical action of 
man organised around a collective mode of production to do the work of the dialectic. 
Man as a natural animal is guided not by Spirit’s quest for self-consciousness and the 
realisation of freedom, but by man’s labouring process and its development in the 
satisfaction of material needs and desires. Marx was very much influenced by 
Darwin and he insists that man is nothing other than a high order animal whose 
consciousness is not only embodied but actually “produced” by the social relations in 
which he is embedded. 106 Marx takes the stages of development argument to its 
logical conclusion in that it is the material development of the forces and mode of 
production which “constitutes” the “real foundation” of society which “give rise to the 
legal and political superstructure” which “correspond” to “definite forms of social 
consciousness”. 107 In short, Marx proclaims that “It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their being, but to the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness.”108 Man comes to know himself through his relations with others, but 
not through the master/slave dialectic, where freedom is the ultimate goal of 
consciousness, but through the forms of social co-operation which are necessary to 
meet his needs and fulfil his desires.
The science of historical materialism can be shown to be the driving force of 
man’s development without the mystification brought about by introducing the 
spurious agency of a dying God. Marx, however, preserves Hegel’s basic idea of the
105 Man is the human world, the state, society. This state, this society, produces religion which is an 
inverted world consciousness, because they are in an inverted world., Karl Marx, “Contribution to the 
Critique o f  Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction, in Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, 
Second Edition, (New York.: W.W. Norton & Co.) p. 53
106 The production of ideas, conceptions, o f consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the 
material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language o f real life...The same applies to 
mental production as expressed in the language o f politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics., etc., - 
real active men as they are conditioned by a definite development o f their productive forces and o f  the 
intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Marx, “The German Ideology”, in Tucker,
op. cit., p. 154
107 Marx, “Marx on the History o f His Opinions”, in Tucker, op. cit., p. 4
Ibid, p. 4
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dialectic as well as the teleology inherent in man‘s progress towards his own 
emancipation from nature. As a result, Marx largely keeps the “development” and 
“stages” model of world history intact and has as little regard for “primitive” ways of 
life as Hegel. Man is defined by his metabolism with nature and as such only escapes 
the world of immediacy to develop his humanity through an evolution of the means of 
production out of their natural simplicity. 109 Capitalism raises man out of his original 
cycle of primitive need by improving the means of production to the point where it is 
not natural, but artificial needs that drives production towards an infinite 
accumulation of wealth which raises man out of his animal existence to the fullness of 
his activity as a human being.110 Capitalism develops a universal means of exchange 
in the “commodity form” which measures the products of labour not through their 
particular use value but through their universal exchange value.111 Through civil 
society man is produced as an essentially social being as his intercourse with nature 
requires that he has a bond to his fellow man through the division of labour and the 
free and equal “exchange” of private property. 112 Money is therefore the ultimate and 
total medium of exchange value because it is a universal and homogenous measure of 
labour-power that equalises differences of quality so that “differences” can be 
reconciled in the market and mediated by the price mechanism.113 As labour and 
land are both “exchanged” as commodities in the market they take on the universality
109 Consciousness is at first, o f  course merely “consciousness o f sensuous environment" limited in 
connection to other things and persons, but it is a “growing consciousness" aware of nature, but as an 
“alien all powerful and unassailable force, with which men‘s relations are purely animal and by which 
they are overawed like beasts; it is thus a purely animal consciousness o f nature (natural religion), 
Marx, “The German Ideology” in Tucker, op. cit., p. 158
110 In the Grundrisse Marx speaks of the “mania” for capital accumulation which drives men beyond 
subsistence and natural necessity into the “unlimited” production o f “surplus value” when the “severe 
discipline o f capital, acting on succeeding generations has developed a general industriousness as the 
general property of a new species” Marx, “The Grundrisse”, in Tucker, op. cit., p. 249
Only through developed industry - through the medium o f private property - does the ontological 
essence o f human passion come to be both in its totality and in its humanity; the science o f man is 
therefore itself a product o f man’s establishment of himself by practical activity., Marx, “Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts o f 1844” in Tucker, op. cit., p. 102] j2
“...the point o f departure, lies in the historical necessity o f private property. Thus the social
character is the general character o f  the whole movement; just as society itself produces man as man, so
is society produced by him the human essence o f nature first exists only for social man; for only here
does nature exist for him as a bond with man - as his existence for the other and the other’s existence
for him - as the life element o f the human world; only here does nature exist as the foundation o f his
own human existence.” Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts o f 1844” in Tucker, op. cit.,
p. 87
113 “By possessing the property o f  buying everything, by possessing the property of appropriating all 
objects, money is thus the object o f eminent possession. The universality o f  its property is the 
omnipotence o f  its being.” Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts o f 1844” in Tucker, op. 
cit., p. 108
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of the commodity form producing the “equality” of individuals within a capitalist 
system. Because capitalists no longer require the direct political domination of the 
rural peasantry having direct and absolute power over the proletariat, old 
superstitions, myths and even traditional religions are no longer needed and are 
replaced by rational religions teaching absolute obedience to rulers and labour 
discipline, a cultivated morality, which Weber would call the protestant work ethic.1,4 
Capitalism performs a useful function in not only developing the means of production 
(technology) to the point where human freedom is possible, but in so doing it destroys 
all the archaic and traditional forms of society which stand in the way of man’s full 
realisation of himself as a universal species-being. 1,5 When the universal proletariat, 
the great mass of humankind was reduced to total destitution and poverty, it would 
know itself only in its bare material subsistence and driven by the urgency of a 
universal need to form itself into a truly universal class thereby overcoming the 
divisions and contractions of capitalism in the very act of bringing about 
revolutionary change.116
The revolution will restore a rational organisation of labour, because men and 
not profit will dictate the terms of production in satisfaction of human needs. Man, 
therefore finally reaches self-determination and freedom because his consciousness is 
not longer directed by the natural drive to satisfy his natural needs, but can develop 
his uniquely “human” desires, to create, produce and externalise his unique individual 
humanity as a self-conscious being. Marx, no less than Hegel, insisted that 
development dictated that all “previous” forms of life were inferior and needed to 
transformed and surpassed before man reached the fullness of his own perfectibility. 
Marxist discourse is therefore permeated with the same kinds of cultural prejudice as 
is all forms of modem discourse and can only look upon efforts to preserve a 
traditional way and a unique culture as an irrational clinging to the past. Trapped in 
their dependence upon nature, Indians will remain forever in the realm of
114 Marx, “Contribution to the Critique o f Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”, in Tucker, op. cit., pp. 22 -
23
115 ujjjg bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all the instruments of production , by the immensely 
facilitated means o f communication draws even the most barbarian nations into civilisation...It 
compels all nations, on pain o f extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode o f  production... In a word, it 
creates a world after its own image.” Marx, “The Communist Manifesto” in Tucker, op. cit., p. 481
116 The proletariat is a universal class which cannot emancipate itself “without emancipating itself 
from all these other spheres o f society, without therefore emancipating all these other spheres, in short 
a total loss o f humanity which can only redeem itself by a total redemption o f humanity.” Marx, 
“Contribution to Critique o f HegePs Philosophy o f Right” in Tucker, op. cit., p. 64
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“immediacy” and “simplicity” suffering from a sever case of “false consciousness” 
and are in need of enlightenment and liberation in order to be in a position to judge 
their own best interests. To reject modernisation is to remain locked within a kind of 
sub-human arrested development; condemning the Indian to irrelevancy if not 
extinction in the face of an unstoppable historical force destined to destroy all 
traditional forms in order to create a new world order, global in its reach and 
totalitarian in its ambitions.
Nihilism and Segregation
Nietzsche was writing at the end of the 19th century when the tensions brought about 
by Europe’s rapid industrialisation had produced both radical social revolution at 
home and an intensified geo-political competition for empire abroad. In many ways 
Europe was in its prime, dominating the globe and generating unprecedented levels of 
wealth and prosperity at home. And yet Nietzsche saw not vitality and strength, but 
sickness and decay, a civilisation on the verge of self-destruction. Nietzsche was 
impressed with Marxist critique of bourgeois society, but insisted that his naturalism 
and materialism did not go far enough and still clung to a form of humanism which 
his own philosophy had made a logical impossibility. Marx, like Kant before him, had 
claimed to provide a secular philosophy, but had failed taking refugee in unproven 
and ultimately metaphysical accounts of the human subject and its apriori will to 
personal freedom and social emancipation. Marx simply did not follow through with 
his radical critique of bourgeois ideology which would have forced him to concede 
that his hoped for socialist revolution was nothing other than the latest of a long series 
of moral philosophies designed to seduce the herd animal man into his own 
domestication. Man had simply lost faith in the “old religion” and its noble lies and 
because he could no longer believe in his God given place at the centre of creation, he 
had lost his own self-respect and any claim he once may have had for the preservation 
of his dignity. If consciousness and self-determination were mere myths and God 
was well and truly dead, killed off by modem science, then man must recreate his own 
purpose and his own values and he must do this through the assertion of his own will 
to power. Art replaces philosophy with Nietzsche because he is no longer looking to 
establish the truth, but in accepting the tmth, overcome it through invention and the
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creative power of the human imagination.117 Man is an animal, the product of his
physical environment and driven by instinct. Consciousness is a fiction, a mere
appearance and as such an epiphenomenon of life itself.118 Life is nothing more than
coming and going from being and as such cycles of production and reproduction
follow cycles of creation and destruction which know no “inner logic” or rationality.
Logic, rationality, thought and self-consciousness are nothing other than the wilful
self-projects of an arbitrary and contingent form of life that has happened to make its
appearance as “man” in the world of chaos. The full realisation of his own primordial
“reality” has driven men to nihilism and as such man has lost not only his self-respect
and his dignity, but any sense of purpose or direction to his life, either personal or
social. For Nietzsche, the nihilism at the heart of the modem condition cannot be
overstated as he believed that only in directly confronting the magnitude of the
problem, staring directly into the void, could he free himself from outdated self-
delusions and address the problem with honesty and integrity. In 1873, he wrote in
Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense:
In some remote comer of the universe, poured out and glittering with 
innumerable solar systems, there was once a star on which clever animals 
invented knowledge. That was the haughtiest and most mendacious moment of 
“world history” - and yet only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths 
the star grew cold and the clever animals had to die.119
For Nietzsche Hegel’s understanding of history is fundamentally flawed because there 
is no purpose or aim, there can be know “Reason” in history without God or 
Providence and that without these founding “concepts” history becomes nothing more 
than a “feeble-minded past time of the imagination”. 120 Post-Hegelian thought 
rejected the notion that history had peaked and as a process that is unfinished and
117 “The only happiness lies in reason; all the rest o f the world is dismal. The highest reason however, I 
see in the work o f the artist and he may experience it as such; there may also be something that, if  only 
it could be produced consciously, would result in a still greater feeling o f reason and happiness: for 
example, the course o f the solar system, begetting and educating a human being.” Friedrich Nietzsche, 
“Notes, (1875)” in Walter Kaufmann, (ed.) The Portable Nietzsche, (New York.: Penguin Books) 1976,
p. 50
118 “ A quantum of force is just such a quantum o f drive, will, action it is nothing but this driving, 
willing acting and only the seduction o f language (and the fundamental errors o f reason petrified within 
it) which construes and misconstrues all actions as conditional upon an agency, a “subject” can make it 
appear otherwise. ..But there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind the deed, its effect and 
what becomes o f it; the “doer” is invented as an afterthought - the doing is everything.” Nietzsche, On 
the Genealogy o f  Morals, (ed.) Keith Ansell-Pearson, (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1996,
Aphorism 13, p. 38
119 Nietzsche, in The Portable Nietzsche, op. cit., Kaufmann, op. cit., p .42
120Nietzsche, in The Portable Nietzsche, (ed.) Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 40
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unfinishable, there is no completion or understanding of the whole from which to 
order or even determine the parts.121
Man may be an historical creature in that he is immersed in a world of 
becoming, but there is no “progress” or “development” because there is no purpose or 
directionality. If purpose is no longer present in nature or in history it can only be 
provided by man’s own action with the result that all ideals or values must be self- 
made, the product or outcome of human creative acts which alone form the ground or
• 19?horizon of their own existence. History without the guiding force of spirit 
becomes open-ended and fundamentally unknowable and as such it loses its 
rationality and becomes the arbitrary play of chaos and contingency. Nietzsche set 
out to free his followers from the “crisis of modernity” by pushing modem scientific 
rationalism to its logical extremes. If the cosmos is a mechanical/materialist void, 
empty of meaning and purpose, than the only meaning possible is that which we 
“create” for ourselves. Like Kant before him, Nietzsche locates human freedom in the 
will, but not as the rational will of practical reason which finds itself in the apriori 
categorical imperative but in its own purely “existential will” which “knows” only 
itself and only in the “act” of self-willed activity. In a world without “ends” activity 
becomes an “end-in-itself ’ and “life” becomes the will to power in the production of 
values which form the basis o f self-affirmation necessary for the flourishing of any 
given culture or people.123 Reason and its values are a cultural production and it is in 
this cultural production that each people produce there own self-overcoming, their 
own will to power and hence their own freedom and dignity.
Rather than succumbing to the nihilism that comes with the discovery that 
there is nothing to know, that there is no rational order or measure in the cosmos 
independent of the human will, Nietzsche lays claim to this fundamental ontological 
fact as a basis for a radical new sense of human freedom grounded in nothing else but 
man’s creative will to power.124 As such reason becomes a mere instrument, a
121 Leo Strauss, “ The Three Waves o f Modernity” in Gildin, op. cit., p. 95
122 Ibid., p. 96
123 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra: First Part., Zarathustra calls for “fellow creators - those who write new 
values on new tables.” pp. 136. These values form the tables which order good and evil within any 
given people and which are therefore self-referential and by definition morally relative. There are “a 
thousand and one goals” and “much that was good to one people was scorned as infamy to another” 
Nietzsche, “ Thus spoke Zarathustra, First Part” in The Portable Nietzsche, (ed.) Kaufmann, op. cit., p.
170
124 “A tablet o f good hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet o f their overcomings; behold, it is 
the voice o f their will to power.” Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra, First Part”, in The Portable
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means to an end, an end that is defined not by reason, but by will. This is why all 
modems believe that reason is a slave to the passions and why it is fundamentally 
incapable of giving an account of itself In modernity reason by definition is 
groundless, the product of wilful self assertion which alone establishes it radical 
freedom from all determinations natural or theological. Self-assertion becomes the 
foundation of modem sovereignty usurping the absolute power of the Christian
19Screator God and declaring itself simply ex nihlio “I am that I am”. Nietzsche is
justly famous for doing what no modem writer had up to that point dared to do,
confront the fully “human” consequences of man’s radical new freedom and the
scientific revolution that gave birth to it: God is dead now we must become Gods
ourselves in order to be worthy of the task. 126
Nietzsche’s “superman” is “beyond good and evil” because he is fully self
conscious of his existential condition and as such is free to order and re-order his
world at will. But in order that this world survive the nihilism lurking at the heart of
the modem condition, the new creator must forget the “knowledge” and “truth” of his
meaningless existence and be reborn in ignorance of his own self-begetting. Why
must the preying lion become a child:
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning a game, a self-propelled 
wheel, a first movement, a sacred “Yes.” For the game of creation, my brothers, 
a sacred “Yes” is needed: the spirit now wills his own will and he who had been 
lost to the world now conquers his own world.127
This is why a politics of forgetting, forged in the fires of sex and death comes to 
dominate Nietzsche’s thought on strategies to overcome the nihilism he found at the 
heart of the modem condition. The idea that sex and death provide the “raw” energies 
of “life” from which “civilisation” will be emerge only if properly controlled and 
directed, sublimated into useful means to a “higher” form of life.
Nietzsche, (ed.) Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 170
125 “Once one said God when one looked upon distant seas, but now I have taught you to say: overman. 
God is a conjecture; but I desire that your conjectures should not reach beyond your creative will.
Could you create a god? Then do not speak to me o f  any gods. But you could create the overman.” 
Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Second Part” in The Portable Nietzsche, (ed.) Kaufmann, op. cit.,
p. 197
126 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, (ed.) Bernard Williams, (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press)
2001, Aphorism 125, pp. 119 - 120
127 Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra, First Part 1” in The Portable Nietzsche (ed.) Kaufmann, op.
cit., p. 139
128 See Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist Antichrist, Fourth Edition, (New 
Jersey.: Princeton University Press) 1974 pp. 211-227. In Chapter 7, Kaufmann argues that 
Nietzsche’s insight into desire and its sublimation in the formation o f morality were further developed
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Nietzsche’s strategy is to revalue values, by overturning the reification of man 
and replacing him with the superman, one who is no longer contained by the artificial 
constraints of herd mentality. Because morality and its manifestation in social and 
political institution forms an artificial restraint upon the instincts, they suffocate life, 
man is a sick animal because he denies his innermost drives. Nietzsche invents his 
own values and as such hopes to reinvigorate man by re-introducing him to his own 
volatile and violent nature. The wild, the uncivilised while it might be an enemy to 
society is nevertheless necessary. Struggle and suffering are the essence of the life 
instinct itself and serve to shake up the corrosions and ossification of civilisation to 
expose the raw power of man in his raw and immediate existence. Man is moved by 
threats to his survival and fear remains the prime motive to reinvention because it 
stimulates the productive forces, the most potent of which are the most violent and 
destructive. Purging the idols of the mind and wiping the slate clean becomes, with 
Nietzsche, the injunction to philosophise with a hammer, but the message remains the 
same, in order to recreate one must first destroy.129 Although Nietzsche speaks of 
self-overcoming as a work of art and as such his philosophy is directed at the private 
world of self-mastery and self-discipline, there is also the unavoidable fact of man’s 
social nature which determines that overcoming nihilism must entail not only 
personal, but cultural and collective transformation as well. Nietzsche rails against 
the state as a machine of oppression, yet there is an acknowledgement that the will to 
power, must also include the will to domination of others, who are the “raw material”, 
the means to the ends, of cultural artistic self-expression. Politics is a necessary, if 
only a preliminary step in the cultivation of civilisation because the population must 
be “fixed” into a form “not just kneaded and made compliant, but shaped” by an 
original “act o f violence”.130
Instinct and desire being the immediate cause of civilisation, all civilisations 
sublimate these desires and yet must keep them alive as the “dark” or “evil” other of 
its own culture and consciousness. As a result, life for Nietzsche comes in a plurality 
of forms, each of which manifests its own “values” which “know” themselves only in
by Freud.
129 “But my fervent will to create impels me ever again towards man; thus is the hammer impelled 
towards the stone. O men, in the stone there sleeps an image, the image o f  my images. Alas, that it 
must sleep in the hardest, the ugliest stone! Now my hammer rages cruelly against its prison. Pieces o f  
rock rain from the stone: what is that to me? 1 want to perfect it ...?” Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, Second Part” in The Portable Nietzsche (ed.) Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 199
130 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f  Morals, Aphorism 17 ,(ed.) Ansell-Pearson, op. cit., pp. 62 - 63
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opposition to the others. Values are incommensurable because they are at base 
irrational beliefs which serve to justify the domination of the “noble” over the “base” 
as constructed in the imagination of culture and civilisation. As values are arbitrary 
and contingent and as values organise subject-object relations values produce “facts” 
including the “facts” of history, which is nothing more than the current form of man 
justifying its own domination over both past and future. The uses of history in the 
service of life serve life only so long as they teach the superiority of the culture of 
which they are a product.131
Man has to be reborn and remade if he is ever to overcome his nihilism and 
this means the whole scale destruction of European culture to be replaced by a new 
form of man who is capable of forgetting his own origins. The “overman” who will 
stride the earth, secure and confident in his own power as a creative/productive 
artist/warrior making himself and the world at will, living a fully human life “beyond 
good and evil.” As such Nietzsche regarded his own civilisation as a means to an end, 
a resource upon which to re-make the future in its very negation and even 
annihilation. Nietzsche’s life force, the will to power can only know itself in its own 
coming to be, all reification is a limitation and must be overcome and as such all 
previous incarnations of value and identity become themselves enemies which must 
be destroyed.132 Nietzsche’s post-modern superman can only know himself in 
struggle, as power is itself the life force, power and the struggle for power defines 
man as man as he realises himself only in the act of overcoming.
In effect, Nietzsche’s “active” nihilism is nothing more than the permanent 
revolution of a will to power that creates as it destroys and destroys as it creates 
because it is the motion itself, rather than the medium of that motion which defines 
the life process. If man as man is conscious of the necessity of his own material 
nature as nothing more than a surface phenomenon of the life-process itself, then his 
own awareness of his inherent nihilism, nothingness, will cause him to posit and 
annihilate successive life forms in order to simply experience his own will to power. 
The entire world, therefore becomes an object of his will to destruction, even if it is a
131 Kaufmann, (1976) op. cit., p . 148
132 Nietzsche’s eternal return o f the same in the great cycle o f creation and destruction o f  cultural 
values is highly reminiscent o f  Hegel’s description of the excesses o f absolute freedom leading to the 
“perpetual revolution” first encountered in Terror immediately following the French Revolution. See 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Third Part, in The Portable Nietzsche, (ed.) Kaufmann op. cit., pp. 
327 - 336 and Hegel, Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, op. cit., Introduction, subsection 5, op. cit., 
p. 39
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world made in his own image. Once it is made, it stands as an object in opposition to 
his own will to power and as such can only be the means to yet another, endless cycle 
o f overcoming. Permanent revolution as the triumph of the will knows itself therefore 
in endless cycles of war and destruction as everything opposed to the sovereignty of 
the subject, in its very existence is a denial of the subjects own power. Power as an 
end in itself becomes the self-conscious project of modem consciousness and 
subjectivity that knows itself only in its existential expression as power after power 
which ceases only in death.
A nihilistic civilisation is therefore driven to the self-conscious construction of 
“others” who serve no other purpose than to be destroyed and overcome. “Others” are 
therefore constructed as objects of appropriation and domination as the medium 
through which the “self’ experiences itself in both creating and destroying the 
“others” of its own negation. The third and final strategy of colonialism is therefore 
the self-conscious construction of “others” as the negation of self, and then the control 
and domination of these others as a means to the realisation of its own freedom. 
Indians therefore are self-consciously constructed as a primitive culture opposed to 
the modem, where there being is defined by a negation of modernity. This is why 
Indigenous means natural, it is the negation of technological and all indigenous 
people find themselves frozen in an “identity” which is defined by its negation of 
modernity as a technological and “advanced” civilisation. All Indian civilisation is 
therefore fixed in a distant past of natural simplicity, a primitive man who must 
remain trapped in his primordial existence to serve as the eternal “other” of modem 
consciousness. Indigenous “culture” must therefore be both “preserved” and 
“overcome” with Indigenous peoples therefore representing both the un-thought of 
man as a permanent, primordial “wild” and “savage” reserve, a source of untapped 
because unknown and unknowable potential. At the same time, this wildness, 
because it is unknown and uncivilised embodies a danger and a threat which must be 
domesticated and kept under control.
The final strategy of colonialism is therefore a form of segregation, which 
preserves the “primitive” and the “traditional”, but only on its own terms and as a 
reification of its own unconsciousness. Indians are not annihilated but herded onto 
reserves so that their “difference” may be preserved as a potential resource for modem 
civilisation, but where this difference is carefully monitored and controlled for the use 
and abuse of the dominant culture. This “difference” is specifically “cultural” and its
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identity is abstracted from the control of land or resources which can only be used in 
their “traditional” and therefore “limited” capacity to preserve the traditional way of 
life. This much is allowed as it serves to keep the culture in tack, but it is an 
allowance that is both devised and subordinated to the general needs of the majority 
of mankind. Indians, like all forms of bio-diversity, are allowed a game park 
existence because they “preserve” a wilderness which may serve the as yet unknown, 
because future, needs o f the “majority of mankind”. Segregation meets the utilitarian 
needs of the universal interest by preserving plurality as a potential reserve on actual 
reserves. However, the needs of preservation are determined by the dominant 
technological civilisation and are not allowed to escape the box in which they are 
carefully maintained. Specifically, self-government as self-determination and the 
management of land and resource cannot be allowed as this would represent a 
negation of state sovereignty. Co-existence is something allowed on unilateral terms, 
but because the “other” is also always a cite of opposition and its very existence 
represents a challenge to the superiority of the dominant civilisation, mutual struggle 
can only define this relationship. It is only through the active process of domination 
that modernity knows itself as superior, the proof is in the pudding, might makes right 
and therefore only repeated victory over the enemy demonstrates a national vitality 
and cultural truth. Indians are therefore objects of cultural identity through their 
subjugation and humiliation as the dominant civilisation knows itself as “civilised” 
against their savagery. War and destruction therefore is as useful as it is inevitable as 
a way to confirm cultural strength and cohesion in the activity of denying and 
overcoming the other.
A fully conscious nihilistic civilisation will self-consciously construct 
“cultural difference” based upon an irrational value incommensurability as a 
mechanism for social cohesion produced by first objectifying an “other” and then 
reducing him to subjugation. Full blown destruction defeats the purpose by 
destroying the basis of the power relation, it is only when the slave resists that the 
master knows his own power because he objectifies his power in the compulsion of 
the other and not his destruction. The other becomes a medium of self-knowledge, 
but only in so far as he exists as an other to be conquered and reduced to obedience. 
Human plurality, therefore becomes an artificial and self-conscious construction of 
difference for the purpose of opposition and the realisation of superiority and vitality 
in the activity of oppression and/or war itself. That this is a deliberate strategy is
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known and yet denied as a necessary component of one’s own strength and unity.
The politics of forgetting, is a form of blind conviction in which the truth of the heart 
replaces the truth of thinking, because thought is the life-forces own undoing. Man 
knows himself only in struggle, as an existential force and activity which does not 
have the luxury of reflection because reflection leads to nihilism and impotence. Thus 
war and cultural diversification as the “objective” basis of a universal life, a 
controlled war of the strong against the weak, produced and reproduced as a dramatic 
fabrication necessary for the vitality of culture. Nihilistic civilisation is aware of its 
own noble lies, but hides these lies from itself in order to achieve a vitality that would 
be dissipated if the “truth” of its own nothingness were allowed to be spoken. 
Technological culture is a civilisation at war, not with the other, but with itself as it 
makes and remakes its own noble lies upon the bodies of its colonised subjects. By 
allowing ourselves the thought crime of reflection we expose the noble lie and with it 
are forced to confront our own construction as objects of power no less than the 
“others” we set up as our “enemies”. Technology is about mastery and control of 
nature and human nature, and we dehumanise ourselves as we make ourselves objects 
of our own power. Technology is not as a neutral tool, but a political ideology, one 
that penetrates beneath the apparent differences animating the “three waves of 
modernity” to expose a shared identity in the modem political project based an idea of 
freedom which is rooted in the belief that you can only know what your make. As we 
will see in the next chapter the price of modem liberty is high and its consequences, 
invariably, written on the bodies of “others”.
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Chapter 4
Political Praxis: Techno-politics and Empire; The Making of the New World 
Indian
We have it in our power to begin the world over again. A situation, similar to 
the present, hath not happened since the days of Noah until now. The birth-day 
of a new world is at hand.1
Thomas Paine
Introduction
In this chapter I will show that the emergence of techno-politics in early modem 
England was a product of changing land use practices indicative of the “culture of 
improvement” which was sweeping through Anglo-American society in the new 
world as well as the old. Social relations were in the process of transformation as 
earlier feudal forms of village life based upon custom and subsistence gave way to 
capitalist forms of productivity based upon contract and profit. Techno-politics was 
the administration and control of land, people and strategic economic resources in the 
interests of “the common good” articulated by a newly empowered gentry class of 
radical protestant nationalists. The newly emancipated gentry elite used their 
dominance of parliament to radically redefine property relations and to project this 
power both for the purposes of internal and external colonialism and the pacification 
of populations both foreign and domestic. New world empire is unique in its will to 
perpetual change and transformation with each innovation of social organisation 
presented as an “inevitable” law of nature.
Unlimited expansion means the perpetuation of empire as the subjects of 
sovereign power are reduced to the raw material upon which the application of 
pleasure and pain is used to produce the desired social order over and against any 
resisting populations who stand in its way. The state initiates a civilisation program 
deploying the three strategies of colonialism identified in the previous chapter as 
assimilation, development and segregation in which first allies, then wards then 
captives are “created" as objects of power and control. While these strategies are 
engineered at home and projected abroad, the infinitely expanding frontier is
1 Thomas Paine, cited in (eds.) Michael Foot and Isaac Krammnick, Thomas Paine Reader (New York: 
Penguin Books) 1987, p. 109
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continually appropriating people and productive resources as it seeks to incorporate 
“foreign” bodies within its “sovereign” domains. In new world empire, political 
space and boundaries as well as identities of self and other are continually under 
construction as it seeks to extend itself universally according to a law of nature and 
necessity which has to be actively and continuously produced and reproduced on the 
subjects of sovereign power. As a result, techno-politics reveals itself in its own 
process of actualisation, as nothing more than the self interested imperative of a ruling 
political class which constructs the state and sovereignty as an “instrument” of 
violence projected inward and outward in the organisation of force and productivity in 
the appropriation of nature and human nature.
Internal Colonialism in the Old World and the New
As new world empire is an historical as well as a geographical phenomenon it needs 
to be understood both in its place of origin and as a continually expanding social form 
which incorporates peoples and places as it expands ever outward into the future. The 
foundation myths of North American exceptionalism rely on the motifs of an empty 
and vacant land that was discovered, settled and colonised by rugged individuals who 
came to the new world to escape tyranny and persecution in the old world in order to 
make a better life for themselves and their children. The discovery of America is said 
to be a foundational moment of the modem world because it unleashed the untapped 
energies of a “vigorous” and expanding technological culture, which had been “freed” 
from the suffocating and stultifying constraints of feudal society. The “new” society 
had an identity forged in the “mastery” and “subjugation” of nature, in the struggle for 
survival and the unlimited potentiality of the human spirit as the self-made men of the 
frontier carved a civilisation from the wilderness. America was the land of 
opportunity and liberty, where merit, enterprise and hard work could transform a 
pauper, a peasant or a convict into a pioneer, a gentlemen farmer and a free citizen.
In reality new world empire is an extension of an internal process of 
colonialism which is continually extended in outward expansion from heart of empire 
to the an every expanding “frontier”. Empty lands were discovered in the “wastes” of 
England and the Celtic fringe, vacant and unproductive spaces awaiting the arrival of 
“improvers” to perform the magical acts of transformation to bring them into full
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productivity and fruitfulness. Improvers were the rational and industrial subjects of 
the British Crown who effected the agricultural and commercial revolution of the 
early modem era. English society experienced in the late 16th and 17th century what 
economic historian Karl Polanyi has labelled the “great transformation”. Medieval 
life, centred around the village and the manor of feudal political and economic 
organisation gave way to modem capitalist agriculture as the great landlords of 
England enclosed their common fields converting subsistence peasant production into 
commercial farming. Agricultural production was being driven by competitive 
market forces determined by “profits” from land rents and the sale of agricultural 
commodities in the towns, rather than the practice of extracting taxes, fines and labour 
services and payments which was the custom and tradition of a privileged European 
aristocracy.
England’s unified gentry class of improving landlords harnessed the power of 
parliament as a “national” legislative authority and the creatively re-interpreted 
English “common law” to impose and increasingly “exclusive” understanding of 
private property right at the expense of copyholders and agricultural wage labourers. 
As landlords enclosed their fields their more successful tenants were able to translate 
their “customary” rights into “contracts” which, as legally enforced leaseholds, could 
be used as a source of “capital” from which to obtain the mortgages necessary for the 
“improvements” which would enable their increased productivity.4 Increased 
productivity in turn lead to the economies of scale and the increased division of labour 
whereby the less successful who would once have supplemented their small holdings 
from lands held in common, found themselves dispossessed of their common rights 
and forced onto to sell their labour on the market instead. As more and more of the 
commons were enclosed to support the growing English wool industry Thomas 
Moore made his famous remark that sheep were replacing men in the English 
countryside.5
With the new social relations transforming the rural and urban landscapes of 
England new and “modem” political notions about the nature of man and society
2
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston.: Beacon Press) 1957
3 Christopher Hill, The Century o f  Revolution, (London.: Routledge) 2002 pp. 43 - 56
4
M.J. Daunton, Progress and Poverty. An Economic and Social History o f Britain, 1700-1850, 
(Oxford.: Oxford University Press) pp. 69 - 76
5 Christopher Hill, Reformation to Industrial Revolution, vol. 2  (New York.: Penguin Books) 1976, pp. 
67-71
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began to challenged received notions of status and rank which structured the old 
hierarchical and organic metaphor of the state. The scientific revolution of the 17th 
century built upon reformation ideas of an man’s individual and personal relationship 
with god to subvert corportist ideas of class privilege in favour of a “natural” liberty 
possessed by atomic individuals moving through a void space propelled by the purely 
physical force of mechanical needs and desires. English liberty was understood as the 
open field of action in which possessive individuals were “free” and “equal” the 
exclusive owners of their “life, liberty and estates” and as such were “liberated” from 
the arbitrary and artificial limits and barriers of irrational custom and tradition.
Nature was no longer and ordered cosmos described and delimited by natural and 
divine law in which man and the state conformed as part of an ordered whole, but was 
an infinite universe of matter in motion in which the pure physics of mechanical force 
directed each man to his individual interest. The state of nature was therefore no 
longer ordered and proscribed by divine will and intent, but was a pre-moral or a 
moral realm of “liberty” where each man was “free” to pursue his own impulses and 
desires.
The state was no longer considered “natural” but an artificial construction in 
which the voluntary social contract produced civil society and erected a regime of 
public positive law as the foundation of government and site of collective sovereign 
power. As a voluntary association of consenting individuals, government was 
understood as an instrument of the public will designed for the single purpose of law 
and order under which personal and property rights would be guaranteed and secured. 
The state therefore was understood in its purely negative function of providing and 
enforcing the laws in and through which individuals could pursue their private 
interests without hindering each other in the pursuit of their own liberty and 
productivity. Civil society was designed to overcome the “inconveniences” of the 
state of nature where the lack of an overarching power meant that order would and 
could only be haphazardly enforced and each would have to rely upon his own power 
and judgment to enforce his rights. Although Hobbes and Locke disagreed about the 
level of disorder and chaos the state of nature would entail, they both agreed that as 
self-preservation was the driving passion of mankind, a civil state of law and order 
was the only “rational” solution to the anarchy of which was man’s “natural” 
condition.
The English civil war and Glorious Revolution of 1688 established the
195
principles of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary sovereignty that would define 
the modem understanding of classical “English liberties” based upon individual rights 
and consensual government. Central to this understanding was the separation of 
political and economic spheres which allowed landlords, commercial farmers and the 
emerging urban merchant and commercial classes to pursue market activities free of 
direct political intervention. As the effects of the agrarian and commercial revolutions 
radiated out from London and the South-east these centres began to draw more and 
more of the English countryside within its orbit. As prices increased in urban centres 
for agricultural products transportation and communication networks were built which 
began to dissolve internal custom and trade barriers as both agricultural and 
manufacturing markets became integrated into a single and homogenous “national” 
space.6 As market production displaced subsistence self-sufficiency more and more 
“master-less” men and landless agricultural labours were required to buy the food 
they could no longer produce creating a mass market demand in basic commodities 
which only served to increase the pressure for large scale commercial production and 
the increased rents which had forced them from the land in the first place.
A self-reinforcing feedback loop of mass demand, rent increase, land 
enclosure furthered the mass peasant expropriation of common rights on marginal 
lands all lead to a spreading “internal colonisation” in which direct subsistence 
producers were systematically displaced by commercial farming. English ” historian 
Christopher Hill has described as a “line of settlement” which steadily advanced from 
the south-east to Cumberland and Westmorland to the west as the pressure to cultivate 
common wastes and royal forests became irresistible and inevitable in the face of 
progressive market forces.7 During the same period, common rights not only to the 
land, but the to the “fruits” of the land where increasingly appropriated by landlords 
under a proliferating system of “private” property legislation. Customary rights to 
such common natural resources as timber, peat, deadfall wood, fish fowl and rabbits, 
wild grasses, straw and dye and medicinal plants as well as sub-surface ore and 
mineral deposits became objects of exploitation and appropriation for those with the
o
power to define and enforce the co modification of nature4 s bounty. While peasants
6 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Pristine Culture o f  Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and 
Modem States, (New York.: Verso) , pp. 9 5 -1 0 0
7 Christopher Hill, op. cit., (1976) p. 62
g
Landlords would employ “foresters” “wardens” and “rangers” to police and enforce their exclusive 
“ownership” rights over anything o f commercial value on the land, especially near heavily wooded,
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and small holders resisted these infringements of their traditional rights and often 
resorted to breaking the fences and hedges erected by enclosing landlords, the ruling 
elite was able to harness the political power of the legislature to enforce a system of 
parliamentary enclosures acts which systematised at the national level in the 18th 
century what had been a fairly sporadic and local practice of individual landlords 
acting in their immediate economic interests.9 Although backed up by the coercive 
power of local Justices of the Peace who in the face of widespread rural revolt were 
not beyond mobilising his majesty‘s armed forces to enforce their “private44 property 
rights, enclosure nevertheless was regarded as a hated and “tyrannical outrage” as it 
spread to the north and the midlands where it had not been previously known or 
accepted.10
The expanding power of England’s agricultural and commercial revolution 
created an alliance between the rural landowning elite and the urban 
mercantile/manufacturing “middling” orders to produce a unified national interest in 
service of the “common good” embodied in the English constitutional state. The 
collective power of the ruling elite produced a vision of the “commonwealth” through 
which political power and economic power could be concentrated at home, while 
simultaneously projecting it abroad in colonial and imperial projects and aspirations. 
The middling gentry and second sons of the land owning class looked to the “West” 
as an infinitely expanding “frontier” in which enterprising young Englishmen could 
make their fortunes by founding plantations and promoting colonies in the pursuit of 
personal profit and national protestant glory.”11 Colonial promoters such as the 
Richard Hakluyt looked to colonies to provide important export crops to supply 
England’s economic self-sufficiency as well as to provide useful opportunities for the 
displaced masses of “idle beggars” roaming England’s urban centres and bustling 
ports in search of useful employment.12 American colonisation presented the
heath or moor lands defined as “wastes” where agricultural production was marginal and “profits” had 
to be creatively extracted from other “exploitable” natural resources. See E.P. Thompson, Whigs and 
Hunters: The Origin o f  the Black Act, (London.: Penguin Books) 1977.
J.L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer 1760-1832: A Study o f  the Government 
o f  England Before the Reform Bill, (London.: Longmans, Green and Co.) 1987
10 Angus Calder, Revolutionary Empire (London.: Pimilico) p. 19
11 Nicholas Canny, “England’s New World and Old 1480 -1630” in Nicholas Canny, (ed.) The Oxford 
History o f  British Empire, Vol. I: The Origins o f  Empire (Oxford.: Oxford University Press) 2001, pp.
148-169
12 Robert A. Williams Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses o f  
Conquest (Oxford.: Oxford University Press) 1990 pp. 177-180
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opportunity to make manifest the promise of Bacon’s technological utopia where 
Christian charity, private profit and scientific invention worked hand in hand to 
further the culture of improvement transforming the world for the common good of 
mankind. In full expectation of being received with enthusiasm, if not gratitude and 
reverence for the civilising benefits colonialism would bring to the peoples they 
encountered, the representatives of Anglo-American empire, set out to establish 
themselves in the new world with the very same strategies of conquest and alliance 
they had brought to bear in the subjugation of their own “ruder” elements in the Celtic 
fringe.13
Allies and Assimilation
The British Atlantic
England, as a late comer in the scramble for the new world, found itself forced to 
accept a peripheral role, at the margins of European power, challenging the 
established rules in order to “assert sovereignty” over the lands they wished to claim 
as their “exclusive imperial domains”. Although it had been accepted practice that 
lands “open” for colonisation could not be those already in “possession” of a 
Christian Prince, Elisabeth’s protestant nation rejected outright the authority of the 
Papal Bulls which had so judiciously divided the new world between Spain and 
Portugal shortly after their discovery.14 Making a claim for the natural liberty of 
mankind and the natural right to pursue trade and commerce unmolested by the 
pretensions of Catholic powers bent upon universal monarchy, English privateers and 
adventures set out to establish rival empires on the fringes of Spanish power. 
Interested as much in plundering Spanish shipping for their cargoes of valuable 
tropical goods and new world silver as establishing colonies themselves, these first 
English expeditions sought out locations for their value as military and strategic 
outposts rather than their trading or agricultural potential.15 Subsequent diplomatic
13 Jane H. Ohlmeyer, “Civilizinge o f  those rude partes: Colonization within Britain and Ireland, 1580 -
1640” in Nicholas Canny (ed.) The Origins o f  Empire (2001) op. cit. pp. 124 - 147
14 Anthony Pagden, “The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image o f Empire in the Atlantic, c, 1700”, in 
(ed.) Nicholas Canny, The Origins o f  Empire, (2001) op. cit., pp. 39
15 John C. Appleby, “War, Politics and Colonization, 1558 - 1625, in (ed.) Nicholas Canny, The 
Origins o f  Em pire, (2001) op. cit., pp. 55 - 78
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overtures to Spain caused English pirates to turn to the more peaceable pursuits of 
planting their own colonies although as a much smaller power the English would have 
to content themselves with the marginal lands of middle America on the fringes of 
Spanish Empire to the South and the French Empire to the North. Secure in their 
belief that they would be welcomed by the “natural” people of America as “liberators” 
from the tyranny of Popish power and the infamous cruelty of Spanish Conquistadors 
which had subjected them to slavery. 16 The English challenged the Spanish claim in 
the new world by arguing that over such vast and uncharted lands, the mere cursory 
“discovery” alone was not sufficient to establish a right of possession which could
17only by made by those capable of an “effective occupation” on the ground.
Effective occupation would entail either the actual foundation of colonies 
under the jurisdiction of Charter Grants issued by the Crown and/or the incorporation 
of Indian Kingdoms as vassals allied with, but subordinated to, the sovereign 
European power. The Charter Grant however, and not the Indian treaty, was the legal 
instrument that conveyed legal ownership to companies and/or individuals who 
received the title and deeds to the lands in question “subject” to the pleasure of the 
Crown. The Crown prerogative power which lay behind the colonial “grants” to the 
Virginia and Massachusetts companies as well as the sole proprietor rights handed 
down to court favourites such as Lord Baltimore or William Perm was based solely 
on the self-referential assertion of sovereignty exercised by the English monarch by
1 ftright of Conquest set out in the common law of England. The English, familiar 
from centuries of conquest and colonisation in Ireland and Scotland merely adapted 
their imperial procedures to the new world. Irish tribal leaders were identified as 
principle chiefs, conquered by force of arms and then offered “peace treaties” wherein 
their submission to the English King was followed by the “surrender” of their and 
their “followers” tribal lands. A portion of the surrendered lands would then be “re­
granted” in the form of conditional title deeds, under the protection of the English 
King, as long as he and his dependents remained loyal and obedient vassals of the 
imperial Crown.19 Following these tried and true methods of subjection and alliance, 
Indians were to be made subordinate allies within England’s “imperial domains” as an
16 Nicholas Canny, “England’s New World and Old, 1480s to 1630s” in (ed.) Nicholas Canny, The 
Origins o f  Empire, op. cit., pp. 151
17 Williams, op. cit., p. 158
18 Ibid., pp. 200
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effective way of incorporating Indian tribal territories under the suzerainty of the
English Crown to the effective exclusion of other imperial powers.
When the representatives of the English Crown were sent to make treaties with
the Indians it was not done in recognition of their political independence or equality
as self-governing communities, but as a legal strategy to bring them into “submission”
and to place them under the “protection” of their sovereign superior. To the extent
that it was necessary to recognise Indian “kings and emperors” as potential partners in
this diplomatic exchange the natural people of America were accorded a degree of
rationality appropriate to the task. As Alexander Whitaker, a minister of Virginia
colony observed in the early years of English colonisation “the law of nature dwelleth
in them; for they have a rude kind of commonwealth and rough government wherein
20  * *they both honour and obey their kings, parents and governors...” From the initial
“crowning” of the Emperor Powhatan in colonial Virginia, to the Covenant Chain
alliance system recognising the “Ambiguous Iroquois Empire” the British sought to
extend their jurisdictional reach not only to the territories of their client kings, but
21through them to those of lesser chiefs and their lands allied to them in turn. In this 
way, the complex political relationships of Indian tribal confederacy and alliance were 
subverted into the hierarchical relationships of domination and subordination. Indian 
clients were granted the powers (by the British not necessarily the Indians) to
“represent” and “negotiate” treaty relationships on their behalf although the power to
22enforce these agreements on the ground was another thing entirely.
The treaty system although designed as a secondary instrument of legal 
pacification remained an important diplomatic devise for maintaining consensual 
trading relationships and land surrender agreements which remained vital to colonial
O'Xsurvival and prosperity throughout the entire history of colonial America. Although
19 Calder, op. cit., p. 32
20
Nicholas Canny, “The Old World and The New, 1480s - 1630s” in (ed.) Nicholas Canny, The
Origins o f  Empire, op. cit., p. 156
21 See Francis Jennings The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation o f  
Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its Beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York.:
W.W. Norton) 1984
22 The Iroquois and the British were notorious for making treaty arrangements regarding other people’s
lands for which explanation let alone permission was often lacking on the part o f the so-called “lesser”
chiefs. On the difficulties that arose as a direct result o f this questionable practice, especially between
among the Iroquois and their neighbours see Fred Anderson, The Crucible o f  War: The Seven Years'
War and the Fate o f  Empire in British North America, 1754 - ] 766 (New York.: Vintage Books) 2000
23 Successfully playing the diplomatic game o f what Daniel Richter has called “the modem Indian 
politics” whereby the colonists inserted themselves into and attempted to manipulate already existing
200
the treaty process provided the veil of legitimacy, obscuring the more brutal and 
primitive forms of power rooted in medieval doctrines of crusade and conquest, it was 
nevertheless rooted in the principle of Crown prerogative and not the treaty agreement 
which remained the fundamental legal basis of the English claim to territorial 
jurisdiction and ultimate land ownership. As the colonists were originally highly 
dependent upon the resident Indians for food and security, diplomacy and 
accommodation in the form of the presentation of gifts and presents in exchange for 
permission to settle and erect buildings was necessary concession to the balance of 
power that could hardly be avoided. Moreover, the English had learned from the 
Dutch that what Francis Jennings has called “the deed game” had proved a highly 
effective method of shoring up territorial claims with competitive European powers.24 
Legal claims to territory through the possession of a written document would be 
understood and recognised as evidence of a legal property right which could be used 
with successful effect in dispute resolution short of war.25
The colonists themselves adapted the treaty system to establish their territorial 
claims when they landed and settled themselves at Plymouth, which was, unavoidably 
outside the boundaries of the Massachusetts Company Grant. John Carver, the first 
magistrate of Plymouth colony believed he had freely “purchased” the colony’s lands 
and was now in full legal possession of exclusive private property rights as set out in 
the “deed” he had Massasoit, the local Sachem sign in 1621.26 Later the reverend 
Sam Purchas boasted of how the colonists had “conciliated” the savages by paying in 
valuable goods for all the land they had occupied, a thing of “no small consequence to 
the conscience, where the mild law of nature, not the violent law of arms lays the 
foundations of our possessions”. 27 English rituals of legal appropriation were no
systems o f political affiliations and rivalries remained a key strategy o f colonial control up to an even 
beyond the American Revolution itself. Daniel K. Richter, “Native Peoples o f North America and the 
Eighteenth-Century British Empire” in (ed.) P.J. Marshall, The Oxford History o f  the British Empire,
Vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century, (Oxford.: Oxford University Press) 2001 pp. 347 - 371
24 Francis Jennings, The Invasion o f  America: Indians, Colonization and the Cant o f  Conquest, (Chapel
Hill.: University o f North Carolina Press) 1975
25 Ibid. pp. 132 - 133 Jennings describes how the Dutch pioneered this technique in their territorial 
battles with the English in the Spice Islands in anticipation o f  new world rivalry which although 
sometimes allowing the occasional dispute to be settled peaceably according to a developing system o f  
“international law” nevertheless failed to prevent not one, but three intense and extensive wars between 
the English and the Dutch which ended only with the final conquest o f Manhattan in the late 17th
century.
26 Virginia DeJohn Anderson, “New England in Seventeenth Century” in (ed.) Nicholas Canny, The
Origins o f  Empire, op. cit., p. 197
27 Sam Purchas, cited in Jennings (1975) op. cit., p. 77
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doubt lost on the Indians who were more inclined to look at the goods offered in 
exchange for land as the presents and tribute due a Chief allowing strangers to enter 
and use the resources of the tribal traditional territories. Indians, like everyone else on
jo
the planet (including even the English in England ) did not regard land as an 
alienable commodity, but a community based collective resource whose use and 
ownership was governed by any number of consensually constructed laws and 
customs prescribed by tradition and sanctified by time. It is not even true that the 
puritan founders of the new world did not recognise the mixed economy of the 
Indians for what it was; village based agricultural cultivation combined with seasonal 
hunting, gathering and fishing activities along with a well developed networks of 
trade and barter with neighbouring tribes. The more observant of the colonists even 
admired how the Indians tended and cleared natural meadows to encourage the deer, 
making analogies between this activity and domestic sheep grazing.29
It is not as if the rural economy England was any less “mixed” at the time, 
villagers and small holders were equally involved in a variety of “hunting, gathering 
and foraging activities on the commons to supplement their meagre existence on the 
edges of a land dominated a powerful landowning elite who had God and the law on 
their side. The increasing encroachment of “exclusive” private property right on use 
and ownership of the “fruits of the forest” was as contentious in England as it was in 
America, although now it was the economic refugees o f the old country who were 
carrying these practices of dispossession to the new. The magic of the legally 
sanctioned “deed” and “contract” was once again being used to assert revolutionary 
ideas of “absolute” and “exclusive” private property right in direct violation of 
communal use rights inscribed in memory and practice since “time immemorial”. The 
English used the “deeds” obtained from the Indians as the justification to coercively 
enforce their “private property” right and punish the Indians for “trespass” when 
traditional hunting and gathering activities continued on lands now “exclusively” 
claimed by the colonists for their use alone. Conversely however, when the Indians 
began complained of the encroachment and destruction of their fields and gardens by 
the colonists’ domestic animals they were told it was their own responsibility to fence 
their holdings to keep the livestock out of what could would otherwise be considered
28 One only has to think o f the laws o f  primogeniture and the strict settlement that comprise aristocratic
land privileges designed to preserve a consolidated gentry class. See Daunton op. cit., pp. 63 - 69
29 Jennings, (1975) op. cit., pp. 61
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“open” range and forest.”30
The deeds and treaties became instruments not of freedom, but of 
expropriation as the colonists used them to restrict and police Indian land use outside 
the boundaries of cultivated fields and gardens the surveyors had mapped out as 
“Indian lands”. The royal charter, not the treaty conveyed land ownership and 
jurisdiction with the result that select parcels were set aside as “Indian reserves14 
“granting44 permission to the Indians to live on their own lands while conveniently 
throwing “open44 the remaining (unbounded) country to colonial appropriation.31 The 
colonists regarded all but the cultivated gardens “empty wastes” which could be 
exploited at will despite the active use the Indians clearly made of the land in ways 
the colonists themselves had learned to imitate. While it is true that in England 
improving landlords had sought to extend cultivation to the “waste lands” adjacent to 
agricultural lands, they certainly did not regard these areas as empty and devoid of 
valuable resources “free” for the taking. The colonists well knew from their own 
experience in England that timber, foraging rights, fish and fowl and especially deer 
had an economic value over and above the land for which the “owner” was due 
appropriate compensation for their exploitation. None of these considerations 
however were carried to the new world with the result that timber and other fruits of 
the forest were plundered to such an extent and with such a disregard for either 
“property right” or the “common good” that it would have been a capital criminal 
offence in the England of their own time.
Already existing tensions between Indians and colonists due to increasing 
competition for land and strategic resources only increased with the discovery of a 
tobacco as a viable export crop which rapidly transformed Virginia’s marginal 
subsistence farming into a rapidly expanding capitalist economy. The need for large 
scale plantation production in general combined with the high level of soil exhaustion 
particular to tobacco ensured that the demand for fertile lands was soon outstripping 
the supply setting the colonists on a collision course with the still powerful Powhatan
30 Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling o f  North America (New York.: Penguin) 2001, pp.
191 -192  See also William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indian Colonists and the Ecology o f  New
England (New York.: Hill and Wang) 1983
31 Despite having “purchased” their lands from the Indians both New England and the break away 
colony o f Rhode Island eventually petitioned and received royal charters from the King in order to 
normalise the legal status o f  colonial land titles existing outside the boundaries o f  the original 
Massachusetts Charter Grant. See Virginia DeJohn Anderson, “New England in the Seventeenth 
Century” in (ed.) Nicholas Canny, The Origins o f  Empire, op. cit., p. 203
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confederacy. The resulting Virginia “massacre” of 1622 erased whatever goodwill 
was left between settler and Indian and abruptly brought to an end the era of 
“accommodation” in which a treaty was viewed as anything other than a temporary 
and punitive device designed to end one round of war only in order to prepare for the 
next.32 The Virginia massacre also made a grave impression upon the Puritans of 
Massachusetts who were experiencing their own problems of population pressure due 
vast waves of new arrivals landing on their shores during the period of the Great
* ■ I'lPuritan migration which peaked in the mid 1630s. Increased competition for land 
and strategic resources combined with growing anxieties about the trustworthiness of 
the Indians directly resulted in the pre-emptive strike which launched the ensuring 
Pequot war of 1637 in which an entire Indian village was burnt and the defeated 
survivors sold into slavery.34
The resulting violence and devastation of unchecked colonial expansion and 
its tendency to provoke costly and expensive Indian wars so alarmed officials in
tliLondon that both the Virginia and Massachusetts companies had by the mid 17 
century lost their company Charters and re-organised as Royal Crown colonies under 
the direct administration of a resident Governor and his appointed council.35 
Colonists retained their magistrates and elected legislative councils but the conduct of 
Indian Affairs came under the sole executive authority of the Governor and his 
appointed officials. In both Virginia the Crown strictly reassert its pre-emptive right 
to enter into treaties with the local Indians, regulate the Indian trade with a licensing 
system and reserve onto itself the right of “first purchase” of Indian lands in order to 
avoid yet another costly Indian war. 36 In Massachusetts where the geo-political 
situation was particularly delicate due to the rival imperial presence of both the 
French and the Dutch, a royal commission was established to bring the rebellious 
colony into submission and force its expansionist colonists to contain their activities 
strictly within the bounds of the law:
No colony hath any just right to dispose of any lands conquered from the
32 Williams op. cit., p. 219
33 Taylor., op. cit., pp. 164-166
34 Peter C. Mancall, “Native Americans and Europeans in English America 1500 - 1700” in (ed.)
Nicholas Canny, The Origins o f  Empire, op. cit., p. 341
35 Anthony Hall, The American Empire and the Fourth World, vol. 1 (Montreal & Kingston.: McGill-
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natives, unless both the cause of the conquest be just and the land lye within the 
bounds which the King by his charter hath given, nor yet to exercise any 
authority beyond these bounds.37
Both of these early Crown assertions of the Royal prerogative in the conduct of Indian 
affairs were to be expanded and consolidated in the next century as colonists provided 
themselves unwilling or incapable of managing what was becoming an increasingly 
disorderly “frontier”. Shortly before the outbreak of King Philip’s war in 1676 the 
Crown had attempted to pacify the increasing outbreaks of hostility and violence 
between Indian and colonist by subsuming responsibility to adjudicate “all complaints 
and injury’s” between Christian and Indian within its own court system. 38 As the 
Crown continued to extend its legal jurisdiction into increasing areas of Indian life it 
was bound to undermine and circumvent the authority of tribal chiefs who were 
themselves forced to appear in the courts as “subjects” of the Crown in order to have 
their grievances addressed.
The Crown was thereby able to reduce what were in effect political disputes 
between Indians and colonists to the level of civil disputes resolvable by reference to 
the colony’s internal legal regime. Such an approach had the effect of assimilating 
“individual” Indians within the over-arching framework of colonial judicial 
administration without reference to their collective or group identity as self-governing 
communities. As such Indians may have been entitled to “equal” treatment under the 
law, but this in itself offered little in the way of security as colonial juries proved 
unwilling to convict their fellow whites and there was little if any hope of appeal to a
- IQ
higher authority. Despite the decidedly bleak prospects of justice at the hands of a 
bias judicial system, the Plymouth magistrates were so overwhelmed by complaints 
from the local Algonquians that they were compelled to ban Indians from the town 
when court was held.40 Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the “Indian 
rebellion” when it finally came in 1676, was the most devastating in colonial history 
and could only be put down by the intervention of British imperial forces and their 
Mohawk Indian allies from neighbouring New York 41
The failure in Virginia and New England to reconcile colonial interests with
37 Hall, op. cit., p. 321
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205
the continued existence of independent Indian communities illustrates the inability of 
the Crown to integrate and assimilate the Indians through either the treaty system or 
the unilateral exercise of Crown prerogative power alone. The fall of the French 
Empire in North America in 1759 saw the last obstacle to colonial expansion beyond 
the trans-Appalachian removed along with any serious intent by the imperial 
government to protect their erstwhile Indian allies from settler encroachment on their 
traditional territories.42 The result was predictably enough a pan-Indian resistance 
movement under the capable leadership of Pontiac which succeeded not only in 
routing Jeffery Amherst’s much reduced infantry, but in capturing and holding key 
strategic points only recently “liberated” from the French including Ft. Detroit, Ft. 
Niagara and Ft. Pitt on the upper Ohio 43 Alarmed, imperial interests in Whitehall 
were once again roused to action and issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763 in a last 
ditch attempt to restore order on what was becoming to all intents and purposes and 
unmanageable frontier.
The Royal Proclamation demarcated a “Proclamation Line” down the length 
of the continent that was intended to erect a partition along the Appalachian watershed 
beyond which all settlement was forbidden by express order of the King44 The 
proclamation however, like all unilateral assertions of Crown prerogative in the past 
would prove as impotent an instrument as its predecessors and may even have fuelled 
the rampant speculation in western lands in which some of the most prominent and 
powerful colonial families were heavily involved.45 The Crown after all had no 
intension of halting settlement, merely ensuring that it proceeded in an orderly manner 
under imperial supervision, something that could only be regarded as an “unjust” 
infringement on the “natural rights” and God-given liberty of the colonists to settle 
and improve the interior lands in any way they saw fit. As colonial and imperial 
interests continued to diverge in the second half of the 18th century the Proclamation 
line was denounced as one of the “coercive” or “intolerable” acts that had lead to the 
irrevocable breakdown in colonial-imperial relations and the declaration of American
42
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Independence in 1776.46
Continental America
The outbreak of hostilities between the Crown and colonies had seen the immediate 
rush on both sides to secure the allies or at least the guarantee the neutrality of the 
powerful interior Indian confederacies. The British, having established a permanent 
department of Indian Affairs to manage “wilderness diplomacy” during the run-up to 
the Seven Years war, were in a better position to court and keep traditional allies than 
their Congressional competitors. The Americans could at best hope for Indian 
neutrality and took steps to warn the Iroquois advising them that the war was “a 
family quarrel” and the Indians would do best to “remain at home and not join either 
side, but keep the hatchet buried deep.” 47 The Indian tribes however, held a strategic 
position in the western interior from which the British forts along the Great Lakes 
could be used as staging points for imperial troops to attack the vulnerable and 
undefended backcountry settlements. In their increasing desperation to secure the 
frontier, the Americans not only entered into Treaty negotiations as early as 1778, but 
went so far as to invite the Delaware Nation to “form a state” so that they could “join 
the present confederation” and even promised them political representation in 
Congress following the war 48 The British for their part, finally began to take the 
advice of their agents in the field and began instructing their officials to deal with 
their Indian “allies” not as subordinate dependents who could be commanded at will, 
but as sovereign and independent peoples whose “friendship” was based not upon 
coercion, but common interests 49 None of this mattered however when the peace 
finally came in 1783 and the Treaty of Paris, recognising American independence 
unceremoniously “transferred sovereignty” of the western lands as far as the 
Mississippi River to the new Republic despite the fact that the Indians still held 
effective occupation of their traditional territories throughout the western interior.
The Americans found that the Indians refused to recognise the Treaty of Paris, to 
which they had not been a part, and insisted that the Proclamation Line be respected
46 Fred Anderson, op. cit., pp. 815
47 Angie Debo, A History o f  the Indians o f  the United States, (London.: Pimlico) 1995, p. 84
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when the newly empowered Indian commissioners came to inform them of the end of 
the war.50 The British meanwhile refused to evacuate their interior forts on the 
grounds of unpaid war debts and even harboured ambitions to establish “Indian buffer 
states” under the administration of Montreal merchants, on the Upper Ohio.51 The 
fur-trade still had an effective lobby in London, as did land speculators attached to the 
Indian Department, which in combination with the imperial desire to protect loyalist 
refugees recently removed to “Upper Canada” on the north side of the Great Lakes, 
was enough to ensured that the battle for “sovereignty” in the old north west was far 
from over. The American’s would fight the Indians and their British allies well into 
the next century until the border dispute between Canada and the United States was 
finally settled by the Jay Treaty of 1819.52
In the immediate post-war era, the need to “assert” sovereignty in the vast 
interior “backcountry” drove the newly emboldened American empire to set upon a 
course of colonisation which not only failed to break away from English precedents 
and procedures, but in large part simply replicated and intensified their technological 
prowess and universal ambition. The Americans boldly and explicitly claimed 
sovereign jurisdiction over Indian territory by “right of conquest” having forfeited 
their rights as “enemies” during the course of the revolutionary war. Successive treaty 
conferences were called within the newly organised northern, western and southern 
districts to inform the Indians of their new status as conquered peoples who must 
“unconditionally” submit to the “protection” and “generosity” of their new “Great 
Father”.53 The treaty system was resurrected to assimilate and subordinate the Indians 
and their lands within the frame of government established by the Congress which 
divided the Indians into administrative districts with no reference whatsoever to 
former colonial alliances or the Indian tribal systems of governance and confederacy 
which had defined the “modem Indian politics” of the pre-revolutionary era. Neither 
the treaty of Paris, nor the American constitution had mentioned the Indians or how 
they would be accommodated under the new system of government except to
50 Gary Nash, The Unknown American Revolution (London.: Jonathan Cape) 2005 pp. 435 - 440. See 
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specifically exclude them (as well as the Blacks) from its terms of reference 
guaranteeing civil rights to all American citizens equally. 54 Indians and their lands 
were to be incorporated into American society, but they were to have no political 
recognition of their rights as either nations or individuals within the new “federal” 
system. Treaties were a mechanism for pacification in which the government, not the 
Indians would decide the terms of “peace” which above all else stipulated non- 
negotiable land surrenders for which little if any compensation was to be forthcoming. 
In addition, the Americans followed the British model of demanding a pre-emptive 
right over Indian lands, repeating the precedent that Indians did not have full property 
rights in their traditional territories and were not free to alienate them at will, but only 
to the United States government and on such terms as that government should 
dictate.55 Echoing the words of the Royal Proclamation, the North West Ordinance of 
1786 pronounced:
No sale of lands made by any Indian, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the 
United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state whether 
having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be 
made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the 
United States.
The right of pre-emption, ostensibly designed to “protect” the Indians from the “sharp 
dealings” of traders, in reality limited the freedom of Indian tribal leaders, as well as 
American citizens, to buy and sell the millions of acres now officially appropriated by 
the same prerogative power once so loudly denounced by revolutionary radicals. 56 
The Indians were informed that they must cede “enough lands” to meet the needs of a 
growing nation and that the “friendship” of the United States depended fixing a line 
of settlement that would in the words of George Washington “neither yield, or grasp 
too much”; thereby allowing the peaceful co-existence of Indians and settlers in a 
land that was “large enough” for both. 57
The dream of peaceful co-existence was however, far from materialising on 
the ground as the terms of the coercive post-war treaties were almost immediately 
rejected by the resisting tribes who refused to surrender their territories and continued
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to raid and harass any settlers that ventured to far into their lands. The western 
Indians, along with their now repentant British allies, argued that the boundaries 
established by the by the Treaty of Paris were invalid, the land never having been 
theirs to give away.58 The Indians were in fact still a military presence to be reckoned 
on the ground and dealt the cash strapped and inexperienced American army a series 
of decisive defeats which convinced Washington that Indian wars were too costly and 
damaging to America’s reputation abroad.59 Reinventing himself as an elder 
statesman above the fray of the wild frontier and its land grabbing locals, he embarked 
upon a vision of “expansion with honour”. Recognising that the sovereignty had not 
simply been “transferred” by Great Britain, the Americans recognised that “ .. .the 
lands originally belonged to the Indians; it is theirs and theirs only. That they have the 
right to sell and a right to refuse to sell.” 60 In order to diffuse the Indian resistance, 
the Congress had opted to renew the British policy of treaty and land surrender 
through “purchase” under the terms which were to be negotiated rather than 
unilaterally imposed. Washington committed himself to a peace process designed to 
respect the legal transfer of lands made possible by the language of the North West 
Ordinance itself:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands 
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their 
property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in 
just and lawful wars authorised by Congress; but laws founded in justice and 
humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to 
them and for preserving peace and friendship with them.61
Unfortunately for the Indians “just and lawful wars authorised by Congress” were to 
prove the norm rather than the exception and although reference to Indian rights and 
property is clearly stated, it is equally clear that it will be the United States 
government and not the Indians who will interpret, judge and enforce this legal 
directive.
The prime objective of the Northwest Ordinance was not the defence of Indian 
rights, but the provision of a legal instrument which would “clear” and “extinguish” 
Indian title from the land in order that the lands could be appropriated by the federal
University Press) 1986 p. 408
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government and surveyed into lots for public sale. The treaty process allowed the 
new republic to incorporate vast tracts of territory into its public administration 
through an act of “purchase” which defined the act of consent whereby the Indians 
“exchanged” their land for a negotiated cash payment or gifts of presents determined 
at the time of treaty. The amount “paid” for these lands was a matter of settled at the 
time of treaty and was a political decision arrived at during the particular negotiations. 
The Commissioners were given discretion in arriving at the amount and encouraged to
pay as little as the Indians could be induced to accept with little or no reference to the
62market value of the land being acquired. The legal “purchase” of land was
therefore regulated and controlled as an instrument of empire in which the “consent” 
of the Indians veiled the inherent military threat that was the pervasive and immediate 
background to the treaty “negotiations” in question. Indian commissioners were sent 
into the field accompanied by armed forces and were instructed to impress on the 
Indians the necessity of treaty by “any means in your power” an injunction which 
often included the use of intoxicants, corruption and bribery.63 Although the treaty 
was supposed to guarantee the Indians in the possession of their remaining lands, 
“reserved” to them by the treaty, the Federal government was to prove as inept at 
“protecting” the Indians from white encroachment as had the British.
Wards and Development
The British Atlantic
As short lived as the immediate era of accommodation proved to be it is important to 
remember that the colonists who arrived on the shores of the new world did not 
immediately regard the Indians as anything other than human beings with whom it 
was possible to do business. While protestant nationalism had invested the pilgrims 
and planters with a unique sense of mission and destiny in their overseas enterprises it 
was equally apparent in their relations with the lower orders o f their own societies. 
Labour discipline and productivity were part of a discourse of “improvement” visited 
upon the rural poor and the idle beggars of England as they were confined to 
workhouses when they were not otherwise industriously employed. It is equally
62 Prucha, (1994) op. cit., pp. 228 - 229
211
worth noting that the internal process of colonisation had spread to the Celtic fringe of 
the British isles in which the “savages” and “barbarians” were not heathens, but 
fellow Christians whose recalcitrant attachment to both Catholicism and traditional 
land use practices became definitive of their “backward” condition. As Nicholas 
Canny has pointed out, English colonial strategies and practices were not rooted in 
some “foreign” and “exotic” encounter with some unrecognisable “other”, but in an 
internally advancing “western frontier” that stretched from the west country to the far 
reaches of the Atlantic seaboard.64
English colonists to the new world came with a well developed discourse of 
civilisation which justified not only the appropriation of land and resources from the 
Indigenous population but an entire program of acculturation designed to transform 
the social, political and economic structures of their persons and properties along the 
lines of a God ordained English model of an advanced “civil” society. At the heart of 
this superimposed social revolution was the structured re-organisation to dismantle 
traditional (feudal) or tribal allegiances in order to impose “modem” forms of 
property ownership in an attempt to increase agricultural productivity and cement 
English political domination of Irish estates. The plantation system was first 
established in Ireland to obliterate feudal tenures and “open” the land to settlement on 
the English model of enclosure, consolidated landed estates, tenancy and wage labour. 
According to Irish historian Jane Ohlmeyer, the plantation system itself became an 
instrument of instruction and state backed coercion intent on “re-creating the world of 
south-east England on the confiscated Munster estates.”65
Along with the reform of the land went the reform of the people whose 
inculcation to English values, customs and manners was deemed essential for the 
cultivation of a ruling class of Irish nobles. As well as establishing educational 
institutions such as Dublin University where the Irish could be taught Protestantism 
and the common law, the English state institutionalised Anglicanism by 
systematically imposing the English parish system complete with compulsory taxation 
and fines for non attendance as established by England. The adaptation and imitation 
of English manners and dress were regarded as a necessary step in “binding” the Irish
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to the new order of things as was the banning of both the Catholic religion and the 
Gaelic language. Nor was this highly interventionist strategy reserved for a 
“subjugated” Irish population, but was equally visited upon traditional clan practices 
in “allied” Scotland where the highland practices of feasting, drinking and singing 
were all regarded as irrational remnants of a pagan culture that must be eradiated in 
the interests of instituting rational religion and the proper work ethic central to an 
advancing age of enlightenment and improvement.
While the process of civilisation and reformation in Ireland would be forever 
hampered by the corrupting influence of the Catholic Church whose influence among 
the vast majority of Irish labours and rural could never be undone, the English did not 
have to confront this problem in the new world. The land was a “virgin” soil and its 
people untouched innocents who could be expected to welcome the “good news” of 
the impending Christian conversion with awe and gratitude. Ireland, unlike the new 
world, was forever stained its past and did not represent the clean sheet of “white 
paper” upon which the colonists would be free to inscribe their future untainted and 
unconstrained by a resistant population.66 While the Indians were regarded as living 
in a “natural” condition this did not immediately suggest that they were incapable of 
entering into civilised human relationships in the forms of treaties and trading 
arrangements necessary to the initial settlement of colonial America.
It was only with the rapid growth of the colonies during the Great Puritan 
migration of the mid 17th century and the discovery of Tobacco as a viable cash crop 
export in Virginia that colonial demands for land began to outstrip Indian hospitality 
and tolerance. Because the English believed that their natural “liberty” was a God 
given right to enter, occupy and possess whatever they desired irrespective of the 
prior use, occupancy or enjoyment of the land by other peoples conflict over the land 
and its resources would not long be avoided. In order to rationalise their invasions the 
colonists began to imagine themselves as a higher order of human being, civilised 
men among savages who had not only a right, but a divinely ordained responsibility to 
create the world anew in God's image, as an actual existing “state of nature” could 
easily as easily be seen as savage beasts as “peaceable innocents” because both 
images represent a state of primitive consciousness that had not arrived at the 
advanced stage of historical development. Because Indians lacked the “experience” of
66 T. C. Barnard, “New opportunities for British Settlement: Ireland, 1650 - 1700” in (ed.) Nicholas
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civil and political government they had not developed a form of social organisation 
conducive to the production of the arts and sciences and therefore lived in an 
immature and deprived state of “natural” simplicity. Rational maturity was not given 
by nature, but advanced by the societies in which individuals could cultivate their 
reason and produce the higher forms of life made possible by a more complex 
collective existence. It became the common opinion of the 17th century Englishman 
that
.. .in Virginia the savage people wander up and down like beasts.. .having no 
Art, nor science nor trade, to imploy themselves or give themselves onto and yet 
by nature loving and gentle and desirous to imbrace a better condition.67
Living only in “the state of nature” they had only a rudimentary form of communal 
property and no money and hence had not created the social condition under which 
more advanced forms of law and civil government become necessary. When things 
were held in common there was no incentive for investment of either money or labour 
in the improvement in the land and as such human beings did not “advance” either 
themselves nor their society. The distinction between things held in common and the 
civil state of political association based upon the human artifice of private property 
remained for the English a demarcation of a properly ordered society and a 
fundamental step in the establishment of the rule of law and the institution of civil 
government. Without private property there would be no ownership and without 
ownership there would be no profit incentive to improvement and man would remain 
locked into a primitive existence without the restraining power of reason to moderate 
and guide his natural animal impulses and instincts. Man without private property 
was little more than a brute beast as summarised by the Cambridge preacher Robert 
Grey in 1609:
Some affirm and it is likely true, that the savages have no particular propriety in 
any part of that country, but only general residency there, as wild beasts in the 
forest; for they range and wander up and down the country without law or 
government, being led only by their lusts and sensuality. There is not meum and 
tuum [mine and thine] amongst them.68
Until such time as the Indians were civilised, they could hold no land as private 
property and therefore claim no ownership or dominion of either the land or its natural
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resources nor prevent others from making use of what God had given to men in
common. Any attempt to deny access to the colonists or their livestock was regarded
as an unjust and illegal restriction upon their natural rights to use and improve the
land as they saw not only for their own profit but for the “common good” of mankind.
An advancing society would improve the productivity of the soil through the
industrious applications of modem sciences and techniques which would use the land
in a more rational and efficient manner thereby creating more and better commodities
for the benefit of everyone. If the Indians were not using the land as God had
intended, then it was the clear duty of the colonists to develop the rich and abundant
under productive “wastes” of America which the Indians had forfeited through their
idle neglect of nature’s bounty. As John Winthrop, Governor of Massachusetts
bluntly stated the matter in 1629:
For the Natives in New England they inclose noe land neither have any settled 
habitation nor any tame cattle to improve land by., .and soe have noe other but a 
natural right to those countries Soe as if wee leave them sufficient for their use 
wee may lawfully take the rest, there being more than enough for them and us.69
If God had given man a natural equality and freedom, it was not God but man himself 
who was responsible for his own education and the cultivation of his reason that was 
the result not of a gift of nature, but the product of rational and industrious 
improvement. Man raised himself from naturally deprived animal existence through 
the sweat of his brow and the labour of his body, the civilised state being a product of 
“experience” and not man’s natural condition. For those who had been deprived of 
the necessary experience either through accident of history, immaturity of age or 
mental deficiency, it was simply given to others to govern them appropriately.
Political responsibility was not given to everyone equally, but reserved for the rational 
and industrious who had proven themselves through their own efforts to have raised 
themselves by their own efforts by cultivating restraint and self-improvement. As 
there was a natural inequality among men regarding tendency to virtue and rational 
industriousness, so there was a natural inequality in the distribution of wealth 
reflecting these differences in character and capability. Government was instituted for 
the protection of property reflecting man’s natural desire to safeguard what he had 
acquired and protect it from the grasping invasion of others.
Those without property had no “part in the whole” and as such could not claim
69 John Wmthrope, cited in Peter C. Mancall, op. cit., p. 339
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an active participation in government, voting and political rights reserved to those 
active subjects who “represented” the collective interests of all embodied not only in 
the commonwealth to which they directly belonged, but to all of mankind in general.
If Indians appeared as either innocents or beasts it is because these “conditions” are 
merely opposite poles of a nature enthralled to “passion” and not governed by 
“reason”. As such they were pre-rational people and like women, children and 
servants destined to be passive subjects of the commonwealth, as wards and 
dependents of their masters and rulers who acting in trust to safeguard their best 
interests would be responsible for their moral education and civil development. 
Without the guidance of government and the cultivation of private property as the way 
and means to the advancement of the arts and sciences, natural men would not 
progress and would remain slaves to the “idols” of the mind, ruled not by reason but 
prejudice, superstition and other such irrational nonsense which was (and still is) the 
mark of a backward culture and a primitive mind. Missionary schools and praying 
towns were founded throughout colonial America to accomplish the important task of 
civilising the savage and through the instruction of religion and the cultivation of 
private property would transform the Indian from primitive ward to useful and 
productive subject under the careful supervision of their benefactors and guardians.
As in Ireland, native education was regarded as an important instrument in the 
reformation of Indian character and plans to build schools specifically designed to 
meet the needs of acculturating Indians were considered in both Virginia and New 
England as an essential part of the civilising mission which had authorised their 
colonising enterprise in America. The Royal charters to both the Virginia and 
Massachusetts companies had included provisions for the conversion of the Indians 
and schools and provision was made for an Indian school to be erected in Henrico a 
principle town on the James River in Virginia and at Harvard Yard in Massachusetts. 
Unlike the Spanish and French missionaries who journeyed to remote Indian towns 
and villages, the Indians were to be brought to the schools and not the schools to the 
Indians. The schools and praying towns were established on the margins of 
settlement areas and near plantations not only to remove Indian children from the un- 
edifying influences of their uncivilised parents and community elders, but to make 
them available to the work which was believed to be an essential part of the education 
process. Children as young as seven were to be placed in these “residential schools” 
got the purpose of conversion and apprenticed to local plantation owners in whose
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70  . _ .service they would learn the skills both useful to themselves and the colony. The 
prospects of converting the Indians looked promising as at first English divines were 
inclined to think of Indians, like the land as a virgin and receptive soil upon which the 
seed of true religion could be planted and brought to successful fruition. From his 
ministry in Virginia, William Starchey had come to regard the Indians as child-like 
and docile willing and eager “like razed and un-blotted tables apt to receive 
whatsoever shall be first drawn thereon.71 Although the London company set aside 
10,000 acres for the Indian school at Henrico, it never materialised as the planters 
immediate concerns for the cultivation of tobacco took precedent over their 
missionary work. In Massachusetts, the situation was little better, the production of 
farm produce for export to the West Indies occupying the minds of most colonists 
until the Puritan parliament of the interregnum began calling them to account for 
dereliction of duty.
In 1649, a legislative act for the “promoting and propagating of the Gospel of 
Jesus Christ in New England was passed by parliament and a preacher, the Reverend 
John Elliot subsequently dispatched to the colonies to do the good work of the newly 
established Society for the propagation of the Gospel (SPG).72 Indian education would 
include not only literacy and bible study, but practical training in “spinning or other 
manufacturing” arts and mechanical vocations.73 In the schools Elliot taught his 
praying Indians how to cultivate the land, make brooms, baskets and eel-pots for the 
colonists, encouraged them to sell fish, venison and berries and furnished them with 
spades, axes and other tools as well as teaching the women domestic skills to be 
employed as household servants in the prosperous households of the emerging urban 
mercantile elite.74 Indians had long participated in the colonial cash economy by 
hunting and gathering and selling their procured “fruits of the forest” in the trading 
houses of colonial merchants, but this “unregulated” trade had been devoid of political 
coercion if not economic exploitation. By separating the Indians from their traditional 
seasonal and mobile “mixed” economy by “settling” them within the strict confines of 
praying towns the magistrates ensured that the Indians were isolated not only from
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their independent means of subsistence, but from the family and friends who it was 
believed could only be a corrupting influence. The establishment of praying towns 
also had the added advantage of containing the resident Indian population in a secure 
and highly supervised space, conveniently freeing the surrounding landscape from its 
disturbing Indian presence. Fields and gardens which were once the centre of Indian 
village life could be appropriated by colonists once the Indian village was itself safely 
located on the outskirts of town. Restricting the Indians movements an confining them 
to the towns was an essential part of the “civilisation” process as it weaned them from 
their “wandering” and “wild” ways which as John Elliot firmly believed was the root
n c
of their “unfixed, confused and ungovemed way of life.”
Praying town Indians had no economic security because they had been 
separated from the land that was their means of subsistence and yet simultaneously 
denied the private property rights in land enjoyed by the white population. While 
Indians could and indeed were encouraged to hold and farm individual plots of land as 
part of their instruction in agriculture, they could do so only as individuals and only 
under the direct supervision of their missionary tutors. Indian political and religious 
leaders were specifically targeted by the reforming ministers as spiritual competitors 
inspired by the devil and bent on corrupting their flock or leading them back to their 
heathen and wild ways.76 As moral conversion necessarily proceeded the internal 
transformation which made rational progress possible, obedience, submission and the 
breaking of pagan pride were more often the object of missionary zeal than the more 
practical lessons in the mechanical arts. It was not enough to simply accept Christ 
into one’s heart as the outward signs of the conversion process had to be duly 
manifested in the daily discipline of the work regime that was designed to completely 
transform an entire “way of life”. Internal moral reconstruction had to be made 
manifest in bodily appearance and personal attitudes which would reflect and mark 
the salvation of the soul through the display of bodily comportment, modesty of dress, 
humility of manner, chastity and sobriety, etc., etc., etc. These experiments in social 
engineering were doomed to failure, not only because the Indians could not at this 
point be compelled to remain within the confines of these artificially created Christian 
utopias, but because colonial society itself was still heavily dependent upon the
75 Taylor, op cit., p. 197
76 Nicholas Canny “England’s old world and New 1480s - 1630s in (ed. Nicholas Canny, The Origins 
o f Empire., op. cit., pp. 155 - 156
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traditional skills of Indian hunters, trappers and warriors whose cash contributions to 
the “mixed” economies of the tidewater colonies cannot be under-estimated.
Despite the economic and political realities surrounding them, missionaries 
and philanthropists usually sponsored by societies and church organisations based not 
in the new world, but in old, continued in their determined efforts to civilise the 
savage. The emphasis on producing a pleasant and compliant Christian convert was a 
direct result of the purpose of Indian education which was not to graduate and Indian 
to equality and citizenship within the “mainstream” society, but to assimilate him/her 
as a wage labourer or domestic servant within the “lower” orders of colonial society. 
Rather than making their living in the growth sectors of the colonial economy which 
included such “wild” and “forbidden” pursuits as hunting, trapping, fishing, whaling, 
guiding, scouting, gun-running, fighting, raiding and slaving the missionaries 
preferred that they settle down to a life of poverty, deprivation and daily humiliation, 
as the lowest among the low, subject to the arbitrary will of an arrogant, fearful and 
openly hostile master class whose attitude to the Indian was anything but benevolent 
or paternal. In addition to scraping a bare existence from the margins of colonial 
economic activity, the Indians were expected to pay for the costs of their own 
“education” either by indenturing themselves as apprentices or by contributing most if 
not all of the meagre earnings to the upkeep and support of the missionaries who 
instructed them in these invaluable skills of independency, industriousness and self- 
sufficiency.
Indian hopes that outward conformity and accommodation to the assimilating 
pressures of colonial society would in some minimal way allow them some modest 
control over their lives and property were to be bitterly disappointed as colonial 
attitudes towards the Indians only hardened as a result. As wards of the colony the 
Indians lost any kind of diplomatic status as independent and allied tribes and soon 
became regarded as weak and dependent charity cases. The distinction between friend 
and enemy Indians would only become blurred to the point of irrelevancy as 
suspicions and hostilities deepened as colonialism penetrated ever deeper into the 
interior. As the tidewater colonies reached inward into the Appalachians and beyond 
and commercial agriculture encroached upon the hunting and trading activities o f the 
“Indian trade” they came across Indians who were not only hostile to white farmers 
invading their lands, but who were by this time armed and familiar with likely 
sequence of events that was soon to envelop their communities. Previously protected
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by their geographical location, these “un-subdued“ and still powerful Indian 
confederacies had had their ranks swollen by the thousands of Indian refugees fleeing 
the depravations and dispossessions of the east. As pressure on the frontier mounted 
and more and more Indians were violently displaced, the movement towards a unified 
pan-Indian resistance became ever more likely as did the potential for a generalised 
total war between Indian and settler, the scope and intensity of which would be truly 
genocidal as colonists sought not only to subdue the Indian resistance, but to 
completely “extripate” the Indian presence from the land.
Continental America
The relationship of the Indians to the new American republic was defined by the 
Treaty process in which Congress proceeded along the familiar tracts established by 
the British Indian Department, with the president simply replacing the King as the 
“Great White Father” under whose “protection” the Indians were required to submit. 
Although America invented itself as a modem and revolutionary new republic which 
had “wiped the slate clean” and was free to create the world anew it nevertheless 
appropriated and continued the ideologies and practices of new world empire as it set 
out to civilise the western lands and its Indian inhabitants. Indians were legally 
defined as sub-humans incapable of self-government and political independence and 
as such were admitted into the care of the United States government until such a time 
as they reached an appropriate level of social development and rational maturity. 
Indians it was decided could no longer be afforded the “illusion” and “conceit” that 
they were even rhetorically regarded as political equals and partners and must be 
unconditionally subordinated to Congressional authority as dependents of the Federal 
government. Under the gentle guidance of the President’s paternal hand, the Indian 
problem would be solved through the implementation of a six point strategy which 
included the following: 1) the impartial dispensation of justice, 2) a defined and 
regulated method of purchasing lands, 3) promotion of commerce, 4) rational 
experiments for imparting the blessings of civilisation 5) presents and 6) efficacious 
provision for punishing those who infringed Indian rights, violated treaties and thus 
endangered the peace of the nation.77 The modem instrument of achieving this aim
77 Prucha, (1994) op. cit., p. 101
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was the institutionalisation of a domesticated treaty system in which Indians were 
unilaterally declared to be an “internal” problem that would be solved by legislative 
fiat, not diplomatic negotiation within the framework of international positive law. 
Through the treaty process Indians would surrender their “natural” and “primitive” 
freedoms for the security of their persons and properties under the sovereign authority 
of the United States government.
Indians would be settled upon lands reserved to them and guided through the a 
period of adjustment and civilisation in which they would learn the skills necessary to 
leave their savage way of life and gradually integrate themselves into mainstream 
society as full assimilated individuals. While the Indians were “wards” of the state 
they would be helped through the civilisation process by missionaries, licensed Indian 
traders and Indian Department instructors who would enlighten them in the ways of
no
the modem world and give them a good solid Christian education. The government 
agreed to pay annuities in return for the ceded lands and guarantee their basic 
subsistence and support through the establishment of government regulated trading 
posts that would meet their basic needs. Washington’s humane Indian policy 
explicitly linked land cessions with Indian civilisation programs both as a means to 
pay for government sponsored projects to improve the social development of the 
Indians and to rid the Indians of their “excess” lands and thereby compel towards the 
more efficient use of what remained to them of their lands. As a hunting and 
gathering lifestyle could no longer be pursued on lands that had been cleared for 
settlement and the game had long since been exhausted both by over use and loss of 
habitat, the Indians were encouraged to take up intensive agriculture and manual 
labour to secure their material subsistence.
Washington’s vision of a new and human Indian policy continued and 
extended under Thomas Jefferson who believed that he could effect the complete 
transformation of the Indian through a comprehensive plan of enlightened social 
engineering. With the completion of the Louisiana Purchase in 1805 Jefferson was 
anxious to extend settlement over the old-north west and beyond the Mississippi 
where America’s continental ambitions could finally be realised. As the policies of 
effective occupation dictated an active program encouraging homesteading families to 
immigrate beyond the Appalachians in order to “fill the gap” and make America’s
78 Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and
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paper claims to the interior a reality on the ground. If the Indians did not want to 
settle down on individual agricultural holdings, they would be driven westward and 
northward where they could continue their traditional way of life beyond the line of
70settlement and free from the encroachment of white settlers. The Indians would not 
be forced off their small holdings left to them by Washington, but would be given the 
free choice to relocate to the vast parts unknown beyond the Mississippi thereby 
peacefully “opening” the “mid-west” to migrating pilgrim pioneers families in the 
north and to southern planters following the wilderness road into Kentucky and 
beyond, as they expanded into what would become the cotton belt of the deep south.
The wave of mass immigration and land speculation that followed the 
Louisiana Purchase pressed in upon the Indians who had managed to keep 
Washington’s army at bay long enough to negotiate treaties guaranteeing their 
territorial integrity upon remnants of their traditional territories despite the massive 
land surrenders demanded as the price of peace. By the turn of the century however, 
settlers had begun arriving in sufficient numbers to drastically alter the local ecology 
that was the economic base of the traditional way of life. Village life based upon a 
mixed economy required both subsistence agriculture communally tended and the 
sustainable use of forest resources which was incompatible with the demands of 
unlimited expansion demanded by land speculators who bought up multiple and 
adjoining sections in order to develop them into township lots to be sold en mass to 
individual capitalist farmers who would “settle” an entire region. In the south where 
planters competed with each other to consolidate land in ever larger blocks in order to 
maximise the economies of scale to meet the unlimited demand for cotton in the 
export market feeding the Lancashire mills of England. Indians were simply in the 
way and an unwanted obstacle in the way of America achieving its ambitions to 
establish itself on the world stage as an economic powerhouse worthy of its newly 
won political independence.80
As their standard of living fell sharply in the wake of a government subsidised 
settler invasion, securing the basic needs of the people became a pressing concern of
Intercourse Acts, 1790 -1834, (Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press) 1962
79 Letter from Jefferson to Secretary o f War, Feb. 27,1803, cited in Francis Paul Prucha, Documents o f
the United States Indian Policy, Second Edition ( Lincoln.: University o f  Nebraska Press) 1990 p. 22
80 Jefferson was anxious to secure America’s independence from both England and France, both of 
which were great powers at the time and convinced that America would simply become an economic if  
not political dependency o f one or the other rival empire. See Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History o f  
the USA, Second Edition (London.: Penguin Books) 1999 pp. 249 - 261
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tribal leaders and as such was recognised as an important strategic instrument in
01 # #
bringing the Indians to obedience. Treaties promised not only an end to immediate 
hostilities, but the promise of a future prosperity in the adoption of “civilised” settled 
agriculture on lands reserved to the Indians for their use and development. Indians 
were guaranteed their social and political integrity, if not their independence by a 
benefactor who would provide them the agricultural implements, breeding stock and 
seed along with education and vocational training necessary to establish themselves in 
their “new way of life”. While taking wisdom or folly of adapting “civilisation” 
would be hotly debated by generations of Indians into the future, the economic 
necessity of coming to terms with the changing landscape could not be avoided or 
denied. Little or no patience was shown by treaty commissioners who found the 
unwillingness of the Indians to abandoned their sacred customs and traditions as an 
irrational attachment to a way of life which they regarded as neither economically 
viable nor politically desirable. Harry Harrison, Jefferson’s secretary of war 
ceaselessly harangued the Indians at treaty conferences that the “scattered tribes” 
should form themselves into towns and villages, adapt the settled life and submit 
themselves to the instruction of Christian missionaries. 82 While simply “moving 
west” could make sense in the mind of a coloniser who regarded the land simply as an 
exchangeable commodity, many Indians were determined to remain on the lands of 
their forefathers by any means necessary. Exiled to the small remnants of marginal 
lands left to them, survival meant successfully negotiating between the onslaught of 
missionaries, traders and federal bureaucrats all of whom would try their hand at 
humanitarian intervention often with competing and incompatible ideals and agendas 
regarding the proper path to progress and the realisation of the “common good”. 
Harrison a firm believer in his own sacred mission to civilise the west lectured the 
Indians that it was not the United States government but God himself who 
“commanded for men to increase and multiply” and that this “divine command could 
not be obeyed if we were all to depend upon the chase for our subsistence”.
The injunction against the chase was however, selectively applied, as the 
mixed economy of subsistence frontier settlement required the systematic
81 Anthony Wallace, Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate o f  the First Americans, (Cambridge
MA,.: Harvard University Press) 1991
82 Prucha, (1994) op. cit., p. 119
83 Ibid, p. 119
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appropriation of nature’s bounty whether harvested or cultivated. The civilisation 
programs enforced upon the Indians merely excluded them from competing with their 
white neighbours in the highly lucrative fur trade which was a valuable source of 
windfall profits throughout the entire region and not an underestimated boon to 
western development. Harvesting the fruits of the forest supplemented many a white 
settler allowing him to accumulate he much needed hard currency from the trading 
posts necessary to purchase supplies and farming implements which otherwise would 
have to be bought on credit, access to which was denied to many an impoverished 
sod-buster whose subsistence existence was not very different from the Indians he 
was displacing. Encouraged by missionaries and instructors to abandon their “wild” 
and “savage” ways in favour of the domesticating virtues of settled agriculture and 
deprived of their “liberty” to buy and sell on the “free market”, the Indians were hard 
pressed to obtain the hard currency necessary to fund the “improvements” demanded 
of them. What had originally been negotiated as treaty promises to “purchase” land 
with the payment of annuity monies and trade goods soon deteriorated into the 
manipulation and abuse of subsistence goods in the pursuit of political and economic 
objectives of those in control of the system of supply and procurement. Along with 
the usual graft and price inflation to be expected from a monopoly system of 
command and control, Indian agents were soon using subsistence supplies as a means 
to impose compliance and obedience upon Indians reduced to dependence by the
Of
systematic destruction of the Indian economy.
Indian communities were settled on reserve lands held in trust and 
administrated according to the dictates of Indian commissioners and agents drawn 
from the ranks of land speculators and Indian traders profiting from their monopoly 
position under the government’s federal factory system. Legally constrained from 
entering the “free market” by their “ward” status and unable to raise the necessary 
capital for farm improvement due to their lack of “private” property and “freehold” 
title in their own reserve lands, the Indians were left to make the necessary
84 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Area, 1650 
-1815  (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1991. The English wilderness pioneers and Indian 
traders who were the initial vanguard o f penetration into the wild west followed a “Metis” or mixed 
way o f life which had been characteristic o f the old-north west since the original French courer de bois 
had traded and intermarried their way into the indigenous population back in the 16th century rendering
the neat division between “white” and “Indian” a fictional nonsense invented in the late 19th century.
85 Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds o f  Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian 
(Chapel Hill.: University o f  North Carolina Press) 1973
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‘"improvements” from whatever was left over after the purchase of basic subsistence
goods. With provisions and treaty annuity monies declining in value relative to the
increasing costs of production and the fixed prices on offer at the trading houses,
agricultural production was barely sufficient to sustain the basic needs of the people,
let alone supply the returns on investment necessary to compete in a profit driven and
highly capitalised market economy. The answer lie, not in advancing Indians the
capital required to improve their lands, but using the coercive compulsion of their
economic situation to drive them towards the necessary improvements. Jefferson
believed that economic pressure alone was sufficient to “force” the Indians to
abandon their traditional way of life and concluded:
When they [the Indians] withdraw themselves to culture of a small piece of 
land, they will perceive how useless to them are their extensive forests and will 
be willing to pare them off from time to time in exchange for necessities for 
their farms and families.86
As Jefferson had correctly perceived, under the economic constraints imposed by the 
federal government it was only a matter of time until the land itself would have to be 
sold in order to obtain the bare necessities of life itself.
The American government, well aware of the growing investment and
financial needs of the Indians, used the provision of trade goods within the factory
system as an economic lever to coerce the Indians into parting with even more of their
lands. Jefferson himself, actively cultivated the debt and dependency trap, clearly
recognising that the more the Indians owed the trading posts, the more they could be
forced to sell the only asset remaining to them, their reserve lands in order to pay their
debts or face starvation. In a letter to Harry Harrison, his Secretary of War, Jefferson
outlined his strategy to part the Indians from their lands on purely commercial terms:
To promote this disposition or exchange of lands which they have to spare and 
we want, for necessaries which we have to spare and they want, we shall push 
our trading houses and be glad to see the good and influential individuals among 
them run in debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the 
individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of land.87
Trapped within an unending cycle of debt, dependency and land cessions, the 
economic base of the interior Indians was further eroded and the capacity for 
progressive “development” and “improvement” was actively undermined by a
86 Prucha, (1994) op. cit., p. 119
87 Ibid, p. 106
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government pledged to “protection” of the Indian and their lands, but only as a 
temporary measure on the way to complete assimilation and disappearance as an 
independent people. Jefferson's dreams of progress and social advance for the 
Indians meant their active participation in the destruction of their own material culture 
through the loss of the land upon which their self-sufficiency depended and their 
survival as Indians was premised.
At issue, as always, was Indian sovereignty and the territorial integrity upon
which a self governing community is ultimately based. Jefferson’s development
policies did not intend the Indians to continue as independent if “subordinate”
communities as the ultimate aim of his Indian policies was the assimilation of the
Indians within the mainstream of American society. Indians were to be “weaned”
from their dependency on government subsistence and support through the eventual
move to private property ownership that would guarantee their prosperity. Once the
Indians had been sufficiently instructed in agriculture and the mechanical arts they
would “naturally” break free of their primitive “communal” existence and strike off
on their own as rugged individualists in pursuit of profit and self-improvement.
Development on the American model could only mean assimilation and the lose of
collective cultural identity and the eventual erasure of the Indian presence from the
land through the strategic erosion of Indian economic independence and loss of
national territorial integrity. Addressing an assembly of chiefs in 1809, Jefferson
proudly proclaimed his vision for the future of the American Indian:
We wish to see you possessed of property and protecting it by regular laws. In 
time you will be as we are; you will become one people with us; your blood will 
mix with ours; and will spread with ours over this great island.88
If the Indians did not immediately recognise the advantages of social progress they 
would have to be unceremoniously disabused of their confused thinking and irrational 
nostalgia for a way of life which had clearly been assigned to the dustbin of history. 
The American government may not have yet been able to remove the Indians by 
force, but they could surround their villages with industrial activities in order to 
provide an examples of “progress” worth imitating. Commenting on his decision to 
build an iron works near a Cherokee village believing it to be a drawn to settlers 
whom he hoped would encourage the Indians to:
88 D.W. Meinig, The Shaping o f America. Vol. 2: Continental America, 1800 -1867, (New Haven.: 
Yale University Press) p. 80
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... .enter on a regular life of agriculture, familiarising them with the practice and 
walue of arts, attach them to property, lead them, of necessity and without delay 
tco the establishment of laws and government and thus make a great and 
iimportant advance towards assimilating their condition to ours.89
The Cherokee, after years of isolation and resistance to American cultural influences 
had! begun, in the wake of the failure of the earlier Hopewell treaties, to move towards 
a pcolicy of gradual and self-directed change which saw them adapt selected aspects of 
Annerican political and economic institutions which would see them become the 
“imost” most civilised of the five “civilised” southern nations.
At issue as always was not development itself, but the power to dictate and 
comtrol the rate of change and adaptation. Rather than having policies of assimilation 
simply imposed upon them, the Cherokee opted to selectively integrate technologies 
amd institutions which were compatible with continued Indian self-sufficiency as a 
way of maintaining and enhancing self-government and independence. Because the 
political leadership remained intact it was possible for development to take place 
within already existing social and political systems which supported and encouraged 
Cherokee self-determination. Rather than erase or deny the centrality of Indian 
language and culture to Cherokee village life, Cherokee was transcribed into a script, 
taught formally in schools and formed the basis of a highly successful printing 
industry key to supporting and nurturing a highly literate and educated general 
population engaged at the ground level in the social and political development of the 
entire community. In 1808 the Cherokees began to formulate a legal code and in 
1828 they elected delegates to a constitutional convention which created a “civil” 
government on the American model including an institutionalised judiciary with 
courts, codified procedures and a regularised system of trial by jury.90
The institutionalisation of Indian self-government however, did not secure the 
Indians in their lands as the federal government and not the Indians remained in 
ultimate control of their legal tenure on the land. For the American government, 
questions of political sovereignty and independence had already been answered by the 
treaty process through which the Indians had voluntarily accepted subordination to the 
Congress and could be compelled by legal fiat to bow to the “will of the majority” for 
the “common good”. Although the treaties were specifically worded to preserve the
Prucha, (1994) op. cit., p. 113
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legal integrity of the Indians in what remained to them of their traditional territories, 
mere legalities were not going to stand in the way of the land appropriation needs of a 
growing nation. As even the most “civilised” of the southern nations were to find, no 
amount of social or economic development was sufficient to “graduate” Indians to 
equal political rights within the American Union. The government’s commitment to 
Indian civilisation was however, directly related to how this philanthropy served to 
subdue and integrate the Indian within the mainstream of American society. If Indian 
social and political development became a base not for the dissolution, but the 
preservation of Indian sovereignty and independence it was seen to “retard” rather 
than “progress” the civilization process. When it became apparent that the provision 
of subsistence goods and annuities were serving to enhance rather than transform 
Indian economic development and self-sufficiency, questions began to be raised about 
the wisdom of the government’s “generosity”. Annuities which had originally been 
formulated as a way of paying the Indians for their ceded lands became reinterpreted 
over time as an unnecessary and counter-productive charity measure which was 
actively discouraging Indian self-reliance and improvement.91 Indians would have to 
be weaned off this “dependency” culture through the imposition of austerity measures 
designed to restructure the social welfare provisions of the treaties so that communal 
practices would atrophy, thereby promoting the values of individual self-interest so 
central to the civilising mission of modem techno-politics at the heart of new world 
empire.
Captives and Segregation
British Atlantic
Controlling the surplus population of idle beggars thrown off the land and making 
their way to the urban centres of England became an a major policy concern as these 
displaced and often starving economic refugees threatened crime, social disorder and 
the occasional mob riot bordering on rebellion. As early as 1517, the rate of 
depopulating enclosures had so aroused the government that a commission of inquiry 
was established in order to examine the cause of this new phenomenon that was so
91 Prucha, (1994) op. cit., p. 139
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09completely transforming the nature of the English countryside. The explanation lay 
in the changing interpretation of property right and land use which empowered a 
manor landlord to simply order open-field peasants off the land following the harvest 
when their labour was no longer required.93 Progressive land reform meant that 
peasant small holdings and farmsteads were demolished and multitudinous village 
strips and arable fields were converted into a number of large pastures, enclosed by a 
hedge or a ditch. As historian Christopher Hill has documented, local law 
enforcement was heavily weighted against the poor with the result that men who were 
violently evicted could only bring an action for forcible entry if they were able to lay 
down the costs in advance.94 The resulting social dislocation was dealt with by 
legislative fiat as the authorities sought to control the growing mobs of “master-less” 
men by the imposition of a series of “poor laws” which restricted the freedom of 
movement of landless day labourers by binding them to the parish of their birth. 
According to Professor Hill, by 1610 any able bodied man or woman who should 
even threaten to run away would be sent to a house of correction and treated like a 
vagabond.95 Despite parliamentary efforts to manipulate the labour force for the 
benefit of the employing class, the growing ranks of the under-employed continued to 
outstrip the means to control them with the result that a great many escaped to the 
“freer” air of England’s towns and villages. In town they found themselves drawn into 
the emerging market in indentured labour, where for the price of passage they sold 
themselves into service for 4-7 years depending on the contract and conditions of 
work on offer. As the demand for labour in the colonies escalated “voluntary” 
indenture merged into semi-coerced exile as the solution to the “over-population” 
problem at home seemed to lie in the rational allocation of excess labour resources 
abroad where they could be more efficiently employed.96 In three years 3,570 people 
were sent to Virginia as scores of pauper children were swept off the streets of 
London to serve as apprentices and English jails were emptied as companies began to 
traffic in human flesh.97 As a captive labour force, the landless and poor were
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increasingly subject to crime and disorder legislation which criminalized large 
sections of the population as the market in “convicts” became increasingly popular 
with planters and farmers unable or unwilling to pay the high costs of “free” wage 
labour in the colonies. Finding useful employment for “idle beggars” and “convicts” 
had long been a popular cry of colonial promoters whose solution to crime and 
disorder at home was to “transport” and “remove” these undesirable base elements of 
society to distant lands where they could serve the common good.
In Ireland, political prisoners were added to the ranks of the de-humanised 
“criminals” sold into bondage, often for life, as “punishment” for their resistance to 
English occupation and expropriation.98 Forced and semi-forced forms of 
transportation and removal thinned the ranks of the unemployed and seditious at home 
while providing a captive labour force which could be worked under terms and 
conditions little better than the institutionalised forms of slavery that would follow. In 
order to justify the degradation of fellow human beings to the status of “chattel 
property” an ideology of degeneration and criminality would eventually merge with 
an already existing discourse of “primitive” and “savage” to produce a racial ordering 
of peoples definitive of characteristics fixed in nature and unalterable by 
“experience”. As a result, educating or civilising the lower forms of humanity would 
be considered a waste of time and resources if not a dangerous perversion of the 
natural order of things. Lacking reason the rule of “wild brutes” could only be assured 
by force with the result that pain, punishment, war and terror became the only 
instrument of order guaranteed to command obedience in the interests of self- 
preservation. As the use of war and terror became increasingly internalised as a 
normal and necessary instrument of government, the legitimate use of “organised” 
violence came more and more to determine and define “sovereign power” with or 
without the accompanying myth of original consent laying at the base of the liberal 
social contract. Nowhere was this apparent than in the ideologies of empire and 
conquest which dispensed with the need for consent of subject populations altogether.
The cultivated strategy of state terror in the service of extending colonialism to
ththe Celtic fringe was pioneered by Elisabeth in her Irish wars of the mid 17 century 
as the west country men sought to use military tactics to secure the plantations against
98 Abbot Emerson Smith, Colonists in Bondage; White Servitude in Convict Labour in America, 1607- 
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Gaelic peasants and herders who threatened to disrupt the smooth conversion of Irish 
lands to English estates. The terror tactics of Sir Humphrey Gilbert were infamous 
throughout Ulster and Munster where he forced his newly “conquered” subjects to 
march between the heads of their dead brothers, fathers, children and kinsfolk in order 
to that this display would “bring a great terror to the people”.99 As the English were 
however, only a small island amongst a much larger indigenous population the total 
control required by colonialism could only be effected within well defined spaces of 
English occupation protected by the establishment of well defended physical barriers. 
The “Pale” came to demarcate English settlement within Ireland beyond which the 
wild and marauding Irish were banished and exiled from their own lands.100 The Irish 
had to be removed and replaced with English planters in order that the civilisation of 
Ireland continue without the disturbing and disrupting presence of ungodly Irish 
rebels whose evil ways were simply beyond all hope of redemption. The only 
solution to the Irish problem was the effective use of force wherein the Irish rebels 
“must be subdued or banished out of the whole realm, and English subjects planted in 
their lands thoroughly” because they were “a people always disposed to naughtiness, 
murder, robbery, stealth and deceit and do not obey God’s law or Man’s.”101 The 
segregation of the two societies was never complete however, as the English 
plantation system remained dependent upon Irish labour, despite the importation of 
displaced Presbyterian Scotsmen to act as tenants on estates largely “owned” by 
absent ascendancy English landlords.102 The inability to completely dispense with the 
Indigenous population was one of the reasons English colonists got “bogged” down in 
Ireland and why so many frustrated gentry planters turned to the “empty” and “virgin” 
soils of America to build the world anew. New world empire would be distinguished 
from the conquests of the old world because it would not be impeded by the resistance 
of an already existing civilisation corrupt in manners and habits contrary to the 
rational and efficient use of the land and its resources as God had intended. While the 
colony remained little more than a military outpost contained within the limits of 
subsistence agriculture, trade and accommodation remained possible through the 
diplomatic instrument of treaty and the mutual exchange of goods which cemented a
99 Williams, op. cit., p. 151
100 Meinig, (1986) op. cit., p. 29
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relationship based upon consent and reciprocity. With however, the introduction of 
intensive capitalist production based upon the cultivation of mass export commodities 
o f either the Tobacco crop in Virginia or the farm products of New England destined 
for the slave plantations of the south and the Caribbean, the changing nature of the 
material demands of the settlers could only upset the balance which had previously 
existed in their relationship. As the land itself became a valuable commodity to be 
bought in large blocks by land speculators to be sold onto individual settlers, what had 
been a limited demand for land based upon the limited subsistence needs became an 
infinite and expanding market in settlement lands which literally knew no bounds.
Any attempt to contain colonial expansion within the agreed upon limits of a “land 
cession” gained through purchase or any other form of consent arrived at through 
treaty, even to end a war, could not keep pace with the infinitely “expanding” frontier 
and the westward marching “line of settlement”.
The result, predictably enough was neither “necessary” or “inevitable” but the 
product of the organisation of social relations on a capitalist basis which required the 
complete “removal” of the Indians in order to “open” the land to settlement through 
the creation of exclusive private property rights defined in common law as land held 
in “fee simple”. The construction of the land market in America is traditionally 
mythologized through the deployment of a discourse which reduces the process to the 
kind of disembodied historical force or biological drive which transcends the social 
and political powers of man to moderate and/or manage, let alone contain or confront. 
The march of Progress is equated to God’s providence, something beyond the power 
of mere mortals to oppose, even if such opposition was desirable which it is clearly 
not. In the same vein, the “land hunger” of the colonists is presented as a physical 
need beyond all reason and restraint excusing the use of terror, violence and war in 
the name of an imagined necessity which triumphed over all moderation and common 
sense. While the imperial authorities in London who were less implicated in the 
competitive pressures for land accumulation than their colonial counter-parts could 
see the wisdom and prudence in the “orderly” transition of Indian hunting territories 
to agricultural holdings, they nevertheless believed as fervently as their colonial
103offspring that this process was as unstoppable as it was necessary. When the
103 The Royal Proclamation which on the face o f it established the partition o f north America between 
Indians and settlers was viewed by its imperial authors as little more than a temporary and expedient 
measure designed to reassure the Indians and hence provide a transition period less violent and
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treaties failed to act as sufficient instruments of pacification through which the
Indians could be convinced of the settlers limited designs upon their lands, treaties
became redundant and the settlers reverted to war as the most expedient means to
compel Indian compliance and obedience. The pattern of aggressive dispossession
was apparent as early as the first planters in colonial Virginia experienced the effects
of a speculative boom in Tobacco which produced an exponential growth in
production from 20,000 pounds in 1617 to 350,000 pounds in 1621.104 Although
Governor Yeardly had sought to regulate colonial growth by including the Indians in
land use decisions through the treaty process, he was overruled by company
merchants unaware of conditions on the ground and looking only to the bottom
line.105 The resulting 1622 “massacre” was then allowed to act as a watershed event
justifying the complete expropriation of the Indians:
Our hands which before were tied with gentleness and fair usage, are now set at 
liberty by the treacherous violence of the savages so that we, who hitherto have 
had possession of no more ground then their waste, and our purchase at a 
valuable consideration to their own contentment, gained; may now by right of 
war and law of nations invade the country and destroy them who sought to 
destroy us.. .now their cleared grounds in all their villages (which are situated in 
the fruitfullest places of the land) shall be inhabited by us. . .106
According to colonial historian, Richard Middleton, after 1622, the English took 
every opportunity to destroy all the Indian settlements near Jamestown and the lower 
peninsula and continued sending expeditionary forces further upriver at least three 
times a year in order to kill the enemy and seize their crops.107 In 1630, the two sides 
agreed to maintain a strict separation line across the James Peninsula with only 
limited contact for the purposes of the fur trade which remained a strictly licensed and 
regulated under the sole authority of Virginia’s governors and strictly forbidden to 
ordinary settlers.108
By mid century, Governor Berkeley had formed the colonists into an effective 
militia fighting force which had finally succeeded in routing the Powhatan
therefore less costly to the imperial authorities. See Fred Anderson, op. cit., pp. 560 - 571., Francis 
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Crown Indian Affairs officials in land speculation .
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confederacies core interior chiefdoms, fragmenting their political and territorial 
integrity leaving them “dispersed and driven from their towns and habitations” and 
left to “lurk up and down the woods, but in small numbers” a mere shadow of their 
former self 109 The most fertile lands however, had by 1665 been already allocated 
and the consolidation of the most productive estates was well underway as the small 
holders found it increasingly hard to compete with the “vast plantations” running to as 
much as 3,000 and worked increasingly by slave labour. Rather than deal with the 
painful adjustments and loss of profits which would accompany a more equitable 
system of land distribution, tax relief and or economic support to see the small holders 
through the inevitable cycles of boom and bust, the emerging squirearchy which had 
come to dominate the House of Burgess, were content to let the market run its natural 
course. 1,0 As a result, the next generation of “freemen” were forced to rent land from 
the wealthiest planters, an erosion of their hard won “independence” which had by 
1675 reduced one third of Virginia’s population to tenancy.111
Rather than submit to the loss of freedom American colonists had come to 
regard as their birthright, many moved west and became frontier squatters who 
“illegally” usurped lands both from the Indians and from the land companies who 
held the official patents and deeds in the governors office. When the official 
surveyors eventually caught up with these “backwoods” men they would be evicted 
and their property confiscated (and resold to legitimate settlers) unless they could 
meet the necessary purchase price as well as any number of other extras such as back 
taxes, fines for trespass, surveying or other “administrative” costs and dues, tacked 
onto a process, which was even by colonial standards, regarded as thoroughly self-
t p
serving and corrupt. Because the Crown claimed its “prerogative” in the first 
purchase of Indian lands, these squatters could be dispossessed after they had served 
the useful purpose of bearing the initial brunt of Indian anger and hostility as 
settlement pressed ever deeper into the interior. To these hardened frontiersmen, it 
was the Indians menace and not the social and economic inequality of colonial society 
that became the focus of their grievances and resentments as colonial elites 
encouraged poor and disaffected whites to vent their aggression into Indian wars. By
Ogberg, op. cit., p. 180
110 James Horn, ‘Tobacco Colonies: The Shaping o f English Society in the Seventeenth Century 
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channelling the desperation bom of poverty, fear, ignorance and economic insecurity 
into a cultivated race hate war, sedition and rebellion at their centre could be projected 
outwards towards the “margins” where it could serve a useful function “extripating” 
the Indians who stood in the way of further colonial expansion.
The formation of colonial militias on the basis of race solidarity to counter the 
ever present threat of slave rebellion had already gone a long way of attaching poor 
whites to the interests of the great planters, defusing class conflict through the 
medium of a much more fundamental “common interest”.113 Cultivating a collective 
colonial identity based upon a universal equality grounded in the politics of race made 
it ever more difficult to draw subtle distinctions between “friendly” and “enemy” 
Indians, especially in the “heat of battle” when the aim was simply “to destroy them 
an ”i 14 Q)Uective security and survival could be counted upon to rally the colonists 
to their leadership, even in the face open civil war as happened in Bacon’s rebellion of 
1675 which had lead Governor Berkeley to declare an open war on Indians and “to 
spare none that has the name of an Indian.. .for they are now all our Enemies.”155 As 
the remnants of Powhatan’s people and the devastated Susquannahocks “chose” to 
“remove” themselves to the north and west of Virginia, they took refuge amongst the 
powerful interior nations whose security and independence would in turn find itself 
under threat as the Appalachian divide was breached in the early years of the new 
century.
Nor were things substantially different in New England where the Puritan 
ideology of mission and separatism informed the colonists with a ready made attitude 
of cultural superiority which allowed them to look on the Indians as natural inferiors 
to be “directed” into servitude for their own benefit. The colony was dependent upon 
the trade in Wampum shells with the Northern Indians to obtain the furs which were 
the financial life blood of the colony. The colonists in the words of historian Alan 
Taylor set up an “extortion and protection racket” that compelled the Indians to 
purchase peace with Wampum.116 Wampum collected as court fines levied upon 
individual Indians convicted of colonial crimes, together with the tribute extracted 
upon Pequot Indians directly financed the colonies trade debts and was vital to its
112 Francis Jennings, (2000) op. cit., p. 100
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expansion between 1634 and 1664.1,7 Fearing a Pequot revolt and the loss of this 
valuable commodity, Plymouth’s governor, William Bradford enlisted the help of the 
Pequot’s traditional rivals, the Narragansetts to launch a pre-emptive strike on the 
Pequot village in order to displace the Pequot and prevent them from holding the 
colony to ransom through the withdrawal of the Wampum trade without which the 
colony “could not subsist but would either be starved with hunger or forced to forsake 
the country.”118 In 1637, the governor undertook a raid on a large Pequot village on 
the Connecticut River in which the entire village and all its inhabitants, men, women 
and children, were burnt to the ground with any surviving Pequot Indians found in the 
vicinity of the colony were captured and sold into slavery.1,9 The level of violence 
was designed not simply to destroy the Pequot “enemy”, but to terrorise the 
Narrangansetts, upon whom they were still dependent, into absolute obedience and 
submission to the colony’s will. The destruction of the Pequot was a demonstration 
of the colony’s willingness to use extreme levels of force as an instrument of 
subjugation designed to preserve order by demonstrating that the Indian’s “allies” did 
not exist in a relationship of equality and reciprocity, but under the absolute 
sovereignty of the colonial government.
The problem, however, was that there was not a single cite of sovereign power 
in New England enforcing order and demanding obedience, but several divided and 
competing communities whose rivalry over Indian land and resources set them at odds
170against each other. This “internal” division and competition was aggravated by the 
“external” threat of the French and Dutch who offered an alternative source of trade 
and supply to the Indians and who had the added advantage of not coveting their land. 
As the different Indian communities managed to maintain a degree of independence 
by playing one side off against the other in this highly complex and fluid system of 
strategic alliance, fragmented both internally and externally, the colonists became
171even more insecure and suspicious of Indian betrayal and rebellion. The majority of
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Indians retained a high measure of freedom of movement, despite colonial efforts to 
regulate their economic and political activities through the extension of colonial law 
over resident Indian communities. The creation and establishment of praying towns 
was a related effort to tie the Indians down within a fixed locale at the “margins” of 
colonial society but still within its jurisdiction and control. The majority of Indians 
however, declined the opportunity to be saved and improved and opting instead to 
“remove” themselves from the “immediate” theatre of colonial settlement while 
maintaining “negotiated” degrees of contact in order to engage in the fur trade which 
remained essential to all, Indians and settlers alike. Suspicions remained high as long 
as alliances partnerships remained uncertain, with fears of conspiracy and betrayal 
never far below the surface even within the relative security of the “praying towns” 
established for the “benefit” of the colony’s Indian subjects. As resentment and 
distrust of Indians in general increased with the endemic low level violence and ever 
present threat of an impending Indian war of one kind or another, the Indian presence 
within the close vicinity of the colonies became ever more intolerable. Growing 
racial tension was only accelerated as available lands within the original boundaries of 
Massachusetts company became scarce forcing younger sons, who would have 
preferred to remain close to their families and home communities to become landless 
labourers or take their chances on the isolated and highly volatile frontier. Given the 
substantial and still formidable Indian threat in the Connecticut valley and the French 
allied Indians to the North and the East, many a pioneer ruined by Indian raiding 
would return home to cast a vengeful eye upon even the small remnants of Indian 
lands still remaining within the boundaries of the older and established colonies.
These lands would no longer be held by individual Indians, but held often in trust and 
under the authority of the colony itself or a sponsoring missionary society in charge of 
the various “civilising” activities which often included instruction in cultivation on 
small holdings of land, usually attached to a school or a church. The praying towns 
came to be under greater and greater pressure with more and more open hostility 
directed at “Indians” in general whose savage and wild ways could never be 
permanently eradicated, but only controlled and then only under the most strict regime
political situation in colonial New England based upon the original 1676 Royal investigation o f  the 
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of subordination and constant surveillance.122 The increasingly compulsive nature of 
life in the praying towns convinced many Indians to quit their “voluntary” residency 
and moving away, even though this meant abandoning ancestral lands to which they 
had a deep spiritual and political attachment. Widespread discontent and desperation 
took hold of New England disparate Indian communities and gave formation to the 
first of many pan-Indian movements which would emerge as a largely defensive 
reaction in the face of systematic and relentless English invasion of Indian lands 
regardless of professed allegiances or stipulated treaty obligations. King Philip’s war 
when it finally broke out in 1675 was the most devastating of all colonial Indian wars 
and raged for nearly two years before it was finally suppressed with the help of British 
forces and their Mohawk Indian allies brought in from neighbouring New York 
colony. The puritan victors defined the Indians as traitors, executed their chiefs and
171sold their captives into slavery en mass to far away colonies in the West Indies. At 
the end of the war, all Indians, even the “wards” under the official protection of the 
praying towns were banished from the colony as an unacceptable internal security 
risk, their lands being confiscated and their persons “removed” to Deer Island in 
Boston harbour.124 Following King Philip’s war a strict policy of internal segregation 
and external hostility was pursued by all of New England’s colonies, with the 
exception of Rhode Island, to the point where New England was the first among many 
later American states to declare the Indian “extinct” within their boundaries leaving it 
to their twentieth century descendents to begin the difficult task of reconciliation and 
“recognition” of the Indians who had persisted in their midst despite the centuries of 
oppression and discrimination which had sought to deny their very existence.125
Continental America
In the immediate aftermath of the Revolutionary War, the Americans had turned their 
revolutionary fury and outrage upon the Indian “allies” of the Crown whom the
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English had abandoned at the Treaty of Paris of 1783. Iroquois villages in the 
Mohawk valley were burnt to the ground and the Mohawk themselves were forced to 
flee with their leader Joseph Brant, himself and officer in the British army, to Canada 
where the British established a Reserve for his people near the fortress of Montreal.
In the south, the five “civilised tribes” attempted to negotiate a promise of eventual 
state status within the union, but were denied their request although under the skilled 
leadership of their chief Alexander McGillivray, the Creeks managed to retain the 
right to refuse entry to United States citizens without a federal or state passport.127 As 
both the British in the North and the Spanish in the South maintained their imperial 
presence on the continent until well after the turn of the century and the American 
army itself was war weary and heavily in debt, the western interior confederacies 
managed to resist the imperial ambitions of the new republic well into the next 
century. Despite Jefferson’s dreams of Indian removal beyond the Mississippi he had 
very little in the way of material means to accomplish this task and contented himself 
with “civilisation” programs designed to “settle” the Indians upon a greatly reduced 
land base. The rhetoric of conquest was moderated to one of “consent” based upon 
land purchases and Treaty promises to provide the Indians with agricultural 
instruments and instruction in husbandry in the hope that their communities would be 
dissolved and they would eventually be absorbed into the mainstream of American 
society.
The Americans however continued to believe in their exceptional enterprise as 
a universal aspiration of mankind in general and understood that it was only a matter 
of time before the Indian succumbed to his inevitable fate and vanished from the 
landscape of the modem world. America was after all a nation “founded under God” 
and the puritan principle of a “chosen” people destined to bring a “new Jerusalem” 
into being from the wild and empty places of the “new world” was never far below 
the surface. As the 19th century opened and the British decamped in the west to 
defend their more valuable empire in the east against a resurgent France, the Indians 
were once again abandoned by their “allies” to defend themselves and their lands 
despite Indian sacrifices during the war of 1812 which had kept British colonies in
126 Nash (2006) op. cit., 345 - 357 For a detailed analysis o f the effect o f  the revolutionary war on the 
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Upper Canada defended during an attempted American invasion.128 Although
Tecumseh had managed to keep the north-western pan-Indian movement alive and
well throughout the last years of the 18th century, he was eventually defeated at the
hands of Harry Harrison who in his victory echoed the sentiments of his pilgrim
forefathers faithfully when he unambiguously voiced what had by then become the by
then a standard reffame of new world empire:
Is one of the fairest portions of the globe to remain in a state of nature, the haunt 
of a few wretched savages, when it seems destined by the Creator to give 
support to a large population and to be the seat of civilisation.129
As industrialism in the north and boom in cotton in the south got well and truly
underway and Jefferson’s dream of a nation of gentlemen farmers gave way to the
modem world of steamships, railroads, urbanisation and mass commodity production
the era of unlimited expansion exploded across the continent from east to west. A
dynamic combination of industrial revolution and protective tariff barriers set
agricultural prices souring and with them the demand for land and profits to be made
in western land speculation.
The treaty promises of the last generation were about to be abrogated by a new
policy that would finally realise Jefferson’s dream of Indian removal, as a new
“Indian territory” was established West of the Mississippi to receive the country’s
relocated tribes. With Ohio, Indiana, Illinois in the north and Alabama, Mississippi
and Louisiana progressing from territorial to state status within the federal republic it
was becoming increasingly problematic to have the “foreign” presence of Indians on
their soil. In 1824, President James Monroe had authorised the “Indian Removal Bill”
providing for the “exchange” of Indian lands in the east for lands west of the
Mississippi River in a scheme which would see the creation of a new “Indian 
110Territory”. The Indian territory would provide a single “sanctuary” for all of 
America’s Indians where they could be safely relocated and taught the benefits of 
civilisation under the direct supervision of the federal government and its Indian
n t
agents. It was becoming more and more obvious to a newly industrialising 
America that a vast historical distance which made it completely inconceivable that
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the Indian could survive in the modem world. If the Indians themselves were 
unaware of their own obsolescence, it would be the duty of the Great White Father to 
impress this fact upon them, by force if necessary. The Indians were becoming the 
“noble savage” an relic of the past whose attachment to the land and “love” of the 
chase erected unbridgeable cultural difference which prevented these proud 
“warriors” from ever voluntarily adopting a settled and civilised way of life. Monroe 
made it clear however, that Americans could no longer afford to indulge the Indians 
by allowing them to remain in their savage state a condition which existed to the 
detriment of all:
The hunter or savage state requires a greater extent of territory to sustain it, than 
is compatible with the progress and just claims of civilised life...and must yield 
to it.. .A compulsory process seems to be necessary, to break their habits, and 
civilise them.132
Although the treaty system would not be abandoned, it would be transformed in 
content, if not in form, so that what originated at least nominally as a “consensual” 
process between political equals, became explicitly nothing more than a domestic 
legislative instrument to impose unilateral actions upon a reluctant and captive 
population. Under the leadership of Andrew Jackson, Tennessee militiaman and 
renowned Indian fighter, the Indian Removal Bill would be put into active use to clear 
the Indian presence completely from all lands east of the Mississippi regardless of 
past treaty promises entered into by the Federal Government.
Jackson, modelling himself as the staunch defender of state’s rights, would use 
his office as President to pursue policies he had long advocated as a southern planter 
who could only view the Indian as an obstacle to the advancing frontier and the 
security of young republics economic development and progress. Jackson was a 
realist who believed that the treaty system was outdated and should be abandoned. 
Now that the Americans had enough power to compel the obedience of the Indians, 
treaties were no longer necessary and could be retired in favour of direct 
Congressional legislation. Jackson, as a military man, dismissed hypocritical claims 
of expansion with “honour” and patronising promises of “benevolence” in preference 
for a clear and straightforward assessment of the Indian problem and its no nonsense 
solution. In a letter he wrote in 1817 to then President Calhoun he stated the 
principles which would later inform his own administration’s Indian policy:
132 Brogan, op. cit., p. 66
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I do not think it [making treaties with Indians] not only useless but absurd when 
Congress has the power to regulate all Indian concerns, by act of Congress and 
the arm of government is significantly strong to carry such regulations into 
effect. When the policy of treating with the Indians was first adopted, it was at 
a time when we found them thrown upon our hands by the treaty of 1783, 
without any provision being made for them and at a time they were numerous 
and hostile, while the arm of government was too weak to enforce such 
regulations as justice and good policy required hence the necessity of managing 
them by treaties. But time has passed away, the arm of government is sufficient 
to protect them and to carry into execution any measure called for by justice to 
them, or by the Safety of our borders. Hence the absurdity of holding treaties 
with Indian tribes within our territorial limits, subject to our sovereignty and 
municipal regulations, and to whom, by legislation, every justice can be done,
1 'X'Xand the safety of our Southern frontier perfectly secured.
Now that the balance of power had shifted in America’s favour, the government no 
longer had to negotiate with Indians, but could simply impose legislation by 
legislative will. To Jackson, Indian affairs was strictly a question of self-interested 
calculation in which the strength of the government and the dependence of the Indians 
rendered it possible for the Americans to now simply assert their sovereignty and 
protect their own national interest.
When Jackson became President in 1829 he set about translating his Indian 
philosophy into practical politics. Indians had become mere objects of administration 
and would be managed for the general good by the self-defined “justice” of the United 
States government according to the overriding needs of national security and the need 
to resolve the Indian problem.134 The rule of law meant nothing other than the 
capacity of Congress to enforce its new policy of direct legislation which the Indians 
would be made to obey through the judicial use of force, if necessary. Treaty consuls 
would still be held, but these gatherings became mere expedient means to inform the 
Indians of their obligations to obey the will of Congress which had decreed that 
Indians would be “removed” from lands east o f the Mississippi and resettled on 
reserves “sufficient” for their needs as determined by the government. Congressional 
concern for the “safety of our borders” and the “security of the frontier” took 
precedence over any concern for treaty and aboriginal rights gave way to a politics of 
survival and necessity carried over from the extended revolutionary war with the
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British Empire.135 Jackson was used the paternalist politics of the “civilisation” 
process to cast the Indian as an irrational savage dependent upon the Great White 
Father to ensure his survival in the modem world. 136 Power was to be understood as 
a political instrument which could be used by the stronger to impose justice upon the 
weaker as a matter of expediency and sovereign will. It was Jackson’s stated 
intension to uphold states rights in matters of territorial disputes with resident Indians 
who would simply no longer have the right to refuse to sell their lands if and when 
they were requested to do so at the treaty meetings called for this purpose alone. 
Jackson was not however acting in a political or legal vacuum, but was instead a 
product of a colonial society whose expansionist ambitions had already begun to be 
reflected in the judgements of the highest court in the land.
During the early 19th century, the Chief Justice John Marshall established the 
key principles and precedents of Anglo-America Indian law that are still in effect to 
this day. In the Marshall decisions, the mediaeval doctrine of terra nullis, based upon 
ancient concepts of natural law is reinterpreted to fit a modem context for the explicit 
purpose of justifying the legal foundations of Anglo-American empire. In 1823 
Marshall was confronted with the contest between rival claimants to the same land, 
one whose title was based upon a pre-revolutionary war deed purchased directly from 
the tribes by the Wabash-Illinois land company and another who had his title from the 
federal government.138 The dispute had arisen because Congress had repeatedly 
asserted its peremptory rights with regard to Indian lands and had declared all deeds 
purchased directly from the Indians as null and void, if not confirmed by federal 
authority through the proper procedures of the North-west Ordinance Act. In his 
decision to uphold the principle of federal prerogative, Marshall explicitly rejected the 
natural rights argument that the Indians were free to sell their lands to whomever they 
chose, describing the Indian “right” of possession as a “diminished” right and not on 
an equal standing with the “sovereign” rights of the United States government. The 
principle cited to justify this devaluation of Indian possession was not the natural law 
distinction between possession and ownership, but the “Doctrine of Discovery” which
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placed colonialism and land appropriation at the centre of a new world empire and its
unilateral assertion of self-referential sovereignty:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were 
eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively 
acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to the ambition and enterprise of 
all; and the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for 
considering them as people over whom the superior genius of Europe might 
claim ascendancy.139
Although it had always been a tenant of European colonial prejudice that Indians did 
not possess the political institutions of government necessary to confer exclusive 
ownership over territory, rendering the land an effective, if not actual terra nullis, the 
doctrine of discovery as outlined by Marshall removed the standard of civilisation 
from that of institutions to that of peoples themselves.
“Discovery” was an exclusively European act (Indians did not “discover”
Europeans) based upon an insurmountable cultural and technological gulf which
separated Europeans and Indians and measured them not according to some objective
natural criteria of social and political development embedded in natural law, but of the
inferior against the superior of which the superior then claimed a prior and absolute
right. The law of nations became under Marshall’s positivist interpretation a simply
matter of fact above and beyond any “higher” philosophical principles of morality,
natural right or justice, taking its foundation instead from the actions of sovereign
governments, which in this case blatantly dehumanised the Indians by pure act of
unilateral legal definition made effective through the exercise of sovereign will:
The title of the Indians was not treated as a right of property and dominion, but 
as a mere right of occupancy. As infidels, heathens and savages, they were not 
allowed to possess the prerogatives belonging to absolute and sovereign nations. 
The territory over which they wandered, and which they used for this temporary 
and fugitive purpose was, in respect to Christians, deemed as if it were inhabited 
only by brute animals.140
The fact that the “sovereign” nations o f Europe acted as if  the Indians were no better 
than animals and had established precedents to that effect was therefore deemed 
efficient to ensure that they would be forever defined as such under modem 
international law. While the medieval language of infidels and Christians had justified
Williams, op. cit., p. 308
139 Ibid., p. 313
140 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story commenting on the Doctrine o f Discovery , cited in Robert A. 
Williams, Ibid., p. 316.
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conquest originally, modem law would simply be based upon the empirical facts of 
the matter, these facts not being the product of an eternal law of nature, but a product 
of new world empire in its own act of self-creation.
Nor were the “empirical” facts of the treaties to stand in the way of the 
exercise of sovereign will on the part of the federal government when dealing with 
Indian affairs in the name of the “general good”. In two subsequent decisions 
involving the Cherokee Nation, Marshall upholds the modem principle that it is not 
the “shifting sands of history” but the unilateral application of sovereign will stands 
alone in proscribing the limits and extent of it own self-determining and self-defining 
power.141 Gold had been discovered in Cherokee country in the 1830’s which 
resulted in Georgia passing a series of racist laws forbidding the exercise of their own 
government and preventing the use of the natural resources on their own lands.’42 
Rather than upholding the law and “protecting” the Indians in their treaty rights to 
their traditional territories, the Georgian government was determined to “open” up 
these lands for the ownership and exploitation by authorising the survey of lands 
containing both farms and gold mines to be redistributed by lottery to Georgians an 
invasion of Indian lands backed up by the deployment of the Georgian guard.143 The 
Indians, knowing that they had a treaty with the United States government which 
promised them “protection” responded to Georgia’s transgressions not with violence, 
but with an appeal to the rule of law and took Georgia to court.
In the subsequent case of the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, March 5 1831 and 
the follow up case of Worcester v. Georgia of February 1832, Chief Justice Marshall 
used the Doctrine of Discovery, not the law of nations to underwrite and determine 
the limit and extent of treaty and aboriginal rights in the United States. The fact that 
Congress had chosen to “limit” its powers by entering into treaties with Indians was 
defined as a voluntary act, which can equally be voluntarily reversed by the same act 
of sovereign authority which brought it into being in the first place. Indians did not 
have treaty rights under any universal natural rights principle, but as a result the 
sovereign power that created them in the treaty process itself when the United States 
chose to limit its powers for their “protection”. Although the Marshall decisions 
seemed to confirm an uphold the Cherokee in their treaty rights it did so by describing
141 Debo, op. cit., p. 120-125
142 Ibid., p. 121
143 Ibid., p. 121
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the Cherokee as “a distinct political society... capable of managing its own affairs and 
governing itself’ it nevertheless subordinated the treaties to “acts of Congress” under 
the “supreme” sovereignty of the United States.144 The paternal relationship defined 
by the treaty no longer had status in international law as that between two sovereign 
equals, but one in which the Indians were defined as “domestic dependent nations.” 
whose relationship to the United States government is “as a ward to his guardian”.145 
Henceforth, American Indians in legal thought and political practice would not only 
be wards, but “perpetual wards” a subject and captive population which the United 
States would seek to exterminate with “singular felicity, tranquillity, legally, 
philanthropically, without shedding blood and without violating a single great 
principle of morality in the eyes of the world.”146
As the power of the American government increased relative to the power of 
the resisting Indians, the treaty system came into increasing disrepute as an outdated 
and obsolescent instrument to be abandoned in favour of direct military action. 
Jackson, citing the doctrine of “states rights” determined to impose what he believed 
to be in the “public interest” by pure force of arms, no matter how brutal the 
consequences for the resisting Indians. Defending the racist laws of Georgia over and 
above the “treaty rights” of the Indians Jackson stood by as the state held its lottery 
and the Indians were dispossessed of their farms and fields and their leadership was 
thrown in jail.147 Chaos and disorder followed upon the decision to forcibly remove 
the defiant Cherokee and so many died that Chief John Ross was finally given 
“permission” to manage the removal himself in the hope of alleviating the suffering 
and appalling lose of life visited upon the people.
Jackson “relocated” the Cherokee to reserves laid out for them east of the 
Mississippi in Indian territory in “exchange” for the traditional homelands they had 
fought so long to preserve against white encroachment. The government sought to 
veil coercion under the disguise of “consent” by offering individual allotments to 
individuals unwilling to move west, but removed by force of arms any who
144 Ibid., p. 122
145 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International law Second Edition, (New York.: Oxford
University Press) 2000 pp. 24 and 25
146 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (Cumberland House, Ware.: Wordsworth Editions 
Limited) 1998. When de Tocqueville did his tour o f  America in 1835, the lands to the Mississippi had 
largely been “cleared” o f Indians and the extreme violence to “win the west” from the Plains Indians 
had not yet begun.
147 Debo, p. 123
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collectively resisted this government sponsored policy of mass deportation. Jackson's 
ruthless removal policy was forever immortalised in the Cherokee “trail of tears” 
which became the defining episode of American westward expansion as “tragic” as it 
was “necessary”. The “inevitability” of the westward movement of America’s 
frontier society did however catch up with the Indians whose safety and security 
within the Congressionally defined “Indian territory” would prove as illusive as ever. 
As easily as reserve lands were given in “exchange” for lands ceded in the east, they 
could be taken away, as soon as it was once again deemed in the “general interest” to 
do so. As the Lord sovereign giveth, he taketh away and this time with even greater 
ease, as the Indians could have no such claim to “original possession” having obtained 
their land at the discretion of the United States government.148 Even as more and 
more western Indian wars were prosecuted to “relocated” the “captive” tribes of the 
Plains and the Southwest to reserves established “as an alternative to extinction” 
Congress busy dissolving Indian reserves through unilateral acts of enforced 
allotment.149 Finally in 1871 Congress passed a law terminating the negotiation of 
treaties with Indian tribes determining to “manage” Indian affairs directly under a 
federal bureaucracy empowered to set apart reserves through the use of executive 
order alone. 150
Indians had become a ‘Vanishing race” in the language of late 19th century 
imperialism to be swept aside by the inevitable march of progress which described the 
manifest destiny of the American people.151 In the face of this newly emergent and 
highly “vigorous” Anglo-American empire populated by the rational and industrious 
protestant nations of Europe, the archaic world of the American Indian could not hope 
to survive. As the systematic extermination of the buffalo was undertaken to ensure 
the most efficient end to the Indian wars which were disrupting the smooth expansion 
of new world empire, American’s could assure themselves that the Indians too would 
eventually providentially “disappear”. In order to preserve and protect the proud and 
fiercely independent Indian warrior, reserves would be allowed to remain as a refuge 
from modernity in which they could practise their ancient customs and dances, living 
museums pieces, in the legal equivalent of a game park for the amusement and
Meinig, (1993) p. 103
149 Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History o f  the American West, (London.: 
Picador) 1975
150Debo, op. cit., p. 294
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edification of the world’s scholars and conservationists. If the Indian, the very 
embodiment of the specimen “man” in the state of nature, was no longer of interest to 
scholastics spinning their webs of legal and political theory, he could still retain his 
magnetic, one could say animal attraction, for a new breed of scientists, now calling 
themselves anthropologists. Anthropology, the prodigal child of empire’s apex, would 
deny its own origins in the search for the Indian, the Aboriginal, the Indigenous, 
becoming the intensive focus not of politics, but of “culture” whose secrets promised 
to reveal not the arbitrary events of history, but the objective truth of man’s origins 
and original condition in the depths of his most primitive instincts and bodily desires.
151 Meinig, (1993) op. cit., pp. 191 - 196
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Conclusion
Ethics: The British Columbia Treaty Negotiations; Repetition, Return and 
Renewal on the Limits of New World Empire.
Therefore if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed
away; behold all things are become new.1
II Corinthians 5:17
Introduction
As this Thesis began, with the ethical/political problem posed by the initiation of 
modem day Treaty talks in British Columbia, so it must return to its original point of 
departure in order to make a new beginning within a broadened horizon of self- 
knowledge and historical perspective. The need to engage in Treaty talks with the 
Indians of British Columbia cannot be understood as an isolated event, but as yet 
another attempt by today’s practitioners of new world empire to solve the Indian 
problem. The Indian problem cannot be solved within the conceptual confines of 
colonial thought and practice because the Indian problem is itself a product of 
colonialism. The Indian problem will be produced and reproduced until the colonial 
power lets go of colonialism and begins a process of change and transformation. In 
order to begin a Treaty process, the imperial temptation to proscribe the Indian 
problem and its solutions must be resisted. In its place must begin a process of self- 
discovery in which the origins of new world empire are identified and its dynamics 
are empirically described. In order to move beyond the polices and practices of new 
world empire its possibilities and limitations must be made visible so that they are no 
longer replicated due to a willful ignorance of the past.
The Treaty negotiations will not and cannot progress within the confines of a 
legal regime grounded in the unilateral assertion of Canadian sovereignty over Indians 
and their traditional territories and yet this remains the official position. In his book 
analyzing the BC Treaty process, academic, Christopher McKee, noted that the 
Supreme Court of Canada has demonstrated that while Indians possess “a kind of 
legal title” to their lands, it nevertheless “must be made absolutely clear that in British
1 The Holy Bible in the King James Version, (Nashville.: Thomas Nelson Publishers) 1984, II 
Corinthians , 5:17, p. 681
249
Columbia, as in other parts of Canada, the Crown has both underlying and ultimate 
title to the Native people’s land.” In other words, the principle of ultimate authority 
vested in the Crown’s prerogative powers has remained the same since its original 
formulation in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Rather than grounding a treaty 
process in mutual recognition and respect, the Proclamation is put forward an official 
procedure through which aboriginal title can be “legally” extinguished. Neither the 
right of Canada to assert this power, nor its declared purpose to “Unburden” the 
Crown of the Indian problem seem to be “on the table” for negotiations. As such, 
British Columbia is set to repeat the errors of the past and begin yet another round of 
the failed policies of assimilation, development and segregation.
In many ways, the beginning of Treaty talks in British Columbia represents 
the closing of the circle within the historical unfolding of the theory and practice of 
new world empire. British Columbia is literally at the geographical limit of the “open” 
westward frontier and as such is a place where unlimited expansion in an absolute 
physical sense must come to some kind of closure and limit. In British Columbia, 
some kind of accommodation must be made to the limits of an imagined “freedom” of 
unlimited expansion into an open and empty frontier makes little if any sense, even as 
a metaphor. While technological “progress” will no doubt continue, nature as a 
boundless raw resource, an unproductive waste, unclaimed and unformed its only 
value in its pure potentiality. Land and resources have become valuable commodities 
whose ownership and control is the subject of intense political contest whose outcome 
is as “uncertain” as it is unknown. Entering into negotiations to construct mutually 
acceptable mechanisms for power-sharing and the co-management of land and 
resources remain the most pragmatic solution for people interested in a politics 
beyond the pure poetics of power.
With the closure of the actually existing physical frontier, the land and its 
resources, become transformed in the colonial consciousness from their original 
“paucity” to the “wealth” that only scarcity can convey. Scarcity sets limits upon 
consumption as finite commodities must be “managed” in a sustainable manner and 
an ethos of unlimited growth and expansion plateaus into a moderated need for 
systemic stability and continuity. As the natural world is re-evaluated in our political 
imagination land, so must our relation to nature be rebuilt, its traditional place of
2
Christopher McKee, Treaty Talks in British Columbia, (Vancouver.: University o f  British Columbia
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honour and dignity restored. The creation and maintenance of sustainability, balance 
and continuity requires respect for boundaries and limits that are material as well as 
social and political. While the culture of improvement will continue to produce and 
reproduce ever advancing means and methods to increase efficiency and productivity 
this does not and cannot answer the political question of ownership and jurisdiction. 
The traditional answer of new world empire has always been that political questions 
have technological answers in that those who have the most advanced arts and 
sciences are the most productive and therefore have the right to rule for “the general 
benefit of mankind”.
As such, politics, in the classical sense of a public sphere for the 
reconciliation of human diversity and plurality can no longer exist because difference 
as an ontological concept no longer exists. Qualitative differences are mere “errors” 
of perception which can be corrected, revealing the absolute uniformity of matter in 
motion, the base components of a purely material and mechanical universe. Once the 
scientific paradigm of physics is applied to the political problem, man’s historical and 
cultural differences can be seen as the product not of rationality, but of irrationality in 
the form of arbitrary and contingent customs, habits and traditions, “idols” to be 
purged from the mind. Man as man, is revealed to be as he is in “the state of nature” 
prior to any social and political “development” in an “original position” from which a 
universal position becomes visible. Man as man, no longer has need of politics 
because all difference has been erased and subsumed within the universal overarching 
technological imperative to progress and improvement. Progress, because it is always 
oriented to an open-ended future, must be without defining or delimiting limit with 
the result that the infinite accumulation of power becomes an end in itself. Traditional 
formulations of politics based upon the “absurd” speech of the scholastics and their 
classical conception of man as the “social and political” animal have no modem 
grounding in empirical science and are therefore dismissed from the realm of 
rationality. Rational politics is and can only be based upon a technological 
metaphysics in which free and equal atomistic individuals contract to transfer their 
natural liberty to the state, constructed as nothing other than an artificial machine 
designed to produce a common purpose; the avoidance of violent death. The 
Leviathan, as a power accumulation machine, is able to command the absolute
Press) 2000, p. 10
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obedience, or sovereignty, upon which all law, order and progress is ultimately 
founded.
Hobbes’s formulation of the Leviathan as an artificial power accumulation 
machine defines modem sovereignty and its will to unlimited expansion. Modem 
new world empire is defined, not by the heroic virtues of conquest and crusade, but by 
the “natural” and “mechanical” dynamics of power accumulation and distribution. 
Technologically “advanced” societies assimilate or annihilate technologically 
“backward” societies by logical necessity, otherwise known as, the inevitable march 
of progress. Bacon’s fervent belief in the trans-formative power of Christian charity, 
deprived of its providentially defined metaphysics, leaves man alone in a mechanical 
universe incarnating not the will of God, but his own will to power. Once elevated 
above all creation as the master and possessor of nature, the instrument and channel of 
God’s incarnation into the world, man is reduced to mere matter in motion, his life 
devalued and degraded into the ceaseless pursuit of power without purpose or 
direction. Although pained by the inherent nihilism at the heart of techno-politics, 
secular modernity will admit of no nostalgic longing for a “return” to an imagined 
sacred and enchanted past. Nor can the dignity of man be resurrected through the 
mere assertion of anachronistic Christian values deifying either man (Kant), the state 
(Hegel) or even the over-man (Nietzsche). Modem nihilism is the root and cause of a 
modem politics of power idolatry that technological progress only serves to enhance 
through each cycle of improved efficiency. Politics defined as the monopoly of 
violence can only work towards power accumulation and concentration with the result 
that state is identified with the police internally and the military externally. The end 
of modem sovereignty is the national security state in which the prosecution of 
perpetual war (both inside and outside) becomes its defining existential condition. 
Sovereignty is techno-politics because it “produces” empire through the colonial 
strategies of assimilation, development and segregation progressively transforming 
the objects of its power from their “natural” to an “artificial” condition. Since the 
transformation from natural to artificial can never be complete, because technological 
progress will never be complete, wave after wave of improvement and invention will 
generate successive and perpetual cycles of “modernisation” and “globalisation” 
moving from the “advanced” centre (origin/beginning) to the “backward” periphery 
(limit/end). Man, the raw material of political power, is transformed into a subject of 
the Leviathan; and as such becomes an object of technological administration, slaves
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to a universal and transcendent machine and its solipsistic auto-poetic productions. 
Modem sovereignty is, however, a non existent theoretical fantasy. Absolutes, 
whether of freedom or power, exist only as concepts and as such cannot bare 
historical scmtiny or practical application. A sa concept it can be evaluated as all 
political concepts and it is worth asking the political question of whether or not it 
remains a useful tool when attempting to negotiate a common future for Indians and 
British Columbians living on the limits of new world empire.
British North America; Born in the Shadow of Empire
Canada while being a successor state of new world empire, differs from its American 
cousin to the south by its very resistance to the revolution and its determination to 
strike an independent path on the basis of “traditional” British laws customs and 
values. Canadians remain curiously wedded to the past and self-consciously 
reproduce and preserve many aspects of the empire and its legacy of colonial and 
common law principles. The Indian problem, as a manifestation of new world 
empire, remains a common and enduring heritage of both successor states created by a 
withdrawing British power. As with Continental America and the British Atlantic 
before it, Canada has been plagued by its own attempts at the civilising mission of 
assimilation, development and segregation. New world empire was not only part of 
British North America’s imperial past, but was carried forward into confederation and 
beyond. When Canada began to gradually let go of the imperial apron strings, it was 
free to launch a nation-building exercise of its own and began once again to repeat the 
colonial pattern, deliberately choosing to ignore the pivotal and substantial role played 
by loyalist Indians nations. Canada’s historical revisionism is still with it today which 
is why Canadian Indian policy and legal practice remains mired in a colonial legacy 
which prevents it from moving forward positively into the future. In the “modem” 
Treaty negations, currently underway in Canada’s most westward province,
Canadians and British Columbians are once again offered the choice of ignoring the 
past and therefore repeating a failed colonial pattern or working with the Indians to 
build a relationship of positive peace grounded in a renewed Treaty relationship 
grounded in mutual respect, equality and partnership.
When the British Empire decided that its presence in the land of fish and fur 
was no longer a profitable and productive deployment of its military resources, steps
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were taken to evacuate the British North American colonies, leaving them to their 
collective fate. At the time, it seemed inevitable that the weak and divided remaining 
British colonies could not help but be absorbed by the emerging power to the south. 
According to colonial historian, P.J. Marshall, the role played by North America in
the Empire had long been marginal with the benefits of trade insufficient to justify the
*1
costs of colonial defense. The Indians, with traditional territories to defend, thought 
otherwise, and waged a war of resistance to American expansion that continued, aided 
and abetted by the British for nearly 50 years (1776-1819). During this time, the 
Indian allies were dealt with diplomatically, in accordance with the protocols and 
ceremonies of the traditional treaty-alliance system. The balance of power had shifted 
and the British, fighting mainly at sea, found the fighting prowess of the Indians 
absolutely vital in the protection of their Upper Canadian Loyalist colonies. The 
“treaty-system” while always diplomatic in form, if not always in content, had a 
chance to evolve and did so according to the “realities” of this new situation. During 
this long period of co-operation and mutual need, the treaty system became what it 
had once been in the early colonial period; an international agreement between free 
and equal partners based on shared and mutual interests. British imperial officers and 
Canadians fought alongside the grand Indian alliance systems and Indian leaders such 
as Joseph Brant and Tecumseh became field officers and proudly wore the Red Coat 
of command.4 The Governor-General of the United Canadas, Lord Dorchester, 
recommended the creation of an interior Indian nation in the old north-west and 
actively campaigned, along with Crown diplomats and Indian Department officials, to 
have the United States recognise Indian rights in their ancestral lands. 5 In the “high” 
diplomacy being pursued in London and Washington, the Canadian based imperial 
governors sought to erect legal barriers to American expansion by advocating the 
legality of Indian titles, treaties and political jurisdiction over lands in the disputed
3 P.J. Marshall, “British North America, 1760-1815”, in The Oxford History o f  The British Empire,
Vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century, (Oxford.: Oxford University Press) 2001, p. 386. Interestingly, 
Marshall himself restate the British imperial presumption that Canada will eventually be absorbed into 
the American orbit. This conclusion follows naturally upon the calculations o f new world empire in 
which political and economic “forces” simply cannot be defied by social and political action. I offer 
the alternative proposition that Canada’s continued existence not only testifies to the contrary, but 
points the way to a shared future with the Indians “outside” the prescriptive norms o f  new world 
empire, thereby defining its “limits” in both political thought and practice.
Robert S. Allen, His M ajesty’s Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence o f  Canada 1774 - 
1815, (Toronto.: Dundrun Press) 1993
5 Anthony J. Hall, The American Empire and the Fourth World vol. 1 (Montreal & Kingston.: McGill- 
Queens University Press) 2003 p. 378
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territory.6
Canadian officials were anxious to protect the new and vulnerable loyalist 
colony of Upper Canada and knew that Indian allies on the as a fighting Upper Ohio 
were key strategic assets. Dorchester revived the old Proclamation of 1763 and 
instructed all of his field commanders to respect the freedom and independence of 
allied Indian nations, stipulating that: “Indian laws, customs and conventions be 
respected and treated as paramount.”; that treaties take place only between authorised 
Crown officials and the Principle chiefs and headmen “.. .of the Nation or Nations to 
whom the lands belong.. .”7 As Indian resistance proved effective, the British were 
encouraged to re-enter active war-fighting in the wake of an attempted American 
invasion of Upper Canada in 1812. The war of 1812 proved a defining moment in 
Canadian history as the stalemated powers of new world empire finally decided to 
settle their differences through negotiation rather than violence. The American 
attempt to absorb BNA was finally abandoned and an international boundary on the 
49th parallel was agreed in 1818.8 The Indians, as well as their British and Canadian 
compatriots, were once again betrayed in Whitehall, as imperial officials conceded on 
paper, territory, the Americans had decisively failed to take on the ground.
Disbelief and dismay overcame field officers who could not understand why 
they were being told to withdraw from lands they and their Indian allies had died to 
protect. Delivering the news to his Indian allies, British Provost, Robert McDouall, 
expressed his grief and mortification, but announced that the decision was definite and 
that there was “no alternative to compliance”, although he admitted that “ ...our 
negotiators, as usual have been egregiously duped; as usual they have shewn 
themselves profoundly ignorant of the concerns of this part of the Empire.”9 Once 
peace had finally been established, however; the British empire began to withdraw 
and the Indian allies were retired into redundancy. The familiar pattern of financial 
retrenchment followed by colonialism returned once again to British imperial Indian 
policy. Indians were once again a troublesome “burden” and an unwanted presence 
that needed to be “cleared” from the land in order to make way for productive farms 
and commercial agriculture.
6 Ibid, pp. 400
7 Ibid pp. 410
g
B. Brown and R. McGuire, Indian Treaties in Historical Perspective, (Ottawa.: Research Branch, 
Canada, Department o f Indian and Northern Affairs) 1979 p. 5
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Former allies became wards and wards became captives as the most 
enlightened policy British officials of the Indian Department could come up with was 
a gradual program of “euthanasia” through “amalgamation” achieved through dual 
policies of education and enforced miscegenation. 10 The Treaty relationship endured 
but was evacuated of its primary function as a diplomatic instrument and in so doing 
was divested of its central ethical premise. The sacred Treaty relationship was once 
again reduced to nothing other than a mechanical devise through which the Crown 
could obtain legal title to Indian lands by “purchasing” them in “exchange” for 
specific treaty rights and annual annuity payments. The Crown resurrected the 
institution of treaty, but reduced it from its military and diplomatic function to a mere 
technical instrument to “extinguish” Indian title through a “legal” surrender. More 
like land cession agreements than treaties, these documents were deployed to quickly 
strip the Indians of their lands and remove them to the margins of settlement. Seven 
such “land cessions” in the decade after the war of 1812 alone, saw some 2.8 million 
hectares of Indian land pass to government control.11 Upper Canada4 s population 
increased by a factor of 10% from 95,000 to 952,000 between the end of 1812 and the 
census of 1851.12 The new colonies had to be developed and this meant the 
conversion of Indian lands into productive farms. Agricultural productivity once 
again was pursued by the British to encourage colonial self-reliance and gradually 
wean them from the imperial purse. With the war over, the Indian alliance and its 
customary payment of supplies and ammunition was once again viewed as an 
unnecessary expense that could and must be drastically reduced.
The local colonial elite, in combination with British imperial governors and 
Indian agents once again worked together to dispossess the Indians of their lands and 
subjugate them to an alien political authority. In order to provide the revenue to pay 
for the land purchased from the Indians, the Lords of the Treasure devised a plan in 
which purchasers would be required to pay 10% as a down payment and carry the rest 
as a mortgage. The interest from these mortgages would then be used to finance the
9 Allen, (1993), op. cit. p. 165
10 David T. McNab citing Herman Melville’s plan to for “Euthanasia of the Savage tribes” in “Herman 
Merivale and the Colonial Office Indian Policy in the Mid Nineteenth Century,” in A.L. Getty and 
Antoine S. Lussier (eds.) As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows, (Vancouver.: University o f  
British Columbia Press) 1990 p. 87
11 Robert J Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Upper Canada 1815 - 1830” in Lussier and Getty, (eds.) 
o|). cit., p. 66
J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History o f  Indian White Relations in Canada,
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annual “treaty annuity payment” to the Indians, thereby sparing the imperial war
1 ^office this unnecessary expense. The Indians were made to pay for their 
dispossession, establishing a pattern for the efficient management of Indian affairs in 
this new era of civil administration.14 Former allies were now considered wards of 
the Crown and an obstacle to agricultural expansion to be removed from the vicinity 
of towns and settlements.
British colonial administrators began to a program of civilization common 
throughout the empire as well as a growing body of law to manage the poor and 
criminal classes of England. Sir Francis Bond Head arrived in Upper Canada 
equipped with his dual experience administering the poor law in England and 
commanding Indian labourers in the silver mines of South America. 15 Sir Francis 
Bond Head was appointed as head of the Indian Department in 1836 charged with the 
implementation of the segregationist policy of removal consistent with 19th century 
imperialist ideology. The Indians were to be relocated and confined to a reserve 
created for them on Manitoulin Island where they could pursue a way of life more 
reflective of their “natural” inclinations.16 Indians had once again been made and 
remade from allies into wards and ending as captives on the margins of colonialism 
where they could await their fate as a vanishing and dying race unfit for the modem 
world. The British North American colonies meanwhile were being pressed into 
responsible government and free trade with the Americans. When the Crown 
eventually “created” Canada as an independent “Dominion” in 1867, responsibility 
for “Indians and Indian lands” was devolved to the new Canadian federal government
17under Section 91, Subsection 24 o f the British North America Act, 1867.
Canadian Dominion and Domination
While the myth of new world empire rests on the dual concepts of an empty and 
vacant land awaiting the hand of civilization to tame the wilderness and bring a vast
(Toronto.: University o f Toronto Press) 1989, p. 92
13 Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Upper Canada, 1815 - 1830”, in Getty and Lussier, (eds.) op. cit., 
p. 69
Ibid., p. 93
15 Hall, op. cit., p. 433
16 Hall, Ibid, pp. 433
17 John L. Tobias, “Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History o f Canada’s Indian 
Policy” in (eds.) Getty and Lussier, 1990, pp. 39
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potential resource into ordered and efficient productivity, the “inevitability” the 
colonial project is nowhere more in question than in the Canadian case. British North 
America was not a sovereign state, forged in the fires of revolution, but a loose 
collection of extremely vulnerable colonies brought together through a gradual 
process of evolution, accommodation and negotiation. Canadian “federalism” has 
always remained a loose and somewhat unstable affair, with diversity, rather than 
homogeneity at the centre of its political culture. Canada is a small and 
underdeveloped country, relying upon resource extraction industries and special trade 
relationships, first with the old imperial preference system, and then with a negotiated 
trade relationship with the American Republic. As the old tie to Great Britain fades in 
comparison the economic importance of trade with the United States the “drift 
towards Continentalism” has always been resisted by the Canadian government. The 
“artificial” and “unnatural” East-West link is maintained by any number of “national” 
institutions ranging from the highly subsidised transportation and communication 
networks to the creation of a political framework which is so highly decentralised that 
Canada seems to be in a perpetual “constitutional” crisis. Canadians have always 
been aware that the plurality at the heart of its confederation perpetually resists the 
creation of a homogenous political culture. The resource base of the various regional 
economies keeps them close to the land and its specific and local character and 
quality. Canadians, because they have always defined themselves as hewers of wood 
and drawers of water, have long identified with the land and it is this sense of 
entitlement and competition which has structured the conflict between Canadians and 
Indians.
The Indians have struggled to extricate themselves from not only the colonial 
machinery of the state, but more importantly from the legacy of empire which has 
rewritten the past for its own convenience and largely wiped the Indians from its 
collective memory. Not only have First Nation histories not been taught to Canadians 
in school, but the early partnership between Upper Canada’s governors and their 
Indian allies has all been buried in favour of a colonial history which reduces the 
Indians to irrelevancy. The Indian Act, the reserve system and the institutionalised 
educational divisions have created such a thorough and complete situation of 
segregation that very few Canadians have any contact with Indians at all. Indians are 
regarded as a vocal, but ultimately small and powerless minority. Many Canadians 
are so uneducated that they can only view Indians as the “spoiled children” of
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confederation who have a whole collection of race based “special rights and 
privileges.” Constitutionally protected treaty and aboriginal rights are blamed for 
delaying the desired “assimilation” or “integration” believed to be the only lasting 
solution to the Indian problem. In 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau publish the 
infamous White Paper on Indian affairs which imperiously declared that it was “an 
absurdity” that one segment of Canadian society should have “treaties” with any 
other, advocating a sweeping reform that would see the entire system of treaty and
i o
aboriginal Rights “wiped away” in a single act of legislative fiat. Immediate and 
effective organised resistance forced the government to abandon the policy, but the 
rallying cry of “one law for all” has endured reactionary apologists of new world 
empire who believe that Indians and their rights can be simply legislated out of 
existence.19
Thankfully, such an extreme policy is no longer regarded as either legitimate 
or even legal now that treaty and aboriginal rights have been enshrined under Section 
35(1) o f the Constitution Act, 1982. Trudeau, an intellectual and a Jesuit by training; 
to his credit actually listened to the Indians; took responsibility and educated himself, 
changing not only his mind but his politics. The White Paper was abandoned and the 
Prime Minister became and advocate and champion of treaty and aboriginal rights, 
often in the face of entrenched provincial opposition. It did not hurt, of course that 
Indians, and Indian lands being a “federal” responsibility strengthened his bargaining 
hand with respect to the premiers, but it is a modem myth that ethics and interests
9ftmust necessarily be opposed. Indians and their potential to disrupt resources 
exploitation, especially with regards to fish, forestry, mines and energy have been the 
driving force in keeping the progress of treaty and aboriginal rights on the government 
agenda. At the top of the current agenda is settling the “outstanding business” of un­
extinguished aboriginal title still “burdening” the Crown in large parts of Canada 
where treaties with the Indians have never been signed. Treaty making as an 
instmment of empire fell into disuse at the turn of the century leaving large parts of 
Canada’s north and all of the Province f  British Columbia with “unresolved” land
18 Juan D. Lindau and Curtis Cook, “One Continent, Contrasting Styles: The Canadian Experience in 
North American Perspective.” in Curtis Cook and Juan D. Lindau, (eds.) Aboriginal Rights and Self-
Government, (Montreal & Kingston; McGill-Queen’s University Press) 2000 p. 13
19 Mel Smith JLome and Native Land? What Governments ’Aboriginal Policy Is Doing to Canada
(Victoria.: Crown Western) 1995
20 See Sally Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 1968 - 70 (Toronto:
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questions. The Indians, still very much in possession of their traditional territories, 
never entered into treaties with the Government and as such still hold what has come
91to be known in Canadian legal discourse as aboriginal title.
As the Supreme Court has recently been upholding aboriginal rights to their 
“un-ceded” lands, the Crown’s right to issue various types of resource harvesting 
licences has become “uncertain”. Uncertainty drives away investment, with the result 
that the BC government has come under pressure from its business community to 
“settle” the “Indian land question” which has remained unresolved since the Province
99 •entered confederation in 1871. Having stubbornly denied aboriginal title since its 
very inception, the Province must now negotiate “modem” treaties in an era when the 
Indians now have constitutional protection of their rights, a well organised political 
machine of their own, to indefinitely delay resource development and a general public 
mood of support given the principles of justice clearly visible in the Indian position. 
Even the usual scare tactics revolving around the usual threats of job loss, if not total 
economic meltdown, have failed to mobilise the levels of fear and hate necessary to
9“>
derail the negotiations. Treaty negotiations are never easy as constructing a binding 
agreement to serve as a lasting dispute resolution mechanism is a difficult process and 
as such the imperial temptation to abandon diplomacy and reach for the familiar 
instrument of state sanctioned coercion is never far from the surface.
Although it is has been the argument of this thesis that the shift from the use of 
Treaty as an established diplomatic practice, to its abuse as a legal instrument of 
domination and subordination, it is political choice and not natural necessity which 
has been the cause. As such, all Canadians must take responsibility and not only 
educate ourselves about the history of Canadian/Indian relations but actively work 
towards building positive peace this time around. The institution of Treaty has 
survived over 300 years of British/Indian relations and pre-dates not only 
confederation, but even British North America itself. Each time, Treaty, as a solution
Toronto University Press ) 1998
21 The law around the definition and substance o f aboriginal title, is as they say in legalese “evolving”
see section on “aboriginal title” below.
22 Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics, The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 
1849-1989, (Vancouver: UBC Press 1990) esp. Chapter 17, “The Province and Land Claims
Negotiations, 1976-89,” pp. 227 - 237
23 During the course o f the Nisga’a Treaty negotiations E. Boyanowsky, wrote in the National Post that 
BC was “entrenching ethnic hatred” and that a race hate “slaughter on the scale o f the Tutsis / Hutu 
genocide was just around the comer if  the government “persisted” in its efforts to “transform an 
underclass into an over-class, replacing on historic injustice with another.” Quoted in Christopher
260
to the Indian problem is revived, there is always the imperial temptation to subvert its 
spirit and intent and use and abuse it as a temporary and expedient measure disposable 
at will. While techno-politics and the three strategies of colonialism have been the 
imperial legacy, repetition can turn into renewal if we learn our history and make the 
self-conscious political and ethical decision to do things differently this time around. 
Canada itself has stood the test of time, despite all “rational” calculations to the 
contrary and has built itself up as a national community in direct defiance of the 
purified poetics of power politics.
Canadians are not Americans by conscious choice and deliberative action 
which is why the inherent right to self-government and self-determination is 
something all Canadians should intuitively as well as “rationally” understand and 
embrace. At the same time, the history of Canadian/Indian relations is as irrational as 
it is shameful, and is something every Canadian has the duty to confront in order that 
we understand our own history and overcome the ingrained cultural prejudices which 
have created the very Indian problem we seek to solve. Making the Indian into a 
problem requires a concentrated effort of willful ignorance which no longer 
politically, legally and especially economically feasible. It is time we constructed an 
alternative strategy, a strategy not invented by ourselves as some unobtainable utopia, 
but one which is already embedded in our history, our law and our political 
institutions. If the spirit and intent of Treaty is to be restored an honest engagement 
with the past as the ground for the present must be undertaken just as truth telling 
must always precede reconciliation and justice is the only salve soothing to ancestral 
furies.24
Constructing the Indian Problem in Canada
When the pilgrims turned on the very Indians who had nurtured them through the lean 
years of initial settlement, the struggle for survival seemed paramount and passions 
were easily inflamed by an intoxicating cocktail of religious zeal and economic greed. 
During the American Revolution, the Indians, in defense of their lands; fought 
alongside the British and came to be viewed as defeated enemies by the victorious
McKee, op. cit., pp. 97 - 98
24 Ted Hughs, Aeschylus, The Oresteia, A New Version by Ted Hughes, (London.: Faber and Faber) 
1999
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Americans. Although, it was the British and not the Indians who submitted in the 
Revolutionary war, but American’s nevertheless coerced the Indians into punitive 
peace treaties acknowledging the sovereign power of the United States Congress. 
Neither of these confrontations were “inevitable” however; as the diplomatic 
relationship of the early years could have been broadened and extended to moderate 
the impact of colonial development in such a way, if not to stop the process of 
expansion to at least keep it within bounds that both sides could find acceptable.
Even the revolutionary war need not have spoiled relations if the Americans had not 
ceased the opportunity to invade the lands of the Six Nations and the Western 
confederacy burning their villages to the ground. During the war of Independence, 
the Indians had not so much joined the British as attempted to maintain their 
independence between what they could only view as a particularly ugly civil war in 
which the victory of either party was likely to be of little value or concern to the 
Indians.
It was not the inherent hostility of the Indians, nor even the insatiable “land- 
hunger” of individual immigrant settlers, but the combined force of speculative profit 
and geo-political domination driving the unlimited expansion definitive of new world 
empire. Colonialism is a product of a government structure in which the “machine” of 
state is designed to protect and consolidate the power of a propertied class of 
landlords, aided and abetted by a rapidly expanding class of international fmancers 
and commercial trading houses. The imperial and colonial elites, although often in 
conflict with each other about the division of wealth and power are nevertheless 
united in the pursuit o f the “common interest” which is the continuation and 
perpetration of an imperial regime of domination and dispossession. Theft, backed up 
by the unrelenting coercion of the state, in both its military and police functions are 
legitimated through the myth of the “inevitable44 march of progress and civilisation. 
First the infidel, then the Indian and finally the barbarian, (the term evolves through 
successive cycles of expansion and contraction) must be shocked and awed into 
accepting the fascinating and fascistic “fantasy” of imperial sovereignty and totalising 
global hegemony. The British Empire and the United States, the first withdrawing and 
the second asserting, its dominance on the continent, irrespective of Indian rights or 
interests. Britain and America would modify their relationship, according to the 
balance of power between them, and would change from enemies, to rivals to allies 
alternating between the conflict and co-operation which has defined the Anglo-
American “special relationship” since the 19th century.
Canada, however was formed both within and against this rivalry and it cannot 
tell, even to this day, which alliance is more important to its sense of identity and its 
relationship with both its “British” past and its “American” future. When the British 
left, after the war of 1812, it could only be assumed that the weak and vulnerable 
colonies would “drift” into the orbit of American power, eventually to be subsumed 
within the giant to the south.25 Somewhere in between lies a “middle-ground” which 
opens up and disrupts the myth of universality, even within the cultural confines of 
new world empire itself. The duality at the very centre of Canadians who claim a 
“loyalist” British identity highlights a glaring hypocrisy which makes the betrayal of 
the Indians, many of whom were self-identifying British “loyalists” themselves even 
more diabolical and inexcusable. British North America was not a nation, but a 
collection of colonies with little in common accept their desire not to become the 
latest addition to the American empire. Being a northern land of forest, fish and fur, it 
was not much suited, even in its agricultural heartland of the United Canada’s to 
agriculture and as such remained largely a subsistence economy. Indians and 
Canadians alike were forced to scrape a marginal existence from the land and the 
“fruits of the forest” and as such resembled a frontier existence even within its 
scattered towns and settlements. As such Canadians understand themselves as 
humbly as “hewers of wood and drawers of water“ and have managed to combine a 
regulated and nurtured agricultural and industrial base alongside its primary industries 
of resource extraction and development. From its earliest days Canada was not so 
much a “modem” economy as a “middle ground” where co-existence and
interdependence began to create a “Metis” or mixed culture where the boundary
*)(\between Indian and trader/settler became ever more blurred. In the largest part of 
the country the vast extended lands of the north-west were run for the most part, not 
by the government but by the Hudson’s Bay company where even the English found 
“half-breed” amalgamation a useful and profitable devise and as such it was put into 
practice, although it was officially forbidden among company officials.
Canadian “nation-building” as it was imagined in the immediate years 
following confederation was premised upon such an extraordinary act of revisionism
25 According to the pure poetics o f power politics, Canada simply should not exist.
26 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Area 1650 - 
1815 (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1991
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that it can only be described as the kind of willful use and abuse of history which 
Nietzsche would recognise as fine art of the politics of forgetting. The decision of 
Canadian politicians and bureaucrats to adopt a self-conscious policy of colonialism 
and imperial expansion in the early years of the Confederation, cannot be explained 
away by the convenient myths of national security and/or inevitable necessity. The 
Indians were partners and often relatives, there was no population pressure and there 
was no imminent threat of invasion from the south. The self-conscious and 
calculating choice of Canada’s very own empire builders to embark upon their own 
designs of unlimited expansion from “sea to shining sea” had more to do with the 
profits to be made from the sale of Indian lands to railway companies than it did with 
any concern with for either settlers or the Indians.27
When the newly empowered federal authority boldly embarked upon its own 
version of new world empire complete with the defining policies of assimilation, 
development and segregation in the late 19th century; it was a self-conscious as it was 
calculating and marked a betrayal of not only the Indians, but of all Canadians who 
would have to live with the legacy of colonialism, right up to an including the present 
day. When the federal government decided to “open” up the western lands to 
settlement in 1871, it revived the treaty process as the most cost effective measure, 
Prime Minister Alexander McKenzie proudly proclaiming to parliament that “ .. .the 
expenditure incurred by the Indian treaties is undoubtedly large, but the Canadian 
policy is nevertheless the cheapest, ultimately if we compare the results with those
?o
incurred by other countries; and it is above all a human, just and Christian policy.”
The purpose of the treaty as understood by the Canadian government was to 
“extinguish aboriginal title” and avoid the “expense” of an Indian war similar to the 
one being waged south of the border and costing the American government an 
estimated 20 million dollars a year when the entire annual budget of the government 
in Ottawa was a mere 19 million Canadian. Indian Commissioners were duly 
dispatched to this end and the “numbered treaties”, so called because numbered 1 
through 7 were negotiated and signed in rapid succession across the prairie fertile belt
27 Dean Neu and Richard Therrien, Accounting fo r  Genocide; Canada’s Bureaucratic Assault on 
Aboriginal Peoples, (London; Zed Books 2003) pp. 42-43
28 Miller, op. cit., p. 162
29 Ibid., p. 163
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between 1871 and 1877.30 Although the Indian negotiated in good faith, the 
commissioners often complained of the delays holding up what was to them a purely 
formulaic and mechanical process which the Canadian government now regarded as a 
moral as opposed to strictly legal obligation undertaken primarily to pacify the 
Indians and prevent trouble on a frontier they had no way of subduing by force.31 
Before the ink was even dry on the treaties however, the federal authority was busy 
consolidating its legislative power over Indians and their lands through the enactment 
of a series of Indian Acts. Beginning in 1876, the Indian Acts, passed by the 
Canadian government, without the representation or even the consultation of the 
Indians, began the process of systematically and unilaterally undermining and even 
abrogating the treaty promises just undertaken by negotiators on the ground.
The first comprehensive Indian Act o f1876 took effective control of Indians 
and their reserve lands, dismissing the traditional Indian leadership and submitting 
their government to Indian agents directly responsible to the Department of Indian 
Affairs in Ottawa.32 As early as 1869 the government had passed the Gradual 
Enfranchisement Act whereby Indians would be “lead by degrees to mingle with the 
white race” and assimilate with the general population even though Indians would not 
be able to vote in federal elections until I960.33 The assimilation process would be 
helped along by a new policy to divide reserve lands into individual lots assigned to 
individuals who would be put on a three year probationary period in which they 
would be expected to demonstrate their adaptation to European concepts of private 
property and settled agricultural production.34
The Indian Act was amended in 1884 and 1894 to allow the Superintendent 
General to lease Indian lands for revenue purposes without taking a surrender, 
allowing the growing bureaucracy to finance itself without excessively taxing the 
public purse. 35 As settlement advanced on the Prairies Indian reserve land was
30 Brown and McGuire, op. cit., p. 28
31 Ever since the Marshal decision o f 1832, treaties with Indians had been strictly defined as an 
“domestic affair” which carried neither national or international legal ramifications. Although Canada 
was committed to the treaty making process by the Royal Proclamation o f  1763 “aboriginal title”
remained undefined and disregarded until tested in the Canadian courts in 1885. More about this later.
32 John S. Milloy, “The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change” in 
Getty and Lussier, (eds.) op. cit., p. 57
33 Allen, (1993) op. cit., p. 202
34 John L. Tobias “Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: an Outline o f  the History o f Canada’s Indian 
Policy” in Getty and Lussier (eds.) op. cit., p. 44
35 Ibid, p. 47
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increasingly made available for sale to non-Indians in order to promote economic 
development on lands which were not being effectively utilised by the Indians 
themselves.36 Indian development was further encouraged by the “education” 
programs designed to convert the Indians through the dual instruments of Church and 
School in which Indian children could be “insulated” from the influence their parents
XIand tribal elders. The Indian residential school system in Canada would soon 
become the primary site of the colonial effort to “wipe away” Indian identity by a 
kind of “enforced amnesia” which would indoctrinate Indian youth in the “Christian” 
heritage of their benefactors. The political and religious institutions of their elders 
were, meanwhile, undergoing similar sustained attack as the Indian Advancement Act 
of 1884 empowered the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs ever greater powers 
to directly interfere in the Band’s political affairs. Indian agents reporting directly to 
Ottawa could without consultation or consent determine election regulations, the size 
of the band council, the deposition of elected officials and even call and preside over 
band meetings.39 Attempts by the Indians to preserve even their traditional religious 
and cultural values came under attack by Indian Act amendments to prohibit 
traditional ceremonies which were the focus of Indian government and dispute 
resolution amongst the nations. Recognising the political importance of the Potlatch 
and Sun Dance; the government made them the subject to outright bans punishable by 
fines and even imprisonment.40 Resistance to escalating levels of government 
interference in the daily life of the Indians lead to an increased police presence in and 
around the reserves, as well as a determined effort by the government to suppress 
Indian organisation and opposition.
Reserves in Canada, unlike those in the United States, had a very small and 
fragmented land base, with an average size of 3000 - 4000 acres compared to the 
300,000 or more acres typical south of the border. 41 The small size of the reserves, 
their fragmented nature and their isolation, both from each other, and from the vicinity 
of towns and settlements is indicative of their function as devises for assimilation
36 Ibid, p. 49
37 Miller, op. cit., p. 113
38 Hall, op. cit., p. 439
Tobias, (1990) op. cit., p. 46
40
Tobias, (1990) op. cit., p. 46
41 Frederick E. Hoxie, “The Reservation Period 1880-1960” pp. 183-258 in (eds.) Bruce Trigger and 
Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Cambridge History o f  Native Peoples o f  the Americas vol. 1, part 1, North 
America (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press) 1996 p. 201
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rather than the provision of a sustainable land base for the Indians. 42 In spite of 
promising the Indians that they could select the location of their own reserve lands; 
Indian officials on the prairies refused to survey reserves which they felt were to close 
to the international boundary and the Plains Indian wars raging to the south.43 The 
American, General Sheridan, had agreed to a peace commission in 1867, but only to 
buy enough time to allow for the completion of the transcontinental railroad which 
would finally bring about the end of the war not only because he would be able to 
move more troops and supplies, but more importantly because the waves of settlers 
would transform the land through population pressure and commercial agriculture that 
would deprive the Indians of their basic subsistence and force them to either conform 
or starve. 44 Sheridan urged legislators to allow the “extermination” of the buffalo, 
knowing that the threat of mass starvation was the most expedient method of forcing 
the Indians onto Reserves 45
Although the Canadians lagged behind their American cousins in opening up 
the West to settlers due to a lack of both settlers and material resources,
Commissioner Edward Dewdney lost no time in taking full advantages of 
developments south of the border in his own campaign to bring the Plains Indians into 
compliance. While “crossing the medicine line” may have offered temporary relief to 
Indian refugees fleeing the American army, starvation proved to be an enemy it was 
not so easy to escape. Canadian officials drew up treaty annuity pay-lists, ticketing 
the Indians in “Canadian” bands in order to prevent unauthorised “non-treaty” Indians 
(American or otherwise) from receiving any supplies, including food rations, from 
Canadian forts. In order to separate and divide the tribes, Indian Affairs officials 
removed their Forts to the north, forcing the starving bands to retreat from the border 
and settle on reserves laid out for them hundreds of miles from the original locations 
initially agreed during the treaty negotiations 46 Dewdney then followed up his forced 
relocation program with a “no work no rations” policy, in which the goods and
42 John L. Tobias, “Canada’s Subjugation o f the Plains Cree 1879 - 1885” in The Native Imprint: The 
Contribution o f  First Peoples to Canada’s Character, vol. 2, From 1815, (ed.) Oliver P. Dickason.
(Athabaska AB: Athabasca University) 1996 p. 152
43 Robert S. Allen, “A Witness to Murder: The Cypress Hills Massacre and the Conflict o f  Attitudes 
towards the Native People o f the Canadian and American West during the 1870s” in Getty and 
Lussier, op. cit., pp. 229-243”
44Jill St. Germain, Indian Treaty-Making Policy in the United States and Canada 1867 -1877  
(Toronto.: Toronto University Press) 2001 p. 35
45 Ibid., p. 209
46 Miller, op. cit., p. 172
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supplies, promised to the Indians by the terms of treaty, would be skillfully managed 
in order to produce the required “adaptation” to settled agriculture.47 As well as being 
fragmented and isolated from each other the Reserve lands themselves were to be 
atomised into 40 acre lots in order to break up villages and undermine the communal 
farming practices in favour of individual plot cultivation supervised by a farming 
instructor 48
Opposition to these draconian policies escalated throughout the 1880’s and the 
government responded by deposing Chiefs and cutting off government rations, and 
increasing the police presence in and around the reserves. 49 When the treaties were 
originally negotiated in the 1870’s the North-West Mounted Police had played a 
minimal and largely symbolic role as agents of the Crown and were neither equipped 
for nor inclined towards a display of force.50 As tensions mounted on the Plains both 
north an south of the border frustrated Cree and Metis leaders held inter-tribal 
councils in 1884 to organise a campaign of co-ordinated resistance. 51 In a panic, 
Dewdney ordered troops be dispatched to suppress what later went down in history as 
the “north-west rebellion of 1885” something that would simply not have been 
possible prior to the completion of the trans-Canadian railway in 1884.52 Dewdney 
demanded that the Indian chiefs declare their obedience and loyalty to the 
government, announced that any Indian found off his reserve would be declared to be 
a rebel, captured those whom he believed to be the leaders, six of whom were hung as 
traitors.53
After the rebellion the Indian Act was amended to ensure organised Indian 
resistance would be avoided in future through the careful control of Indian mobility 
formalised in the formal power granted to the NWMP to arrest any Indian off the 
reserve without permission.54 In what became known as the “pass-system” Indians 
were not only subject to the arbitrary detention of their agents but were subjected to 
increased police surveillance on and off reserve where they could be arrested and 
jailed for congregating in large numbers or engaging in any behaviour deemed
47 Ibid., p. 174
48 Tobias, (1996) op. cit., p. 151
49
Hoxie, op. cit., p. 203
50 Allen (1990) op. cit. pp. 232 - 233
51 Hoxie, op. cit., p. 203
52 Ibid, p. 204
53 Ibid, p. 204.
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threatening or even merely disorderly.55 Government control over the reserves and 
Indian property in general was increased in the wake of the rebellion in order to assert 
ever growing control over band resources and economic development. In order to 
drive home the point that the government and not the Indians “owned” the land and 
Band resources, Indians were forbidden from disposing of any goods without 
permission, including the crops and animals raised on the individual plots of land 
assigned to them.56 In 1890 the Indian Commissioner Hayter Reed decided that 
Indians could only learn to farm the land if they were taught the work habits of 
peasants “who cultivated their crops with hand tools, grew produce for home 
consumption and maintained more than one or two cows”. 57 In an effort to instill the 
moral values of industrious and self-reliance , Indians had to learn the protestant work 
ethic through the discipline of work as an end in itself and as such mechanised 
equipment and any other form of labour saving devise was forbidden, even if the
ct>
Indians funded the purchase of such instruments themselves.
The reserves were never intended as an enduring economic base form which 
Indians could survive as Indians, but as a temporary and expedient measure to contain 
a captive population, while various experiments in social engineering were 
successively deployed is evident in the way the Department administered both Indians 
and their lands. Indians were not seen as free and independent peoples capable of 
organising their own representative structures but as objects for administration that 
must be reformed to meet the civilisation agenda of the Canadian government. Indian 
systems of government and political leadership were ignored and/or systematically 
suppressed in the construction of an entire bureaucratic apparatus of hierarchically 
arranged structures through which power flowed downward from the federal 
Department of Indian affairs through to regionally organised “Indian agencies” 
terminating in the local and immediate unit of the Band council. Although the 
“Band” members “elected” their councillors and their Chiefs, voting eligibility was 
determined and defined by the Indian Act, as was the power and representative 
function, of both these “representative” offices. Neither did representation translate
54 Miller, op. cit., p. 175
55 Ibid., p. 192
56 Tobias, (1996) op. cit., p. 152
57 Hoxie, op. cit., p. 216, See also Sarah Carter, Lost Harvest: Prairie Indiart Reserve Farmers and 
Government Policy (Montreal.: McGill-Queen’s University Press) 1990
58 Tobias, (1996) op. cit., p. 152
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into decision-making power as all band decisions were subject to the approval of the 
Indian agent who could not only depose non-compliant chiefs and councils, but could 
even divide and/or amalgamate the bands themselves if deemed administratively (or 
politically) expedient.
The assault on Indian political and economic independence and integrity was 
actively resisted, but all legal remedies were effectively foreclosed both by the 
structure of Indian administration imposed under the Indian Act, by the exclusion of 
individual Indians to the ordinary rights of citizenship and in 1927 by an 
extraordinary amendment to the Indian Act which made it illegal for any person 
(Indian or non-Indian) to raise money or provide funds for the persecution of Indian 
claims.59 This was not to be repealed until 1951, effectively making it impossible for 
any Indian organisation to exist if pursuing Indian claims was one of its objectives.60
Over the years, Indian policies of forced assimilation, unwanted development 
and policed segregation have been attempted with disastrous results for everyone 
concerned. The outright denial of aboriginal rights, including the inherent right to 
self-government and the right to the use and enjoy the land, has lead to the perfectly 
predictable and legitimate outrage of Indians everywhere. With the institution of 
treaty first subverted into a purely formalistic mechanism for the conversion of Indian 
lands into real estate and then abandoned altogether, there has been no sanctioned 
channel for the representation let alone mediation of Indian interests within the 
Canadian political system, nor was such a mechanism either intended or desired. 
Indians were expected to assimilate and as such to “disappear” with the mainstream 
population and their failure to do so has always been at the heart of what is commonly 
constructed as the Indian problem.
The government has attempted, over the years, to get to grips with the Indian 
problem and has devised any number of reports, commissions, strategies and 
initiatives to effect a solution, but has never succeeded in its self-appointed task. 
Rather than providing the ground for the gradual “adaptation” of the Indian to the 
benefits of civilisation the Canadian government has produced a system of 
segregation so extreme that the south African government found it a useful model 
upon which to base its own system of “native administration” commonly known as
59 Paul Tennant, op. cit., p. 112
60 Ibid, p. 112
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the Apartheid regime.61 The reason for the persistence of the Indian problem is to be 
found not in the irrationality of Indians, but in the construction and perpetuation of a 
colonial relationship in which unresponsive and unrepresentative technocrats design 
and implement their own policy agendas, with little if any, consultation or consent on 
the part of the subject peoples. In the absence of any political institutions to moderate 
and mediate conflict, coercion, sanction and even the naked use of force have come to 
characterise a relationship defined through the parameters of power and resistance.
There is however, a limit, even in the use of force, and it is in that limit that 
the Indians have created a space in which to articulate their demands at every level of 
political engagement from the local to the global. Despite efforts to actively frustrate 
and repress Indian political organization, the government has never been entirely 
successful in silencing an active and engaged Indian activist population. The 
struggle to have their voices heard and their rights recognised has been the driving 
force behind the formation of the American Indian Movement in the United States, 
the Assembly of First Nations in Canada, the Special Working group on Indigenous 
Peoples at the United Nations and a whole host of local, regional, national and 
international organisations pursuing what has become known as contemporary “fourth 
world” movement in Canada and throughout the world. Fourth world politics, is a 
broad based international social and political movement which addresses issues that 
cut across the arbitrary boundaries of political theory and include civil and political 
discrimination, social and economic dispossession and exploitation and cultural, if not 
actual genocide. The growing power and confidence of the fourth world is not the 
result of some new post-modern and post-colonial Indian renaissance, but a testament 
to the strength and endurance of people who have successfully survived the onslaught 
of imperial domination which produced the modem state system itself. Indians are 
linked across the length and breadth of new world empire, not only because they are 
building up trans-national alliances which “transgress” borders, but because those 
borders were superimposed from the very beginning on already existing interlocking 
Indian social systems of alliance and tribal interdependence. The very fact that North 
America “Indians” have common colonial experiences with Australian “aborigines”
61 Hall op. cit., 504 - 506
62 The 1927 Amendment o f the Indian Act made it a criminal offence for anyone, white or Indian to 
make material contribution to any Indian organization for the purpose o f pursuing a land claim. This 
was not repealed until 1951. See Paul Tennant, op. cit., pp. 111 - 112.
63 G. Manuel and M. Posluns, TheFourth World: An Indian Reality (New York: Free Press) 1974
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on the other side of the planet speaks more about the international reach of new world 
empire and its continued relevance to contemporary world politics, than anything else. 
Indigenous politics continues to deity the arbitrarily constructed boundaries of the 
modem-nation state, but the state and its self-referential “assertion” of sovereignty 
remains an important, if not the most important, site of political contestation and 
resistance.
Aboriginal Title and The British Columbia “Land Question”
The Indian challenge strikes at the heart of sovereignty by attacking its main 
legitimising discourse, the social contract and the inviolable rights of “property.” The 
BC Treaty negotiations offer an opportunity to look behind the mask of sovereignty 
and glimpse the political struggle between two contending claims to ultimate 
ownership and control of land and its resources. The question of who governs and to 
what purpose cannot be answered by a simple unilateral “assertion” of absolute right, 
but must be opened up to address the political/ethical claims of both parties on an 
equal footing and judge between them. Such a task requires that we move beyond the 
simplistic calculation of power relations and requires that we re-examine the 
ethical/political foundations of sovereignty in its modem form. While it is self-evident 
that the Canadian state dwarfs the Indians in power political terms and can command 
vast resources of financial power and legal expertise, to say nothing of the police 
powers it keeps close at hand and has occasionally threatened to use, this fact alone is 
insufficient to “resolve” the problem. The Indian problem in BC takes the particular 
form of a contest over land and property right, but is much more than a simple “land 
claim” because aboriginal title refers not to a single defined piece of property or even 
a collection of properties, but to the communal ownership of the land in general, it is a 
national and territorial claim which predates that of the British Crown and as such has 
therefore rendered Canadian sovereignty “uncertain” in almost all parts of British 
Columbia.64
While the “land question” in BC has been effectively denied and/or ignored by
64 The Indians in resident in North-Eastern section o f British Columbia were adherents to Treaty 8, 
because they were on the Eastern side o f the continental divide and so were include when the treaty 
system extended from the southern to the northern prairies as land in the central wheat belt gradually 
filled up. Treaty 8 wasn’t signed until 1899, some 20 years after the “numbered” treaties simply 
because the Canadian government did take on its responsibility to settle with the Indians until there was
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both levels of government throughout the history of Canadian confederation, the 
Indians did not give up their long struggle to have their rights recognised and have 
recently enjoyed some success in the courts. The Supreme Court has found that 
because aboriginal title has not been “extinguished” or “surrendered” by either treaty 
or direct legislation, it remains a “burden” on the Crown which must be dealt with 
before resource development on the lands in question can proceed. The nature and 
definition of aboriginal title, is as they say in the legal profession, “evolving” but even 
at the bare minimum allowed under colonial law and legal precedent, it constitutes a 
“use” right, which as a type of “property right” can not be arbitrarily extinguished, or 
at least not without due process.65 The Indians are pulling away the mask of 
sovereignty to unveil the cluster of rights and interests contained within the “black- 
box” of the state and in so doing bring politics back into the equation of power at this 
most fundamental of human questions; who has the right to rule and why? The contest 
for “sovereignty” taking place in this far flung outpost of the Pacific north-west 
remains tantalisingly close to pinning down new world empire and making it give an 
account of itself.
To be forced to disclose reasons, is to be forced to admit of a definition and
hence a limit, and with limits come questions of accountability outside and beyond the
mere calculation of technological efficiency and expediency. The Indians have called
into question, and revealed sovereignty’s alchemy, its ability to conjure itself out of
nothing and to assert self-referential and illegitimate claims over other peoples’
person and property.66 By challenging the myth of sovereignty the Indian land
question raises the question as to how the Crown “asserted” sovereignty over the
province when there were self-governing territorial nations in place whose “rights”
where neither recognised, nor extinguished. As John Burrows, a leading expert in the
field of aboriginal and treaty writes has written;
Sovereignty is pretty powerful stuff. Its mere assertion by one nation is said to 
bring another’s land rights to a “definite and permanent form;” simply by 
conjuring sovereignty is enough to change an ancient peoples relation to the 
land. A society under sovereignty’s spell is ostensibly transformed for use and 
occupation are found to be extinguished, infringed or made subject to another’s
pressing political or economic reason to do so.
65 See Thomas Isaac on the “evolving” nature o f  treaty and aboriginal rights, with specific respect to 
the concept o f “aboriginal title” Thomas Isaac, Aboriginal Law Cases Materials and Commentary, 
Second Edition: Cases Materials and Commentary (Saskatchewan.: Purich Publishing) 1999 pp. 1 - 1 0
66 John Burrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, (1999) vol. 37, No.3, pp. 538 
-596
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designs.67
As the Indians remain the lawful owners of the land and its resources, the Crown can 
only be viewed, even and especially within its own terms of reference as an illegal 
trespasser at best and a criminal usurper and invader at worst. The Indians have never 
given their consent to the alienation of their lands, nor surrendered their inherent 
rights to self-government and self-determination. By confronting modernity on the 
terrain of its own making, the Indians strike at the very heart of techno-politics and 
the claim of a universal and transcendent power guaranteeing the common good.
The Indians have never and will never be subsumed within the state and as 
such will never be just another “pluralist” interest group vying for power in the 
competitive market place of political influence and power. Indians, by their very 
definition are “different” and stand “outside” the “unity” of the “body politic” and 
cannot be made to enter into a political relationship against their will and without their 
consent. By refusing to abide by the rules of Hobbes’ scientific paradigm of politics, 
the Indians refuse his nihilistic choice between assimilation or annihilation, and force 
a relationship which cannot be defined by force alone. The Indian land question, 
because it cannot be solved through the mere calculation of power, opens up the 
political/ethical debate which must surround any attempt at the reconciliation of 
differences. The universal and transcendent myth of state sovereignty has been 
revealed to be an instrument of colonialism, one with the very modem intimate 
connection between political power and property right. As such it is a revelation, 
which although never really far from the surface, serves to highlight this connection 
and bring it to the surface for rational argumentation and debate. When sovereignty 
can no longer claim to be the embodiment of the universal interest, the cracks in its 
mask become visible, opening up even greater room for political contestation and 
debate. Sovereignty’s powers of shock and awe are shown to be limited, its power to 
fascinate a spellbound citizenry is broken and this more than anything else opens 
space for critical thought and action, challenging the myth of new world empire at its 
very source and origin.
The “outstanding business” of un-extinguished aboriginal title goes to the 
heart of the social contract theory of the state by refusing the legitimating discourse 
which empowers state sovereignty to speak for the “common interest”. By opening
67Ibid., p. 558,
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the “land question” to historical analysis and reflection it becomes self-evident that 
there was and can be no “original” position real or imagined without erasing the 
Indian presence from the land which far from being scientifically “neutral” is in 
reality an ethical choice for dispossession and colonisation. Customs and traditions 
while they may be “constructed” are nevertheless the social, political and ethical 
narratives which tie a people both to each other and to the land in a way that is both 
profound and mysterious. Moreover, the social contract is itself, such a creation myth 
with real historical connections to Christian conceptions of the fall of man and a 
mechanical “nature” devoid of life or spirit. By confronting modernity we can see that 
it too has is an embedded social and political practice, which while being highly 
powerful and even beneficial in its own technological achievements is a 
social/political practice like any other and cannot claim any special access to universal 
truths, as it is in fact a particular discourse which denies such truths altogether. Even 
scientific method, while it is powerful, useful and productive cannot reveal the origins 
or purpose of the universe, nor give any coherent answers to these deeply human 
spiritual questions, which questions of origins and beginnings always invoke. The 
question of aboriginal title provokes exactly these kinds of reflections because it is 
about who we are and how we came to be here, what is our relationship to the land 
and how do we deal with the people who were here before us. Given our deeply held 
beliefs about the sanctity of property, it becomes immediately clear that occupation of 
lands not our own can only be justified by the strangest forms of mental gymnastics 
that have to do not with land ownership, so much as land use. While acknowledging 
that the Indians “originally” occupied the land and; therefore must be acknowledged a 
kind of “use” right, denying them ownership and political jurisdiction in the lands 
they were bom in requires seeing them as less than human; this is what continuing 
down the colonial path requires.
As it is forcefully stated in the opening lines of the federal government’s own
publications, the underlying premise on which the British occupation of what is now
Canada is said to be based is th a t:
.. .absolute title to the land was vested in the Crown - this paramount estate 
becoming a plenum dominium (full power to dispose of property at will) 
whenever the Indian title was surrendered or otherwise extinguished.68
The exact definition of “aboriginal title” remains, in the parlance of legalese,
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“uncertain” and “undetermined” because it is an “evolving” area of Canadian and now 
international law.69 When the question of “aboriginal title” was first “tested” and 
therefore “defined” in Canadian law, in the case of St. Catherine Milling and Lumber 
Company v. the Queen (1888) the Judicial Committee o f the Privy Council (the 
highest court in the Empire and Canada’s highest court of appeal until 1949) held that 
the:
“...possession of the Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty and 
protection of the British Crown could only be ascribed to the provisions of the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763, the terms of which showed that the tenure of the 
Indians was a personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of 
the Sovereign.”70
The Indian title, however; recognised as being a kind of diminished form of property 
right, described as an “interest” in the land, which created a “burden” on the Crown’s
71present proprietary estate in the land. The Marshall doctrine of discovery, although 
of American and not English origin was nevertheless incorporated within Canadian 
law, by the St. Catherine’s Millings case and has since set the standard by which has 
provided the rationale and authority upon which all similar court cases in Canada have 
been founded.72 What is more, the Court also rejected the earlier ruling of Connelly v. 
Woolrich, 1867 in which recognised the common law marriage of a Cree customary 
marriage in which judge J. Monk ruled that the Indian’s laws, customs and political 
and legislative rights were in full force and therefore applicable within the Canadian
7Tlegal system, following the Common law principle of continuity after conquest. In 
so ruling, the Court, not only ignored the historical context of the Crown’s treaty 
relationship with its former Indian allies, but narrowly reinterpreted the very wording 
of the Royal Proclamation itself. The Royal Proclamation clearly identifies Indian 
land rights, as a collective right, in that the purchase of land could only be undertaken
68B. Brown and R. McGuire, op. cit., p. 2
69 On evolution o f aboriginal rights discourse in the international context See James S. Anaya,
Indigenous Peoples in International Law, Second Edition (New York.: Oxford University Press) 2000
70 Cited in Kent McNeil, “The Meaning o f Aboriginal Title”, in (ed.) Michael Asch, Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law Equality and Respect fo r  Difference (Vancouver.: UBC Press 
) 1998 p. 142
71 Ibid, p. 142
72 Allen (1993) op. cit., p. 230, Footnote #18 . For the Marshall decisions impact on the evolving 
international law o f nations See Wilcomb E. Washburn “The Moral and Legal Justifications for 
Dispossessing the Indians” in James Morton Smith, (ed.) Seventeenth-Century America; Essays in 
Colonial History (Chapel Hill.: University o f North Carolina Press) 1959
73 Isaac, op. cit., p. 4
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by the Crown and at a “public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians.”74 In this 
instance, the British Empire went even further than the 1823 ruling in Johnson vs. 
McIntosh, which creatively reinterpreted English property law in order that the Indian 
right of occupancy and possession be could be reconciled with international law 
doctrines relating to territorial acquisition.”75 The Chief justices in 1888, not only 
held that the Indian “interest” in the land was of one of simple “usufractary” right and
7 f*of a “personal” or “individual” nature held at the “pleasure” of the Crown. Armed
with a new “positivist” interpretative framework, the Proclamation, rather than the 
“pre-existing” rights of Indians, became the sole “source” of aboriginal title, the effect 
of which was to deny the essential humanity of Indians within the boundaries of 
Canadian law, from that time forward.
Falling into the familiar pattern of colonial law described the Indians as a 
primitive and nomadic people, who “being without fixed, abode” and “moving about 
as the exigencies of life demanded” were “as heathens and barbarians” and as such 
not thought to have “had any proprietary title to the soil, nor a claim thereto as to 
interfere with the plantations and general prosecution of colonisation.”77 If that was 
not enough to put the Indians firmly in their place, the treaty process itself was to be 
regarded as a strictly moral undertaking without any legal implications whatsoever, 
the so-called “lawful obligation” being reduced to nothing more than a fiduciary duty 
which could be effectively waived by duly constituted legal fiat.78 The idea of 
aboriginal title as sui genesis, or unique to the Canadian context, is a lawyerly way of 
saying that the Indians, not being fully human, cannot have human rights and as such 
must only have those rights which the Crown itself has created. The St Catherine’s 
Millings case stood as the benchmark decision of aboriginal title until effectively 
challenged by Frank Calder, hereditary Chief of the Nisga’a First Nation in 1973 who 
had his land claim and his nation’s “pre-existing“ rights finally acknowledged by a
74 The Royal Proclamation o f  7 October 1763, as reproduced in Getty and Lussier, op. cit., p. 34
75 Catherine Bell and Michael Asch, “Challenging Assumptions” in Asch (1997) pp. 44
76 Kent McNeil, op. cit., p. 142
77 Chief Justice Boyd as cited in Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada's First Nations A History o f  the 
Founding Peoples from the Earliest Times, (Toronto; McClelland and Steward) 1992, pp. 341-342 
Given this legal definition of aboriginal title it is a wonder that compensation for the loss o f the so 
called “range" rights o f Indians ought not to be extended to deer and wolves and any other “beast” o f 
the forest for loss o f their grazing and hunting habitats.
78 Ibid., p. 342
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70Canadian court, if not the British Columbia government. Calder, while hailed as a 
victory for once and for all establishing that Indians had land rights in British 
Columbia, did not however; advanced the substantive definition of “aboriginal title” 
far beyond the St. Catherine's Milling’s benchmark of a narrow and restrictive ““use” 
right limited to the pursuit of such “traditional” Indian activities such as hunting, 
gathering and fishing, although such rights were reaffirmed as collective and 
communal nature and not simply of a “personal” nature as held in the previous 
decision.80
Calder confirmed that “aboriginal title” was based not on the Royal 
Proclamation but from the fact that “when the settlers came, the Indians were there, 
organised in societies and occupying land as their forefathers had done for
O f
centuries.” Since Calder, however, the ground has shifted from the inherent right 
principle to the definition of what constitutes an “organised” society, now being 
argued in anthropological as well as legal terms. In 1992, The British Columbia 
Support of appeal held in the Delgamuukw decision that Indians, lacked the social, 
political and legal institutions to have an “interest” in the land beyond the familiar 
traditional “use” right, with the added value of traditional now being “frozen” or 
“reified” by increasingly narrow and restrictive anthropological determinations of 
“traditional” or “aboriginal” activities.82 In coming to this decision, Chief Justice 
McEachem cited a decision of the J.C.P.C. 1919 in the case of Southern Rhodesia 
which in effect resurrected the highly convenient true terra nullis foundation principle 
of new world empire that aboriginal societies “are so low on the scale of social 
organisation that there usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be
o - i
reconciled with institutions of the legal ideas of civilised societies.” Needless to 
say, such arguments were so outrageous that the Gitsan and Wet’suwet’en, having 
proven beyond all doubt that it was impossible to obtain a fair hearing anywhere 
within the political/legal jurisdiction of the province of British Columbia,
79 It is significant that the Court acknowledged a “pre-existing” right, in that this means that the Royal 
Proclamation did not itself “create” that right, but is a right adhering in the Indian Nation itself as an 
“organised” society. This finding however; was not enough to push the province to the negotiation 
table, that would require over 10 years o f intense lobbying and direct action. See Paul Tennant, op. cit. 
pp. 218-224 .
Bell and Asch op. cit., pp. 47 - 48
81 Ibid., p. 48
82 McNeil, op. cit., pp. 150 -151
83 Cited in Bell and Asch., op. cit., p. 50
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immediately appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1998) became the “much-awaited” 
landmark decision wherein the Court was to “clarify” the substantive nature and 
content of “aboriginal title.” The decision, many years in the making is highly 
complex, but its main points are neatly summarised by Thomas Isaac’s Aboriginal 
Law Case Materials and Commentary as the following: Aboriginal title “although not 
authoritatively determined by the Court has been found to contain the following 
dimensions; that it is inalienable; that it arises from prior occupation; that it is held 
communally; that it includes the right to exclusive use and occupation for an array of 
purposes which are not limited to Aboriginal practices, customs and traditions but that 
those uses cannot be “irreconcilable” with the Aboriginal occupation and uses which 
gave rise to the title in the first place and that Aboriginal title is recognised and 
affirmed in s. 35 o f the Constitution Act, 1982.84 While setting down these main 
principles; however; the Court displayed a surprising degree of wisdom by refusing to 
spell out what these rights may mean in practice declaring them to be “uncertain” and 
basically beyond the competence of the Court to decide. Chief Justice C.J. Lamer 
concluded that: “.. .ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith 
and give and take on both sides” that we will achieve the “reconciliation of the pre-
Of
existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.” In other words 
the “outstanding business” of the Crown’s inherited colonial legacy remains largely 
unresolved and that this is of an inherently political, rather than legal nature.
Conclusion: The Long Path Towards Positive Peace
The British Columbia Treaty commission was established in 1990 by the federal and 
provincial governments in order “to resolve” the land question in British Columbia 
and put an end to the legal “uncertainty” threatening to retard economic development 
and scare off foreign investment. The result has been the resurrection of “Treaty” as 
the colonial instrument of choice, as sanctified by both legal and historical precedent 
as the mechanism through which aboriginal title has been extinguished by the Crown 
in exchange for a negotiated settlement which has traditionally included both 
compensation and the protection of the specific rights outlined and defined by the
84 Isaac, op. cit., p. 8
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treaty itself. This “exchange” is premised upon the idea, strangely still held by the
Crown that the Indian’s regard the traditional territories as a commodity which can be
and to be “purchased” and that their sacred responsibility to the land of their ancestors
given to them by the creator can be “extinguished” by such an act. It boggles the
mind and defies all reason that after 400 years of repeatedly being disabused of this
delusional assumption it remains the unsupported and unsupportable premise upon
which the Crown proposes to proceed. The Indian position could not be clearer and if
any doubt remained it has once again been clearly spelled out by Chief Edward John
of the First Nations Summit:
When government asks us to agree to surrender our title and agree to its 
extinguishment, they ask us to do away with our most basic sense of ourselves, 
and our relationship to the Creator, our territory and the other peoples of the 
worlds. We could no longer do that without agreeing that we no longer wish to 
exist as a distinct people. That is completely at odds with our intensions in 
negotiating treaties.86
In the wake of the Delgamuukw decision, 1998, the office of the BC treaty 
Commission, at least, has acknowledged the utility if not the wisdom behind moving 
beyond the language of “extinguishment” and is now beginning to talk in terms of 
“mutual assurances, although whether or not this “recommendation” will be put into 
effect, remains to be seen.87 What is clear however; is that the Crown nevertheless 
and unambiguously reserves the right to assert its sovereignty by direct legislation if 
and when necessary for the “public interest.”88 The interest of the Indians, however, 
in participating in a process deeply embedded within and compromised by its 
inherently colonial context is anything but assured. Whether or not the modem Treaty 
process is able to rise above its colonial past is a matter of political choice and 
political will and as such remains and “open” question.
With this openness however; comes hope; just as with human freedom comes 
human responsibility and it is in this space that the past is both repeated and renewed 
in the production of the future. The Indian problem as it is largely a product of our
85 Ibid, p. 10
86 Chief Edward John, cited in McKee op. cit. p. 72
87
McKee op. cit., pp. 94 - 96
88 Whether or not such legislation would be “constitutional” is an open question given the recent 1998 
Delgamuukw decision, with the result that the BC government finds itself within the same 
legal/political conundrum of Andrew Jackson when he had to decide whether or not he was going to act 
within the limits o f his own Supreme Court’s legal framework. Sadly, he chose not to and under the 
rallying cry o f “national interest” created the all to familiar ethical/legal black hole in which any kind 
of human atrocity becomes possible.
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own making will be made and remade again and again until we learn to change our 
thinking and with it the path that we chose to walk. The Indians meanwhile walk 
theirs and it is in the intersection where new world empire finds its end and limit as 
techno-politics and its accompanying strategies of assimilation, development and 
segregation have all proven fundamentally ineffective. As efficacy and utility are the 
self-proclaimed standards upon which techno-politics sets its measure, it is surely 
time to move on and try something new; that is after all; the empirical method.
As modernity is enamoured of all things “new” I humbly suggest that 
something both new, radical and truly “inventive” and “creative” could be found in 
the simple act of actually listening to the Indians on their own terms and not as the 
different products of new world empire. Instead of engaging with the Indians and their 
ownership of the traditional territories, the Canadian government continues to 
replicate the demands that they “extinguish” aboriginal title and “assimilate” into 
mainstream Canadian society, that they “develop” themselves and their lands through 
the application of the latest technological process in fashion in Ottawa and that they 
secure their “place” within Canadian confederation as “segregated” and subordinated 
domestic dependent “cultural” communities. It seems inconceivable to modem 
Canadian government that the First Nations of British Columbia have resisted these 
demands from the very beginning and will continue to do so to the very end. Canada 
must relinquish its colonial relation to the Indians and to do this it must reinstate a 
diplomatic relationship on a government to government basis which may or may not 
be moderated by the Treaty process. The Indians would be forgiven for observing 
that the “good faith” required for a treaty negotiation has been sadly lacking in 
Canadian strategies of unilateral policy pronouncements which have only begun to 
consider “consultation” as a key component part of the process of treaty negotiation.
The terms and conditions upon which the First Nations may yet consider 
entering into a treaty relationship with Canadians will, of course very, on a case by 
case basis but the universal principle of mutual respect and recognition must be not 
simply be symbolic but must include legal acknowledgement of the inherent facts of 
self-government and Indian ownership and jurisdiction of the traditional territories. 
The necessary beginning of a political relationship in mutual respect and a desire to 
negotiate in good faith does not come from some place of un-utter able difference and 
does not require a degree in rocket science or anthropology to understand. Indians are 
human beings and as such are self-determining peoples who have lived on their
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ancestral lands since time immemorial. They were placed on these lands by the 
Creator and it is from the Creator and not the Crown, or Common Law or section 
35(1) of the new Canadian Constitution, that their rights and responsibilities flow.
Any “reconciliation” to be effected between what we call Aboriginal title and Crown 
sovereignty is conditional upon this ultimate truth being both recognised and 
respected. Once this basic premise and self-evident fact has been accepted it then 
becomes possible to discuss any number of lesser; though equally important issues 
such as; the recognition of past injustice and compensation for the damages incurred; 
the establishing joint dispute resolution mechanisms for the mediation of disputes, 
past, present and future; creating and implementing co-management boards within 
which shared responsibilities land and resource use can be determined and 
implemented; forming territorial boundary commissions in which areas of separate 
and overlapping jurisdiction can be clarified and respected; framing resource revenue 
sharing agreements and taxation policies with respect to third parties; and a 
commitment to capacity building measures in which knowledge and technical 
expertise can be mutually and respectfully exchanged. While this list is meant to be 
illustrative and not exhaustive it represents a bare minimum of what the Canadian 
position should bring to the table in “good faith.”
Unavoidably, these are highly politically contested questions and once again 
bring the discussion back to the issue of sovereignty, the nature and extent of political 
community and the modem problem of politics. If politics is ever going to return to 
roots as a process by and through which political differences are recognised and 
reconciled, the current understanding of politics as mere power relations of 
dominance and dependence is going to have to be challenged and resisted. The cost 
of preserving and maintaining the instruments and mechanisms of colonialism is 
quickly becoming more expensive than dismantling them, which if nothing else, will 
soon push a recalcitrant government into action. Not that this is going to happen 
overnight, die Indian Act is still in effect and DIAND has shown a bureaucratic inertia 
which can only be explained by the politics of entrenched interest. Nor is it realistic 
to expect the ideology and implements of new world empire to simply disappear 
overnight; education and self-awareness invariably being a slow and often painful 
process. Education and enlightenment are however; not beyond the bounds of human 
possibility and both are definitive of human civilisation and survival. The time and 
cost of self-education however is mounting and endless commissions and consultation
processes designed to defer decision-making have themselves become a way of 
deferring decisions which have festered for much too long already. To move forward 
Canadians have to let go of colonialism and embrace change in the form of 
acknowledging that the spirit and intent of arriving at treaty is about the negotiation of 
values and that values are not irrational, secondary “qualities” of human existence, but 
the very core and centre of human existence in the co-construction of the world. 
Human beings inhabit a human and therefore social world, founded not only in 
reason, but in tradition, custom, science, art and poetry. All politics relies on creation 
myths as myths of origins that ground man in the past and orient him to the future. 
Canada myth of origin is grounded in strength and courage of a pioneer civilisation 
“wresting” an existence from a barren and empty land. Heroic individualism is a 
replication of the original liberal myth of the state of nature and the foundation of a 
political order on the basis of a collective act of will in the social contract.
The Indians have never been nor can they be incorporated into this foundation 
myth and if Canadians are ever to be reconciled with the Indian presence on the land 
they will have to recreate foundation myths not in domination and creation, but in the 
self-respect that comes from willing acceptance of necessary limits on the exercise of 
an arbitrary will to power. Good faith cannot simply be legislated but must be built 
up through inclusive practices beginning with the co-construction of the treaty as a 
historical instrument of significance to both peoples and not as a unilateral policy 
emanating from framed entirely within Canadian terms of reference. The Indians and 
their roadblocks are not going away and as time goes on more and more “ordinary” 
Canadians will be soon be joining them. Both Canadians and Indians have reasons to 
be frustrated by the lack of leadership and vision displayed by an entrenched and self- 
interested political/economic elite which seems at time completely incapable of 
calculating even its own rational self-interest. Treaty by its very nature implies a 
voluntary agreement, in which both parties have the power and the freedom to enter or 
not enter, according to their own assessments of the costs and benefits of doing so.
The fact that “aboriginal title” has never been “extinguished” in British Columbia 
combined with the fact of self-government means that the issue of the legality of 
Canada’s claim to sovereignty in BC, is to say the least “uncertain”.
Armed with this legal “uncertainty” First Nations in BC have demonstrated 
the ability to block the Province’s powers to issue licences for resource exploitation in 
areas subject to unresolved Indian land claims. As this includes substantial parts of
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the Province, the urgency on the part of the Provincial government is completely 
understandable as is the determination on the part of the First Nations not to exchange 
a potent, if undefined right, for a Treaty that is by definition going to define and 
therefore limit those rights. The very idea that the Indians could chose not to enter 
into Treaty and therefore build a legal firewall around at least some of the traditional 
territories has at long last begun to alert even the Province to the limits to the 
expediency of force. Faced with its own “uncertainty” the British Columbia 
government has been gradually opening itself up to the possibility that another way 
might be possible and has begun to enter into in-term measures agreements (IMAs) 
with amendable First Nations designed to work out agreements in principle on
O Q
specific issues while continuing the process of negotiation on more global issues. 
Although the BC and federal governments adamantly deny that “sovereignty” is on 
the table, every aspect of the negotiations point to a “division” of sovereignty wherein 
various power sharing arrangements are being forged in any number of fields usually 
regarded as within the remit of the sovereign state. The creation of joint 
“governance” structures relevant to both internal and external sovereignty and the 
relation of various levels of government with each other, both within and between 
First Nations and the larger Canadian state as well as larger regional and even global 
organisations is an ongoing process. Devolution of sovereign authority has both 
positive and negative possibilities for democratic practice and as such can only be 
assessed within the specific local site in which these global issues are framed and 
articulated. It is by understanding and mediating the “global” through the “local” that 
we as limited and finite agents (in both thought and practice) move from the particular 
to the universal and back again. This can be seen in the thought and practice of any 
political process on the ground and is why it is necessary to begin thinking about 
concrete problems demanding concrete solutions, even if the construction and 
deconstruction of agents and the structures is as fluid as the history of new world 
empire amply demonstrates.
Canada as a small country understands the value of interdependence which 
adds rather than detracts from its sovereignty defined as capability because co­
operation creates collective goods over and above what is possible by individual 
action alone. The fact that Canada’s self-preservation with regard to its fundamental
89 McKee, Ibid., pp. 41
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security and economic interests ties it into the world’s greatest power, described by 
former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau as a mouse dancing with an elephant, has made 
all Canadians all to aware that i f  power alone determined political existence Canada 
simply would not be. One can only hope that even a little reflection on the 
circumstances of our own existence, both past and present will go some way to 
opening hearts and minds to the possibilities of peace and reconciliation in Indian 
country. If the Canadian government has grasped the benefits of devolving 
sovereignty to strangers either “upward” to participate in regional and global 
international organisation and trade agreements and allow the “penetration” of our 
sovereignty by multi-national capital and foreign investment, why is it so impossible 
to imagine the construction of power sharing arrangements with the Indians partners 
and allies? It is the structural division between economic and political power that 
gives economic interests the “freedom” to dictate the terms of economic growth 
necessary to sustain viable levels of employment, social welfare provision and a 
sustainable tax base from which the state is ultimately dependent. Such an 
arrangement however is a social and political arrangement and can be made and 
remade through the use of law and treaty both of which are the basis of a shared and 
sustainable relationship to the land and its resources as the material foundations of life 
as well as the life-world of politics. Both law and treaty are living social practices 
which cannot simply be imposed from without, but which must be internalised as a 
valued end in itself, above and beyond the mere temporary nature of shifting political 
interest and expediency. Law and treaty are frameworks and guidelines for action 
through which actors recognise and constitute each other in the act of creating and 
preserving a shared political order. When the basis of either law or treaty is not 
mutual recognition and consent it impoverishes the human condition by denying the 
capacity of human beings to enter into political relationships based on anything other 
than force and violence. Reducing politics to force and violence betrays an 
ideological preference for force and violence, made naturally enough by the rich and 
powerful. There are however, alternatives to the idolatry of power which are based on 
organising the collective power of the many, who having less of a stake in defence of 
wealth and power can concede sharing more in the interests of building positive and 
peaceful social and political relations. Building positive peace however, is an 
ongoing challenge in a technological age which renders all human relationships, with 
ourselves, with others and especially with nature as nothing other than that dictated
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by immediate and expedient instrumental exploitation. When politics is defined as 
power, it is unsurprising that the most powerful dominate public life with the 
predictable result that the BC government has demonstrated a remarkable lack of 
insight regarding, not only of the needs and desires of its negotiating partners, (big 
surprise) but also the needs and desires of the “people” it is supposed to be 
representing (even bigger surprise). In effect, the B.C. treaty negotiations offer the 
democratic polis a chance to renew itself in co-operation with the Indians who as 
partners, allies and elders have a whole “new” world of wisdom, knowledge and 
power to give as a gift freely shared with those willing and able to learn.
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